Duero vs.

CA 373 SCRA
Facts:
According to petitioner, respondent Eradel, entered and
occupied his land. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an
assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private
respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the
land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with
bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained
steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership against Eradel and two others. A
compromise agreement was reached by petitioner and the defendants
except Eradel. Consequently, Eradel failed to file his Answer and was
declared in default. Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte and
judgment was rendered in his favour.
Private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that
he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr.,
since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter
had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any
adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial. Private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial.
He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the
land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the
judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio
Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
The trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief
from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private
respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case,
since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under
the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. The trial court denied the
MR.
Petitioner filed a motion for execution which was granted.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA. The CA granted the
petition and declared that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the
action.
Issue:

action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,

acquiescence or even by their express consent.19 Further, a party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in
saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction
over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21
Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is
not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law.22 Also, neither waiver nor estoppel
shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious
and exceptional circumstances.
Donato vs. CA 417 SCRA
Facts:
Petitioner file a complaint for FE and UD against against 43
named defendants and all unknown occupants of his land in San
Andres, Manila. He alleged that private respondents had oral contracts
of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly
renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance;
sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent. Demand letters were sent
but were left unanswered.
20 of the 43 defendants filed a consolidated answer. They
contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform
Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the
subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of
the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive
stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered
payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for
consignation while they await the outcome of the negotiation to
purchase.
The METC renderer judgment against the 23 defendants
who failed to answer, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied
by each of them. As to 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a
separate judgment[on the same day sustaining their rights under the
Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing
the case without prejudice.

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion

when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that
private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC after he had filed several motions before it.

On appeal, the RTC sustained the METC. Thereafter, the CA

dismissed the petition for review because the certification against
forum shopping was signed by counsel not the petitioner himself the
only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision
but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed.

Held:

Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the

SC raising the issue of grave abuse of discretion of the CA when it
dismissed its petition on a mere technicality.

No. In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of

RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was
petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two
other parties before the said court,16 believing that the RTC had
jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 769117
amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already
belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.
Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that
since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his
landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the
surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the
summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was
declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same
court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit
ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he
had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than
petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and
uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.18But
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before
the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court
denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In
his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's
lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private
respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case
was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC
that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for
relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for
reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of
private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue
the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in
overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an

Issue:
Whether the proper remedy was filed?
Held:
NO. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a
decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one
of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court
in Fortich vs. Corona:[19
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of
petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the
petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the
court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Sps. Gonzaga vs. CA 394 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioners bought a parcel of land with Lucky Homes Inc.
The lot was known as Lot 19. Said lot was used as security for
petitioners housing loan with the SSS. Petitioners then started the
construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as
private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19.
Upon realizing its error, private respondent Lucky Homes, through its
general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter
offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus,
petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However,
petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS.
Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name
of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot
Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their
contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed
with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built
therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of
contract and damages with the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. A writ of execution was
issued. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution,
alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was
vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private
respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. The CA denied the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the trial court?
Held:
Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court
have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.5 We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has
consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order
or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held
in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction
x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the
jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the
issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its
decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because
said decision was unfavorable to them.
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.Petitioners should bear
the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from
their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.

Escobal vs. Garchitorena 422 SCRA

Facts:

Petitioner was a member of the Philippine Constabulary.

While conducting a surveillance operation on drug trafficking at the Sa
Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant, he got involved in a shooting
incident which resulted in the death of Rodney Rafael Nueca. An
amended information was filed against him for murder with RTC.
He was preventively suspended. During arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that the court martial and not the RTC which has
jurisdiction.
The prosecution commenced the presentation of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that since he committed
the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The MTD was denied but a
preliminary hearing was ordered to determine whether the offense was
committed in relation to his office. The trial court initially ruled in the
negative but it reversed such decision. The Information was ordered to
be amended and that the records of the case be transmitted to the SB.
The Presiding Justice of the SB ordered that the case be returned to
the court of origin. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case,
considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC?
Held:
No. Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No.
1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00 .
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under
the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their
office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation
between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties
must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in
the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender
in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.22
The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner
does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between
his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had
jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it
ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office.
The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D.
No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in
relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary
grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial
Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by
reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied
retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is
a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.

Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Atienza 420

Facts:
Petitioner is the national organization of all the barangays in
the Philippines pursuant to the Local Government Code. The Liga
adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its
internal organization.4 Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said
Constitution and By-Laws states: All other election matters not
covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election Code" or
such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga
Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws.
By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and
ratified its own Election Code.5 Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election
Code states: . There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for
the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the
third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held.
Thereafter, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of
representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila
and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the
barangay elections. Mayor Atienza signed and approved the assailed
city ordinance and issued E.O. No. 11 to implement the same.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 directly with the SC seeking nullification of Manila City
Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, 1 and respondent City Mayors
Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002.

instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the

proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
(Note: the SC likewise held: although the instant petition is styled as a
petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court
of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.14 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.(2) Review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does
not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved.)

Hannah Serrana vs. SB 542 SCRA

Issue:
Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts?

Facts:
Petitioner was appointed as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one-year term by President Estrada. She then discussed and
proposed to to President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.

Held:
Yes. We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in
certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant
of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants
and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system
by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two
reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some

Thereafter, petitioner and her siblings, registered with the

Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
President Estrada gave 15million pesos to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine
Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a systemwide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for
estafa.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Also,
that she is not a public officer and assuming in arguendo that she was,
she did not commit the crime in relation to her office.

Issue:
1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction?

2. Whether petitioner is a public officer?

3. Whether she committed the crime in relation to her office?

Held:
1. Yes. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
2. Yes. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In
Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not
be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan
with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
3. Yes. In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position,
with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA,
a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government.
(note: according to sir,)

Petitioner returned to the Philippines on April, 1990 only to

find out that the turn-over of the unit was reset to May 31, 1990
because various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts,
typhoon and steel and cement shortage). Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990,
upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990,
respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still
uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities. Once more,
petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building
administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move
in on August 22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines
only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated,
he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21,
1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner
ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file an action for
specific performance and damages. Meanwhile, during the pendency
of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on
April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action
has been limited to his claim for damages.
The trial court found petitioner liable for damages. On
appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. A MR was filed but
was denied. Hence, this petition for review questioning the jurisdiction
of the RTC over the case. Petitioner argues that it is the HLURB which
has jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction?
Held:
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction
before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case.
Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial
courts jurisdiction.
On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this
is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual
findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by
substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.[7 Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus,
liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the
impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8 These
exceptions are not present here.

Katon vs. Palanca 437 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of
lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its reclassification from forest to agricultural land and, thereafter for him to
apply for a homestead patent. The In, 1965, Director of Lands
favourably declared the land as agricultural land.

Manila Bankers vs. Ng Kok Wei 418 SCRA

Facts:
Respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, Petitioner, expressed his intention
to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. He paid
petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00.
Then, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of
P729,830.00.
Consequently, Petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio
G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The
contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall
substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within
fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that
(S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the
unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by
respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).

"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent

Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the
island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent
Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972.
Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No.
145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84
hectares of Sombrero Island.
In 1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the
homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well
as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner
claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested
for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or

Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999,
they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged
defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint
so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the
deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted
by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was
denied , for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first
and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA
dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual
prerogative. Hence, this petition.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it

dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds
directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" 15 and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

(Note: the action was more of an action for reversion and not
annulment of title nor reconveyance; dismissal was proper because,
the action being one for reversion, it is only the Sol Gen who can bring
said action, thus, the complaint states cause of action)

Rule 1 to 5 (inc. 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)

Issue:
Facts:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged
residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the
Petition?

Held:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the
claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally

limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected
to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these
instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of
the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised
Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought
about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there
is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts
is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have
lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the
parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41.
Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the
case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were
the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.

Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint

with the Regional Trial Court of Makati 1 alleging that petitioner
Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated
cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges
incurred by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent
for respondent. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim,
asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct
commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses earned from
1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary
damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitoner.
In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim
as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that
respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such
counterclaim.
The trial court9 granted respondent's motion to dismiss
petitioner's counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioner's motion.
The court found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely permissive in
nature and held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same.10 The trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA
sustained the trial courts decision. A MR was filed but was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive?
Held:
Permissive. A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or
is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.19
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court capsulized the criteria or
tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well s defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of

Appeals,21 is the "compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a
logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court."

Tested against the abovementioned standards,

petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to
prove petitioner's claims differs from that needed to establish
respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The
recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or dependent upon
establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate
trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort
of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a
logical connection between the parties' claims. This conclusion is
further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared in
her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not
based upon the Special Agent's Contract. 23 However, petitioner's
claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by
respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.24
There is no need for need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim.25 On the other hand, in order for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner
is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. 26 The rule on the payment
of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion27-

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of
the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its nonpayment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Korea Technologies Inc. vs. Lerma
Facts:
Petitioner (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is
engaged in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private respondent Pacific
General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic
corporation.
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract whereby
KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in
Carmona, Cavite. The total contract price amounted to USD 1,530,000.
Subsequently, the machineries, equipment, and facilities for the
manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped, delivered, and installed in
the Carmona plant. For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the
installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC issued two
postdated checks. When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were
dishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED. Thus, on May 8,
1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter [6] to PGSMC threatening criminal
action for violation of BP 22 in case of non-payment. On the same
date, the wife of PGSMCs President faxed a letter to KOGIES
President who was then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained
that not only did KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press
from that agreed upon but it had not delivered several equipment parts
already paid for.
PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their
Contract dated March 5, 1997 on the ground that KOGIES had altered
the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment
it delivered to PGSMC, and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer
the machineries, equipment, and facilities installed in the Carmona

plant. Five days later, PGSMC filed before the Office of the Public
Prosecutor an Affidavit-Complaint for Estafa. KOGIES wrote PGSMC
informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their
contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on
mere imagined violations by KOGIES. It also insisted that their
disputes should be settled by arbitration as agreed upon in Article 15,
the arbitration clause of their contract.
Then, KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before
the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) in Seoul, Korea
pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as amended. Pursuant to the
application for arbitration, KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance before the RTC of Muntinlupa. PGSMC filed its Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim. The petitioner filed a MTD the
counterclaim for failing to pay the docket fees. The trial court ruled that
payment is unnecessary because the counterclaim of respondent is
compulsory in nature. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via
petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence,
the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether respondent was required to pay docket fees for the
counterclaim?
Held:
No. As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC
were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated
July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or
cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a
defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained
therein.
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its
counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for
said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however,
that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
compulsory counterclaim or cross- claims.
Mercado vs. CA 569 SCRA
Facts:
Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel
Corporations (SMCs) beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. In
1991, SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to
withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned
three China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit
amounting to P5 million1 to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out
agreement stating that Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC],
claiming default on my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC] and shall
serve as absolute authority for [CBC] to encash the [CBC certificates of
deposit] in accordance with the third paragraph of this Hold-Out
Agreement, whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on any of my/our
obligations with [SMC], it being understood that the issue of whether or
not there was factual default must be threshed out solely between
me/us and [SMC]
SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items
he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out
agreement, it asked CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned
certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed
Mercado.
Mercado filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC of Manila. He claimed
that the agreement constitute pactum commisorium which is void. SMC
filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that
Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates of deposit amounting
to P4.5 million5 and asserted that the execution of the continuing holdout agreement and deed of assignment was a recognized business
practice. Then, Mercado filed an Urgent Manifestation claiming that he
was no longer interested in annulling the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment. The RTC, however, denied the
motion.8 Instead, it set the case for pre-trial.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favour of SMC.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, insisting that Mercado did not default in
the payment of his obligations to SMC. The CA, however, affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Thereafter, Mercado passed away and was
substituted by his heirs. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition
asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto. The
said decision was void. SMCs counterclaim was permissive in nature.
Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
Issue:
Whether the counterclaim is permissive or compulsory?
Held:
Compulsory. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending
party may have against any party)16 may be compulsory17 or
permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily

connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter

of the opposing partys claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court
and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is
compulsory.18 Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.s
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and
deed of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit
purchases), he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he
admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that
those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its
part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC
therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado
purchased on credit. Thus, Mercados complaint and SMCs
counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing holdout agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether
Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would
essentially support or refute Mercados claim and SMCs counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the
efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated.
Clearly, SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercados claim,
was compulsory in nature.19 Consequently, the payment of docket fees
was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque National de Paris 460 SCRA
Facts:
Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit
facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To
guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive
Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea)
and Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee 2 to the
extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into
three trust receipt.
Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton
would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in
trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the
condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be
applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton
would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying
documents of title.
Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale
and return the unsold motor vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate
guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the
payment. These Guarantors refused to pay. Hence, BNP filed a
complaint for sum of money. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed
the docket fees which BNP paid at P352,116.30.
The defendants-herein petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss9 on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees
to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
The RTC denied the MTD. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied. Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and
mandamus to the Court of Appeals which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed because of incorrect
payment of docket fees?
Held:
NO. 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subjectmatter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in the 2005
case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the

fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,

more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide
by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing
fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention
to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the
assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be
incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Judge Formaran 578 SCRA 283
Facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Romeo Y. Tan
(Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by real estate
mortgages over five parcels of land. When petitioner was unable to pay
the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and
Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same. In turn, petitioner is to
execute Deeds of Sale of the parcels of land in favor of respondents
and if he fails to pay, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already
present the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same to the RD of
Naga to acquire TCTs to the said properties in their names. Also,
petitioner may choose to redeem the property.
Petitioner failed to pay, respondents Tan and Obiedo
presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the RD of Naga City. As a
result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of
land in their names.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint 12 against
respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of
deeds of sales.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid the
sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the
Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil
Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according
to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Only respondent Tan filed an Answer. Thereafter, respondent
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended
that the case filed by the petitioner involved real properties, the docket
fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a),
not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since
petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No.
2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner, however, had not yet
conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
This time, petitioner asserts that the RTC24 acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it issued
the order mandating that the docket/filing fees for Civil Case No. 20060030, an action for annulment of deeds of sale, be assessed under
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC in
so far as the applicable computation of docket fees is concerned?
Held:
No. In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,28 the Court explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 29 the Court laid down
guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in
Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, thirdparty claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by

the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees
for Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate
courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Consistent with the
liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright
petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner
time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite the seeming
munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket
fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct
amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
(The SC explained that in order to determine the correct basis for the
computation, the nature of the action must be settled. The SC said that
it was a real action and not merely an action to declare as null and void
the deeds of sale. Hence, Rule 141 (a) should apply. Consequently, in
a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be
the basis in computing the fees.)

St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias 626 SCRA 649

Facts:
Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate
professor of the petitioners College of Human Sciences. She is an
active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis
University (UFESLU). Their 2006-2011 CBA, contained the following
provisions: Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the
yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1)
regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be
suspended.
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first
semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the
evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007, with
the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required
rating of 87 points.
Respondent sought recourse from the CBAs grievance
machinery but no settlement was reached. Thus, respondent filed with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE a case for
illegal forced leave and illegal suspension. The case was then referred
to the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). The case was dismissed by the VA.
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay
the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the
material portions of the record. The CA dismissed the petition. On
February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the ground cited is technical. She, nonetheless, attached
to her motion copies of the material portions of the record and the
postal money orders for P4,230.00. The CA reinstated the petition. It
found that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying
the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion
for reconsideration.
SLU filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. SLU
insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for
Cobarrubias failure to pay the docket fees on time. When the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, SLU filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias petition
despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period,
and in reversing the VA decision.
Held:
Yes. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory
privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the
provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that
appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing
a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the
petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other
lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be
a sufficient ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus, payment in full of
docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision

appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has

been filed.
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres,
we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic,
we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was
deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was
tendered after the period within which payment should have been
made. In Aranas v. Endona, we reiterated that the appeal is not
perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the
reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration
of the period.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition
for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full
only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money
orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and
without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not
perfected within the reglementary period.
( The SC added that respondent failed to prove that the case falls
within the exceptions for paying the docket fees in full when she filed
her petition for review.)
Relucio vs. Lopez 373 SCRA 578
Facts:
Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against
defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda Relucio. She alleged that
she and Lopez are legally Married and that after abandoning her and
their 4 legitimate children, he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and
using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the
private respondent and their four children and that he maintained an
illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner
on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against
her. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner Relucio filed a Motion
for Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent Judge but the same
was likewise denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition. She
moved for reconsideration but was also denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole
administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her
husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is
essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the
controversy.
Held:
1. No. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party
the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other."10 The elements
of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be
rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist,
rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is
sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all
against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of
respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action.
2. No. A real party in interest is one who stands "to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." 18 In this case,
petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there

can be no final determination of an action. 19 Petitioner's participation in

Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial
court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an
accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez'
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment
would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is
to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination
or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 20 In the context of her
petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete
relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged
conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership
with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.
Rule 1 to 5 (inc. 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)
Facts:
Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati 1 alleging that petitioner
Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated
cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges
incurred by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent
for respondent. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim,
asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct
commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses earned from
1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary
damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitoner.
In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim
as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that
respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such
counterclaim.
The trial court9 granted respondent's motion to dismiss
petitioner's counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioner's motion.
The court found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely permissive in
nature and held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same.10 The trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA
sustained the trial courts decision. A MR was filed but was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive?
Held:
Permissive. A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or
is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.19
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court capsulized the criteria or
tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well s defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of

Appeals,21 is the "compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a
logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would

entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court."
Tested against the abovementioned standards,
petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to
prove petitioner's claims differs from that needed to establish
respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The
recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or dependent upon
establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate
trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort
of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a
logical connection between the parties' claims. This conclusion is
further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared in
her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not
based upon the Special Agent's Contract. 23 However, petitioner's
claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by
respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.24
There is no need for need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim.25 On the other hand, in order for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner
is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. 26 The rule on the payment
of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion27-

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of
the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its nonpayment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Korea Technologies Inc. vs. Lerma
Facts:
Petitioner (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is
engaged in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private respondent Pacific
General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic
corporation.
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract whereby
KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in
Carmona, Cavite. The total contract price amounted to USD 1,530,000.
Subsequently, the machineries, equipment, and facilities for the
manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped, delivered, and installed in
the Carmona plant. For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the
installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC issued two
postdated checks. When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were
dishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED. Thus, on May 8,
1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter [6] to PGSMC threatening criminal
action for violation of BP 22 in case of non-payment. On the same
date, the wife of PGSMCs President faxed a letter to KOGIES
President who was then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained
that not only did KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press
from that agreed upon but it had not delivered several equipment parts
already paid for.

PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their

Contract dated March 5, 1997 on the ground that KOGIES had altered
the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment
it delivered to PGSMC, and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer
the machineries, equipment, and facilities installed in the Carmona
plant. Five days later, PGSMC filed before the Office of the Public
Prosecutor an Affidavit-Complaint for Estafa. KOGIES wrote PGSMC
informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their
contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on
mere imagined violations by KOGIES. It also insisted that their
disputes should be settled by arbitration as agreed upon in Article 15,
the arbitration clause of their contract.
Then, KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before
the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) in Seoul, Korea
pursuant to Art. 15 of the Contract as amended. Pursuant to the
application for arbitration, KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance before the RTC of Muntinlupa. PGSMC filed its Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim. The petitioner filed a MTD the
counterclaim for failing to pay the docket fees. The trial court ruled that
payment is unnecessary because the counterclaim of respondent is
compulsory in nature. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via
petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence,
the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether respondent was required to pay docket fees for the
counterclaim?
Held:
No. As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC
were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated
July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or
cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a
defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained
therein.

Whether the counterclaim is permissive or compulsory?

Held:
Compulsory. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending
party may have against any party)16 may be compulsory17 or
permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily
connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing partys claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court
and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is
compulsory.18 Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.s
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and
deed of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit
purchases), he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he
admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that
those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its
part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC
therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado
purchased on credit. Thus, Mercados complaint and SMCs
counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing holdout agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether
Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would
essentially support or refute Mercados claim and SMCs counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the
efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated.
Clearly, SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercados claim,
was compulsory in nature.19 Consequently, the payment of docket fees
was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque National de Paris 460 SCRA

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its
counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for
said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however,
that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
compulsory counterclaim or cross- claims.

Mercado vs. CA 569 SCRA

Facts:
Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel
Corporations (SMCs) beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. In
1991, SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to
withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned
three China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit
amounting to P5 million1 to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out
agreement stating that Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC],
claiming default on my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC] and shall
serve as absolute authority for [CBC] to encash the [CBC certificates of
deposit] in accordance with the third paragraph of this Hold-Out
Agreement, whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on any of my/our
obligations with [SMC], it being understood that the issue of whether or
not there was factual default must be threshed out solely between
me/us and [SMC]
SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items
he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out
agreement, it asked CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned
certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed
Mercado.
Mercado filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC of Manila. He claimed
that the agreement constitute pactum commisorium which is void. SMC
filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that
Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates of deposit amounting
to P4.5 million5 and asserted that the execution of the continuing holdout agreement and deed of assignment was a recognized business
practice. Then, Mercado filed an Urgent Manifestation claiming that he
was no longer interested in annulling the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment. The RTC, however, denied the
motion.8 Instead, it set the case for pre-trial.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favour of SMC.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, insisting that Mercado did not default in
the payment of his obligations to SMC. The CA, however, affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Thereafter, Mercado passed away and was
substituted by his heirs. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition
asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto. The
said decision was void. SMCs counterclaim was permissive in nature.
Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
Issue:

Facts:
Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit
facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To
guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive
Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea)
and Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee 2 to the
extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into
three trust receipt.
Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton
would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in
trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the
condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be
applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton
would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying
documents of title.
Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale
and return the unsold motor vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate
guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the
payment. These Guarantors refused to pay. Hence, BNP filed a
complaint for sum of money. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed
the docket fees which BNP paid at P352,116.30.
The defendants-herein petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss9 on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees
to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
The RTC denied the MTD. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied. Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and
mandamus to the Court of Appeals which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed because of incorrect
payment of docket fees?
Held:
NO. 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subjectmatter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly

10

authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in the 2005
case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide
by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing
fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention
to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the
assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be
incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Judge Formaran 578 SCRA 283
Facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Romeo Y. Tan
(Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by real estate
mortgages over five parcels of land. When petitioner was unable to pay
the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and
Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same. In turn, petitioner is to
execute Deeds of Sale of the parcels of land in favor of respondents
and if he fails to pay, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already
present the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same to the RD of
Naga to acquire TCTs to the said properties in their names. Also,
petitioner may choose to redeem the property.
Petitioner failed to pay, respondents Tan and Obiedo
presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the RD of Naga City. As a
result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of
land in their names.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint 12 against
respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of
deeds of sales.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid the
sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the
Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil
Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according
to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Only respondent Tan filed an Answer. Thereafter, respondent
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended
that the case filed by the petitioner involved real properties, the docket
fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a),
not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since
petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No.
2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner, however, had not yet
conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
This time, petitioner asserts that the RTC24 acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it issued
the order mandating that the docket/filing fees for Civil Case No. 20060030, an action for annulment of deeds of sale, be assessed under
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC in
so far as the applicable computation of docket fees is concerned?
Held:
No. In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,28 the Court explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 29 the Court laid down
guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in
Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:

considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed

therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees
for Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate
courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Consistent with the
liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright
petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner
time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite the seeming
munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket
fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct
amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
(The SC explained that in order to determine the correct basis for the
computation, the nature of the action must be settled. The SC said that
it was a real action and not merely an action to declare as null and void
the deeds of sale. Hence, Rule 141 (a) should apply. Consequently, in
a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be
the basis in computing the fees.)

