DFA vs NLRC

2. Whether or not by entering into service

contracts with different private companies,

Facts:

ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary

party to a commercial transaction giving rise to

On

27

January

1993,

private

respondent

a waiver of its immunity from suit

Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against

Asian Development Bank. Two summonses
were served, one sent directly to the ADB and
the other through the Department of Foreign

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal

standing to file the present petition

Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent

Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity

from

legal

process

except

for

borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities

pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of

certiorari is proper in this case
Held:

Agreement Establishing the Asian Development

Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5
and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The
Bank and The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding

The

Bank's

Headquarters

(the

"Headquarters Agreement").

1. Under

the

Charter

and

Headquarters

Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from

legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities. The Banks officers,

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the

complaint on the impression that the ADB had
waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and,
in

time,

rendered

decision

in

favor

Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision.

Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA
referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral,
the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void
judgment."

When

DFA failed

to

obtain

favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a

petition for certiorari.
Issues:

on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all

acts

performed

by

them

in

their

official

capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters

Agreement

granting

privileges

are

commitments
Philippine

these

immunities

treaty

voluntarily

government

covenants
assumed
which

and
and

by

the

must

be

respected.
Being an international organization that has
been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. "One of the
basic

immunities

organization

is

of

an

immunity

international
from

local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

legal

writs

and

processes

issued

by

the

tribunals of the country where it is found. The

imperii, especially when it is not undertaken

obvious reason for this is that the subjection of

for gain or profit.

such an organization to the authority of the

local courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may interfere

The service contracts referred to by private

in their operations or even influence or control

respondent have not been intended by the ADB

its policies and decisions of the organization;

for profit or gain but are official acts over

besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction

which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

would impair the capacity of such body to

discharge

its

responsibilities

impartially

on

behalf of its member-states."

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its

other mandates, the determination of persons
and

institutions

covered

by

diplomatic

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of

immunities,

an ordinary party to a commercial transaction,

challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the

which should have constituted a waiver of its

court so as not to seriously impair the conduct

immunity from suit, by entering into service

of the country's foreign relations.

contracts with different private companies.

must be allowed to plead its case whenever

There

necessary or advisable to enable it to help

are

two

conflicting

concepts

of

the

determination

credibility

The DFA

keep

firmly established. According to the classical or

government

absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without

community. When international

its consent, be made a respondent in the

are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed

Courts of another sovereign. According to the

to have likewise accepted the responsibility of

newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of

seeing to it that their agreements are duly

the sovereign is recognized only with regard

regarded.

to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but

principally on the DFA as being the highest

not with regard toprivate act or acts jure

executive department with the competence

gestionis.

and authority to so act in this aspect of the

In

our

the

when

sovereign immunity, each widely held and

before

of

which,

the

Philippine
international

country, this

agreements

task falls

international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon.

Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract

matter in good detail; viz:

by a foreign state with a private party cannot

be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be
the start of the inquiry. The logical question is

"In Public International Law, when a state or

whether the foreign state is engaged in the

international agency wishes to plead sovereign

activity in the regular course of business. If the

or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it

foreign state is not engaged regularly in a

requests the Foreign Office of the state where

business

it is sued to convey to the court that said

or

trade,

the

particular

act

or

transaction must then be tested by its nature.

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or
an incident thereof, then it is an act jure

defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed

"In the case at bench, the Department of

is the process of 'suggestion,' where the

Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal

foreign state or the international organization

Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to

sued

intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court

in

an

American

court

requests

the

Secretary of State to make a determination as

allowed

the

said

Department

to

file

its

to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the

memorandum in support of petitioner's claim

Secretary of State finds that the defendant is

of sovereign immunity.

immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the

Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign

immunity.

immunity was submitted directly to the local

courts by the respondents through their private
counsels.

In cases where the foreign states

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the

bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can

foreign

inquire into the facts and make their own

government

organization

to

first

or

the

secure

international
an

executive

endorsement of its claim of sovereign or

determination as to the nature of the acts and

transactions involved."

diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine

Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the

4. Yes.

courts

Catholic

extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court

Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA

has, under special circumstances, so allowed

130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs

and entertained such a petition when (a) the

just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of

questioned order or decision is issued in excess

Labor and Employment, informing the latter

of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the

that the respondent-employer could not be

order or decision is apatent nullity, which,

sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

verily, are the circumstances that can be said

In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48

to obtain in the present case. When an

SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign

adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter

Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that

before him, his action that assumes otherwise

effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974),

would be a clear nullity.

varies.

In

International

Relative

to

the

propriety

of

the

the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the

to make, in behalf of the Commander of the

decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August

United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,

1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.

Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge.

The

Solicitor

'suggestion'

General
in

embodied

the

manifestation

and

memorandum as amicus curiae.

