Family Art36 Cases

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF
PERSONALITY DISORDER. In Leouel Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has
been
to
confine
the
meaning
of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases
of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that
"the
psychological
incapacity
must
be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT
REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN PERFORMANCE OF
MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS
OR
INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. On the
other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of 'irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence
adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity
of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
1|Family
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ARTICLE 36. The following guidelines in the

interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
PADILLA, J., Separate Statement:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF
EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE
FACTS OF THE CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST
TAKE PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU
AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID
SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF
THE TRIAL COURT. I concur in the result of
the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban
but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.

As to whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion:
MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING
PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. The majority
opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling,
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the
latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the
present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons, it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT
BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS. I
would add that neither should the incapacity be
the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:
OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ ALONG
WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. In
determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but
2|Family
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for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab

initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage
merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are
not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 of the Family
Code
cannot
be
taken
and
construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. In fine, the term
psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests;
viz: First, the incapacity must be psychological or
mental not physical, in nature; Second, the
psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand assume
and discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or
serious and incurable.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an
entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions
to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel

provision in specific cases. In the present case
and in the context of the herein assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
\
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990
with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of
a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina
was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility"
as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner
of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that
a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrelsome individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest
to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
3|Family
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In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo

admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the
following were stipulated:
"1.That the parties herein were legally married on
April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2.That out of their marriage, a child named Albert
Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;
4.That petitioner is not asking support for her and
her child;
5.That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6.That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of
her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as
well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She
also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A"
to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that
"the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect
interpretation
of
the
phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the

respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the Committee)
intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights . . .." It
concluded that:
"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychological incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to
their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these
discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity'
to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
4|Family
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Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the

Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that
"the
psychological
incapacity
must
be
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is
no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital
obligations.
Mere
showing
of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable
psychiatric
disorder
but
only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified: 8
"COURT
QIt is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
AYes, Your Honor.
QThere is no hope for the marriage?
AThere is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
QIs it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
AYes, Your Honor.
QNeither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
AYes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions."
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that
his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was

made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case visa-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts in
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes
this occasion to thank these friends of the Court
for their informative and interesting discussions
during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
5|Family
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symptoms may be physical. The evidence must

convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be

stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature." 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,
we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
6|Family
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The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo

Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ .,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur in
the result.
Padilla, Romero, Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.]
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Alexander G. Amor for petitioner.
J.T. Baurera for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; DISMISSAL;
ABSENCE OF CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING, VALID GROUND. The petition
should be denied not only because of its noncompliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-forum shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
2.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE;
ANNULMENT BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; MERE FAILURE TO RETURN
HOME FOR MORE THAN FIVE (5) YEARS, NOT
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY. Leouel argues that the failure of
Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years
are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. Until further statutory and
jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the
degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate
and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed.
The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable. Marriage is not an
adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and
even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that "Article 1. Marriage is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable

social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code." (Italics supplied.) The above provisions
express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus
of our laws on marriage and the family, and they
are no doubt the tenets we still hold on to. The
factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE
UNDER
CANON
LAW,
AN
AID
IN
THE
INTERPRETATION THEREOF. Although neither
decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the
time of the code's enactment, nevertheless,
cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value
as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
4.ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, CONSTRUED. It should be
obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations
of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that
the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical
authorities,
extremely
low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American
Psychiatric
Association;
Edward
Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
7|Family
Code
Art
36
cases
most serious cases of personality disorders

clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER FORMS OF PSYCHOSES
MAY
BE
CONSIDERED
INDICIA
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. The other
forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various
circumstances
being
themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
INCAPACITY; FAILURE TO RETURN HOME FOR
MORE
THAN
FIVE
(5)
YEARS,
NOT
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR NULLITY. I agree
that under the circumstances of the case,
petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage
declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of private respondent.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON WHY PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
WAS
NOT
DEFINED.
By
incorporating what is now Article 36 into the
Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to
above intended to add another ground to those
already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for
nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of
the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration
of nullity based on it should be treated on a caseto-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition
and an enumeration of what constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
Moreover,
the
Committee feared that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law
requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological
incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is

open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be
guided by "experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."
PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion:
INCAPACITY;
INDICATED
BY
LACK
OF
INTENTION TO COHABIT WITH SPOUSE IN
CASE AT BAR. To my mind, it is clear that
private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of
living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live
and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent. A spouse's obligation to live and
cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the
part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner,
bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical
reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the
spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect
for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contacts
with the other to inform the latter of his/her
condition and whereabouts. In the present case, it
is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with
petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact
with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that
she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of
living and cohabiting with him. To me there
appears to be, on the part of private respondent,
an unmistakable indication of psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were
made manifest after the celebration of the
marriage. It would be a great injustice, I believe,
to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties
has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
8|Family
Code
Art
36
cases
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A SANCTION FOR

ABSOLUTE DIVORCE; EVIDENT PURPOSE OF
LAW MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION
IN GRANT OR DENIAL THEREOF; BASIC
PUBLIC POLICY INVOLVED. Besides, there
are public policy considerations involved in the
ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect,
directly
or
indirectly,
facilitating
the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because
he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled? I do not go as far as to suggest that Art.
36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict
it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and
thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
"Article 36.A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
The present petition for review on certiorari, at
the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeals, 2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held
the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to
be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz,
Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos,
Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the
frequent interference by Julia's parents into the

young spouses' family affairs. Occasionally, the
couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number
of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United
Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines from 10 April up to 25 August
1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come
home, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental. cdasia
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain
a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its
report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences
had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of
its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-forum shopping,
but also for its lack of merit. cdasia
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
". . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for
(him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia9|Family
Code
Art
36
cases
Santos failed all these years to communicate with

the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period
of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. Respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos is one such wife."
The Family Code did not define the term
"psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
"'Article 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
'xxx xxx xxx
'Article 36. . . .
'(7)Those marriages contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.'cdasia
"On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the
Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say 'wanting in sufficient use' instead of
'wanting in the sufficient use,' but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say 'wanting in
the sufficient use.' On the other hand Justice
Reyes proposed that they say 'wanting in
sufficient reason.' Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking
in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise
of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is
more serious than insufficient use of judgment
and yet the latter would make the marriage null
and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"'That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
is made manifest after the celebration.'
"Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase 'was
wanting in sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage'
refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph
(7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital

