Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRUZ, J.:
The employer has absolute discretion in hiring his employees in accordance with his standards of
competence and probity. This is his prerogative. Once hired, however, the employees are entitled
to the protection of the law even during the probation period and more so after they have
become members of the regular force. The employer does not have the same freedom in the
hiring of his employees as in their dismissal.
Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted
for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. 1 For her services,
she received food and transportation allowance. 2 On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she
was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months ending November 12,
1991. 3
Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment
at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or
progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions
and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.
On November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn
notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the
standards of the Hotel. 4
Through counsel, Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a
regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure. 5 The
complaint was dismissed on April 22, 1992 by the Labor Arbiter, 6 who held that her separation was
justified under Article 281 of the Labor Code providing as follows:
Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement
stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged
on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered
a regular employee.
On appeal, this decision was reversed by the NLRC, which held that Honasan had become a
regular employee and so could not be dismissed as a probationer. 7 In its own decision dated
November 27, 1992, the NLRC ordered the petitioners to reinstate Honasan "to her former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with backwages without deduction and
qualification." Reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January 26, 1993. 8
The petitioners now fault the NLRC for having entertained Honasan's appeal although it was filed
out of time and for holding that Honasan was already a regular employee at the time of her
dismissal, which was made 4 days days before the expiration of the probation period.
The petition has no merit.
On the timeliness of the appeal, it is well-settled that all notices which a party is entitled to
receive must be coursed through his counsel of record. Consequently, the running of the
reglementary period is reckoned from the date of receipt of the judgment by the counsel of the
appellant. 9 Notice to the appellant himself is not sufficient notice. 10Honasan's counsel received the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on May 18, 1992. 11 Before that, however, the appeal had already been
filed by Honasan herself, on May 8, 1992. 12 The petitioners claim that she filed it on the thirteenth but
this is irrelevant. Even if the latter date was accepted, the appeal was nevertheless still filed on time,
in fact even before the start of the reglementary period.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, we find that Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation
twice, first during her on-the-job training for three weeks, and next during another period of six
months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of
six months prescribed by this article.
Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for
possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during
Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued after this training, the
petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular
employee.
Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her
services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period.
But she was not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they were
acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on probation.
Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of on-the-job
training, there is still no reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated six-month
period of probation. Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991. Assuming
that her probation could be extended beyond that date, it nevertheless could continue only up to
October 15, 1991, after the end of six months from the earlier date. Under this more lenient
approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure
as of October 15, 1991.
The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated on the ground invoked by
the petitioners. As a regular employee, she had acquired the protection of Article 279 of the
Labor Code stating as follows:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The grounds for the removal of a regular employee are enumerated in Articles 282, 283 and 284
of the Labor Code. The procedure for such removal is prescribed in Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. These rules were not observed in the case at bar
as Honasan was simply told that her services were being terminated because they were found to
be unsatisfactory. No administrative investigation of any kind was undertaken to justify this
ground. She was not even accorded prior notice, let alone a chance to be heard.
We find in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain
mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have
already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate Honasan's
services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory. Not having done so,
they may dismiss her now only upon proof of any of the legal grounds for the separation of
regular employees, to be established according to the prescribed procedure.
The policy of the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the working class when
subjected to such maneuvers as the one attempted by the petitioners. This Court is fully
committed to that policy and has always been quick to rise in defense of the rights of labor, as in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners. It is so ordered.
Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
CASE NO. 2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
decision 1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker
as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to
November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum
wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which
he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a
nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines
without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of
P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
Aug
ust
2,
199
0
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung
papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang
paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng
kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon
siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho.
Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling
kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper
training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is
hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with
backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is
actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear
complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and
evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by
ruling thus:
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship
program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government
agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To
translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship
program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement
of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph:Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal
exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.
11
4 Id., at 14.
5 Id., at .47-48.
6 Id., p. 47.
7 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
8 Ibid.
9 Sec. 18, Art. II, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
10 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 (1988); Gold CityIntegrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 811 (1990); Kwikway
Engineering Works v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 526 (1991).
11 Abiera v. National Labor Relations Commission, 215 SCRA 476
(1992).
12 210 SCRA 277 (1992).
13 Original Record, p. 39.
CASE 3
the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home
using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he
drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep
was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school
president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his
desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or
for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932];
See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124
SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of
his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising
the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant
was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
(Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner
anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the
purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of
employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the
powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained
and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of
resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The
Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is
not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability
of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation
arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection
of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as
would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than
the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772
[1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v.
Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa,
179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party
defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as
the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was
the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The
plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the
petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner
even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing
circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to
establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner
Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his
own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of
the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Case no. 4
THIRD DIVISION
TIMOSA, petitionersvs.
NATIONAL
COMMISSION
&
FAR
EAST
COMPANY, respondents.
LABOR
RELATIONS
BANK AND
TRUST
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be
granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied
employees. Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all
the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This
treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.
The Case
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision [2] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), [3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994
ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as
follows:[4]
The Facts
Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on
various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as
Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called
Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full
text of said agreement is quoted below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with
business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week,
from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be
required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant, for which
overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his
daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during
Saturday or [a] rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
i. Proportionate 13 month pay based on his basic daily wage.
th
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank
and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of
workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special
employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and
political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due
to pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent
Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career and working environment which
is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers
and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent
schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in
addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the
corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to
them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to
help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the
complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of
counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be
assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works
which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers normal
functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the
respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already
did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their
duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were
relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without
creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any
other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills
in banking operations.
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:[7]
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent
Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the
conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the]
recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were
covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of
contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a
quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties. [10]
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable,
considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six
months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from
employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari
Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of
facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the
Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular
employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees,
we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine
whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established
facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task
as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of
Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special
workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.[12] Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private
respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was
merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government officials and civicminded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government
representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla
positions for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were
renewed several times, not because of need but merely for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no
longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore
their special employment contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private
respondents effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make
them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal
consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The
facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect
and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained
for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they
should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may
terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing
by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance
with Article 80 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular
employees and hence not entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity
of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract
on equal footing.It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were
backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the
petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the
position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier,
petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed
by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners
are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts,
imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be
addressed by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public
interest.[22] Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the
parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of
labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.[23] Clearly, the agreement of
the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as
qualified able-bodied employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the
BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime
sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could not be done by deaf mutes
because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night. [24] We find
no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied
persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact
does not change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular
because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the
reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to
recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,
[25]
the Court held that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not
depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the
nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence.
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they
could not become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation
in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that
the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the
nature of the work performed.[26] Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple
expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27]
Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the
employees right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely
ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular
employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security
of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment.
xxxxxxxxx
At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves
instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of
fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term employment
should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day
certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their
employment relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or
disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor
of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble
objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or
accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or
not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their
work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment
contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically
impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them,
they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners
cause.[28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20,
1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is
hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twentyseven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David,
David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon,
George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G.
Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R.
Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette
Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S.
Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact amount due each of said
employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of
this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.