BELL VS BURSON

Citation. 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971)

Brief Fact Summary. A clergyman in Georgia was involved in an accident when a child rode her bike into the side of his car. He challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act (Act), which prevented him from submitting evidence regarding his lack of fault prior to the suspension of his drivers license.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Once licenses are issued, they cannot be revoked without procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts. The Act provided that the registration and license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident should be suspended unless he posted a security to cover the damages claimed in the
accident reports. The administrative hearing to be conducted prior to the suspension excluded any evidence of fault or liability for the accident. Petitioner was a clergyman who was involved in an
accident when a five-year-old child rode her bike into the side of his car. In the administrative hearing, Petitioner was not permitted to present any evidence that he was not at fault for the accident,
or that his ministry would be severely handicapped if he lost his license. Petitioner appealed to Superior Court, which found him free from fault for the accident and ordered that his license not be
suspended. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting Petitioners contention that the States statutory scheme denied him due process of law.
Issue. Did the revocation of Petitioners license without affording him an opportunity to contest liability violate due process?
Held. Yes. Reversed. Once issued, licenses may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, as in the Petitioner s case. Suspension of issued licenses involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of licensees, and due process is required. The procedure set forth by the Act violated due process. Dissent. None. Concurrence. None.
Discussion. It is fundamental that, except for in emergency situations, States afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of a case before terminating an interest. This case
did not involve an emergency situation, and due process was violated.

Bill of Rights: Section 4 - Freedom of Expression

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officers and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they
informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration
was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right
to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of
the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of
the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO s motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
RULING:
No.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfilment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
Yrasuegui v. PAL
G.R. no. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
In consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Te Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It
also issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without loss of seniority and other benefits, and also the payment of back wages. Respondent PAL appealed to the NLRC
which affirmed the LAs decision. Respondent PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the NLRC case.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
Held:
Yes. The Court upheld the legality of the petitioners dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so
because his dismissal is not serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282 (e) of the Labor ode. His obesity may not be
unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. Voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Art. 282 (a), (c), and (d).
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). [55] In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination
laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation
of a business or enterprise.
Argument that BFQQ is a statutory defense must fail.
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it. ]Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.
First, the Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of
Canada adopted the so-called Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that
in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.

The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.
Petitioner is entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause. Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice, or based on equity.
Provided the dismissal:
(1) Was not for serious misconduct;
(2) Does not conduct on the moral character of the employee
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay

Judgment was handed down in the case of Greater Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v Doogan and another (Respondents) (Scotland) [2014] UKSC 68 on 17 December 2014. The Health Board
appealed against the decision of the Extra Division of the Inner House, which found in favour of the respondents and their "entitlement" to conscientious objection. Both respondents are Roman
Catholics practising as Labour Ward Coordinators at one of the appellant's hospitals.
In a unanimous judgment delivered by Lady Hale, with which Lord Wilson, Lod Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge agreed, the appeal was allowed. The essential issue in the case was how to
interpret the words "to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection" taken from section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967. What is therefore the scope of
the right to conscientious objection?
Lady Hale decided that Parliament was more likely to have contemplated that the words "to participate in" should be given a narrow meaning, limited to meaning those people taking part in the
treatment in a "hands-on" capacity. It is unlikely that Parliament had in mind the ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that might be associated with those acts legalised by section 1, when
enacting the conscience clause. The managerial and supervisory tasks of the respondents, as Labour Ward Coordinators, are more closely related to roles such as the administrators who decide
how best the service can be organised within the hospital, than they are to the those providing the treatment that terminates the pregnancy.
Appeal allowed. Declarator made by the Inner House set aside. Lady Hale invited further submissions on what, if any, order or declarator should replace it.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

The Constitution and the Courts

REQUESITES FOR JUDICIAL INQUIRY
No constitutional question shall be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliancewith what are known as the requisites of a judicial inquiry.These requisites are the following:1.
There must be an actual case or controversy.2.
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party.3.
The constitutional question must be raised at earliest possible opportunity.4.
The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of thecase itself.ACTUAL CONTROVERSY
PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 Phil 806
The petitioners challenged a regulation of the respondent requiring all private colleges anduniversities to first obtain a permit from the Department of Education before they could open
andoperate. It appeared, however that all petitioners had previously obtained the required permit and theywere questioning the regulation only because of the possibility that such permit might be

denied themin the future.The Supreme Court declared the case was premature as there was no showing at the time of any conflicts of legal rights that would justify the assumption of jurisdiction
by the judiciary. The court
said, mere apprehension that the Secretary of Educa
tion might, under the law, withdraw the permit of
one of the petitioners does not constitute a judicial controversy.
PHILCONSA v. Villareal 52 SCRA 477
This is a petition to compel the Speaker of the House of Representatives to produce the books of accounts of that body in which were recorded the amount appropriated by the legislators for
theirallowances. Before the case could be decided, however, the 1973 Constitution became effective and theCongress of the Philippines was consequently abolished. The Supreme
Court thereupon dismissed thepetition, holding that the same had already become moot and academic.
Perez v. Provincial Board 113 SCRA 187
It was held here that the petitioners claim to an appointive office was rendered moot and
academic when he filed a certificate of candidacy for an elective office.
Morelos v. De la Rosa 102 SCRA 671
An election protest will have to be dismissed upon the expiration of the protested officials
term.

84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael
Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.

They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new
legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797

FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was
once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai property.

It was decided that the properties would be

available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.

HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements.
property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.

They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi

It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man.

It cannot be alienated.

application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group.

Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in

The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the

common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AGAPITO DE LA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-30912
April 30, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 1903, accused Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to
death, by the Court of First Instance of Basilan City.
For the kidnapping and slaying of Yu Chi Chong, the City Fiscal of Basilan City filed against AGAPITO de la Cruz as Amended Information for Kidnapping with Robbery in Band and Murder, which
contains that de la Cruz, together with ten others were accused of the crime of kidnapping with robbery in band and murder committed on March 6, 1968. Agapito dela Cruz, as principal by
inducement and his co-accused as co-principal by direct participation, armed with carbine and garand rifles, they being all private persons, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and
assisting one with the other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting money for ransom, kidnap and deprive the liberty of one Yu Chi Chong
and demand the amount of P50,000. 00 as a consideration for, the release of Yu Chi Chong and when Yu Chi Chong was already in the custody of the accused and taking advantage of their
superior force, take and steal a wrist watch (Rado) worth P150.00 and cash money in the amount of P400.00, all worth the total amount of P550.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Yu
Chi Chong and on the way from Basilan to Sulu, the said accused with treachery and evident premeditation, assault, attack and shoot Yu Chi Chong, which caused his death and thereafter
dumped the body into the sea.
Two of the other accused namely, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were utilized as state witnesses.
ISSUE: WON the trial Court erred in convicting the accused as master-mind or principal by inducement in the absence of the elements of conspiracy to the crime charged.
HELD: AGAPITO further assails the conclusion of the trial Court finding him guilty as a principal by inducement reasoning that since he did not take part in the commission of the crime,
conspiracy does not exist and consequently he incurs no criminal liability.
This contention is untenable. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are:
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and

2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor.
The foregoing requisites are indubitably present in this case. The two discharged witnesses testified that Asmad and Amil contacted them to go to Basilan to do a job for AGAPITO. When the
group was brought face to face with him, he lost no time in laying down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who knew when the
truck of the intended victims would go to Lantawan to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route that the truck would take and the approximate time that it was to pass by.
He even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had the positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in
the form of ransom, which was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused.
Without him the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors, his
co-accused.