obligations.
"Judge Diy raised the question: Since 'insanity' is
also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
'insanity' only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration of nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it
is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
"Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word 'mentally' be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, preferred to retain the word 'mentally.'
"Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said
that it is called selective impotency.
"Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion
lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages. Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction. cdasia
"Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the
defects in marriage cannot be cured.
"Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is:
Why is 'insanity' a ground for voidable marriage,
while 'psychological or mental incapacity' is a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable
and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
"On another point, Justice Puno suggested that
the phrase 'even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest' be modified to read 'even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest.'
"Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the
time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
"Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase 'psychologically or
mentally incapacitated' in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know
all the consequences of the marriages, and if he
10 | F a m i l y
Code
Art
36
cases
had known these completely, he might not have

consented to the marriage.
"xxx xxx xxx

"Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one
who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as
if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce. cdasia
"xxx xxx xxx
"Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in
the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there
is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear
that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and
it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant
to marriage.
"xxx xxx xxx
"On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth
P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked
if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is affected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation
of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of
the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age,
for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity
is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should
not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription.
In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been really cured,
it should be a defense in the action for annulment
so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically

incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it
is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage. cdasia
"Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will
not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been cured.
"Prof.
Romero
opined
that
psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter.
Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the
mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
"Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner
that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply
if the marriage was contracted at the time when
there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage. 5
"xxx xxx xxx
"Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence is only temporary
and only with respect to a particular person.
Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
'incurable' has a different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that 'psychological
incapacity' can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however,
pointed
out
that
'psychological
incapacity' is incurable.
"Justice Puno observed that under the present
draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is
that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, which
11 | F a m i l y
Code
Art
36
cases
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

cdasia
"Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity becomes manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to
allow him to remarry. 6
"xxx xxx xxx
"Justice Puno formulated the next Article as
follows:
"'Article 37.A marriage contracted by any party
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be
void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.'
"Justice Caguioa suggested that 'even if' be
substituted with 'although.' On the other hand,
Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause 'although
such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization' be deleted since it may encourage
one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse. cdasia
"Judge Diy suggested that they also include
mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser
in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities
are
vices
of
consent
while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice
of consent.
"Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the
matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"'On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that
the phrase 'psychological or mental impotence' is
an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as
'psychological
or
mental
incapacity
to
discharge . . .'
"Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the
word 'mental' precisely to distinguish it from vice
of consent. He explained that 'psychological
incapacity' refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
"Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the

last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of 'psychological incapacity'
because there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they classified it
as a special case.
"At this point, Justice Puno remarked that, since
there have been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should
not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law. cdasia
"Prof. Romero raised the question: With this
common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family
Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R.

No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
"The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, in the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."cdasia
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
"Canon 1095.They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1.who lack sufficient use of reason;
"Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article

37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
2.who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of

judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
"Judge Diy opined that she was for its

retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the
other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.
3.who for causes of psychological nature are

unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage." (Italics supplied.)
"Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to

a vote, which the Committee approved.
"The members voted as follows:
"(1)Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
"(2)Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
"(3)Prof. Baviera abstained.
"Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code
Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has, in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
12 | F a m i l y
Code
Art
36
cases
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even

perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical
or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon
Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
"The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow
norm was proposed first:
'Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
'. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .' (cf.
SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);cdasia
finally, a new version was promulgated:

'because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae)'.
"So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly
was altogether eliminated. It would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage."
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
"This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in
legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due
by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract
to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties."cdasia
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the
work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
13 | F a m i l y
Code
Art
36
cases
must be grave or serious such that the party

would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void
and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must
law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."cdasia
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not

necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various
circumstances
being
themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated
so
that
no
precipitate
and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment. We should continue to be reminded
that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code, is that
"Article 1.Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code."
(Italics supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Section 1.The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
"Section 2.Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).cdasia
The above provisions express so well and so
distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are no doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
14 | F a m i l y
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Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Romero, J ., see separate concurring opinion.
Padilla, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1
dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals 2
affirming the decision 3 dated August 28, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio
Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita QuinteroHamano filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she
and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown
to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated
to
assume
his
marital
responsibilities,
which
incapacity
became
manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times
but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained
unserved because he was no longer residing at
his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996,
respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
effect service of summons by publication. The
trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In
August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a

newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15
days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to
file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60
days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. The trial court
granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I.
Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted
was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the
trial court granted respondent's motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage
between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano
and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the
National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the aforenamed parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED. 4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the
ground of Toshio's psychological incapacity, the
trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that
respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations
as husband of the petitioner and father to his
daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and
lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing
herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same
was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which read:
15 | F a m i l y
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and

pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is
hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The
decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The appellate court found that Toshio left
respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to
Japan with the promise to support his family and
take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But
except for two months, he never sent any support
to nor communicated with them despite the
letters respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see them.
Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts
to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and
to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support pursuant to
Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other
spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable
institution? Why should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not
around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7
The appellate court emphasized that this case
could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina 8 and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals. 9 In those cases, the spouses were
Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based
on this lone assignment of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
OF
TOSHIO
HAMANO
TO
PERFORM
HIS
MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS, DESPITE RESPONDENTS FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN
THE MOLINA CASE. 10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by

Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them
did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing
respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a
quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with
Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36.A marriage contracted by any party who,
at
the
time
of
the
celebration,
was
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the
bar:
the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. . . .
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
16 | F a m i l y
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provision under the principle of ejusdem generis
(Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
thereto. cEaDTA
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be

should be given great respect by our courts. . . .
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
contemplated under Canon 1095. 13 (emphasis
supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be medically or clinically identified.
What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. 15
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an
actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a
ground for legal separation. 16 There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. 17 There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person
from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. 18
We now proceed to determine whether

respondent
successfully
proved
Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
According
to
the
appellate
court,
the
requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a mixed
marriage, the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any
person regardless of nationality.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his

duty to live with, care for and support his family.
He abandoned them a month after his marriage
to respondent. Respondent sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
In Pesca vs. Pesca, 19 this Court declared that

marriage is an inviolable social institution that the
State cherishes and protects. While we
commiserate with respondent, terminating her
marriage to her husband may not necessarily be
the fitting denouement.
We find that the totality of evidence presented

fell
short
of
proving
that
Toshio
was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital
responsibilities.
Toshios
act
of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
17 | F a m i l y
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SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002.]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA,

respondent.
Oscar C. Fernandez for petitioner.
The Mirano Mirano & Mirano Law Offices for
respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent filed an annulment of
marriage case based on petitioner's alleged
psychological incapacity. After private respondent
presented his last witness, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss or a Demurrer to Evidence. The
trial court denied the demurrer. Petitioner
elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition
for Certiorari. The CA upheld the trial court's
denial of the demurrer, and held that since the
order was merely interlocutory, certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available.
The proper remedy was for the defense to
present evidence, and if an unfavorable decision
was handed down later, to take an appeal
therefrom. CETDHA
In this petition, petitioner argued that the trial
court denied her demurrer to evidence despite
the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondent's evidence. Thus, she was entitled to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held
that Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court
expressly
recognize
the
exception
when
interlocutory orders may be subject to certiorari
proceedings when the lower court acts with
grave abuse of discretion, as in this case. It was
totally erroneous but also grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court to rule that
the filing by petitioner of a series of cases against
the
respondent
established
the
latter's
psychological incapacity. The evidence presented,
even if taken as true, merely established the
prosecution of the cases against the respondent.
Other complaints of respondent, namely, about
petitioner's alleged lack of attention to their
children's needs, immaturity and lack of an
"intention of procreative sexuality" do not
constitute psychological incapacity. Finally, the
testimony of the supposed expert witness
presented by the respondent was based on
hearsay evidence.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI;
WHEN
INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS MAY BE SUBJECTED TO CERTIORARI
PROCEEDINGS; CASE AT BAR. In general,
interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor
subject to certiorari proceedings. However, this
rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, this Court
declared that appeal not certiorari in due
18 | F a m i l y
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time was indeed the proper remedy, provided

there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess
of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of
Court expressly recognize this exception and
allow certiorari when the lower court acts with
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an
interlocutory order. Thus, a denial of a demurrer
that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari.
2.ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE; CHALLENGES THE SUFFICIENCY
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN
A VERDICT; CASE AT BAR. A demurrer to
evidence is defined as "an objection or exception
by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether
true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict. In
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt. We have thoroughly
reviewed the records of the present case, and we
are convinced that the evidence against
respondent
(herein
petitioner)
is
grossly
insufficient
to
support
any
finding
of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage.
aSITDC
3.ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; HEARSAY
EVIDENCE; HAS NO PROBATIVE VALUE,
WHETHER OBJECTED TO OR NOT; CASE AT
BAR. Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal
knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent.
The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable. As to respondent's
argument that because Dr. Gauzon's testimony
had never been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived the Supreme
Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that
although the question of admissibility of evidence
could not be raised for the first time on appeal,
hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because
it has no probative value. We are, of course,
mindful of the ruling that a medical examination
is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of
evidence presented is enough to establish the
incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality
of evidence presented by respondent was

completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any
medical,
psychiatric
or
psychological
examination.
4.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT;
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY;
NOT
ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. The
documents presented by respondent during the
trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the
height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her
as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations, simply because she filed
cases against him. The evidence presented, even
if taken as true, merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that
the filings are sufficient to establish her
psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity. Neither is the testimony
of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction
with his documentary offerings, sufficient to
prove
petitioner's
alleged
psychological
incapacity. Even if taken as true, the testimony of
respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioner's personality; namely, her
alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2)
immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of
procreative sexuality." None of these three, singly
or
collectively,
constitutes
"psychological
incapacity."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Though interlocutory in character, an order
denying a demurrer to evidence may be the
subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the
petitioner can show that it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course
is not plain, adequate or speedy under the
circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiff's
evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to
prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a
trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require
the defendant to present evidence to controvert a
nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an
unwelcome imposition on the court's docket and
an assault on the defendant's resources and
peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly
delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 16, 2000 Decision 1 and the May 22, 2000
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
19 | F a m i l y
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"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit." 3
The assailed Resolution denied
Motion for Reconsideration. 4
petitioner's
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March
15, 1981. Out of this union two children were
born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27,
1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a
Complaint 5 for the annulment of his marriage to
petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an
Amended Complaint 6 dated November 8, 1993,
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological
incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting
his evidence in chief. After his last witness
testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of
Exhibits 7 dated February 20, 1998. Instead of
offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) 8 dated
May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a
number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998
Order 9 denying petitioner's Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a
quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert."
10
After
her
Motion
for
Reconsideration 11 was denied in the March 22,
1999 Order, 12 petitioner elevated the case to
the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, 13
docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was
merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The
proper remedy was for the defense to present
evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was
handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.
14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent judge in issuing the
assailed Orders. 15
The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting
or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the
sound exercise of the [trial] court's discretion." 16
Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to show that the
issues in the court below [had] been resolved
arbitrarily or without basis." 17
Hence, this Petition. 18
The Issues
In her Memorandum, 19 petitioner submits the
following issues for our consideration:
"1)Upon the denial of petitioner's demurrer to
evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of
inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals
required of her, to present her evidence, and
when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down,
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law, despite the palpably and patently weak and
grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of
the private respondent as plaintiff in the
annulment of marriage case, grounded on
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The
Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly
and immediately resorted to by the petitioner;
and
"2)In upholding the lower court's denial of
petitioner's demurrer to evidence, did the Court
of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard
in
a
whimsical
manner
the
doctrinal
pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and
Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58
SCRA 17)?" 20
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari
available to correct an order denying a demurrer
to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC
commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or
ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
SDAaTC
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her
Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent
weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent's
evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the
immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters
that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the
proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are
neither appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v.
People, 21 this Court declared that appeal not
certiorari in due time was indeed the proper
remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of
20 | F a m i l y
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discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive

exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court
expressly recognize this exception and allow
certiorari when the lower court acts with grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of an
interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
"No appeal may be taken from:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)An interlocutory order;
xxx xxx xxx
"In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65." 22
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
"SEC. 1.Petition for certiorari When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require." 23
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari. 24 In Cruz v. People, this
exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
"Admittedly,
the
general
rule
that
the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court
may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed
interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy
of certiorari lies." 25
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may
be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court
is now tasked to determine whether the present
case falls under the exception; that is, whether
the RTC indeed committed a "patent error" or
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's

Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an
objection or exception by one of the parties in an
action at law, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law (whether true or not) to make out his
case or sustain the issue." 26 The demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
evidence to sustain a verdict. 27 In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
proof to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt. 28
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the
present case, and we are convinced that the
evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is
grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by
petitioner of a series of charges against him are
proof of the latter's psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These charges included Complaints for perjury,
29 false testimony, 30 concubinage 31 and
deportation. 32 According to him, the filing and
the prosecution of these cases clearly showed
that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only
to put him behind bars, but also to banish him
from the country. He contends that this "is very
abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the
name and integrity of her husband as the father
of her children, had acted to the contrary." 33
We do not agree. The documents presented by
respondent during the trial do not in any way
show the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she
filed cases against him. The evidence presented,
even if taken as true, merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that
the filings are sufficient to establish her
psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent,
taken by itself or in conjunction with his
documentary offerings, sufficient to prove
petitioner's alleged psychological incapacity. He
testified in these words:
21 | F a m i l y
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"Q.Will you please tell us or explain to the Court

what
do
you
mean
by
'psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.' What do you mean by
that?
A.Because before our marriage she was already
on the family way, so at that time she even want
it aborted by taking pills. She was even
immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention
of procreative sexuality. 34
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she
is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please
elaborate on this what you mean by 'carefree'
approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means
by 'carefree.'
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she
does not take care of the child, she wants me to
hire an attendant in order to take care of the
child. Even when the children were sick she does
not bother to let the children see a doctor. 35
xxx xxx xxx
"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of
Atty. Chua):
'ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of
your marriage to the defendant, did you notice
any characteristic or traits which you consider as
psychological incapacity?'
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she
gets mad at me, and she won't talk to me when I
call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for
me to visit her everytime and even at the time
when I am busy with some other things. So, I
think that is all." 36
Even if taken as true, the testimony of

respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioner's personality; namely, her
alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2)
immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of
procreative sexuality." None of these three, singly
or
collectively,
constitutes
"psychological
incapacity." Far from it.
In Santos vs. CA, 37 this Court clearly explained
that
"psychological
incapacity
must
be
antecedence and (c) incurability." 38 Said the
Court:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's 'Void
and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must
law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological
incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
the marriage is celebrated." 39
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina, 40 we ruled
that the psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations.
We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
22 | F a m i l y
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In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by

respondent merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along with each other. There was
absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondent's evidence is proof
that the psychological incapacity was grave
enough to bring about the disability of a party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In
Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes of psychological incapacity. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage." 41
Respondent's pious peroration that petitioner
"lacked the intention of procreative sexuality" is
easily belied by the fact that two children were
born during their union. Moreover, there is
absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect"
was already existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not
incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony
presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio
M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the
root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not
show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he
testify that it was grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of
his testimony are quoted thus: DHEACI
"ATTY. CHUA:
Q.And then finally and ultimately you reached the
conclusion that both parties, meaning the
husband and the wife in the present case have a
personality which is normal. That is your
conclusion?
WITNESS:
A.They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q.So as a general proposition, both of them are of

normal personality, only that they are not
compatible with each other?
A.With different personalities. So that they were

incompatible.
Q.Normal, simply incompatible.
A.Yes.
Q.And by normal personality, you mean that
neither of them suffer from any personality
disorder, bordering on abnormality?
A.Yes.
Q.But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no
couple could be or are perfectly match?
A.Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem,
there should be somebody who knows how to
handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
A.Yes, with personalities different from each

other, which I mentioned there in my last page.
That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like
oil and water, they will not mix.
Q.You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning
to say the husband told you about the frequent
quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you
that was a serious or major quarrel?
A.Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all
petty quarrels. 43
Q.You mean expert advise or services should be

needed by the couple?
xxx xxx xxx

Q.So the problem of this couple is fundamentally
a conflicting personalities?
A.Yes.
A.Yes. 44
Q.Now, if the couple are mature enough and each

of them practises what we call maximum
tolerance and give and take, will that serve the
purpose?
xxx xxx xxx

Q.Now, you mentioned that you may be able to
make them reconcile?
A.That would served the purpose of getting well.
A.Yes.
Q.Yes?
Q.You mean that given the time and opportunity,

things could be worked out?
A.Yes.
A.Yes.
Q.Meaning to say that the incompatibility could

be harmonized?
Q.You mean reconciliation at this stage with

expert services, and the advise of those who
possess the necessary [expertise] could be
worked out?
A.Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but

both of them are personally disordered. It cannot
be harmonized. So this case, if only they have
tried professional help to take care of their
marital problem, it could have been solved.
Q.Or the situation could have been remedied?
A.Yes. But I would like to say that it must be
somebody who is an expert. Not just any from
Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That
means from the very beginning they have
personalities which they were incompatible. So if
anybody would handle that, they will not mix,
they will be always quarreling with each other.
They should not have got married. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q.Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion
was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out
that both are normal?
23 | F a m i l y
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A.Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family

therapy. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Q.Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is
psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
A.Yes.
Q.Because of the . . .
A.The incompatibility.
Q.Incompatibility.
A.Yes. 46
His testimony established merely that the
spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through
psychotherapy. We need not expound further on

the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony
to establish the psychological incapacity of
petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr.
Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor
never conducted any psychological examination
of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Professional Opinion 47 began with the
statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true, . . ." 48 The expert witness
testified thus:
"ATTY. CHUA
Q.Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours,
you gathered most of your material data from the
plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
A.Yes. By the way, I requested the husband
Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni,
and he said, he doesn't know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q.He doesn't know. Now, Doctor if we were to
request you to conduct the same personal
interview and written psychological examination
on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to
do that?
WITNESS
A.Sure for a fee. I may be able to make them
reconcile." 49
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal
knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent.
The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by
asserting that he was able to assess petitioner's
character, not only through the descriptions given
by respondent, but also through the former's at
least fifteen hours 50 of study of the voluminous
transcript of records of this case. Even if it took
the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still find his
assessment of petitioner's psychological state
sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
24 | F a m i l y
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36
cases
As to respondent's argument that because Dr.

