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Justifying Circumstances, Art.

11
Defense of Self, Relatives, &
Strangers
Those where the act of a person is said to be in
accordance with law, so that such person is
deemed not to have transgressed the law and is
free from both criminal and civil liability.
The law recognizes the non-existence of a crime
by expressly stating in the opening sentence of Art.
11 that the person therein mentioned DO NOT
INCUR CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate,
natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in
case the revocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of
a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are
present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does not act which causes damage to another, provided
that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done
to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Article 11 recognizes the acts of such persons as


justified. Such persons are not criminals, as there is
no crime committed

Par. 1 SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense includes not only the defense
of the person or body of the one assaulted but also
that of his rights, that is, those rights the
enjoyment of which is protected by law.
REQUISITES:
a.

There must be unlawful aggression

This is an indispensable requisite.


If there is no unlawful aggression, there is
nothing to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or
at least threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind.
There must be an ACTUAL PHYSICAL assault
upon a person, or at least a THREAT to inflict real
injury.
When there is no peril to ones life, limb or
right, there is no unlawful aggression.
PERIL TO ONES LIFE
1. ACTUAL that the danger must be present,
that is, actually in existence.
2. IMMINENT- that the danger is on the point
of happening. It is not required that the attack
already begins, for it may be too late.
A slap on the face constitutes unlawful
aggression since the face represents a person
and his dignity. Slapping it is a serious personal
attack.
Retaliation is different from an act of selfdefense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased to
exist when the accused attacked him. In selfdefense, the aggression was still existing when
the aggressor was injured or disabled by the
person making a defense.
In self-defense, the person must have no time
nor occasion for deliberation and cool thinking.
The unlawful aggression must come from the
person who was attacked by the accused.
There is no unlawful aggression when there is
agreement to fight because where the fight has
been agreed upon, each of the protagonists is at
once assailant and assaulted. But when the
aggression is ahead of the stipulated time and
place, it is unlawful.
The rule now is STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE
RIGHT. So, where the accused is where he has the

right to be, the law does not require him to


retreat when his assailant is rapidly advancing
upon him with a deadly weapon.
The belief of the person may be considered in
determining the existence of unlawful aggression.
Ex. If the aggressor used a toy pistol but the
accused believed it was a real gun, he may claim
self-defense.
b.
Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it
The second requisite presupposes
existence of unlawful aggression.

the

The law protects not only the person who


repels an aggression (meaning actual), but even
the person who tries to prevent an aggression
that is expected (meaning imminent).
The reasonableness of the necessity depends
upon the circumstances particularly the time and
location where the aggression took place.
The means employed by the person making a
defense must be rationally necessary to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression.
The reasonableness of the means used will
depend upon the NATURE and QUALITY of the
weapon used by the aggressor, his PHYSICAL
CONDITION, SIZE and other circumstances, and
those of the person defending himself, and also
the place and occasion of the assault.
*** THE FIRST TWO REQUISITES ARE COMMON TO
THREE KINDS OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE: 1) SELFDEFENSE, 2) DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE AND 3)
DEFENSE OF A STRANGER.
c.
Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself
The third requisite of self-defense is present:
1. When no provocation at all was given to
the aggressor by the person defending himself; or
2. When, even if a provocation was given, it
was not sufficient; or
3. When, even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or
4. When, even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate
and immediate to the act of aggression.
Par. 2 DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
RELATIVES THAT CAN BE DEFENDED
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants

3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and
sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same
degrees.
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree.
Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are
parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and brothers
or sisters-in-law.
Death of the spouse terminates the relationship
by affinity; unless the marriage has resulted in
issue who is still living, in which case the
relationship of affinity continues.
Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers
and sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle
and niece or aunt and nephew are within the third
civil degree; and first cousins are within the fourth
civil degree.
REQUISITES OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVES:
1. Unlawful aggression;
Unlawful aggression may not exist as a
matter of fact, it can be made to depend upon
the honest belief of the one making a defense.
Ex. The sons of A honestly believed that their
father was the victim of an unlawful aggression
when in fact it was their father who attacked B. If
they killed B under such circumstance, they are
justified.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
The gauge of reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel the aggression as
against ones self or in defense of a relative is
to be found in the situation as IT APPEARS TO
THE PERSON REPELLING THE AGGRESSION (the
defender).
3. In case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, the one making a
defense had no part therein.
There is still legitimate defense of relative
even if the relative being defended has given
provocation, provided that the one defending
such relative has no part in the provocation.
Reason for the rule: Although the provocation
prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do
not reach the defender who took no part
therein, because the latter was prompted by
some noble or generous sentiment in protecting
and saving a relative.
Par. 3 DEFENSE OF STRANGER
REQUISITES:
1. Unlawful aggression;

2. Reasonable necessity of the means


employed to prevent or repel it;
3. The person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.
Who are deemed strangers?
Any person not included in the enumeration
of relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this
article, is considered stranger for the purpose of
paragraph 3.
BASIS: What one may do in his defense, another
may do for him. The ordinary man would not stand
idly by and see his companion killed without
attempting to save his life.

People v. Decena
Facts: According to the testimony of the 14-year
old daughter of the victim, her father was walking
home in an intoxicated state on Christmas day
when suddenly she saw George Decena rush
towards with a long bladed weapon. She tried to
warn him by shouting but all the father did was
raise his hands, which enabled the assailant to stab
him on the chest. Decena then fled from the scene,
leaving the victim on the ground. The daughter,
unable to carry her father, yelled for her mother to
come and stated that George Decena was the one
who stabbed her father.
Decenas defense, however, states that it was the
father, Jaime, who, when drunk in the basketball
game before returning home, held Decena by the
neck with one arm and poked a fork against it by
the other. The barangay tanod also surnamed
Decena then took the fork from Jaime and advised
George Decena to go home. Jaime allegedly
followed. The uncle of Decena testified that it was
Jaime who tried to attack Decena and that the
latter was able to parry the blow. During the
struggle that ensued, Decena was able to twist the
wrist of his combatant and thrust the knife towards
his person thereby effecting his death.
Issues: WON Decena acted in self-defense and
thus, exonerated from criminal liability.
Held/Ratio: No. The burden of evidence, instead of
being on the part of the prosecution, shifts towards
the defense because it alleges it acted in selfdefense. The basic requirement for self-defense, as
a justifying circumstance, is that there was unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself
so indispensable is this element that, without it,
there is no occasion to speak of the two other
requisites. The theory of the defense rests on the
premise that the unlawful aggression was
continuing from the basketball court to the scene of
the Jaimes demise. This wasnt the case because

when the aggressor leaves, the unlawful aggression


ceases (elementary rule) which was seen when the
would-be combatants heeded the advice of the
barangay tanod. Since the unlawful aggression no
longer existed after this cessation, Decena had no
right whatsoever to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.
It is an old but respected and consistent rule that
courts must determine by a
balance of
probabilities who of the participants in a fight had,
in the natural order of things, the reason to
commence the aggression. In the present case and
according to the logical view of the court, Decena
acted in retaliation not in self-defense. Whereas in
retaliation, aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased to exist when the
accused attacked him, in self-defense, the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor
was injured or disabled by the person making the
defense.

People v. Dela Cruz


Facts: Daniel Macapagal, a married man, was
living-in with a woman for about 2-3 years prior to
the womans cohabitation with another man, one
Roberto dela Cruz. One night, when Roberto dela
Cruz and the woman were in the house of the
latter, Macapagal arrived. The woman opened the
door and Macapagal barged in holding a gun while
lookibg for someone. He then went to the closed
bedroom where dela Cruz was and banged at the
door with his gun while yelling Come out. Come
out. Dela Cruz then opened the door but he was
greeted by Macapagals gun. He thereby
immediately closed the door, retrieved his own
gun, and reopened the door. Both men grappled for
each others firearm and a few moments later, four
shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor,
his body sustaining all four gunshot wounds.
Issues: WON Macapagal acted in self-defense.
Held/Ratio: No. Upon opening the door the first
time, Macapagal was able to prevent at this stage
harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He
could have stopped there. Instead, he took his own
revolver, again opened the door and, brandishing
his own firearm, confronted the victim. This
encounter removes the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.
The first element, unlawful aggression, is not a
mere threatening or intimidating attitude. It is an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent
danger on the life and limb of a person at the time
the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. The second element would demand that
the means employed to quell the unlawful
aggression were reasonable and necessary. The