St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias 626 SCRA 649

Facts:
Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate
professor of the petitioners College of Human Sciences. She is an
active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis
University (UFESLU). Their 2006-2011 CBA, contained the following
provisions: Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the
yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1)
regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be
suspended.
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first
semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the
evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007, with
the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required
rating of 87 points.
Respondent sought recourse from the CBAs grievance
machinery but no settlement was reached. Thus, respondent filed with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE a case for
illegal forced leave and illegal suspension. The case was then referred
to the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). The case was dismissed by the VA.
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay
the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the
material portions of the record. The CA dismissed the petition. On
February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the ground cited is technical. She, nonetheless, attached
to her motion copies of the material portions of the record and the
postal money orders for P4,230.00. The CA reinstated the petition. It
found that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying
the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion
for reconsideration.
SLU filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. SLU
insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for
Cobarrubias failure to pay the docket fees on time. When the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, SLU filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, thirdparty claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be

whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias petition

despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period,
and in reversing the VA decision.
Held:
Yes. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory
privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the
provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that
appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing
a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the
petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other

11

lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be

a sufficient ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus, payment in full of
docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has
been filed.
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres,
we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic,
we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was
deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was
tendered after the period within which payment should have been
made. In Aranas v. Endona, we reiterated that the appeal is not
perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the
reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration
of the period.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition
for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full
only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money
orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and
without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not
perfected within the reglementary period.
( The SC added that respondent failed to prove that the case falls
within the exceptions for paying the docket fees in full when she filed
her petition for review.)
Relucio vs. Lopez 373 SCRA 578
Facts:
Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against
defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda Relucio. She alleged that
she and Lopez are legally Married and that after abandoning her and
their 4 legitimate children, he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and
using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the
private respondent and their four children and that he maintained an
illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner
on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against
her. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner Relucio filed a Motion
for Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent Judge but the same
was likewise denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition. She
moved for reconsideration but was also denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole
administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her
husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is
essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the
controversy.
Held:
1. No. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party
the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other."10 The elements
of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be
rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist,
rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is
sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all
against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of
respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action.
2. No. A real party in interest is one who stands "to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." 18 In this case,

petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special

Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there
can be no final determination of an action. 19 Petitioner's participation in
Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial
court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an
accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez'
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment
would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is
to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination
or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 20 In the context of her
petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete
relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged
conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership
with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.
Navarro vs. Judge Escobido 606 SCRA
Facts:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed 2 complaints. for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these
complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for
the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. She
alleged that, she, under the Trade name Kargo enterprises, enetered
into a contract of lease with option to purchase with Navarro. Under the
agreement she was to leased 2 Fuso with mounted crane to Navarro.
As consideration, Navarro issued checks. Some of it were dishonoured
for insufficiency of funds.
The RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result,
the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the
possession of Karen Go. Navarro alleged as a special affirmative
defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen
Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not
state a cause of action. A MR was filed. The RTC reversed its earlier
ruling. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, essentially
contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
reconsidered the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to
amend her complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as coplaintiff. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a
cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action
by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. The CA denied the
petition. A MR was filed but was denied.
Issue:
Who is the real party in interest?
Held:
Karen Go. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the
registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still
insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case.
According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo
Enterprises name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical
personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were
Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this
case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in
the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN
T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and
this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.
Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES
undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the
defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was
thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and
attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the
transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The SC went further and explained that Karen Go may file the action
as the real party in interest base on the Family Code. Under this
ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to
recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which

12

they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the

Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may
act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not
dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other
spouses consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an
indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased
vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the
suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action,
we have held in a number of cases26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder
of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of
action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag:
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither
misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may
be severed and proceeded with separately.

1. No. Petitioners contention is far from tenable. An

indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final
determination can be had of an action.8 It is true that mortgagor Oliver
One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the
case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared
valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake.9 However, mortgagor
Oliver Ones absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in
resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A
perusal of Oliver Twos allegations in the complaint below shows that it
was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in not
determining the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the
mortgages annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds
custody. To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to
prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT,
and (2) that she is not the same person using that name who entered
into a deed of mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver
Two can do in her complaint without necessarily impleading the
mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party
in the case filed by Oliver Two.
In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504
(1999), we held that a party is not indispensable to the suit if his
interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be
prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in
court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however,
is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which involves
the land used as collateral for the loan.

In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy

when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any
stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion
of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give
the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include
indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the
indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to
obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.

Further, a declaration of the mortgages nullity in this case

will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor Oliver One. The bank still
needs to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who in turn can
raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them. A party is also not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply
avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and mortgagor
Oliver One.10 The latters participation in this case will simply enable
petitioner Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and
hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus, it was the bank
who should have filed a third-party complaint or other action versus the
mortgagor Oliver One.

China Banking Corp. vs. Oliver 390 SCRA 263

2. No. As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is

not an indispensable party, Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that
applies.11 Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own
initiative or on motion of the parties.12 Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court for denying Chinabanks motion to dismiss and, instead,
suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor
Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded
by the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the
ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.

Facts:
A certain Mercedes M. Oliver (Oliver One) was granted a
loan by petitioner. The loan was secured by a REM. The mortgage
was duly registered and annotated on the title. Then, respondent
claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver (Oliver Two), filed an action for
annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against
Chinabank.
Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
action and non-joinder of an indispensable party, the mortgagor (Oliver
One). The motion was denied. Chinabank filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin enforcement of
the order.
Respondent Oliver Two moved to declare petitioner
Chinabank in default. She pointed out that since petitioner received the
order denying the motion to dismiss on March 21, 1997, it had only
until April 7, 1997 to file its answer to the complaint. However, until the
filing of the motion for default, no answer had been filed yet. The trial
court granted the motion and declared petitioner in default.
Consequently, petitioner Chinabank filed a supplemental
petition. It argued that the special civil action for certiorari filed in the
Court of Appeals interrupted the proceedings before the trial court,
thereby staying the period for filing the answer.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision,
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial judge in
ruling that the Rules of Court provided the manner of impleading
parties to a case and in suggesting that petitioner file an appropriate
action to bring the mortgagor within the courts jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
1. Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver,
herein called Oliver One, an indispensable party?
2. Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure7 apply
in this case?
Held:

Pacific Consultants vs. Schonfeld 516 SCRA

Facts:
Respondent was a Canadian citizen. He was offered
employment by Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI), a domestic corporation
which is a subsidiary Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ).
In a letter of employment to respondent, sent by PCIJs president he
was offered a post in the Philippines with PPI. In the same letter, it was
stipulated that Any question of interpretation, understanding or
fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as well as any question
arising between the Employee and the Company which is in
consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company
and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding
to both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration
in London.
Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI
Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a resident alien. PPI
applied for an Alien Employment Permit (Permit) for respondent before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The DOLE granted
the application and issued the Permit to respondent.
Respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him
that his employment had been terminated. Respondent filed with PPI
several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from
Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI
partially settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay
the rest. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners PPI and Henrichsen (PCIJs President) with the Labor
Arbiter.

13

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the

following grounds: (1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and (2) venue was improperly laid. It argued that the
proper venue was with the Court of Arbitration in London.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners
Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions
of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latters decision in toto.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA. The CA found the petition meritorious. On the issue of venue, the
appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract
of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case
related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement
that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London
Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no
stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other
than in the Philippines.
A motion for the reconsideration of the above decision was
filed by PPI and Henrichsen, which the appellate court denied for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the venue was properly laid?
Held:
Yes. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held
by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v.
Tensuan,31 is that while they are considered valid and enforceable,
venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered
merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the
intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their
purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the
place named by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely,"
"exclusively in this court," "in no other court save ," "particularly,"
"nowhere else but/except ," or words of equal import were stated in
the contract.33 It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London
is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
employment contract.

Rule 6-9 Pleadings and Default

Benguet Exploration vs. CA 351 SCRA

Facts:
Benguet chartered the vessel, Sangkulirang No. 3, owned by
Seawood Shipping. The latter agreed to transport copper concentrates
from Poro Point, Lanao to Japan. The shipment was insured by
Switzerland Insurance. Upon arrival in Japan, petitioner alleged that
the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of
lading. Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance. As both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland
Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought a complaint
for damages against Seawood and Switzerland. The cases were
consolidated. In trial, petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence. It included the presentation of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of
Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate's Receipt which was all
authenticated by Ernesto Cayabyab, an employee of the Petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial courts decision.

the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment,
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him."29 In another
case, we held that "When the law makes use of the phrase
'genuineness and due execution of the instrument' it means nothing
more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face from the one executed."30 It is equally true, however,
that Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it
cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond
reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out
a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not
contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.31
In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the
veracity of these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance
presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 (Exh. 11)32 which petitioner's
own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared,33 in which it was stated that
the copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight
of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more
or less.34 On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which
Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner's claim, prepared a
report which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.
Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the
actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and
loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of
copper concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of regularity
in the transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due
execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of
Loading, and Mate's Receipt was successfully rebutted by the
evidence presented by respondent Switzerland Insurance which
showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro
Point and loaded on the vessel.

Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. CA 458

SCRA
Facts:
Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC)
leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting
systems from Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) ACDC failed to
pay the rentals despite demands. MEC filed a Complaint for a sum of
money with damages against the ACDC. ACDC filed a motion to file
and admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas
Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness
to MEC. ACDC alleged that Third-party defendant Becthel contracted
the services of third-party plaintiff to do construction work at its
Mauban, Quezon project using the leased equipment of plaintiff MEC
and that it rendered and complied with its contracted works with thirdparty defendant using plaintiffs (MEC) rented equipment. But, thirdparty defendant BECTHEL did not pay for the services of third-party
plaintiff ASIAKONSTRUKT that resulted to the non-payment of plaintiff
Monarks claim. ACDC prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor
dismissing the complaint and ordering the third-party defendant
(Becthel) to pay.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint
against Becthel on the ground that the defendant had already admitted
its principal obligation to MEC and the transaction between it and
ACDC, on the one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the
other, were independent transactions. MEC then filed a motion for
summary judgment, alleging therein that there was no genuine issue
as to the obligation of ACDC to MEC. ACDC opposed the motion for
summary judgment. alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special
and affirmative defenses partook of the nature of a negative pregnant,
and that there was a need for a hearing on its claim for damages. The
trial court ruled in favor of MEC and the CA affirmed.
Issue:

Issue:
Whether the establishment of the genuineness and due
execution of the documents presented was enough to warrant reversal
of the decision.
Held:
No. This contention has no merit. The admission of the due
execution and genuineness of a document simply means that "the
party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was
signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of

Whether the third party complaint was proper?

Held:
No. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a thirdparty which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus
preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned
would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of
procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it
abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant.15 This
right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the
discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually

14

independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint,

such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately
from the original complaint.16

Issue:

A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive

basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one
of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. 17 The
bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the
plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiffs claim
against the original defendant, although the third-party defendants
liability arises out of another transaction.18 The defendant may implead
another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the
latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party
defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant
to both the plaintiff and the defendant.19 There must be a causal
connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a
claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against
the third-party defendant. In Capayas v. Court of First Instance,20 the
Court made out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based; or whether the
third-party claim, although arising out of another or different contract or
transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (2) whether the thirdparty defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all
or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although
the third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction;
and (3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses
which the third-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim.