Gauzon's testimony had never been objected to,
the objection raised thereafter was deemed
waived the Supreme Court has already ruled
on the matter. It held that although the question
of admissibility of evidence could not be raised
for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable
evidence should be disregarded whether objected
to or not, because it has no probative value. 51
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a
medical examination is not a conditio sine qua
non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so
long as the totality of evidence presented is
enough to establish the incapacity adequately. 52
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented
by respondent was completely insufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity
more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and
assessed the evidence presented by respondent
and
taken
into
account
the
prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have
easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was
useless to proceed further with the tedious
process of hearing contravening proof. His
evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the
RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore
this Court's rulings in point. Indeed, continuing
the process of litigation would have been a total
waste of time and money for the parties and an
unwelcome imposition on the trial court's docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. 53 Any
decision, order or resolution of a lower court
tantamount
to
overruling
a
judicial
pronouncement of the highest Court is
unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. 54
There is no reason to believe that an appeal
would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not
promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious
effects of the patently mistaken Orders
maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It
would only compel her to go needlessly through a
protracted trial, which would further clog the
court dockets with another futile case. 55
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent's Demurrer to Evidence is
GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity

of marriage based on the alleged psychological
incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. TICaEc
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
Puno, J., is abroad on official business.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE
F. REYES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a
sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of
deception between spouses, no matter the
gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark
and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any
trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability
to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24
October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed
the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N.
Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the
trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989
when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through
a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa
de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila
on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child
was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to
have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed
at the time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present. 8
25 | F a m i l y
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36
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As manifestations of respondent's alleged

psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:
(1)She concealed the fact that she previously
gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted
child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy's parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their
marriage. 11
(2)She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law,
Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3)She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to
her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4)She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance
voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member
of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect 14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place. 15
(5)She invented friends named Babes Santos and
Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from
Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth
P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and
sent the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected
with Blackgold. 18
(6)She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She
bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7)She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over

him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no
longer take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November
1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr.
Dante
Herrera
Abcede
(Dr.
Abcede),
a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez),
a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand,
they observed that respondent's persistent and
constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect.
22 They further asserted that respondent's
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that
perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that
she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities. 24 She presented her version, thus:
ASHaDT
(1)She concealed her child by another man from
petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband. 25
(2)She told petitioner about David's attempt to
rape and kill her because she surmised such
intent from David's act of touching her back and
ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3)She was actually a BS Banking and Finance
graduate and had been teaching psychology at
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4)She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las
Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann
Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold
office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at
26 | F a m i l y
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cases
the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.

28
(5)She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner
were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the
Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares. 29
(6)She admitted that she called up an officemate
of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the
one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not
to monitor her husband's whereabouts. 30
(7)She belied the allegation that she spent
lavishly as she supported almost ten people from
her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her
non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage,
the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity
on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio
Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute
the allegations anent her psychological condition.
Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he
himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might
point to the presence of disabling trends, were
not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were
flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted
respondent's
psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable
because a good liar can fake the results of such
test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to
petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything her
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and
her income, among others had been duly
established. According to the trial court,
respondent's fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to

live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to
her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its
decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of the parties. 37
During the pendency of the appeal before the
Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which
held instead that only respondent was impaired
by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of
these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment.
While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of
the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's
pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondent's psychological
incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court
is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect from the appellate courts because the
trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony
which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.
42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity
of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead,
the appellate court concluded that such evidence
was not sufficient to establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent. 43
27 | F a m i l y
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Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual

version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the
state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as
the Molina case 45 ), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing
the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47
In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led
to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as
the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what
Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a
set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration
of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under
Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization." 50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from
contracting marriage persons "who are not in the
full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and
persons already married, among others. A party's
mental capacity was not a ground for divorce
under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage
where "either party was of unsound mind" at the
time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable
marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54
Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable
insanity was permitted under the divorce law

enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound
mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse
was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45
(2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a
party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is
recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of
the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The
initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee
that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given
free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family
Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original
understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not
be juridically different from physical incapacity of
consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the
Civil Code . . . [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At
the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of
consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v.
Court of Appeals, 64 wherein the Court, through
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains
to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the
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Molina 66 case. Therein, the Court, through then

Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed
that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity
"is a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of
psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase
reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
preference of the revision committee was for "the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in
a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition
of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable
specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of
each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is

under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of
the framers that the Court has developed the
Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that
guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in
stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and
Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the
Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the
interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is
but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that
the concept of psychological incapacity was
derived from canon law, 73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic
Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence
of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and
subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the
Court
has
expressly
acknowledged
that
interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the
sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation
occurred
in
wholly
secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on
the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding
on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on
another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and
lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV
of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
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strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its

total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State."
These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family.
It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based
on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification
that such legislative enactment itself adheres to
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being
the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment
of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate
to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1
and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying
marriages
contracted
by
a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as
the foundation of the family, which in turn serves
as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family
life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand or
SECHIA
These are the legal premises that inform us as we
decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the
guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36.
The Court has consistently applied Molina since
its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They
warrant citation in full:
1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
thereto.
4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be
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and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
6)The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be
7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate
psychological nature."
invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina
had
provided
for
an
additional
requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement
however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates
that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is
not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to
the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,
the fiscal's participation in the hearings before
the trial court is extant from the records of this
case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC

are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to
the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court
of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts.
As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of
fabrication
sufficiently
establishes
her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies
the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his
burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations
on
his
wife's
behavior,
and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the
Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert
witnesses from the field of psychology who
testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In
any event, both courts below considered
petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even
the
appellate
court
acknowledged
that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
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able to establish the cause of action with a

preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed
with State interest, the Family Code likewise
requires the participation of the State, through
the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,
even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such
proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's
psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court's decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from
the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and
situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in
generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field
of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist
who had headed the department of psychiatry of
at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as
follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the
affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are
a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with
the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent,
constant and repeated lying of the "respondent";
which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. . . .
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q-Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because
of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of
her marriage?
A-Well, persistent lying violates the respect that

one owes towards another. The lack of concern,
the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship.
You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But
then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think
is going to happen as far as this relationship is
concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.
Q-Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to
the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q-Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy
Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been
calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask
him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And
this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you
say about this, Mr. witness?
A-If an individual is jealous enough to the point
that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband
is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything
that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
Q-Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would
she be considered psychologically incapacitated
to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A-Yes, Ma'am. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to
establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
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These two witnesses based their conclusions of

psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's
testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had
already held in Marcos v. Marcos 85 that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common
conclusion
of
respondent's
psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set
of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented
as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this
wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are
indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations
of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of
make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her
marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the
dark about her natural child's real parentage as
she only confessed when the latter had found out
the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological

incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports
the
belief
that
respondent's
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record,
was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital
life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to
respondent were not adopted as false pretenses
in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses
and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according
to
them,
were
revelatory
of
respondent's inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic
meaning,
and
the
corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot
be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that
since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect
a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her
ability to perform her marital obligations. We are
not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain
in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.
Respondent's
ability
to
even
comprehend
what
the
essential
marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that
the
evidence
convincingly
disputes
respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage
cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3)
of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
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draw linkages between misrepresentations made

by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article
45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is
lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of
the
lying
spouse.
In
this
case,
the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity
under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As
noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it
failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to
bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. DTISaH
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of
the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated
30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion"
on the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of
nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman
Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent's
psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the
Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that
matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective
when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession
and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty
with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for

the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the
certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised
on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts
that were markedly antithetical to the substantive
content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of
its deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in
its practico-concrete judgment formation on
account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological
incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must
clarify the proper import of the Church rulings
annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent's version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on
this matter would have diminished persuasive
value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition
by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the
requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It was on this score that
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondent's
condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did
not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and
his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However,
respondent's
aberrant
behavior
remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
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From this fact, he draws the conclusion that

respondent's condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be
definitively concluded that respondent's condition
is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure
thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioner's expert
witnesses characterized respondent's condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on
whether the psychological incapacity was curable
or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good
reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994
and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in
1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be
Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family
Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which
was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the
Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of
canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of
psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to
Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is
incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese
of
Manila
that
psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos
omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was
decided months before the trial court came out
with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondent's psychological incapacity
was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological
incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of
this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial court's decision that required a medical
finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was
on appellate review, or after the reception of

evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the
Court countered an argument that Molina and
Santos should not apply retroactively with the
observation
that
the
interpretation
or
construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the
statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this
present
case
from
utterly
practical
considerations.
The
requirement
that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is
one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses
that respondent's psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and
the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without
deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice
to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and
their expert witnesses would not have seen the
need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may
hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the
trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone,
and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be
insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability,
since the parties would have had no impelling
cause to present evidence to that effect at the
time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence,
we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability
of respondent's psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological
incapacity,
were
sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated
to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has
established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court.
35 | F a m i l y
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There is little relish in deciding this present

petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond
as having been inexistent in the first place. It is
possible
that
respondent,
despite
her
psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent's avowed commitment to remain in
the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases
on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to
live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,
concur.
Carpio
and
Carpio
Morales,
JJ.,
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.]
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED DECISION ON
ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE
JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AFTER TRIAL;
CASE AT BAR. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on
the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was crossexamined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented. it
became incumbent upon petitioner to present his
side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between
them. To prevent collusion between the parties is
the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the
Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because

petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the
truth.
2.ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION
COURT FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. Neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party,
i.e.,
even
the
psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
3.ID.;
EVIDENCE;
SENSELESS
AND
PROTRACTED REFUSAL OF ONE OF THE
PARTIES TO FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION,
EQUIVALENT
TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
would have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that
he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection. Since it is
petitioner' s claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity."
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
36 | F a m i l y
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parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is

equivalent to psychological incapacity.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J p:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by
which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate.
Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a
distraught wife against her uncaring husband in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court
to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made
by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts
were preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married
the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house defendant's
mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in
the same room for the first night of their married
life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to
her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then
turned his back and went to sleep. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join

them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta
time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not
even see her husband's private parts nor did he
see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
"The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine
was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to
return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the
defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married
her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile-with her
husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the
defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault
lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage
with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1)
that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can, still
be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
37 | F a m i l y
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"The defendant admitted that since their

marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it.
So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she
will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will
remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested
that there is no collusion between the parties and
that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila,
before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court
that there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent
to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof
thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between
the parties, there remains no other basis for the
court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1.Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
38 | F a m i l y
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party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that

party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on
the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial.
The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner
to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
cda
The case has reached this Court because
petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
penned
with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz.:
"The judgment of the trial court which was
affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved
upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal
reluctance
or
unwillingness
to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.

Court of Appeals, G.R No. 112019, January 4,
1995)." 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity
and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to
psychological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court
nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The
fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex
with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be
psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
would have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that
he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner' s claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
39 | F a m i l y
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and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals

attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity." 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us
that the husband's plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire
belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but
he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989) that he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is
the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the
fact that defendant did not go to court and seek
the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This
case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against
her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that
what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act which
is not psychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission
that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder
that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the

contemplation of the Family Code." 7
While the law provides that the husband and the

wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the
sanction
therefor
is
actually
the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate of court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is
an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. cda
It appears that there is absence of empathy
between petitioner and private respondent. That
is a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go
a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing
commitment
to
compromise,
conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship
in
which the
parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows
and unconsummated marital obligations, can do
no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.]
40 | F a m i l y
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EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs.

ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this
petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the
concept was formulated free in form and
devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution 2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a
glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTe in a gathering organized by the FilipinoChinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena's close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was in
January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore
student and respondent, a freshman. 3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the
two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other.
In March 1996, or around three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed
to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4
However, Edward's P80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could
not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle's
house and Edward to his parents' home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle's place. 5 CaTSEA
On April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought the

two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20. 6 The two then continued
to stay at her uncle's place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner he was not allowed to
go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena. 7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested
that they should stay at their parents' home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena
who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home. 8
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in

college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological
evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the
grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
TDaAHS
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena.

Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways. 10
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now

in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom
he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to
each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of
meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in
being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence,
as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on
becoming a full servant of God by being a priest
or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his
friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,

Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720. 11
Respondent is said to come from a fine family

despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court,

on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the parties.
12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.
13
In January of 1996, respondent showed her

kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually
wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time
on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are
both young and inexperienced, but she insisted
that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going
to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea
and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her,
so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by
respondent that they should go back and seek
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of

Rowena's uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family
whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an

investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner
found both parties psychologically incapacitated,
and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old]
Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
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help from petitioner's parents. When the parties

arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole
family was all out of the country so respondent
decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home.
After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk
to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to
be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got
scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what
to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends
and at this point in time[,] respondent brought
the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her.
And so on April 23, 1996, respondent's uncle
brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that
very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner
actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at
their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent
even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him
at his parents['] and relatives['] houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents
about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort.
Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he
signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent.
Petitioner offered her to live instead to [sic] the
home of petitioner's parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own family. When
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respondent refused to live with petitioner where

he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to
tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that
petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate
lives. CacEID
The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by
both parties['] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she
was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach's Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this
case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as
to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded
to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really
sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals.
He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved
and timid type of person, as he prefer to be
religiously attached and spend a solemn time
alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is
said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative
in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour.

She is seen to take move on marriage as she
thought that her marriage with petitioner will
bring her good fortune because he is part of a
rich family. In order to have her dreams realized,
she used force and threats knowing that [her]
husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the
realization that there is really no chance for
wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship. AcDHCS
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to
know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not
be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,]
is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to
be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent
that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both
parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take. 15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
Decision 16 declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. 17 The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its
notice of appeal. 18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed
August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court's
ruling. 20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina 21 needed for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. 22 The CA faulted the lower court
for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the
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OSG's reasons for its agreement with or

opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.
23 The CA later denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January
19, 2004 Resolution. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 25
In his memorandum, 26 petitioner argues that the
CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared
the marriage void, not only because of
respondent's psychological incapacity, but rather
due to both parties' psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the
OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because
the latter represented it during the trial; and it
had been furnished copies of all the pleadings,
the trial court orders and notices. 27
For its part, the OSG contends in its
memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition
filed before the RTC contains no statement of the
essential marital obligations that the parties
failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged
in the petition; neither was it medically or
clinically identified. The purported incapacity of
both parties was not shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the
requirements in Molina 29 were not satisfied. 30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of
whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and void.
31 IEHaSc
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its
origin, and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code 32 provides:
Article 36.A marriage contracted by any party
manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil

Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: 33
However, as a member of both the Family Law
Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In
fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses
after a number of years of separation, legal or de
facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two
grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss
the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation
of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
aITDAE
'a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.'
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
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indissoluble social institution upon which the

family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of
an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present
Civil Code, to wit: cSICHD
'(7)those marriages contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
'Art. 32.The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'
'Art. 33.The action or defense for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.'
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken
marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by
the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as
well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering
an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact,
during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of

the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting
with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed
that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the
ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice
of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal
work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly. 34
In her separate opinion in Molina,
expounded:
35 she
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the

draft provision read:
"(7)Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion
took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7)That contracted by any party who, at the time
of
the
celebration,
was
psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably,
the
immediately
preceding
formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated". It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in
the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligation." There being a defect in
consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the
45 | F a m i l y
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appearance of consent and it is capable of

convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage." aTEHIC
My own position as a member of the Committee
then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the
term "psychological or mental impotence",
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon
Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista
commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow
the afflicted spouse to remarry. ATEHDc
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz.:
1.lack of one or more of the essential requisites of
marriage as contract;
2.reasons of public policy;
3.special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36

in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage
is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances
existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or
lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in
keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the
following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon
Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can
only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing. AHCaED
Such so-called church "annulments" are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbo freed from the
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marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic

Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution
to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law
(1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized
the
same
indirectly
from
a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to be 'capable according to law'
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of
the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called 'lack of due
discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during
the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman
Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders
such
as
homosexuality
and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems
that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony. 36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.

The Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application. 38 acHDTA
Yet, as held in Santos, 39 the phrase
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 68 40 of the Family Code,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance
to
the
marriage.
41
This
interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1.The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A
sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume
the
essential
obligation.
Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains
the object of the contract, viz., the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior
to the conclusion of the contract, the house was
gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does
not deal with the psychological process of giving
consent because it has been established a priori
that both have such a capacity to give consent,
and they both know well the object of their
consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object which is
not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
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distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the

positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a
free act of consent, but he is not capable of
fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the
Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological
conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from
others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity
which
arises
from
sexual
anomalies.
Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus:
do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which
affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say,
they arise from certain physiological dysfunction
of the hormonal system, and they affect the
sexual condition, leaving intact the higher
faculties however, so that these persons are still
capable of free human acts. The evidence from
the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which
are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality].
However,
these
anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although
he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather
than the incapacity to posit consent itself. SHAcID
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if
not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at
the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This
line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of

this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was
under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But
this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of
fact, true that the intellect is always and
continuously
under
such
an
irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and
what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in
corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to
say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.
The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2.Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.
Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as
he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs
usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a free
and intelligent consent. However, such persons,
capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent.
Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated
the difference between the act of consenting and
the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of
the goods.
3.5.3.3Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object
of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain
progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (that is to say, the formal object of
consent) can coexist in the same person with the
ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing
of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a
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spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to