(DFA

vs

NLRC, G.R.

No.

113191,

18

September 1996)

Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRME
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
Facts:

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the

Estate of MacarioNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by
Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
LaureanoBania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of
physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a
compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a
Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such
as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner
and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of
the collision.
Respondent

Judge

Romeo

N.

Firme

ordered

defendants

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to

pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses.
Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered
that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
Non-suability of the state.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided
for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the
State may not be sued without its consent."Consent takes the
form of express or implied consent.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to
suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if
it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable."

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for

the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.
Dual capacity of LGU.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate
or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilianriver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of
the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to
Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence,
We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of
IlocosNorte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer
(102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads
in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the
accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence,
We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held
liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM,

JR.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lim Chao
against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan
for collection of sum of money and damages.
The complaint alleged that a contract was

entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality

corporations with the power to sue and be

for the delivery of motor vehicles, which

sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

supposedly were needed to carry out certain

courts order.

developmental undertakings in the municipality.

Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of

Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to

Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality

P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made

of Hagonoy is valid.

several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly

did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment.

HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the

Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of

State gives its consent to be sued by private

the said amount, with interest and damages

parties either by general or special law, it may

and prayed for the issuance of a writ of

limit

preliminary attachment against the Municipality.

completion of proceedings anterior to the stage

The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary

of execution" and that the power of the Courts

Attachment directing the sheriff "to attach the

ends when the judgment is rendered. Since

estate, real and personal properties" of the

government funds and properties may not be

Municipality.

seized under writs of execution or garnishment

claimants

action

"only

up

to

the

to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious

The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on

considerations of public policy. Disbursements

the ground that the claim on which the action

of public funds must be covered by the

had been brought was unenforceable under

corresponding appropriations as required by

the statute of frauds, pointing out that there

law.

was no written contract or document that would

rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be

evince the supposed agreement they entered

paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of

into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to

public funds from their legitimate and specific

Dissolve

objects.

and/or

Preliminary

Discharge

Attachment

the

already

Writ

of

issued,

invoking, among others, immunity of the state

from suit. The Municipality argued that as a
municipal corporation, it is immune from suit,
and that its properties are by law exempt from
execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her
part, counters that, the Municipalitys claim of
immunity from suit is negated by the Local
Government Code, which vests municipal

The

functions

and

public

services

Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy
for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the
one year residency requirement.
2. When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he
had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months.
3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed
his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent)

filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in
his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa
City for two years and eight months prior to the
scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, 41 the
COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of
private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified
from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and
canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not
being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to
meet the statutory one-year residency requirement
under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26
January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during
the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local
elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed
the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering
the highest number of votes cast for the said position.
He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the
COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, 43 the
COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
(Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order
and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case)
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010
and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year residency requirement
for local elective officials.
Ruling:
1. As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily
review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been
established, including when the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is
compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.
2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact
definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty
3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is

4.

5.

6.

sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with

grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present
petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the
COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and non-reviewable.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of
fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case
the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this
regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable,
the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the
grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.

7.

Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the

COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether
petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its
cancellation.
8. Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had
resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the
May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence
adduced by the parties and the COMELECs
appreciation thereof.
9. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are
tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying
his COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The
court here defined what grave abuse of discretion is;
and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of
COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
10. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a
resident of Lipa and the SC granted his petition.

11.

Aldovino VS COMELEC

12. FACTS:
13. Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected
to the said office for three consecutive terms: 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005,
during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension
against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the
Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the
functions of his office.
14. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he

had been elected and had served for three

consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term
Constitutional limit.
15. ISSUE:
16. WON the suspensive condition interrupts the threeterm limitation rule of COMELEC?

17.
18. RULING:
19. NO. The preventive suspension of public officials
does not interrupt their term for purposes of the

canvass that declared her as the winner in

May 10, 2010 election.
The said Comelec resolution also granted the
petition for intervention of Alcala and ordered
him to succeed Barbara as provided under
Section 44 or the succession rule for elected
local officials under Republic Act 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991.

three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the

Local Government Code (RA 7160).

20.
21. The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F.
Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X,

The poll body had reversed and set aside the

resolution by the Comelec 2nd Division in
January 2011 that ruled Talagas election as
valid and legal.

sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term

was not interrupted by the preventive suspension
imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of
Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
22. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of service within a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid
the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted
that preventive suspension can pose as a threat

Lucena Councilor Rey Olivier Alejandrino,

Alcalas political ally, said the vice mayor
received the copy of the SC decision
Thursday afternoon.
The vice mayor is a nephew of Agriculture
Secretary Proceso Alcala, a close ally of
President Benigno Aquino III.

more potent than the voluntary renunciation that

the Constitution itself disallows to evade the threeterm limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge
that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.