Held:

It bears stressing that common liability is the very essence for

contribution. Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any of
several having a common liability of his share in the damage suffered
or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the
other or others.24 The rule on common liability is fundamental in the
action for contribution.25 The test to determine whether the claim for
indemnity in a third-party complaint is, whether it arises out of the same
transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or the third-party
plaintiffs claim, although arising out of another or different contract or
transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim.
There is no causal connection between the claim of the
respondent for the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the
equipment and parts sold and leased to the petitioner, and the failure of
Becthel to pay the balance of its account to the petitioner after the
completion of the project in Quezon.

Whether respondent Tansipek was in Default?

Yes. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was

erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have
filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for
Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court:
(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may at any
time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath
to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge
may impose in the interest of justice.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in
that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses.7 The
allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2)
of meritorious defenses must concur.8
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that respondent
Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration may be treated as a Motion to
Lift Order of Default, his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has
already been dismissed with finality by the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the Court of Appeals
to this Court. The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the
denial of respondent Tansipeks Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial
of the same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the case.
The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default had already
been adjudicated in Tansipeks Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. As such, this issue cannot be readjudicated in Tansipeks
appeal of the Decision of the RTC on the main case. Once a decision
attains finality, it becomes the law of the case, whether or not said
decision is erroneous.10 Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be
altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain.

Caneland Sugar Corp vs. Alon

Banco de Oro vs. Tansipek 593 SCRA
Facts:
J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) entered into a contract with
Duty Free Philippines, Inc. for the construction of a Duty Free Shop in
Mandaue City. As actual construction went on, progress billings were
made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein
respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received
by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to JOCI. However,
payment through PNB Check No. 0000302572 in the amount of
P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI. Instead, respondent
Tansipek endorsed said check and deposited the same to his account
in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). PCIB allowed the
said deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the
deposit to payees account only, and despite the alleged lack of
authority of respondent Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused
to pay JOCI the full amount of the check despite demands made by the
latter. Thus, JOCI filed a complaint against PCIB for collection of sum
of money.
PCIB filed its answer and likewise moved for leave
for the court to admit the formers third-party complaint against
respondent Tansipek. In the third-party complaint, PCIB prayed for
subrogation. Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the ThirdParty Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do
so. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied.
Respondent Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the Default Order and the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for
failure to attach the assailed Orders. The Court of Appeals denied
respondent Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed
out of time.
The main case ensued where the trial court ruled for JOCI
and ordered the payment of the sum prayed for and that respondent
shall pay whatever amount PCIB shall be paying JOCI. Tansipek
appealed to the CA. The CAissued the assailed Decision finding that it
was an error for the trial court to have acted on PCIBs motion to
declare respondent Tansipek in default. The Court of Appeals thus
remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Banco de Oro
as successor-in-interest to PCIB, filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari, assailing the above Decision.

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages, injunction, and
nullity of mortgage against the Land Bank of the Philippines
(respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera. The complaint prayed for the
following: issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be
held; declaration of nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners
property covered by TCT No. T-11292 in favor of respondent; and
award of damages. The RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the
auction sale. Notwithstanding said directive, another foreclosure sale
was scheduled. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial
courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction.
The CA found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, denied due course and dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. The petitioner filed a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule
45.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the properties subject of this case.
Held:
No. Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with
respondent. Petitioners bone of contention before the RTC is that the
promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the
Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property
covered by TCT No. T-11292.13 It does not categorically deny that
these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These
vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,14 a negative pregnant is a "form of
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the

15

pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language

and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted."
Petitioners allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the
granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were
disputing the amount being sought from them, upon the non-payment
of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged
property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance
with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff
must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.

Rule 10-14 Amendments to Summons 2

Teh vs. CA 401 SCRA

Facts:
EIM International Sales, Inc. filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City a Complaint for collection of sum of money with
prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment against Wood Based
Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig and petitioner. . Petitioner
was impleaded in the case because he was the President of both
Wood Based Panels, Inc. and Sinrimco, Inc. The sheriff failed to serve
the summons intended for the petitioner because the former could not
locate the petitioners address as indicated in the complaint. Said
address was obtained by the respondent from the General Information
Sheets filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by the two
corporations.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person
because he had not been served with summons.
The trial court issued an Omnibus Order dated November
17, 1999 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and directing that an
alias summons be issued against the petitioner to be served upon him
at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The respondent
thereafter filed a manifestation and motion, informing the court that the
address of the petitioner as indicated in the complaint was erroneous,
and that summons should instead be served upon him at "138 Maria
Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City," which was his correct
address. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts Omnibus order but was denied. The CA denied his petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction because defendant was not served with summons?
Held:
No. The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that
there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the
latter denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the issuance of an alias summons to be served upon him.
Although the respondent should have resorted to other means to
determine the correct address of the petitioner when it was informed by
the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the
respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the
petitioners address as indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and
Sinrimco, Inc. on their respective General Information Sheets, was
incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under
Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the
motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or
order the amendment of the pleading. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss based on its finding that the issues alleged by the
respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully in the absence
of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the issues brought
before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance of alias
summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its
discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it.

Santos vs. PNOC 566 SCRA

Facts:

Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint

for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. due to
petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan4 advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not
be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the
summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the
affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate5 and an
affidavit of service of respondents employee6 to the effect that he sent
a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known
address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed
period, respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its
evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion. Respondent
proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its
evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Then, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He sought
reconsideration and alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that
he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September
11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex parte be
stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted. The trial court
denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
but the trial courts decision was sustained.
Issue:
Whether there was improper service of summons? Whether
summons by publication apply only to actions in rem not in personam?
Held:
No. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. (emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite
diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was
granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
properly served with summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an
action in personam and claims that substituted service may be availed
of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam
distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to
the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.10 Because of this
silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem
actions only.11
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it
applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to
any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of
Section 19,13 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the
following:
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order
for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the
printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons.
The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendants last known address.
This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the
deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to
his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary
service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily

16

does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to
make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the
party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his
own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this connection,
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer."14 This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the
trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support

their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We
must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court
were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under
the new rule. Hence, the cases15 cited by petitioners where we upheld
the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by
Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other
party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or
a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process.16 We will deprive private respondent of its right to present its
defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with
the rules on service of summons.

Jose vs. Boyon 414 SCRA

Facts:

Mason vs. CA 413 SCRA

Facts:
Spouses Mason owned two parcel of lands along EDSA.
They entered into a Lease Contract with private respondent Columbus
Philippines Bus Corporation (Columbus), under which Columbus
undertook to construct a building worth 10M at the end of the third year
of the lease. Because private respondent failed to comply with this
stipulation, petitioners filed a complaint for the rescission of the Lease
Contract. Summons was served upon private respondent through a
certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return
described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly
authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other
responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private
respondent in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were
allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision.
A decision was rendered by the trial court favouring the
petitioners. Private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default,
which was opposed by petitioners but was denied. Columbus moved
for reconsideration but it suffered the same fate. It then filed an appeal
with the CA which reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:

Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific

performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel
them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. As per return of the summons, substituted service
was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to
serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed.
Petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication which was granted.
The respondent judge, without a written motion, issued an Order
declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their
respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default,
[petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately,
the trial court ruled in petitioners favour.
Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of
America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the
resolution issued by the respondent court. Respondents filed an Ad
Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service
of summons effected by the court a quo which was denied. The
Respondents MR was likewise denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA granted the
petition.
Issue:
Whether there was valid service of summons?
Held:

Whether there was valid service of summons?

Held:
No. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule
is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the
instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna
St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private
respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to
comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit
for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon
Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over
Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for
certiorari. We decided in Villarosas favor and declared the trial court
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.1awphi1.nt We
held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as
service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial courts basis for denying the motion to dismiss,
namely, private respondents substantial compliance with the rule on
service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioners assertions that
the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive,
following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended
to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent
to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

No. "Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever

practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
"Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof."
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service
of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.
Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that
the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the
office or regular place of business, of the defendant.7 It is likewise
required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated
in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.8
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually
exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or
petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged
whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information
was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly,
without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the
efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the
rules of substituted service of summons.

17

The necessity of stating in the process servers Return or Proof of

Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of
substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy,11
from which we quote:
"x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary
in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective."12
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons
by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the
defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant,
and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of
property to the obligation or loan burdening it.15
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action
for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit
incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession
thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or
right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an
action for specific performance is an action in personam.16

DOLE Phil. vs. Quilala 557 SCRA

Facts:
Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation ("All
Season") sought the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and
damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division)
("Dole") and several of its officers. According to Dole, an alias
summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a
legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which
is an entity separate from Dole.
Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of
summons. The RTC denied said motion but was denied. The MR
suffered the same fate. Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals contending that the alias summons was not
properly served. The appellate court, however, ruled otherwise.

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with

Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to
question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt
of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive
pleading.15 Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt
of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to
secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner
effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is
estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.

Manotoc vs. CA 499 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioner is the defendant in a case entitled Agapita Trajano,
pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda
Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc 2 for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement
of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a
foreign courts judgment rendered the United States District Court of
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita
Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, for
wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command,
direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence
of defendant Manotoc.
The trial court issued a Summons 3 on July 6, 1993
addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or
Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig
City. The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served
upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the
condominium unit mentioned earlier. 4 When petitioner failed to file her
Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order.
Petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion
to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The trial
court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss. Manotoc filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals. The CA
rendered the assailed Decision, 14 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition
Issue:
Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons
on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.

Issue:

Held:

Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner

for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the corporate
defendant below, now the petitioner herein.

No. Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court

which applies to this case provides:

Held:
No but Dole is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the Court because it sought affirmative relief from the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a
domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio
unios est exclusio alterius.11 Service must therefore be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal
assistant, received the alias summons.12 Contrary to private
respondents claim that it was received upon instruction of the
president of the corporation as indicated in the Officers Return, such
fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which
Marifa Dela Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was
authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president.
Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal
assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.13 As
held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.14

SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served

within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal
service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendants residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to
effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is
given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in
person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is
defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for
a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 23 Under the
Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return
of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the
validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. 24 What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff,
"reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of
the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for

18

service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which
the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons
can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service
on the defendant.

defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must

have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be
contained in the Return.
Remington Industrial vs. CA 382 SCRA

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons

with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and
speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice.
Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal
service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff
must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of
the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the
absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons
on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many
occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x
personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for
the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or
residence or premises."
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion
then residing therein." 27 A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance
of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions
which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding
of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of
sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and
fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of
confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or
at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt
of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons.
Macky de la cruz does not meet the two (2) requirements under the
Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion;
and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks
information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la
Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the
"resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn
Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra
Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner
Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of
her stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in
her dwelling.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular
place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in
charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service
will be made must be the one managing the office or business of

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro)
and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and
respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against
them. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. ISL filed its answer. On
the other hand, respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, petitioner
sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional
factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against
respondent. Petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a
matter of right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive
pleading thereto. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and
Motion, stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
together with said Amended Complaint before the trial court. Hence,
petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the special civil action be
suspended. The trial court allowed the amendment. Thereafter, the CA
rendered the assailed decision granting the writ of certiorari and
ordering respondent judge to dismiss the case.