number of wounds sustained by the victim negates


the existence of this element of self-defense. The
third element was lost when Macapagal drew his
own gun and used it to challenge the initial
aggressor.

the authorities, will work in her favor to lessen the


degree of punishment.

Oriente vs. People

Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of


murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez
shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two
were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and asked them to
stop destroying his house and asking if they could
talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to
the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle
with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the
time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending
for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property
to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property from
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to
remove his house from the land. Shooting was
barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he
killed in defense of his person and property. CFI
ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for
moral damages.

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

People v. Jaurige and Jaurige


Facts: A girl by the name of Avelina was being
courted and harassed by one Amado. The young
man, whom the girl flatly refused, nevertheless
persisted in his endeavors by going to the girls
house at midnight, surreptitiously entering her
room, putting his hand on her forehead (evidently
with the intention of abusing her) and thereby
causing the girl to scream for help. Her parents
arrived but the father of the girl allowed Amado to
go home. Avelina is purported to have received
news of Amado falsely boasting of having taken
liberties with her person. In church one day,
brightly-lit and filled with other people, Amado
went to sit with Avelina and without saying a word,
placed his hand on the upper right thigh of the girl.
Avelina then pulled out her fan knife with the
intention of punishing the offenders hand. Amado
seized the girls right-hand which held the weapon,
however, Avelina was able to quickly grab the knife
with her left-hand and at once stabbed Amado once
at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting a
mortal wound. When asked by those around her
why she did it, she replied by saying that she
couldnt take it anymore and that she hoped that
she would be taken care of.
Issues: WON Avelina can invoke self-defense.
Held/Ratio: No. The attempt to rape a woman
constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put
her in a state of legitimate defense which will thus
exempt her from criminal liability if, as the only
means to protect her honor, she wounds or kills the
offender. However, in the present case, there could
be no possibility of her being raped. And the means
employed by her in defense of her honor, resulting
in the death of Amado, was clearly excessive. She
cannot be legally declared completely exempt from
criminal
liability.
However
three
mitigating
circumstances such as: provocation producing
passion/obfuscation, inflicting only one wound
intended to punish the offenders hand, and the
fact that she immediately surrendered herself to

People v. Narvaez

Issues:
(1) WON the aggression on the property of Narvaez
was lawful or unlawful.
(2) WON self-defense can be claimed by Narvaez in
shooting those who would
Held/Ratio:
(1) Yes. The assault on the property constituted
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased
who had no right to destroy or cause damage to
Narvaezs house, nor to close his accessibility to
the highway while he was pleading with them to
stop and talk things over with him.
(2) No. Although aggression is established as the
first element in self-defense and there was no
provocation on the part of Narvaez (thereby
meeting the third element), the second element,
being reasonableness of resistance, was not met

when, in killing the two victims, such resistance


was disproportionate to the attack. Hence, the act
of killing the deceased was not justifiable since not
all elements for justification are present.
Gutierrez, Dissenting: Defense of property can only
be invoked when coupled with form of attack on
person defending property. In the case at bar, this
was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to
prision mayor. However, since he has served more
than that, he should be released.