Talaga vs COMELEC

LUCENA CITYIncumbent Lucena Mayor

Barbara Ruby Talaga (Lakas-Kampi) was
unseated by the Supreme Court and replaced
by her vice mayor, Roderick Alcala (Liberal
Party).
In an SC decision dated Oct. 9, 2012 but was
only released Thursday, a copy of which was
posted on its website, the court affirmed the
decision of the Commission on Election en
banc on May 20, 2011 that annulled the
election and proclamation of Talaga as mayor
of Lucena and cancelled the certificate of

Talagas youngest son, number one Lucena

Councilor Ramil Talaga, will replace Alcala as
vice mayor.
Questions on the legitimacy of Talagas
assumption to office arose when she
substituted for her husband Ramon Talaga Jr.
then the incumbent city mayor.
In 2010 election, Ramon, while then serving
his last term, filed his CoC with the belief that
he was still qualified to run for a fresh term
because he was suspended for three months
and thus failed to serve three consecutive
terms in office.
But the Comelec later ruled he was no longer
qualified to run for another term. Under
existing elections law, a local elected official
(councilors to congressmen) can only serve
for three consecutive three-year terms.
Ramon had himself substituted by his wife
just six days before the elections, a fact that

was hidden from their political foes and the

city electorate.
In the final tally, Ramon received 44,099
votes while his opponent Philip Castillo, a
former vice mayor, earned 39,615.
Based on existing election laws on
substitution, the votes garnered by Ramon
were automatically considered votes for his
substitute, his wife Barbara.
Castillo consequently asked the Comelec to
declare him as the winner as he argued that
since Ramons candidacy was found by the
poll body to be defective and null and void
from the start, it meant that he ran unopposed
and thus should be declared as the victor in
the last election.
In the 26-page SC decision penned by
Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin, the high
tribunal ruled that Ramons disqualification
rendered his CoC invalid and thus, could not
be validly substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not
give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no
valid substitution of the candidatethat a
candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate, the SC said.
However, the SC dismissed Castillos
assertion that he was entitled to assume the
city mayoralty post for having obtained the
highest number of votes among the remaining
qualified candidates.
The high tribunal reiterated its earlier ruling
that a candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could
not assume the office despite the
disqualification of the first placer because the
second placer was not the choice of the
sovereign will'.
The SC added: There was to be no question
that the second placer lost in the election, was
repudiated by the electorate, and could not

assume the vacated position. No law imposed

upon and compelled the people of Lucena
City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.
Although not an original party to the poll
protest between Castillo and Talaga, Alcala
filed a petition for intervention with the
Comelec last July 22, 2010 to implement
Section 44 or the succession rule for elected
local officials under RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The SC said Talagas dismissal has resulted to
a permanent vacancy in the office of Lucena
mayor and such vacancy should be filled
pursuant to the law of succession as defined
under the Local Government Code.
Ramon, who is the current city administrator,
will clash with Alcala for the mayoralty post
in next year election.
Ramil, youngest son of the Talagas, will be
the running mate of his father. The
young Talaga will face opposition from
Castillo (LP).
Quinto vs COMELEC
QUINTO vs. COMELEC, 1 DECEMBER 2009
Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22,
1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369,
amending the previous act.
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce
and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and
5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of
Candidacy.a)
Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

b)
Any person holding an elective
office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elective office or
position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of
Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy
shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office
hours, except on the last day, which shall be
until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to
run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUES:
1.
Do petitioners have locus standi?
2.
Do the second proviso in paragraph
3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and Section
4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal
protection clause?
HELD:
1.
The transcendental nature and
paramount importance of the issues
raised and the compelling state interest
involved in their early resolution the
period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010
elections has already started and
hundreds of civil servants intending to
run for elective offices are to lose their
employment, thereby causing imminent
and irreparable damage to their means
of livelihood and, at the same time,
crippling the government's
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court
must, for propriety, if only from a sense
of obligation, entertain the petition so as
to expedite the adjudication of all,
especially the constitutional, issues.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while
petitioners are not yet candidates, they
have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because
they are qualified voters. A restriction on
candidacy, such as the challenged

measure herein, affects the rights of

voters to choose their public officials.
The Court, in this case, finds that an
actual case or controversy exists
between the petitioners and the
COMELEC, the body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all
election laws. Petitioners have alleged in
a precise manner that they would
engage in the very acts that would
trigger the enforcement of the
provisionthey would file their CoCs and
run in the 2010 elections. Given that the
assailed provision provides for ipso facto
resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it
cannot be said that it presents only a
speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners' candidacy.
2.
It is noteworthy to point out that the
right to run for public office touches on
two fundamental freedoms, those of
expression and of association.
Here, petitioners' interest in running for
public office, an interest protected by
Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the
Constitution, is breached by the proviso
in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.
In considering persons holding
appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing
of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify
such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid
classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection,
it is necessary that the four (4) requisites
of valid classification be complied with,
namely:
(1) It must be based upon
substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the
purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all
members of the class.