Issue:
Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer
has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal
before the higher court?
Held:
Yes. The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to
amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not
precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss20 or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to
amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory
and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this
remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he
files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally
allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case
as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This
principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party
litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on
the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.21
In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed
judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of
facts and to which the defendants would likely raise the same or, at
least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage
in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for
petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly amend the
complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the complaint would
not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this would, in fact,
simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioners right to amend the complaint as
against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants
have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a
matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the nonanswering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.22

Valmonte vs CA 252 SCRA

Facts:
Valmonte sold to his his daughter co-appellant Pastora, three
(3) parcels of land. Then, Pastora obtained a loan from PNB for 16k.
She secured the loan with a REM of the 3 parcels of land. Thereafter,
Pastora executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Virginia
V. del Castelo for the purpose of borrowing money in the amount of
P5,000.00 from appellee bank with authority to mortgage the same
parcels of land. Pastora failed to pay the loans. Thus, bank sent a
"Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale of Mortgaged Properties" to the
Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija for publication. On July 19, 26 and

19

August 2, 1954, the notice of extrajudicial sale on Augerst 19, 1954 to

be held in the City Hall of Cabanatuan City, for the satisfaction of
appellant Pastora's debt of P5,000.00 plus interests due thereon, was
published in a newspaper called Nueva Era. On August 19, 1954, the
auction sale was conducted and appellee bank was the sole and only
bidder for P5,524.40. On the same date, the Provincial Sheriff ExOfficio issued the corresponding Minutes of Auction Sale and
Certificate of Sale. The period of redemption expired but petitioners
requested for an extension but they still failed to redeem the property.
The property was sold to Valenton. The petitioners filed a complaint ot
annul the foreclosure sale. They alleged that it should be invalidated
because it was done on a holiday.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreclosure sale should be invalidated?
Held:
No. Said the court in the case of Rural Bank of Caloocan,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 15, in holding that Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code is not applicable to auction sales:
. . . The pretermission of a holiday applies only where the day or the
last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a
holiday, or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on
a holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the
government for an act to be done, as distinguished from a period of
time within which an act should be done, which may be on any day
within that specified period. For example, if a party is required by law to
file his answer to a complaint, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is
deemed moved to the next succeeding business day. But, if the court
fixes the trial of a case on a certain day but the said date is
subsequently declared a public holiday, the trial thereof is not
automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day. Since
April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period, but a
date fixed by the deputy sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be
made on the next succeeding business day without the notices of the
sale on that day being posted as prescribed in Sec. 9, Act. No. 3135. 16
Conformably, the extrajudicial foreclosure conducted on August 19,
1954 was valid, notwithstanding the fact that the said date was
declared a public holiday. Act 3135 merely requires that sufficient
publication and posting of the notice of sale be caused, as required by
law.

Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive

and that service of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein
is invalid. This is the general rule.13 However, it is settled that
substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than
those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 we ruled that although the service of
summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule 14, 13, if it
appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose
has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court enumerated the
requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance,
to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person
served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from
the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a
receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the
summons by the corporation through the person on whom the
summons was actually served.16 The third requisite is the most
important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on
the service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites
were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate court held that
petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that
it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is,
however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned
over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast,
in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule,17 there was
direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person upon whom
it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely
infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For
there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a
corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the
complaint against it through some person or means other than the
person actually served, the service of summons becomes
meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is
serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of
summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation.
Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd
Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.

E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito 312 SCRA

Facts:

Millenium Industrial vs. Tan 326 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage1 over its
real property in favor of respondent Jackson Tan to secure payment of
petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the amount of P2 million.
Petitioner failed to pay. Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint
for foreclosure of mortgage. The summons and a copy of the complaint
were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches,
described in the sheriff's return, dated November 23, 1995, as "a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein,
he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's
Corporation, to receive processes of the Court." Petitioner moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied the MTD. On petition
for review, the CA dismissed the same.

Issue:
Whether the service of summons was proper?
Held:
No. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a
case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby,
the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.10 If
the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of
summons be made upon the corporation's president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.11 The rationale of the
rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated
with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will
realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal
papers received by him.12

Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office

address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at
2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private
respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement
wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at
Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing
subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. Private
respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost
houses, there were no substantial developments therein.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon
the defendant, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at
the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City2 but
the Sheriff's Return of Service3 stated that the summons was duly
served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its
Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at
their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and
evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the
summons.
The defendant filed a MTD. It alleged that summons
intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an
employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. The
MTD was denied.
Issue:
Whether there was proper service of summons?
Held:
No. Rule 14, Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic
corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly

20

registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,

cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In
the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,25 the Court
held:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer
jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom
service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise
the service is insufficient. . . .
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure
that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him. In other words, "to bring home to the corporation notice
of the filing of the action." . . . .
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a
substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation. . .
This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval
Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,31 which became the basis
of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is
now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides
that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance." The emplacement of this rule clearly
underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on
summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not
belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney,
precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction
of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court
cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court
will consequently be null and void.

Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but
represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino.
They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of
the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or
administrator.19 Thus, there was no need to implead them as
defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased coowners had already been made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of
Court were still in effect. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of
Rule 3,20 an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or
defended.21 The present rule,22 however, requires the joinder of the
beneficiary or the party for whose benefit the action is brought. Under
the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue
or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the estate
of petitioners father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio
Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included as defendant23 and
served summons.24 As it was, there was no need to include petitioners
as defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served
summons.
Rule 15 to 19 (Motions-Intervention)
People vs. Perez 397 SCRA
Facts:
Jesus S. Perez was charged of rape and found guilty of rape
"penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610," committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio
Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the Municipality of Palauig, Province of
Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion,
inducement and other consideration, did then and there, wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Mayia P.
Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter."

Ramos vs. Ramos 399 SCRA

He was sentenced to suffer the death penalty. On his appeal,
he questions that the age of the victim was never established thus the
imposition of the death penalty was unwarranted.

Facts:
Petitioners are children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco
Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel of land with his sister Narcisa,
and his brothers Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter
Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold the lot to herein respondents.
Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity
of the sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 a
Complaint6 for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.
The case was ultimately decided by the CA rendering judgment
upholding the sale. The decision became final and executory because
of the lack of appeal. On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a
Motion to Set Aside the Decision. They contended that they had not
been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to summons?
Held:
No. To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to
determine whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
The rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of
the action.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of
the person;15 while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation.16
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an
interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in
question.17 Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the
land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them
owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of
the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any
particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title
to or possession of real property.18 As such, the Complaint was brought
against the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino
and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates.

Issue:
Whether the death penalty was properly imposed?
Held:
Yes. During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence
Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit "A".29 The prosecution submitted its
Offer of Evidence30 which included Exhibit "A", a certified true copy of
Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit "A" 31 without
any objection from the defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea
bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of
evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will
promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.32 Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind
the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure33 provides:
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice."
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During
the trial on December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-three (23)
months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia
testified on cross-examination that she was "8 years old last May 23."34
Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown
in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7)
months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule
that the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia was below
seven years old at the time appellant raped her.

21

Saguid vs. CA 403 SCRA

Facts:
In 1987, Private respondent Gina Rey (17 y/o then) was
separated de facto from her husband. Then she met petitioner. After a
brief courtship, they decided to cohabit as husband and wife. They
were not blessed with children. Jacinto Saguid was a patron of a
fishing vessel. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when
her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. In 1996, the couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
Thereafter, Gina, filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery
of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the
RTC. She was asking for the reimbursement of contributions she made
to their unfinished house and the amount she deposited in their joint
bank account.
In his answer, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the
construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel.
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration14 of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June
2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.15 Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same
was also denied on October 8, 1997. The decision was affirmed by the
CA but deleted the award for damages.
Issue:

rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and

ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner the amount of P2,116,103.31,
as well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR
Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the office of the
Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement. Pursuant to the writ, the
deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna, registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private
respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The property was scheduled for public
auction.
Private respondent filed before the RTC, , a petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo
from proceeding with the public auction. Private respondent alleged
that she co-owned the property subject of the execution sale; that the
property regime between private respondent and her husband was
complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in the
HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to
answer for the separate liability of her husband.
The respondent judge issued a 24 hour TRO. After
conducting a conference, the respondent judge issued the assailed
resolution, granting private respondents petition for prohibition and
declaring the subject property exempt from execution. On April 25,
2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the
resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention.
However, public respondent judge denied the motion. The petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private

respondent to present evidence ex parte

Whether the denial of the motion to intervene was proper?

Held:

Held:

No. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect
as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his
evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof.20 The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration21 showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.22 The motion need not
really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious
defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on
record.23

Yes. Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to

intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the
inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On
the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise
qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a
separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first
is not more important than the second.5

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
is justified because he was not represented by counsel. This
justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing
private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the
petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even
without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion
for extension to file answer,24 the required answer stating therein the
special and affirmative defenses,25 and several other motions.26 If it
were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23,
1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired
from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief.
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged
receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the
court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.27

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment

creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject
real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property
exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be
levied upon.

In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer
is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is
nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a noncriminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of
such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without
the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated.

Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals

Yao vs. Perello 414 SCRA

Facts:
A complaint filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR
Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin,
private respondents husband. The HLURB rendered a decision

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed
had the right to intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance
with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.6
Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the
period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private
respondents petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject
property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the
lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and
executory.

Facts:
The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted
dispute over a sizeable piece of real property situated in what is now
known as Old Balara, Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all
of Quezon City. Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their
dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit
primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC. In particular, petitioners
claimed that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502
hectares, were part of forest lands belonging to the government; that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property
continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years;
and that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their
respective names with the appropriate government agency.
One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the
Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual lot
owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named.

22

Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma

and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave
of court to serve summons by publication which was granted.
Accordingly, the summons was published in the "Metropolitan
Newsweek", a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan
and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective
responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to
answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners
were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the defaulted
respondents. The trial court rendered a partial judgment in favor of the
petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the
above-quoted judgement by default was rendered, a Petition for
Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus4
was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of the
subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgement
which nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no
jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties. They also
alleged that they only came to know of the adverse judgement when
petitioners sought the execution of the judgement by attempting to
dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and making formal
demands for them to vacate their respective properties. Also, they
claimed that the Partial Decision against the defaulted respondents
was null and void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Thereafter,
granted the petition for annulment of judgment.
Issue:
a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the petition for
annulment of judgment?
b. whether publication of the summons made in the
Metropolitan Newsweek?
Held:
a. yes. The case before the Court of Appeals was one for
annulment of judgement, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In
resolving the same, the Court of Appeals need not retry the facts. An
action for annulment of judgement is grounded only on two
justifications: (I) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process.14 All that herein private respondents had to prove was
that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from
having a trial or presenting their case to the trial court by some act or
conduct of petitioners; 15 or that they had been denied due process of
law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack
of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of
law.
The action for annulment of judgement cannot and was not a substitute
for the lost remedy of appeal. The very purpose of the action for
annulment of judgement was to have the final and executory
judgement set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.16
Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts and
evidence presented by the petitioners is meritorious is irrelevant and
immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err, nor did it violate the
petitioners' right to due process of law, when it refused to consider all
the factual issues raised by petitioners.

Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly

complied with the rules, the service of summons would still be
ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time
the complaint for Quieting of title was filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma
Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma
Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6)
years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the
SEC dated January 26,1976.22 Consequently, it could no longer be
sued having lost its juridical personality.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison 612 SCRA

Facts:
The Isog Han Samar Movement filed a letter-complaint with
the Petitioner, Office of the Ombudsman, accusing Governor Milagrosa
T. Tan and other local public officials including the Provincial Budget
Officer, private respondent Maximo D. Sison.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation
dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that
various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper
bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the
President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and
cement were substantially overpriced.
Petitioner found basis to proceed with the administrative
case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar. Private
respondent was required to to file their counter-affidavits and
countervailing evidence against the complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations
contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the
charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a
certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the
corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are
available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the
certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred
that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the
minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. Further, he alleged that
not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the lettercomplaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually
connected nor directly implicated in the complaint.
The petitioner rendered a decision finding Sison and several other local
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissing him from service.
Private respondent appealed to the CA a Petition for Review under
Rule 43. On June 26, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Then, petitioner filed on
July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion
for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration,
which was subsequently denied by the CA
Issue:
a. whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to
intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered
by the CA.
b. whether the motion to intervene was timely filed?

b. No. While the service of summons by publication may

have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the
fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City .The Rules strictly require that
publication must be "in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order."18 The court orders
relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of
time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such
specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict
requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo
coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the
service by publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons
should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the respondents,19 and failure to strictly comply with
the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a
fatal defect in the service of summons.20 It cannot be over emphasized
that the statutory requirements of service of summons, whether
personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that
prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.

Held:
a. No. (citing Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 19) Simply, intervention is
a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but
claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order
to protect their right or interpose their claim.10 Its main purpose is to
settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or
the whole controversy among, the persons involved.11
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two
requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment.

23

(citing PNB vs. Garcia) Based on the facts above, the Office of the
Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in the
appellate court for the following reasons:
First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges
against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case, OMB-C-A05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being,
unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to
intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal.
And third, Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals15 and National Appellate Board of the National Police
Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),16 in which this Court qualified
and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to
actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases.
In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a
decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975
authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows
appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from
the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining
authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes
that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government
party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative
case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will
result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case,
instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant
in prosecuting the respondent.

the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have
already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.
They presented Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel
and Rodolfo; the birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and their
respective proof of births.
Bernardino, appointed special administrator opposed the
intervention on the ground that the birth certificate of their mother,
Sylvia, revealed that Isabel and had a previous and subsisting
marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married
to Rodolfo. Hence, Rodolfo and Isabel could not have entered into a
valid marriage.
The trial court allowed the petitioners to intervene. The CA
reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the
orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to
intervene in the settlement proceedings.
Held:
NO. A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary
in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial
procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding
may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise stated, a court has no
authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an
uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply
an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the
allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be
the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of
error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.

Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to

intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More
importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an
advocate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a

previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately
established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.

It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from

cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review.
The raison detre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not
active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing
parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to
decide the issues without the judges active participation.17 When
judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a
way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a

marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48
Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49

b. No. Furthermore, the Rules provide explicitly that a motion to

intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was
promulgated on June 26, 2008.
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the
appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall
be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of
service of a copy on the court or agency a quo.23 Clearly, the Office of
the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to
intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be
countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an
"activist watchman," not merely a passive onlooker.

Anonuevo vs. Interstate Estate of Jalandoni 636 SCRA

Facts:
In 1967, Bernardo Jalandoni, brother of Rodolfo Jalandoni,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration to commence
the judicial settlement of the latters estate.(still pending)
In 2003, a manifestation was made by petitioners and their
siblings. They introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee
Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of
Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. The petitioners and their
siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of
Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which reason,
Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and
their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the
intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it was, by

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as

the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries:
(a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is
their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvias
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima
facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the
facts attested.52 In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings
offered no such rebuttal.
Rules 21, 23 to 32 (Modes of Discovery)
DASMARIAS Garments vs. Reyes 225 SCRA
Facts:
The American President Lines, Ltd.(APL) sued Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. (Dasma) for recovery of sum of money. Dasma
specifically denied the allegations of APL in its Answer and asserted
counterclaims.
The trial was set for hearing. AML presented its first witness.
The case was reset for the taking of the testimony of two (2) more
witnesses in APL's behalf. On the date of the trial, instead of
presenting the witnesses, APL moved to take the depositions of H. Lee
and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose,
a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in
Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating
that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan
in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set
up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces
which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.,"
The motion was opposed by Dasma. It argued that (a) the
motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign

24

court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters

rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined
before
the
Philippine
Court;"
and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness
must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."
The trial court granted the motion. An MR was filed but was
also denied. A special civil action for certiorari was filed to the CA. The
petition was denied. MR was also denied.
Issue:
Whether the taking of the deposition should be allowed?
Held:
Yes. It is apparent then that the deposition of any person
may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the
party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken
before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules
of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken:
(a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken
before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and
the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24).
After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished
within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or
contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is
required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every
other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined,
if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient
to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . .
" (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party
moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or
(2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the depositiontaking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall
not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present
except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec.
16,
Rule
24),
or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is
being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule
24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the
Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken
only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory.(citing Sec. 12 Rule 24)
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by
a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to
take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or
tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic
Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be
defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a
judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be
examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the
former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to
whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic
Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a
commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by
name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are addressed to some
"appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this
connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be
applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned
unexecuted.
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to
the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to
take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by
deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said
Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a
"Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of
Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China,
Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of the
latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition
for review on certiorari) a prima facie showing not rebutted by
petitioner.

Allied Agri-Business vs CA 299 SCRA

Facts:
Cherry Valley Farms Limited (CHERRY), a foreign
corporation, filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money against
Allied Agri-Business Development Co. Inc. (ALLIED). It alleged that
petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten (10) separate orders and received
from respondent CHERRY VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and
ducklings which in value totalled 51,245.12 which ALLIED did not pay
despite repeated demands. ALLIED filed its answer questioning
CHERRYS capacity to sue.
Thereafter, CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIED's counsel a
Request
for
Admission.
ALLIED
filed
its Comments/Objections 3 alleging that: (a) the admissions requested
were matters which the private respondent had the burden to prove
through its own witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not
answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding the ownership
set-up of petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not
having been pleaded in the complaint. In CHERRYS reply, it
maintained that there was no need on its part to produce a witness to
testify on the matters requested for admission, for these pertained to
incidents personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner alone.
Thereafter, CHERRY filed a motion with the trial court to resolve the
objections of ALLIED to the request for admission.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering ALLIED to
answer the Request for Admission. An MR was filed but was denied.
The period to file the Answer was extended but again, ALLIED failed to
submit the same. Subsequently, CHERRY moved for summary
judgment 7 alleging that there was already an implied admission on the
matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court.
The trial court granted the motion and ruled in
favor of CHERRY. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for
summary judgment?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner cannot also successfully argue that its failure
to answer the request for admission did not result in its admission of
the matters stated in the request. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 1. Request for admission. At any time after
issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission by the latter of the genuineness of
any material and relevant document described in
and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have
already been furnished.
The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and
genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of
the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the
truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the
matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less
than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time
as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is
directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. 12 Upon service of
request for admission, the party served may do any of the following
acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is
requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit
the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving
upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within
the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10)
days after service, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement. denying
specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he
may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an
admission is requested. 13
The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial court its
comments and objections to the request for admission served on it by
private respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections and
directed petitioner after denying its motion for reconsideration, to
answer the request within five (5) days from receipt of the directive;
otherwise, the matters of which the admission was requested would be

25

deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within

the period. The matters set forth in the request were therefore deemed
admitted by petitioner, i.e., (a) that for a period of six (6) months
starting from 1 September 1982, petitioner ordered and received from
respondent CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings amounting to
51,245.12; (b) that petitioner received a letter dated 22 March 1985
from private respondent's lawyer demanding payment of the amount of
the purchases; (c) that instead of paying the obligation to respondent
CHERRY VALLEY, petitioner's president Ricardo Quintos sent a letter
to the former proposing the establishment of a new corporation with
CHERRY VALLEY as one of the stockholders; (d) that the proposal
was refused by the Director of CHERRY VALLEY; and, (e) that
petitioner's president Ricardo Quintos admitted the indebtedness of his
corporation to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling Pounds
51,245.12.
People vs. Webb 312 SCRA 573
Facts:
Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in
Criminal Case entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, et al. During the course of the proceedings in the trial court,
respondent filed Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition 1 praying
that he be allowed to take the testimonies of 5 officials of the us govt.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said
motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court,
contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no
application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides
for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not
during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses
for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.
The trial court denied the motion of respondent.
Respondents MR was also denied. Dissatisfied, respondent elevated
his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari
under rule 65. The CA granted the petition and annulled the trial courts
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion
in denying the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the
United States which would be used in the criminal case before her
Court?
Held:
No. The purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give
greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of
detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make
available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which
otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate
the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.]
Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow
the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and
trial.22 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping
with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not
during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice particularly on the
defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the criminal
proceedings against him in the court below states that when a
person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for
the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for
filing a pre-trial motion.23
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking
the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any objection
and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense
Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been
rendered moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned
documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10,
1998.24
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence
to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or
corroborative at best. A careful examination of Exhibits "218" and "219"
readily shows that these are of the same species of documents which
have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial
court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb, et al. v.
People of the Philippines, et al.25 wherein We pointed out, among

others, "[t]hat respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and

already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the
defects in (their) admissibility have been cured though the introduction
of additional evidence during the trial on the merits"."

Rule 33 to 38 (Demurrer-Relief from Judgment)

Rule 33 Demurrer
Bernardo vs. CA 278 SCRA 782
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with 4 counts of B.P. 22. After
presenting its last witness, the prosecution rested its case and formally
offered its exhibits. The case was reset and the prosecution formally
offered its evidence. Counsel for the accused, manifested in open
court, for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court denied
the motion. Counsel for the defense moved for reconsideration. Again,
the Court denied the same. Then, counsel for the defense stated that
In which case your honor, if there is no leave of court, we will be filing
our demurrer to evidence, your honor . Therafter, the trial court gave
the following order, Alright, the prosecution having rested, and the
defense having been considered to have waived his right to present his
evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision. Set the
promulgation of this case to June 6, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
Petitioner assailed the Order of respondent judge
hereinbefore immediately quoted before the Court of Appeals by way
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner argued that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in considering her to have
waived her right to present evidence after the denial of her motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision modifying in effect that portion of the questioned order. The
CA ordered the the trial court to set for trial for reception of evidence for
the petitioner."9 Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals but her motion was denied.
Petitioner Bernardo filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that
when it refused to allow petitioner to demur to the evidence the
appellate court decided the matter not in accordance with law and
applicable decisions of this Court. 10 Petitioner submits that when her
counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on 20 May 1994
this meant that she intended to make a written demurrer after
extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same;
that when the trial court denied her motion, it was in effect a denial only
of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the
demurrer to evidence itself and, therefore, the order of respondent
appellate court allowing petitioner to present her evidence was
premature. Petitioner further contends that she should first be given the
opportunity to file her demurrer to evidence and wait for its denial with
finality before she could be directed to present her evidence before the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense has waived its right to present
evidence?
Held:
Yes. As the trial court observed, her move, expressed
through counsel, was merely "dilatory." 12 But neither can we affirm the
ruling of respondent Court of Appeals directing the trial court to receive
the evidence of the defense after its motion for leave to file a demurrer
to evidence was denied. It is contrary to the letter and spirit of Sec. 15,
Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the
accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of
court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his
demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court,
or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused
to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer
is merely stalling the proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20
May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a demurrer
to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15,
Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to
submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However,
even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for
leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of
presenting evidence in her defense.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to
evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused
to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is
not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files