People v. Boholst-Caballero
Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero allegedly killed
her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting
knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a
daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the
husband's gambling and drinking and there were
times when he maltreated and abused his wife.
After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his
family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with her
friends and when she was on her way home she
met her husband who suddenly held her by the
collar and accused her of going out for prostitution.
Then he said he would kill her, held her by the hair,
slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her
towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt
on her and proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda,
having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt
line while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall
to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and thrust
it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just
above the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident
due to the stab wound. Then she ran home and
threw the knife away. The next day, she
surrendered herself to the police along with the
torn dress that she wore the night before.
Issues: WON she acted in self-defense.
Held/Ratio: Burden if proof of self-defense rests on
the accused. In this case, the location and nature of
the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the
husband, was the aggressor. With her husband
kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no
other choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt
line and thrust it into his side.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where
the knife was drawn from is a strong indication of
the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on
the re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for
her to use her right hand to lunge the knife into
husband's left side.

because she was out caroling at night constitutes


unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of
injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed.
While being choked, Cunigunda had no other
recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it
into husband's side in order to protect herself.
Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the
harm done but on the imminent danger of such
injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation. Provocation is
sufficient when proportionate to the aggression. In
this case, there was no sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the
attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke
an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of
her husband was to be out caroling at night.

People v. Madrid
Facts: According to the prosecution, Camilo, chief
barangay tanod, was being ganged up by four
armed people, namely: Jesus Madrid (JM), William
Madrid (WM), Jill Madrid, and Hilarion Tinao, Jr.
Antonio Tasis approached the group but WM hacked
him but he was able to parry. JM tried to strike
Antonio but the latter was able to take hold of the
striking hand and twisted it towards the assailant.
Antonio was then able to flee.
According to the defense, it was JM who was
accosted by Antonio by stabbing him. JM struggled
with Antonio for the knife and eventually
succeeded in wresting it away from him. JM struck
Antonio and the latter scampered away. Wounded,
JM asks someone to notify his nephew, WM. WM
comes to the scene and sees that Antonio and
Camilo were chasing the wounded JM and were
about ten meters away. He races to JM, who in turn
gives the knife to his nephew, and faced Antonio
and Camilo. Antonio ran away but Camilo held his
ground and fought JM for possession of the knife.
As they struggled with each other WM repeatedly
stabbed Camilo and stopped only after Camilo gave
up.
Issues: WON WM acted in self-defense.

Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are


present

Held/Ratio: JM, in invoking self-defense, is acquitted


of the crime charged. He only retaliated when he
was wounded by Antonio. It should be noted that
the theory of self-defense is available only against
the aggressor, who in this case, was Antonio and
not Camilo, who came in after the initial scuffle
despite the fact that Camilo joined Antonio in
chasing JM.

Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to


pushing her to the ground then choking her just

WM, on the otherhand, in invoking self-defense and


defense of a relative, fails to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.


Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or an imminent
danger thereof, and not merely an intimidating
attitude. There has to exist a real danger to the life
or personal safety of the person claiming selfdefense. Nothing of the sort could reasonably be
said of Camilo who was unarmed whereas WM was
equipped with a knife. Even assuming there was
unlawful aggression as it was borne out of the
confrontation between Antonio and Jesus, when
Camilo and Antonio were seen following JM, there
no longer was any confrontation to speak of as it
had already ceased and ended. Thus, when WM
retrieved the knife from JM, it was he who became
the aggressor.

Justifying Circumstances, Art. 11


Avoidance of Greater Evil
Par. 4 AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does an act which causes damage to
another.
DAMAGE TO ANOTHER the term covers
injury to persons and damage to property.
REQUISITES:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;
- The evil must actually exist and not
merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future.
2. That the injury feared be greater than
that done to avoid it;
Note: The instinct of self-preservation
will always make one feel that his own
safety is of greater importance than that of
another.
- The greater evil should not be brought
about by the negligence or imprudence of
the actor.
- The evil which brought about the greater
evil must not result from a violation of law
by the actor.
3. That there be no other practical and
less harmful means of preventing it.
General rule: No liability in justifying
circumstances because there is no crime.
Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under
this paragraph. It is borne by the persons benefited
by the act. They shall be liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have been received.