the moment of consent but also, and especially,
with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse.
The decision concludes that a person in such a
condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating
of those same obligations. SCHIac
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon
Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence,
or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies
leave intact the faculties of the will and the
intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence
that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxx xxx xxx
3.5.3.5Indications
of
Incapacity.
There
is
incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately
thinks of those cases where one of the parties is
so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality]
that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity
could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the
good of himself or of the other party. The canon
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the
bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only
of realizing or contributing to the good of the
other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx
would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person
who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the
other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes
and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where
the concrete circumstances of the case concerns
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious

sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of
the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them
because of his "constitutional immorality".
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and
capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment
of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially
during the moment of execution of decision. And
when this is applied to constitution of the marital
consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of
the essential obligations of marriage is a
pertinent consideration that must be factored into
the question of whether a person was in a
position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability
of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations,
one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but
also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse.
In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to
assume the essential obligations of marriage in
the psychic constitution of the person, precisely
on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of
others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience
how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in
which others are taken advantage of in order to
achieve one's ends. ADaECI
Authors have made listings of obligations
considered as essential matrimonial obligations.
One of them is the right to the communio vitae.
This and their corresponding obligations are
basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to
assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic
features
of
inability
for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was
not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage
that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the
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responsibilities of marriage, or because of the

inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand
it as incapacity to assume the obligations of
marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to
consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a
person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. In this same
rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent
is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus
but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems
to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable
to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent. AEIHaS
3.5.3.6Causes of Incapacity. A last point that
needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm
that the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person
is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to
the extent that he is found to have something
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes
the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
deeply engrained in one's consciousness would
not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while
one accepts as given one's psychic constitution. It
would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom. 42
Conscious of the law's intention that it is the
courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is

psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court's judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43 ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts. 44
Again, upholding the trial court's findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 45 explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by
its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, 46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation". It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable", thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
TAEDcS
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
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nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
do's". The manifestation of the illness need not
thereto.
characterological peculiarities, mood changes,

included in the text of the decision. DICSaH
psychological nature."
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
contemplated under Canon 1095. 47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of
the Court's membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero took
pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
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emphasized that "each case must be judged, not

on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions
or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on 'all fours' with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court." 48 SEAHID
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
cases, 49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
decisions of church tribunals".
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world". 50 The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity
and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota
has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals. 51
The Court need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is

actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with
a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with
or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that
the
infliction
of
physical
violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. 53 Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. 54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the
freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latter's disorder
recurring in their marriage. HIAEcT
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or
less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically
incapacitated.
Petitioner's
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent
personality
disorder,
and
respondent's, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder. 56
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By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite

having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties. 57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as
follows:
Furthermore,
and
equally
significant,
the
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but
rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent. TaSEHD
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential
obligations
of
marriage.
For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to
the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right
to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the
spouses must be 'other oriented' since the

obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this
interpersonal
relationship.
A
serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support
is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality
where
personal
responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into
the psychological category. DSCIEa
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts
are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time
of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent
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cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'

incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into." 58
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 59 emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos 60 asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. 61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention
nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and indepth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. 62 Parenthetically, the
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, 63 an option for the trial
judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert
for
an
independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological
state of the parties. This will assist the courts,
who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
arrive
at
an
intelligent
and
judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties' prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses. cSDHEC
Going back, in the case at bench, the
psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disorders to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that
The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits
that are characteristic of a person's recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
thinking are not usually limited to isolated

episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and
normal functioning. Personality disorders are
often recognizable by adolescence or earlier,
continue through adulthood and become less
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may
have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who have
personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder
leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.
Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along
with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others
for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely,
isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental
health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at
certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from
his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent
and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness
were thought to derive from fixation at the anal
stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to
lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers
have found little evidence that early childhood
events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that
there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that
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schizotypal personality may be related to genetic

factors. AaSTIH
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have
borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid
(5-HIAA)
negatively
correlated
with
measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has
been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.
Brain
Wave
Activity
Abnormalities
in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported
in antisocial personality for many years; slow
wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities,
compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric
Association's
Diagnostic
and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessivecompulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category,
"personality disorder not otherwise specified",
that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders
usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term. 64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized
in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern
of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals
usually
lack
self-esteem
and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by

others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they
are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears
of being abandoned. 65 TaISDA
and antisocial personality disorder described, as
follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of
behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe

criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose
habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that
was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic. 66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity
of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and,
thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null
and void on ground of both parties' psychological
55 | F a m i l y
Code
Art
36
cases
incapacity. We further consider that the trial

court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses' deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with
dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends
to agree with people even when he believes they
are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person,
has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals
and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also
be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society. 68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
SCaIcA
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe
and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on
April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August
5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario
and Peralta, JJ., concur.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

ARTICLE 36. The following guidelines in the

but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.

for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab

lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the

Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the

marriage celebration. While some effort was

symptoms may be physical. The evidence must

non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be

The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo

the foundation of the family and an inviolable

most serious cases of personality disorders

incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A SANCTION FOR

frequent interference by Julia's parents into the

Santos failed all these years to communicate with

(7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital

had known these completely, he might not have

"xxx xxx xxx

although one might have been psychologically

incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

"Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the

Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R.

"Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article

2.who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of

"Judge Diy opined that she was for its

3.who for causes of psychological nature are

"Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even

finally, a new version was promulgated:

must be grave or serious such that the party

These provisions of the Code, however, do not

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,

copy of the petition, was published in a

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by

obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,

(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate

behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

We now proceed to determine whether

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his

In Pesca vs. Pesca, 19 this Court declared that

We find that the totality of evidence presented

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA,

time was indeed the proper remedy, provided

of evidence presented by respondent was

"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby

discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive

grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's

"Q.Will you please tell us or explain to the Court

Even if taken as true, the testimony of

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by

Q.So as a general proposition, both of them are of

A.With different personalities. So that they were

A.Yes, with personalities different from each

Q.You mean expert advise or services should be

xxx xxx xxx

Q.Now, if the couple are mature enough and each

xxx xxx xxx

A.That would served the purpose of getting well.