SPECIAL LAWS

RA 349
AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR ANY PORTION
OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC
PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
Section 1. A person may validly grant to a licensed physician, surgeon, known scientist, or any
medical or scientific institution, authority to detach at any time after the grantor's death any
organ, part or parts of his body and to utilize the same for medical, surgical or scientific
purposes.
Similar authority may also be granted for the utilization for medical, surgical, or scientific
purposes, of any organ, part or parts of the body which, for a legitimate reason, would be
detached from the body of the grantor.
Sec. 2. The authorization referred in section one of this Act must; be in writing; specify the
person or institution granted the authorization, the organ, part or parts to be detached, the use or
uses of the organ, part or parts are to be employed; and signed by the grantor and two
disinterested witnesses.
If the grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization may be executed by his
guardian with the approval of court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother, in
order, named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in section one of this Act,
without the consent of the husband.
A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the Secretary of Health.
Sec. 3. An authorization granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be bind the
executors, administrators and successors of the deceased and all members of his family.
RA 7170
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE LEGACY OR DONATION OF ALL OR PART OF A HUMAN
BODY AFTER DEATH FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES
Section 2 (j) "Death" - the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or the
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. A person shall
be medically and legally dead if either:
(1) In the opinion of the attending physician, based on the acceptable standards of medical
practice, there is an absence of natural respiratory and cardiac functions and, attempts at
resuscitation would not be successful in restoring those functions. In this case, death shall
be deemed to have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
(2) In the opinion of the consulting physician, concurred in by the attending physician, that
on the basis of acceptable standards of medical practice, there is an irreversible cessation

of all brain functions; and considering the absence of such functions, further attempts at
resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would not be successful in resorting
such natural functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time
when these conditions first appeared.
The death of the person shall be determined in accordance with the acceptable standards of
medical practice and shall be diagnosed separately by the attending physician and another
consulting physician, both of whom must be appropriately qualified and suitably experienced in
the care of such parties. The death shall be recorded in the patient's medical record.
Section 3. Person Who May Execute A Legacy. Any individual, at least eighteen (18) years of
age and of sound mind, may give by way of legacy, to take effect after his death, all or part of his
body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof.
Section 4. Person Who May Execute a Donation.
(a) Any of the following, person, in the order of property stated hereunder, in the absence of
actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a member of
the immediate family of the decedent, may donate all or any part of the decedent's body for any
purpose specified in Section 6 hereof:
(1) Spouse;
(2) Son or daughter of legal age;
(3) Either parent;
(4) Brother or sister of legal age; or
(5) Guardian over the person of the decedent at the time of his death.
(b) The persons authorized by sub-section (a) of this Section may make the donation after or
immediately before death.
Section 5. Examination of Human Body or Part Thereof . A legacy of donation of all or part of
a human body authorizes any examination necessary to assure medical acceptability of the
legacy or donation for the purpose(s) intended.
For purposes of this Act, an autopsy shall be conducted on the cadaver of accident, trauma, or
other medico-legal cases immediately after the pronouncement of death, to determine qualified
and healthy human organs for transplantation and/or in furtherance of medical science.
Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees. The following persons may become
legatees or donees of human bodies or parts thereof for any of the purposes stated hereunder:

(a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation;
(b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university - For education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
(c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental education, research, therapy, or
transplantation; and
(d) Any specified individual - For therapy or transplantation needed by him.
Section 7. Duty of Hospitals. A hospital authorized to receive organ donations or to conduct
transplantation shall train qualified personnel and their staff to handle the task of introducing the
organ donation program in a humane and delicate manner to the relatives of the donor-decedent
enumerated in Section 4 hereof. The hospital shall accomplish the necessary form or document
as proof of compliance with the above requirement.
Section 8. Manner of Executing a Legacy.
(a) Legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may be made by will. The
legacy becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate of the will. If
the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the legacy, to the
extent that it was executed in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may also be made in any
document other than a will. The legacy becomes effective upon death of the testator and shall be
respected by and binding upon his executor or administrator, heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest
and all members of the family. The document, which may be a card or any paper designed to be
carried on a person, must be signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who must
sign the document in his presence. If the testator cannot sign, the document may be signed for
him at his discretion and in his presence, in the presence of two witnesses who must, likewise,
sign the document in the presence of the testator. Delivery of the document of legacy during the
testator's lifetime is not necessary to make the legacy valid.
(c) The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or without specifying a legatee. If the legacy is
made to a specified legatee who is not available at the time and place of the testator's death, the
attending physician or surgeon, in the absence of any expressed indication that the testator
desired otherwise, may accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy does not specify a legatee, the
legacy may be accepted by the attending physician or surgeon as legatee upon or following the
testator's death. The physician who becomes a legatee under this subsection shall not participate
in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part or parts of the body of the decedent.
(d) The testator may designate in his will, card or other document, the surgeon or physician who
will carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is
not available, the legatee or other persons authorized to accept the legacy may authorize any
surgeon or physician for the purpose.

Section 13. Rights and Duties After Death.