The classification, even if based on

substantial distinctions, will still be
invalid if it is not germane to the purpose
of the law. Applying the four requisites to
the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law.
The challenged provision also suffers
from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil
servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they
occupy high positions in government or
not. Second, the provision is directed to
the activity of seeking any and all public
offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they
be in the national, municipal or barangay
level.

Quinto Vs COMELEC 22 Feb. 2010

This is a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of the Supreme Court in Quinto vs.
COMELEC, 1 December 2009.
ISSUES:
1.
Do the assailed provisions violate
the equal protection clause?
2.
Do the assailed provisions suffer
from overbreadth?
HELD:
1.
No. The intent of both Congress and
the framers of our Constitution to limit
the participation of civil service officers
and employees in partisan political
activities is too plain to be mistaken.
The equal protection of the law clause in
the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while

others serve at the pleasure of the

appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between
the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity
or take (sic) part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision,
elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis--vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification
are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is,
thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are put
in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit
of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete
deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast,
there is no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of the
law.
2.
No. The view that the assailed
provisions are overly broad because they
apply indiscriminately to all appointive
civil servants regardless of position
obviously fails to consider a different, yet
equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan
potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic
abuse perpetuated by a "powerful
political machine" that has amassed "the
scattered powers of government
workers" so as to give itself and its

incumbent workers an "unbreakable

grasp on the reins of power."
[T]he avoidance of such a "politically
active public work force" which could
give an emerging political machine an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of
power" is reason enough to impose a
restriction on the candidacies of all
appointive public officials without further
distinction as to the type of positions
being held by such employees or the
degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto.
Obviously, these rules and guidelines,
including the restriction in Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, were issued specifically
for purposes of the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, which, it
must be noted, are decidedly partisan in
character. Thus, it is clear that the
restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678
applies only to the candidacies of
appointive officials vying for partisan
elective posts in the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections.

Mitra vs COMELEC
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied due
course or cancelled if there is any false
representation of a material fact.
The critical material facts are those that refer to a
candidates qualifications for elective office, such as
his or her citizenship and residence.
The false representation must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must
be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a
mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently
absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results.
The foregoing are the legal standards by which the
COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as
stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC
must determine whether or not the candidate
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide
a fact about his or her residency that would
otherwise render him or her ineligible for the position
sought.

The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in

this case when, in considering the residency
issue, it based its decision solely on very
personal and subjective assessment standards,
such as the nature or design and furnishings of
the dwelling place in relation to the stature of
the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.

Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No.

191938, July 2, 2010.

Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner
Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he
is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of
Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came
to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.

Facts:
-

When his COC for the position of Governor of

Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
incumbent Representative of the Second District of
Palawan.
This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of
Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative
district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras
second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City
was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus
ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan.
The direct legal consequence of this new status was
the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from
voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for
the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the
transfer of his Voters Registration Record from
Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto
Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales
and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of

Palawan.

Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as

Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did
not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

RATIO:
-

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of

Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in
a vote of 11-3.
The respondents were not able to present a
convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras
evidence of effective transfer to and residence in
Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this
point in his COC.
Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any
legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras
statement in his COC regarding his residence was a
misrepresentation."

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto

Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light
of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto
Princesa City from a component city to a highly
urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for
provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile
of origin and acquire a new one within the local
government unit where he intended to run; this
would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile
of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC
correctly invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new
locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Mitra, presented sworn statements of various
persons (including the seller of the land he
purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and
the Punong Barangay of the site of his residence)
attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan;
photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya
Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental
pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock
farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill;
and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started
constructing his house. He clarified, too, that he does
not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then
under construction; his actual residence is the
mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.
Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral
contest and has therefore the mandate of the
electorate to serve

NOTES:
-

The minimum requirement under our Constitution and

election laws for the candidates residency in the political
unit they seek to represent has never been intended to
be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very
specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s]
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community" from seeking elective offices in that
community.
The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the
area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice."
Read and understood in this manner, residency can
readily be appreciated as a requirement that goes into
the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports
the purpose of representation electing those who can
best serve the community because of their knowledge
and sensitivity to its needs. It likewise adds meaning and
substance to the voters freedom of choice in the
electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.
To acquire a new domicile a domicile by choice
the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. In other words, there must be an
animus non revertendi with respect to the old
domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile of
choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time and
the acts of the person must be consistent with this
intent.