People v. Ricohermoso

Facts: On the morning of January 30, 1965,


Geminiano met Pio and asked him if he could have
his share of the paiay that Pio harvested from tilling
Geminiano's land. Pio told him to drop by his house
anytime to get it so Geminiano said he will drop by
in the afternoon with his son Marianito.
That afternoon, Geminiano sat outside Pio's house
to wait for the promised palay. Pio was standing by
the door of his house with Severo also standing by.
Marianito was standing a few feet behind his father
with a gun slung in his shoulder. Hostile, Pio told
Geminiano that he was not going to give him palay
thus Geminiano remonstrated. Pio then unsheathed
his bolo and approached Geminiano from the left.
Severo took an axe and approached from the right.
At this, Geminiano held up his hands and told
Severo not to fight. Pio then stabbed Geminiano's
neck with the bolo. With Geminiano faced down on
the ground, Severo hacked his back with the axe.
While this was going on, Juan suddenly embraced
Marianito from behind. They grappled and rolled
downhill where Marianito passed out. When he
came to, he saw his mortally wounded father and
carried him a short distance. Geminiano died at
approximately 2pm.
Pio is a fugitive from justice in this case. Severo
and Juan were convicted of murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. The two were also convicted
of lesions leves (for Marianito). Other three were
acquitted. Severo and Juan appealed for the
murder conviction. They contend that Geminiano
unsheathed his bolo first so Pio met him and struck.
As Geminiano turned to flee, Pio struck again on
the left side and thus Geminiano fell to the ground
and died due to the bleeding. Marianito was
embraced by Juan because he allegedly reached for
his gun and tried to shoot Pio. With this argument,
they shift the responsibility of the killing to Pio (who
was not there and not tried - a fugitive) and that Pio
was only acting in self-defense. Juan contends he
was just protecting Pio and Severo when he
prevented Mariano from firing his gun. A few days
after filing this appeal however, Severo withdrew
and in effect accepted prosecution's version. So,
this appeal concerns Juan only.
Issues: WON Juan conspired with Pio and Severe in
the killing of Geminiano and is he deserving of
reclusion perpetua?
Held/Ratio: Yes. Considering the trio's orchestrated
behavior and Juan's close relationship to Pio and
Severo, conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy
with them, planning the whole thing, from the time
after Pio met Geminiano in the morning to the
event in the afternoon. He cannot invoke Article 11,
par 4 (justifying circumstances) in explaining his

act of preventing Marianito from shooting Pio and


Severo as evidence shows he did this to ensure
that the killing of Geminiano happened without any
risk to Pio and Severo. His malicious intention was
not to avoid any evil from Marianito but to forestall
any interference in the assault done by Pio and
Severo. Even though he did not take direct part in
the killing, his conspiracy with the others made him
a principal too. Moreover, treachery was involved.
Juan weakened the victim's defense by disabling
Marianito and ensured the killing without any risk
to themselves. Thus, the act of one is the act of all,
and Juan is also guilty of murder.

People v. Norma Hernandez


Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of
Batangas in which herein appellant was convicted
of serious slander by deed
Facts:
Complainants version:
Vivencio Lascano, 19, started courting Maria
Norma Hernandez sometime in August 1954.
Appellant accepted Vivencio on January 6, 1955.
On the same date, appellant requested Vivencio to
bring his parents with him to her house and ask her
hand for marriage before her parents.
On February 6, 1955 Vivencios parents
and aunts brought about 30 chickens and goats to
appellants house. The parents of both parties
agreed to the marriage, to be held on March 19,
1955.
On February 21, 1955, appellant and
Vivencio applied to the municipal treasurer for
marriage. On March 5, 1955 marriage license was
issued. Vivencio, his parents, appellant and her
parents went to the parish priest of Taal, Batangas
to arrange the proclamation of marriage.
Appellants wedding gown was delivered to
her house on March 16, 1955; but there was no
one in the house so it was just left in the balcony.
The parents of Vivencio cleaned the
appellants yard and did other chores on March
16, 17 and 18, 1955. On March 18, they
constructed a temporary wedding shed and a
temporary stove for the feast; they likewise
slaughtered goats, chickens and pigs and served
around 90 guests.
March 19 came and they served around 70
guests. Vivencio and his parents waited for
appellant until twelve midnight but she was
nowhere to be found. She never showed up thus
causing them great shame and humiliation.
Appellants version:
She never honestly loved Vivencio. She was
coerced by her parents and her uncle Agapito
Mortel to accept him.
She felt a sense of torture and so on
March 11, 1955 she left for a cousin in Calapan,
Mindoro where she stayed until April of 1955

when she was fetched by a cousin because she was


under arrest.
She denied receiving a wedding gown.
Vivencio and his parents did not go to their
house on March 17 and 18 and there was noshed
constructed and no food were prepared by them.
Issue:

Whether or not Marias failure to fulfill the


marriage agreement by not attending the
celebration constituted slander by deed.
Held Decision:
No
Ratio:
1. There is no malice, a requisite of slander.
She was merely exercising her right not to
give her consent to the marriage after
mature consideration.
2. Appellant had the right to avoid to herself
the evil of going through a loveless marriage
pursuant to Art. 11, paragraph 4 of RPC.

Justifying Circumstances, Art. 11


Fulfillment of Duty
Par. 5 FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR LAWFUL
EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE.
REQUISITES:
1. That the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office
Art. 429. Civil Code. The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. (doctrine of self-help)
If in protecting his possession of the
property he injured (not seriously) the one trying to
get it from him, he is justified.
The actual invasion of property may
consist of a mere disturbance of possession or of a
real dispossession.
2. That the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.

Shooting an offender who refused to surrender is


justified but shooting a thief who refused to be
arrested is not justified.

People v. Delima
Facts: Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail where
he was serving sentence. Some days afterwards
the policeman, Felipe Delima, who was looking for
him found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed
with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a
lance. Delima demanded the surrender of the
weapon but Napilon refused and answered with a
stroke of his lance. Delima dodged and fired his
revolver to impose his authority but the bullet did
not hit him. The criminal ran away and Delima went
after him and fired again his revolver this time
hitting and killing him. Delima was tried and
convicted for homicide; he appealed.
Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted.
The killing was done in the performance of a duty.
The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender and had no right, after evading service of
his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience
with a weapon in his hand, which compelled the
policeman to resort to such extreme means, which,
although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the
circumstances.

People v. Lagata
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Mamangun vs. People


Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Justifying Circumstances, Art. 11


Obedience to a Lawful Order of a
Superior
Par. 6 OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR
SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE
REQUISITES:
1. That an order has been issued by a
superior.

2. That such order must be for some lawful


purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate
to carry out said order is lawful.
When the order is not for a lawful
purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is
criminally liable.
The subordinate is not liable for carrying
out an illegal order of his superior, if he is not
aware of the illegality of the order and he is not
negligent.

People v. Beronilla
Facts: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at
the outbreak of war and continued to serve as
mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19,
1944 accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was
appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col
Arnold.
Simultaneously,
he
received
a
memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to
appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons
accused of treason, espionage or aiding the enemy.
He also received a list of all puppet government
officials of Abra, with a memorandum instructing all
Military Mayors to investigate said persons and
gather
against
them
complaints.
Beronilla,
pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under
custody and asked residents of La Paz to file case
against him. He also appointed a 12-man jury
composed of Labuguen as chairman and others,
plus Alverne and Balmaceda were prosecutors;
Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Inovermo as
counsel for the accused, later Atty. Barreras
voluntarily appeared as counsel for Borjal. The jury
found Borjal guilty on all counts and imposed death
penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of
the case to Headquarters of Infantry for review.
Records were returned on April 18, 1945 with
approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla
ordered the execution of Borjal. Immediately after
the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to
Arnold, the latter complementing Beronilla.
Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others
involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of
Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the execution of Borjal. Pres.
Roxas issued E.P. no. 8, granting amnesty to all
persons who committed acts penalized, under RPC
in furtherance of resistance to the enemy against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. All
the accused (except Labuguen who filed and
granted amnesty by the AFP), filed their application
to Second Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which
denied their application on the ground that they
were inspired by purely personal motives, thus
remanding case to CFI for trial on merits. On July
10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico

were convicted as conspirator and co-principals of


crime murder. They appealed.
Issues:
WON accused appellants are guilty of
murder; and WON they should be granted amnesty.
Held/Ratio: The records are ample to show that
Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of the
Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by
the state that there was a radiogram from certain
Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of
Borjal's execution, there are no sufficient evidence
to show that it was known to Beronilla.
Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold
approving the decisions of Beronilla prove
otherwise. The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda,
relative of Borjal was also unreliable.

Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan


Facts:

In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos


Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President
Marcos
allegedly
commanded
petitioner
Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
to pay immediately the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office
of the President), the sum P55M in cash as
partial payment of MIAAs account with said
company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade
and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this
Office dated Jan. 7,1985 Tabuena withdrew
the sum of 55M on three separate occasions
(25M, 25M, 5M with Adolfo Peralta) and
delivered them to Gimenez, Marcoss private
secretary.

It is without dispute that Tabuena did not


follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and
delivery of the money (no disbursement slips
and paid in cold cash).

Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the


third delivery and it did not mention anything
about the purpose of the receipt or the money
being used to pay PNCC, but merely
acknowledged that Gimenez had received the
sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions.
Furthermore, there was no receipt from the
PNCC recognizing payment of debt.

Prosecution: there were no standing


obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of
disbursement of 55M. PNCC said themselves
that they didnt receive the P55M.

Tabuena claimed that he was only


complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus
the Marcos memorandum which contained same
order) to immediately forward to the office of
the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment of
MIAA's obligations to PNCC and that he believed

that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In


short, that Tabuena acted in good faith.

Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuena's claim of


good faith and found him guilty of malversation
by negligence, hence this case.
Issue: WON Tabuena, in following the orders of his
superior, was guilty of malversation (or if because
of the justifying circumstance of following the
orders of his superior, in good faith, he would not
be criminally liable, but merely civilly liable)?
Held: Tabuena is merely civilly liable. The very fact
that he was merely following the orders of his
superior is a justifying circumstance.
Ratio:
1. On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot
be charged with intentional malversation and be
convicted by malversation by negligence, the
Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the
offense is only a modality in the perpetration of
the felony. The same felony is still there and
conviction thereof is proper.
2. On the defense of good faith: it is a valid
defense against malversation because it would
negate criminal intent. To constitute a crime, the
act must, except in certain crimes...be
accompanied by criminal intent or such
negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as is equivalent to criminal intent
The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea a crime is not commited if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of is
innocent (malversation cases: US v. Catolico, US
v. Elvina).
3. The Court, based on the evidence presented,
found that Tabuena had no other choice but to
actually follow the order stated in the Marcos
Memorandum, because, as president of the
Philippines,
indubitably
the
head
of
governmental agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC, Marcos is undeniably the superior of
Tabuena.
4. Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance
of "any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose because he is only acting in good faith,
faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from
the highest official in the land. Moreover, there
was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that
may invite suspicion - there was no question
about the lawfulness of the order contained in
such a memorandum. Tabuena had reason to
believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due
and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger
liability to PNCC (existence of such debts
determined from testimonies). So even if the
order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of
the illegality, he would not be liable because

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

there would only be a mistake of fact committed


in good faith.
Tabuena followed the memorandum to the
letter, paying immediately the PNCC, through
this office (office of the president) the sum of
55M. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe
that the President was entitled to receive the
money because as Chief Executive, Marcos
exercised
supervision
and
control
over
governmental agencies (good faith in the
payment of public funds relieves a public officer
from the crime of malversation).
While even Tabuena admitted that procedures
were ignored and that the disbursement was
unusual, he is found to be excused from such
because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his
IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the other hand,
while this allows for the negation of criminal
intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would
still be civilly liable (but he's not criminally liable
anymore, escaping the harsher penalties) (see
page 362).
There is no showing that Tabuena had anything
to do with the creation of the Marcos
Memorandum - that even if the real purpose
behind the memorandum was to get 55M from
public funds, it is clear that he did and would not
profit from such and that he did not have
anything to do with the creation of the
memorandum.
Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in
good faith of a duly executed order. The
order/memorandum came from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the
president himself, in effect allowing for the
presumption that such order was regularly
issued and patently legal. Furthermore, the
wording of the memorandum expressed a
certain urgency to its executionObedienta est
legis essential (act swiftly without question).
Main Ratio: Furthermore, the Court itself raises
the contention that the case involves a violation
of the accused's right to due process in the
sense
that
it
was
obvious
that
the
Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt
to convict parties involved as seen in the
volume of questions asked, and the manner the
same
were
posed
(cross
examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and
insinuation). To quote Justice Cruz, Respect for
the Constitution is more important that securing
a conviction based on a violation of the rights of
the accused. Sandiganbayan was obviously
biased, denying Tabuena and parties involves
the requirement of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. As a consequence of such
violation of due process, the order of
Sandiganbayan was found void. Note that this
defense was not raised by Tabuena.

Voting:

Four concurred (Narvasa, Vitug,


Kapunan, Mendoza)

Six
dissented
(Padilla,
Davide,
Romero, Puno, Melo, Panganiban)

Justice Hermosisima took no part as


he was a signatory to the SB decision

Regalaso, Bellosillo and Torres, Jr, Pro


hac vice (meaning they join the majority opinion
but they reserve their right to change their vote
should a similar case with the same facts arise.)

Implication of pro hac vice: Tabuena v.


Sandiganbayan is not precedent for the proposition
that any public official who blindly follows orders of
their superior. Thus, this case is not authoritative
on Art. 11(6).
Decision: Tabuena and Peralta acquitted.
Davide, dissenting: Davide disagrees with
majority that all the requisites of the sixth justifying
circumstance in art 11 of the RPC were present The
sixth circumstance of the said article implies 3
things: a) that the order was issued by a superior;
b) such order must be for some lawful purpose and;
c) means used by subordinate to carry out said
order must be lawful. According to Davide, facts
show that the debt was only 34.5M so order of
Marcos had excess of 20.5M - said order then had
no factual or legal basis and unlawful.
Romero, dissenting: He also believes that not all
requisites were present to warrant a justifying
circumstance as Tabuena, by his own admission,
did not follow standard operating procedures (no
vouchers, no approval by Commission on Audit,
non-issuance of a receipt in 1st 2 deliveries, nonissuance of receipt by PNCC, delivery to office of
Gimenez [not office in Malacanang], a stranger to
contract between PNCC and MIAA). The entire
process, done with haste and with a total disregard
of appropriate auditing requirements was not based
on normal procedure. Tabuena's rank does not
excuse him from ignoring such.
Puno, dissenting: He concentrates on the case
involving a mistake in fact, citing the Ah CHong
case among others, and discussing article 3 in
some detail -saying that mistake in fact should not
excuse the accused from incurring liability. It was
also clear from the facts that it took one month for
Tabuena to comply with order (starting from the
time Marcos called him up by phone - to which the
memorandum containing the same orders followed
a week later), which is more than enough time to
comply with procedure. He also adds that if there
was not enough time, Tabuena should have asked
for more time or at least communicated such
problems to the president. Moreover, to acquit the
petitioners imply that people believe that the
president is always right, that he or she can do no

wrong - that the president is above and beyond the


law.
Panganiban, dissenting: He is of the same view
as Romero, Davide and Puno but also raises some
points: the defense of obedience to a superior's
order is already obsolete, as determined by the
Tribunal in Nuremberg, in its judgment against Nazi
war criminals who put up the defense that they
were merely following orders. The tribunal said that
the true test did not lie with the existence of an
order but whether a moral choice was in fact,
possible. To allow this defense to hold in the
Tabuena case sets a dangerous precedent in the
country because it would deprive the Courts the
moral authority to convict any subordinate because
he or she was "merely following the orders of the
his or her superior (allowing the same doctrine to
be invoked in similar criminal cases before the SC
and even in the inferior courts who have no choice
but to follow the doctrines set by the SC).

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