(a) The legatee or donee may accept or reject the legacy or donation as the case may be. If the
legacy of donation is of a part of the body, the legatee or donee, upon the death of the testator
and prior to embalming, shall effect the removal of the part, avoiding unnecessary mutilation.
After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the body vests in the surviving spouse,
next of kin or other persons under obligation to dispose of the body of the decedent.
(b) Any person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of this Act shall not be liable
for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding of this Act.
Section 14. International Sharing of Human Organs or Tissues. Sharing of human organs or
tissues shall be made only through exchange programs duly approved by the Department of
Health: Provided, That foreign organ or tissue bank storage facilities and similar establishments
grant reciprocal rights to their Philippine counterparts to draw organs or tissues at any time.
RA 7719
BLOOD DONATIONS ACT OF 1994
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
(a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill
public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
(b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a professional
medical service and not a sale of a commodity;
(c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of supply of blood and
blood products;
(d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards
caused by the commercial sale of blood;
Sec. 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. All commercial blood banks shall be
phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act.
Sec. 8. Non-Profit Operation. All blood banks/centers shall operate on a non-profit basis:
Provided, That they may collect service fees not greater than the maximum prescribed by the
Department which shall be limited to the necessary expenses entailed in collecting and the
processing of blood. Blood shall be collected from healthy voluntary donors only.
CASES

Mercado v. CA
Facts:
The private respondents, referred to as the Bulaong Group, were individual lessees of stalls in a
public market in Baliuag, Bulacan. The market was destroyed by fire on 17 February 1956 after
which the lessees constructed new stalls therein at their expense and thereafter paid rentals
thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag. In 1972, the private respondents leased their stalls to
other people, referred to as the Mercado Group, with the intention of making them sub-lessees.
However, by reason of Municipal Ordinance No. 14 which prohibited the lessees leasing of
stalls, the respondents were stripped of their right to occupy the stalls which was then transferred
to the sub-lessees.
The members of the Bulaoung Group sued, seeking for the recovery of their stalls from the
Mercado Group. They anchored their rights upon the fact that such stalls were built at their own
expense after the fire in 1956 destroyed the original stalls. As such, they claimed ownership of
the stalls constructed by them, and their resulting right, as owners thereto, to sub-lease the stalls,
and necessarily, to recover them from any person withholding possession thereof from them.
In 1975, the respondent judge rejected the claim of the Municipality of Baliuag that it had
automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls. He likewise declared the members of the
Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the stalls respectively
put up by them until and unless indemnified for the value thereof. The decision also declared that
the Bulaong and Mercado Groups executed the sub-letting agreements with full awareness that
they were thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they were thus in pari delicto and thus had no
cause of action one against the other.
Unable to accept the ruling, the Mercado Group filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition to contest the decision, but the Court of Appeals rejected it on the reason that the
Mercado groups previous appeal was filed after the period for perfecting an appeal which had
made the decision final and executory. Moreover, it explained that they cannot use an action for
certiorari and prohibition to substitute their lost appeal.
Issue:
Are the Bulaong Group builders in good faith?
Held:
No, they are not. The members of the group were lessees of space in the public market and
therefore could not, and never could, make the claim that they were owners of any part of the
land occupied by the market to the extent that any new structure put up by them thereon could
make them builders in good faith.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert the title to the land on
which he builds (i.e. that he be a possessor in concept of owner) and that he be unaware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. It is such a builder in
good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has
been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses.

On the other hand, unlike the builder in good faith, a mere lessee who makes in good faith useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased can only claim payment of one-half of the value of the
improvements or, should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, remove the improvements,
even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.
Nevertheless, since the petitioners have lost the right to appeal, the judgment rendered, although
erroneous, will still be treated as valid. The error did not render the judgment void for while a
judgment contrary to the express provisions of a statute is erroneous, if it becomes final and
executory, it becomes as binding and effective as any valid judgment.
Ballatan v. CA
Facts:
The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located in Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24 is
registered in the name of the petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong
Chy Ling; Lots 25 and 26 are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr.; and on Lot
No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot
No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in the name of respondent Li
Ching Yao.
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan was constructing her house on her lot when she noticed that part of
the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side
of her property. Ballatan informed Go of this discrepancy, but he claimed that his house was built
within the parameters of his father's lot and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose
Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the ownerdeveloper of the subdivision project. When brought to their attention, the AIA authorized another
survey of the land.
After completing the survey, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan
was less by few meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao three lots away increased by two
meters. Specifically, he found that Lot No. 24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern
boundary that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor
gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by
Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the
eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this finding, the petitioner made a written demand on respondents Go to remove
and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Failing to agree amicably, the petitioner
brought the issue before the barangay where the respondents still failed to appear. As a result of
their absence, Ballatan instituted a civil case for accion publiciana to recover possession which
later decided by the RTC in favor of the petitioners, ordering Go to vacate the subject portion,
demolish their improvements, and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court which instead of
ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, it ordered them to
pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable
amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached.
Issue:
To whom does the land belong to?
Held:
Lot No. 24 belongs to Ballatan and it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that
triggered the discrepancies. Go built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the
parameters of his father's land and had no knowledge that they encroached petitioners' lot. They
are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their
encroachment on her property.
With respect to respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties
did. He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is
no evidence that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a
portion thereof encroached on the respondents land. Thus, since good faith is always presumed,
and the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor, all the
parties therefore are presumed to have acted in good faith. They petitioners, however, are not
without remedy.
According to Article 448 which has been applied to improvements built by mistaken belief on
land belonging to the adjoining owner, it states that the owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnityxxx
In light of the provision, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the
improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject
portion. If the respondents are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land
and, until they vacate, must pay rent to petitioners. However, they cannot compel respondents Go
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed
thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, the respondents Go
must pay reasonable rent. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents the subject
portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.
The same conditions abovementioned also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of
their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirtyseven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.