26

his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has

discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse
left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the
instant case, the trial court's denial of prior leave to file demurrer to
evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 17 However, any
judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the
accused to the appellate court.
Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. Del Rosario 335 SCRA
Facts:
Spouses Del Rosario executed a PN in favor of petitioners.
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite
repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligations under their
Promissory Note. Petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money. The
trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for
the petitioner. Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits
and rested its case. Respondents filed a demurrer to evidence. the trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Hence, the this petition.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court was correct in remanding the

and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its

documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public
prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to
end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required
written offer.
Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, 6 complaining of a
turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in
2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Unknown to petitioner
Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the
prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its
formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss. The RTC issued an Order treating
petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer
to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the
RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his
defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar
as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of
this Order but the RTC denied it. Cabador questioned the RTCs
actions before the CA but the latter denied his petition. With the CAs
denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner came to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before
the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of
court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present
evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as
he was concerned.

case?
Held:
Held:
No. Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence,
the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced:
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and
logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a
dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal
motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of
judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains
before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive
the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the
contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as
well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost.
The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in
the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered
evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly
relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts
upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a
correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for
retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility
thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The
rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his
demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal
is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence
in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand
on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the
appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to
render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence.
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the
plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the
trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but
on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present
their own evidence.[16 The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer
aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the
appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and
the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been
admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the
CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled
that the documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should
have been allowed and appreciated xxx, and that the petitioner
presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in
the appealed order, we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient
evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only
frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis
of the facts on record.
Cabador vs. People 602 SCRA 760
Facts:
Petitioner was charged of murdering Atty. Jun N. Valerio.
After presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial,
the RTC declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence

No. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on

the ground of denial of the accuseds right to speedy trial. 14This denial
is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays
without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that
unreasonably prolonged the trial.15 This was the main thrust of
Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a
ruling by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to
dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court "has
no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that
"the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any
participation by the accused in the incident." But these were mere
conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so
fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such
evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His socalled "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one
witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not
because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal
offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. 16 To
say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the
proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming
that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the
prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case,
the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by
the accused with or without leave of court.
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on
August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the
trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the
admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer.
And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have
rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he
could object to the prosecutions formal offer, before the trial court
could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it
could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve
as a demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the
Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to
evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present
evidence in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the
proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be
exercised17 in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the
accused to present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the
crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
People vs. Sumingwa 603 SCRA 638
Facts:
The prosecution charged appellant with two (2) counts of
Acts of Lasciviousness, four (4) counts of Rape, three (3) counts of
Unjust Vexation, one (1) count of Other Light Threats, one (1) count of
Maltreatment, and one (1) count of Attempted Rape for acts committed
against his minor daughter AAA from 1999-2001.

27

The RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of six (6)

counts of acts of lasciviousness, one (1) count of attempted rape and
one (1) count of unjust vexation.
On appeal to the CA, it affirmed the conviction of appellant,
except that in Criminal Case No. 1646; it convicted him of Qualified
Rape instead of Acts of Lasciviousness.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of light threats, unjust
vexation and maltreatment?
Held:
No. Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light
Threats for threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for
undressing her without her consent, causing disturbance, torment,
distress, and vexation; nor for Maltreatment for boxing the right side of
AAAs buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in the
Information for Attempted Rape in the Order dated September 24,
2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 involving the above
crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence based on the
demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an acquittal.
Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate
the proscription on double jeopardy. Accordingly, appellants conviction
of any of the above crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would
trench in his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Hun Hyung Park vs. Eng Won Choi 515 SCRA
Facts:
Respondent was charged with B.P. 22. He pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued and after the prosecution its case, respondent filed a
motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The METC of
Makati granted the demurrer and dismissed the case.
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its
civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove respondents criminal liability, it did not altogether
extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of
petitioner. Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, however, the
RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the
MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the respondent may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the remand of the
case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, by the
assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon
to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or
priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the
trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged
civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies
the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects
of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between
the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a
court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the
same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence
so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to
establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that
the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance
when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil
aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial

as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this
Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the
court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect
of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and
dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely
borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and
that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner
counters, however, that the payments made by respondent pertained
to other transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual,
a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties
to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
Rule 37 New Trial and Reconsideration
Mendezona vs. Ozamiz 376 SCRA 482
Facts:
A petition for guardianship was filed by respondents over the
person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz. In the course of the
guardianship proceeding, the petitioners and the oppositors thereto
agreed that Carmen Ozamiz needed a guardian over her person and
her properties, and thus respondent Paz O. Montalvan was designated
as guardian over the person of Carmen Ozamiz while petitioner Mario
J. Mendezona, respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz
were designated as joint guardians over the properties of the said
ward.
Montalvan and Ozamiz filed with the guardianship court their
inventories and Accounts , listing therein Carmen Ozamizs properties,
cash, shares of stock, vehicles and fixed assets, including a 10,396
square meter property known as the Lahug property. Said Lahug
property is the same property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of the
petitioners. Respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz
caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice
of lis pendens, regarding Special Proceeding No. 1250, thus giving rise
to the suit for quieting of title filed by herein petitioners.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioners. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
reversed the findings of the trial court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the petitioners filed a
motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. They
contended, among other things, that the appellate court totally ignored
the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental
condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale in question. The said testimony was taken in the
Special
Proceeding
No.
1250
in
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. However, Judge Durias was
not presented as a witness. Petitioners alleged that Judge Duriass
testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due
diligence. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Judge Durias is Newly Discovered
Evidence?
Held:
No. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had
been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if
admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must
characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not
been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar,
the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible
witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents
chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of
evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present
as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another case be
considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified
to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial,
could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below.[16The
testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be
elicited from him by questioning.
It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where
the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the
pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the
course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure

28

it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know
the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from
co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public
records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control
of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in
other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery
procedures.[18 Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
Mesina vs. Meer 383 SCRA 625
Facts:
Respondent discovered that his title to a parcel of land in
Pandacan, Manila was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of
Sergio and Lerma Bunquin. It appeared that the latter acquired said
property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June 3, 1985 purportedly
executed by respondent in their favor. respondent sought the
cancellation of the TCT issued to the Bunquins with MTC. On the same
day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of TCT.
While the case was pending, the TCT issued to the Bunquins
was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina. It appears that
the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners on
September 28, 1993, even prior to the annotation of lis pendens. Due
to the foregoing developments, Meer impleaded petitioners as
additional party defendants.
Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during the
hearings, leading the court to declare them in default. Petitioners,
however, participated actively in defense of their position.
The trial court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and
Banquin was fraudulent. However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in
good faith and thus were entitled to the possession of the subject
property. Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration against
the said Decision but the trial court denied the same. Respondent
thereafter filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC
reversed the MeTC and held that petitioners were not purchasers in
good faith, reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and
not the date of its consummation that will confer title to the property.
Since the Deed of Sale was registered subsequent to the annotation of
the lis pendens, petitioners were bound by the outcome of the case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs
decision. After the reglementary period for appeal has lapsed,
petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the
Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution on the following reasons: (a)
extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from
presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the
judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b) mistake and
excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an
appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and
substantial defense in his action. The CA denied the petition and the
MR subsequent thereto.
Issue:
Is Petition for Relief under Rule 38 available against the
judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction?
Held:
No. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5,
prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial
courts21 and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts
of record.22 While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to
municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court 24 and
may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As
it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals25 allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court
of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioners allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at
issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default
of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have
questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the
proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their efforts
were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional
Trial Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial
Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals
sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for
consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to
benefit from their own negligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by
the petitioners in support of their petition. These contentions should
have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to them
since the beginning.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a

mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be

tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost
either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of
procedure by counsel.27 Petitioners, however, place the blame on their
counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack
legal education, hence, were not aware of the required period for filing
an appeal.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so
palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party
a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is
unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have
squandered the various opportunities available to them at the different
stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation
and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality
will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
Garcia vs. CA 336 SCRA 475
Facts:
Florencio Junior Garcia, representing himself as attorney in
fact of the herein petitioners, brought in the name of the latter, an
action for collection of sum of money, against the private respondents.
Respondent Rural Bank of Sara, Inc., Anthony Cabugso, and Leda
Suello, (manager and cashier, respectively, of respondent bank), filed
their answer contending by way of special and affirmative defenses.
The respondent spouses, Rafael Dinglasan and Maria Elena
Dinglasan, likewise filed their answer contending by way of special and
affirmative defenses.
Then, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
asseverating that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
since the pleadings and supporting affidavits submitted are barren of
any genuine issue which may be controverted. The trial court denied
the motion. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals, theorizing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
denying their subject motion. The CA upheld the trial courts decision.
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present
Petition.
Issue:
Whether summary judgment is proper?
Held:
No. The Court citing Sec. 1 and 3 of Rule 34 explained: A
summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of
damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
The aforecited rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction
to summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives it
limited authority to render summary judgment only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact at bar. Upon a motion for summary
judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine whether or not
there is an issue of fact to be tried, and any doubt as to the existence
of an issue of fact must be resolved against the movant. Courts are
quite critical of the papers presented by the moving party but not of the
papers in opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most
favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the
benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiff's
showing that defendant is unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a
sufficient basis to assume that the allegations of defendant are sham,
frivolous or unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant
is legally sufficient and does not appear patently sham, the motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
In the case under consideration, the pleadings and exhibits
on record reveal that there exist genuine issues on material or
pertinent facts sufficient to preclude a rendition of summary judgment.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the pleadings submitted
below by the parties raise the following issues:
"1. Whether or not Florencio Junior Garcia is properly
authorized to file the complaint for the plaintiffs named in the title of the
complaint.
2. Whether or not defendants (private respondents) spouses
Dinglasan may be held jointly and severally liable with their codefendant (co-private respondent) rural bank."
People vs. Li Ka Kim 429 SCRA 169
Facts:
An Information was filed against appellant for the Sale,
Administration, Dispension, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs under RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drug Act. During
arraignment, he did not plead, thus, a plea of not guilty was entered.
After trial, the RTC convicted the appellant. On appeal, he filed a
motion seeking to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be
given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his
passport which would establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a
Chinese National, and as having entered the Philippines as a tourist.

29

Invoking his constitutional right to an effective counsel, appellant

chides his former counsel for having failed to secure and present his
travel documents.
Issue:
Whether the motion should be granted?
Held:
No. The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to
justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change
the judgment.8
Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants
passport could have easily been presented and produced during the
trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport, would hardly
be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the
crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim
at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, 9that bolsters the conclusion that
appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious
enterprise.

Mercury Drug Corp. vs. CA 335 SCRA 567

NO. The Court cited Sec 1 and 3 of Rule 38 and explained: A

petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed
only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail himself of this petition. 9 In order for a petition for relief to
be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that
he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. 10 It
is also incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was
filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38
(within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken).11 And the rule is that the reglementary period is
reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of the
decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for
purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the
judgment of the lower court through their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou
I. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have
received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served
notice and not on March 24, 1995 when they actually learned of the
adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for relief, which was filed
on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was
filed out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a
partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable
him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not
excusable.13 However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon
the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.

Facts:
Rules 40-56
Mercury filed a complaint against respondent (spouses Yee)
for annulment and/or reformation of contract of lease. It was alleged
that it is stipulated in their contract that in case of official devaluation of
the Philippine pesos, the parties hereto shall by mutual consent make
the necessary adjustment in the rate of rentals. Petitioners sought the
increase of the monthly rentals from P6,900.00 to P50,000.00.
Private Respondents demand for increase of rentals had
been refused by lessee Mercury Drug Corporation on the ground that
there was no official devaluation of the peso thus no basis for a rental
increase. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner but it ordered the
increase of the rent up to 30% of its current amount.
The former counsel for the petitioners Atty. Ralph Lou I.
Willkom received a copy of the decision on 3 March 1995 but did not
inform petitioners nor take any step to protect the interests of his
clients by presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal.
Petitioners learned of the judgment only on 24 March 1995 when they
visited his office. The 15-day period within which to appeal lapsed. On
15 May 1995 petitioners filed thru their present counsel a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38.
The trial court denied the petition. A MR was filed
but was also denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts
decision. A MR was filed but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the petition for relief was filed on time?

Held:

Latorre vs. Latorre 617 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before
the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint[3] for Collection and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for
Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban
Latorre. She alleged that they are co-owners of the a house and lot
located at Dasma village, Makati City and that said lot was donated to
The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre
Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Then, the donation was revoked but
the revocation was not registered.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improperly laid venue. He alleged that since it is a question involving
title to or possession of real property, the venue should have been in
Makati and not in Muntinlupa. The trial court denied the motion.
Undaunted, respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam insisting, among
others, that the case was a real action and that the venue was
improperly laid.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. A MR was filed but was denied. Then, petitioner filed directly
with the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether the mode of appeal used by petitioner was correct?
Held:
NO. Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41,
of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law.
In Murillo v. Consul,[22] we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted
by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court
had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of
error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review,
where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court
of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the
CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The

30

third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme
Court only on questions of law.
In her Reply to respondent's Comment,[26] petitioner prayed that this
Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require
the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence
presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate
this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It
thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with
this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to
this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court
will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

Manaloto vs. Veloso III

Facts:
A complaint for UD was filed by petitioner against
respondents. The METC in said case ruled in favor of petitioner but
was later reversed by the RTC. The case was elevated up to the SC.
The RTCs decision was sustained all the way and became final and
executor.
Whilst respondent's appeal of the METC decision was
pending, respondent filed Complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damages4 against the petitioners. The first cause of action was for
damages
because
the
respondent
supposedly
suffered
embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of
the above-mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to
the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was
still pending before the Quezon City RTC. The second cause of action
was for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make
continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it
tenantable.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the
complaint, arguing that, respondent had no cause of action against
them because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was a
matter of public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law
or any legal right of the respondent. Moreover, petitioners averred that
the respondent's present Complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damages was barred by prior judgment since it was a mere replication
of respondent's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful
detainer case before the MeTC. The said unlawful detainer case was
already judicially decided with finality.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. Respondent received a
copy of the dismissal on September 26, 2003. He filed a MR of said
judgment on October 10, 2003 which was denied on December 30,
2003. Respondent received a copy of the order denying the MR on
February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal 9 on March 1,
2004. However, the RTC dismissed respondent's appeal for being filed
out of time. Respondent filed a MR of said dismissal which the RTC
granted. It stated in its decision it was "convinced that it is but
appropriate and fair to both parties that this matter of whether or not
the Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appellate court rather
than by this Court."
The Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated February 8,
2005, resolved to give due course to respondent's appeal. Then, the
CA affirmed the RTCs decision in so far as dismissing the first cause of
action but it found petitioners liable for damages. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether respondent timely filed his appeal?
Held:
Yes. Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule,"
according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of
Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original
judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial
court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,17 we presented a survey of the
cases applying the fresh period rule:
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court
of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is
allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with
the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal

within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
(The SC cited several cases reiterating the same doctrine; it also
explained the retroactive application of the fresh day period.)
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for
appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the
general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. 19(Emphases
supplied.)
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution
dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003.
Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227
denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated
December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20,
2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his
Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was
able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, and
the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 82610.
Land Bank of the Phils. Vs. De Leon 399 SCRA
Facts:
Herein respondents, spouses De Leon filed a petition to fix
the just compensation of a parcel of land 2 before the RTC of Tarlac
acting as a Special Agrarian Court. The agrarian court rendered
summary judgment fixing the compensation of the subject property as
follows: (1) P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2)
P2,957,250 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) and
LBP both filed separate appeals using different modes. DAR filed a
petition for review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a
notice of appeal, both with the CA. DARs petition for review was given
due course, while, LBPs appeal was dismissed. LBP appealed to the
SC which affirmed the CAs decision. LBP filed a MR of said decision.
Issue:
What is the proper mode of appeal in decisions made by the
RTC, acting as a special agrarian court?
Held:
Petition for Review. In accordance with our constitutional
power to review rules of procedure of special courts, 15 our Decision in
the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a
rule on the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. In determining whether a rule of procedure affects
substantive rights, the test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto,16 which
provides that:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure. (italics supplied)
We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper
mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of

31

procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given

retroactive application, it will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because
pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright
on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It
would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a
party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith
thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
(WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002
and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated November
11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the
Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling
therein that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases
appealed after the finality of this Resolution.)

by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals

are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[21

Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals 417 SCRA

After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to disturb the

affirmance by the CA of the findings of the trial court that the private
respondents have checked-in on time; that they reached the airport at
6:20 a.m., based on the testimonies of private respondent Judy Amor,
and witnesses Salvador Gonzales and Atty. Owen Amor who were
consistent in their declarations on the witness stand and corroborated
one anothers statements; and that the testimony of petitioners lone
witness, Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private respondents
evidence.

Facts:
Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian
Carlo Amor, represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor
Carlo Benitez, represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed with
the RTC of Sorsogon, a complaint[3 for damages against petitioner
due to the latters failure to honor their confirmed tickets.
It is alleged in their complaint that Judy Amor purchased
three confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo
Amor as well as her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m.
flight, PR 178, bound for Manila from defendants branch office
in Legaspi City. On said date, Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo
Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at
6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the
confirmed ticket of a certain Dra. Emily Chua. They were accompanied
by Atty. Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell
in line at the check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three
persons behind him.
While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd
Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas wrote
something on the tickets which Gonzales later read as late checkin 7:05. When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of
private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to
the cashier to make arrangements. Salvador then went to Atty. Amor
and told him about the situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas,
pointing out that it is only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at
him or utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with Delfin
Canonizado and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to
no avail. Private respondents were not able to board said flight. The
plane left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind the original schedule.
Private respondents then went to the Bus terminals hoping to
catch a ride for Manila. Finding none, they went back to the airport and
tried to catch an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m. flight, PR
278, was cancelled due to aircraft situation.[11 Private respondents
were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180. They checked-in their
bags and were told to hand in their tickets. Later, a PAL employee at
the check-in counter called out the name of private respondent minor
Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff Judy approached the counter and was told by
the PAL personnel that they cannot be accommodated. Fojas who was
also at the counter then removed the boarding passes inserted in
private respondents tickets as well as the tags from their luggages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in upholding the RTCs decision
in favor of respondents?
Held:
Yes. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[18 Factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially
when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court.[19 This is
because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again.[20However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h)
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed

Petitioner invokes exception (b).

As to the first issue: Whether or not private respondents checked-in on
time for PR 178. The determination of this issue is necessary because
it is expressly stipulated in the airline tickets issued to private
respondents that PAL will consider the reserved seat cancelled if the
passenger fails to check-in at least thirty minutes before the published
departure time.[22

Estinozo vs. Court of Appeals 544 SCRA

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa under Art. 315 par 2 (a)
of the RPC. (Illegal recruiter; waray; southern leyte)
She was found guilty by the trial court. On appeal, the CA
affirmed her conviction. Then, petitioner, within the 15-day
reglementary period filed with the appellate court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied
the motion. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
denial but the appellate court denied the same. Displeased with this
series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether the remedy was proper?
Held:
No. Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong
remedy to question the appellate courts issuances. Section 1 of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari.35 Considering
that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she
effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action
for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse,
which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.36
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition
for certiorari under
Rule
65
are
mutually
exclusive
remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy.37 The nature of the questions of law intended to be
raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or
final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal,
not certiorari as a special civil action.38
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an
appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for
because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in
the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without exception,
is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion
for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases
before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound
discretion grant the extension requested.39 This rule also applies even
if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.40 Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioners
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.
It is well to point out that with petitioners erroneous filing of a motion
for extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review from the CAs decision, the
challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be
reviewed by this Court. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even
substitute for the lost appeal41certiorari is not a procedural device to
deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her
favor.42 When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the
power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to

32

litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to
assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed
with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties."

Rule 39

Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the

Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof.

A.M. No. P-02-1535

March 28, 2003

FERNANDO FAJARDO, complainant, vs.SHERIFF RODOLFO V.

QUITALIG, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, respondent.
FACTS:
Fajardo filed a complaint for ejectment against Maria Datuin. On
appeal to the RTC, the court ruled in favor of Fajardo and the decision
became final and executory on November 29, 1999. Fajardos lawyer
filed a Motion for Execution, and on March 7, 2000, the Court issued a
Writ of Execution, which was brought by the respondent Sheriff to the
defendant Maria Datuin on March 9, 2000.
"Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was served,
defendant asked for a period of two (2) weeks for her to remove her
personal properties on the land. After two (2) weeks he went to Sheriff
Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be implemented but he was
told that a restraining order was issued, but when he asked for it, the
respondent told him that he left it in the office.
However, upon verification on March 24, 2000, they found that there
was no restraining order issued by the court. Fajardo told the
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. Respondent,
accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the
place where the Writ of Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that
morning but when they reached the place, respondent did not do
anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her personal
properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office, Mr.
Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order
was brought to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ of
execution can no longer be implemented.
Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or showed partiality in
favor of the defendant to his prejudice.
The Office of the Court Admistrator (OCA) found the Sherrif to have
been negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff.
ISSUE:

Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return

of the Writ after duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
Nonetheless, because of the request of the defendant and her promise
that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000, he allowed her
to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24, 2000, he
was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC of
San Carlos, Pangasinan. He averred that he was finally able to
execute the Writ on August 24, 2000 and to submit his Return thereof
on the next day.
We find respondents explanation to be utterly wanting. He is guilty of
dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the
Writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of
Service within the same period, (3) make periodic reports to the MTCC
until the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with
copies of the Reports.
By his own words, respondent admitted his dereliction of duty.
First, as we have said earlier, he should have immediately executed
the Writ when he served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he
was unable to enforce the Writ because another court had issued a
TRO enjoining him from doing so.
Third, he should have informed the parties, particularly the plaintiff or
his counsel, about his inability to enforce the Writ.
Fourth, he should have immediately enforced it twenty days after its
issuance.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the MTCC until the
judgment was fully satisfied and the parties furnished a copy thereof.
Sixth, within thirty days from his receipt of the Writ, he should have
promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should have
immediately furnished the parties.
Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if not
outright defiance, of the MTCCs authority. In the absence of
instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with
reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with its mandate.

Was Sheriff Quitalig guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff?

HELD:
Yes.
As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to
maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. Having the
forsworn duty to uphold the majesty of the law, they must see to it that
the final stage in the litigation process is carried out without
unnecessary delay.
A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced
the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as
shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from
receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully
satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report
on the action taken on a writ of execution. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the
Rules provides the manner in which the execution is to be
implemented, as follows:
"SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of execution shall be
returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full
within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall
continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every

In Lumbre v. Dela Cruz,15 respondent, after being found guilty of an

inexcusable seven-month delay in carrying out a lawful Writ of
Execution was fined P5,000. Justifying the penalty, the Court said:
"When a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
duty, in the absence of contrary instructions, to have it implemented
forthwith. The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and
efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from the
court and its branches, including such as may be properly delegated to
him by other courts. The delay of more than seven months, from the
time the writ of execution was issued by the court on 07 August 1998 to
the time when respondent sheriff posted the notice of sale or levy on
23 March 1999, is an inordinately long period for respondent to act
thereon. The importance of the role played by all court personnel in the
administration of justice is never to be taken lightly. It is the sheriffs
particularly who are depended on, and who must properly attend to,
the proper implementation of court decrees and orders, and they are
expected to do so with utmost diligence and dispatch."16
WHEREFORE, Sheriff Rodolfo V. Quitalig is found guilty of dereliction
of duty and is ordered to pay a FINE of five thousand pesos (P5,000).
Considering that he has already retired from the service, this amount is
hereby ordered deducted from his retirement benefits.

33