Sarmiento v. Agana
Facts:
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979 Decision rendered by the then Court of
First Instance of Pasay City. The Decision was one made on memoranda, pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6031, and it modified, on October 17, 1977, a judgment of the then Municipal
Court of Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila Sarmiento
against private respondents, the spouses Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo.
It appears that while Ernesto was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the
couple could build a residential house on Lot D of a subdivision in Paranaque where he did
construct a house on the land. However, it subsequently turned out that the land had been titled in
the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, on September 7, 1974, sold the same to petitioner
Sarmiento. The following January 6, 1975, Sarmiento asked Ernesto and wife to vacate and, on
April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment suit against them.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the house in good faith and
ordered him and his wife to vacate the land after Sarmiento has paid them the mentioned sum.
When elevated, the Court of First Instance of Pasay modified the decision under Article 448 of
the Civil Code and Sarmiento was required to exercise the option to reimburse the sum of
PHP40,000.00 as the value of the residential house, or the option to allow them to purchase the
land for PHP25,000.00. However, he did not exercise any of the two options within the indicated
60-day period and thus Ernesto was allowed to deposit the sum of PHP25,000.00 with the Court
as the purchase price for the land.
Issue:
Can Sarmiento refuse to exercise his options?
Held:
No, he cannot. Ernesto was a builder in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under
which they had constructed the house. As far as they knew, the land was owned by Ernesto's
mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected
to later on give them the land. As such, the provision of the Civil Code on property applies,
specifically, Article 488 of the latter.
The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7, 1974, could not have been
very much more than that amount during the following January when ERNESTO and wife were
asked to vacate. However, ERNESTO and wife have not questioned the P25,000.00 valuation
determined by the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the house, the only evidence presented was the testimony of
Ernesto that its worth at the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The
Municipal Court chose to assess its value below the minimum testified while the Court of First
Instance chose the maximum. In the latter case, it cannot be said that the Court of First Instance
had abused its discretion.

The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the land and
P40,000.00 for the house, cannot be viewed as not supported by the evidence. The provision for
the exercise by petitioner Sarmiento of either the option to indemnify private respondents in the
amount of P40,000.00, or the option to allow private respondents to purchase the land at
P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a correct decision.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under Article 546. The owner
of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under Article 448, either to pay for the building
or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse
both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Tecnogas v. CA
Facts:
The petitioner Tecnogas Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio
San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro Manila purchased by from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970,
together with all the buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon. The
defendant owns an adjoining lot to that of the petitioners. Some portions of the buildings and
wall bought by petitioner, together with the land, from Pariz Industries occupied a portion of
defendants adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and
wall of a portion of defendants land, Tecnogas offered to buy from the defendant that particular
portion of land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but the defendant, however,
refused the offer.
In 1973, the parties entered into a private agreement before a certain Col. Rosales in Malacaang,
wherein the petitioner agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to
defendant possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by petitioners wall. The
defendant later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal Engineer of Paranaque, but the
complaint did not prosper. Aggrieved, the defendant decided to take matters into his own hands
and dug a canal along the wall which caused its partial destruction which led to the filing of
malicious mischief charges against the defendant to which they were ultimately convicted of.
Issue:
Was the court wrong in declaring Tecnogas a builder in bad faith?
Held:
Yes, it was wrong. The lower court ruled that the petitioner cannot be considered in good faith
because as a land owner, he is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property,
especially if the same are reflected in a properly issued certificate of title. However, this
pronouncement relied on J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Lumanlan and J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong which do not apply to the certain case since they have radically
different moorings and neither have cited any claim that one has the presumptive knowledge of
ones territory through looking at the TCT alone. Moreover, no such doctrinal statement could

have been made in those cases because such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the
contrary, it has openly rejected such a theory in Co Tao vs. Chico where it held that unless one is
versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the precise extent or location of his
property by merely examining his paper title.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings
and other structures were already in existence. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good
faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped
portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching
structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and that his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs
successor, petitioner in this case. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that
he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
The same benefit can likewise be invoked by the petitioner who, while not the builder of the
offending structures, possesses them as a buyer. Upon delivery of the property by Pariz
Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the property.
Consequently and as earlier discussed, petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the
seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel
the private respondent to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448 of the
Civil Code.
The private respondents insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as the proper
remedy, which respondent Court sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus legally flawed. This
is not one of the remedies bestowed upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he
chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay
such price. This has not taken place. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating the
encroaching portion of petitioners building after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the
latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking.