Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA.
DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA
DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS
DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA
DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ,
namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZRODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October
24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into
two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces,8 his
illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never
married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural
children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before
him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to
the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall
within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado
and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred
by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much
as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is
that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later
on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural
de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any
mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors
(now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not
necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months
later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether
a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually
lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred
to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on
lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their
relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their
own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie
Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the
local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his
own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from
her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was
prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children.

Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as
her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in
the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia
filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated
under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February
28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was
opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias
late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the
other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived
together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion
was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate
of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this
Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same
among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the
said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela
Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the
Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the
decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the
petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to
turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due
on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of
the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the
record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals

reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial
justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the
reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain
matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the
party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal,
but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical
ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial courts decision.
Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:

With
the
further
modification,
our
assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of
Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.)
the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to
the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositorsappellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates
in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting
of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia)
actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
notice of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo
Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into

presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than
50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their
reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the
absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that
they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need
not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration
under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and
the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,"
more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily
relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed

marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband
and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered
by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita")
civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof,
no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions,
one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of
sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado
and
(2)
Luis
Delgados
and
Caridad
Concepcions Partida
de
49
Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence,
all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed
each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between
them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore,
that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable
to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of
half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,
they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left

no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he
may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in
the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but
only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not

constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did intervenors report
card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately
not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified
that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado
which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping
of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by
Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We
affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but
is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must
be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption
is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of

Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and
nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of
the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias
hereby ANNULLED.

June

15,

1973

affidavit

of

self-adjudication

is

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or halfsiblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178221

December 1, 2010

MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS

NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by
BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the
Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court)
allowing herein petitioners and their siblings 4 to intervene in the estate proceedings of the
late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders
dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No.
338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby
issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their
behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6
The antecedents are:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. 7 He died without
issue.8
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration9 with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition
was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.10
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation 11 before the
intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia
Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee
(Isabel) with one John Desantis.12
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the
time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is
entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be
allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.14 As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel
have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.15
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation,
the following documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 and
c.) Their respective proof of births.18

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence
sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful
representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino
as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the
ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as
an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time
she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation, 19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the
birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946. 20 As it turned out, the
record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John
Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as
"married."22 The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an
official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis.23
According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that
it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab
initio.24
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings. 25 The intestate court was convinced
that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of
Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
proceedings on her behalf.26
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove
that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.27 It ventured on the
possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the
status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family
from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.28
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its
order dated 26 January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the
intestate court.30
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of
the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth
certificate.31 The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth
certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein statedwhich includes the

civil status of her parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis
should have been taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any
other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved
by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe
Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel cannot
be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore,
failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.34
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the
orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35 In
nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue
of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion. 36 Rather, it chose to reassess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from
Rodolfo.37
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion
exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously
in issuing its assailed orders.38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court
is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage
certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.39
Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in
addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a
right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none. 40 A
proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had
a previous marriage with John Desantis.41
To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed
between Isabel and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in
turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to
be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. 43 In assessing the
probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a
"typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to
embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child
begot by them is legitimate.44

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily
proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is
bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether
the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of
Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is
circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with
interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise stated, a
court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding,
to intervene therein.46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to
intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and
can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error
may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of
certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.
The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and
their siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich,
as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately,
the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if
the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient
evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of
the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos
estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true

notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis
exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that
the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.48 Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent
evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains
the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth
certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They
are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they
can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.52 In the case at bench, the petitioners
and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate
as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face." 53 They urge this Court to take
note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court
cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence,
do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners
would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude
therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners
would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in
intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves
which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage
had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabels
prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the
estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the
settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that

the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to
public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on
my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private

respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

J.

GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner -- a
Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.She claimed that
she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.
[15]
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After
they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued
in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended,
but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing
a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements
of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29]Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
[36]
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.
[37]
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and

clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. [40] Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage
was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and

board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that
no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;
[55]
(2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c)

Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit 4

Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;
[59]
and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC
OF
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus-

THE

G.R. No. 152577

Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:

September 21, 2005

CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3] for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to
the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five
children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hottempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only
six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus

learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for
the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs.
Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely
left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and
continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now
married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent
Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered
than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere

effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She
could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic
needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient
to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she
continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting
him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out
that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a
child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of
the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus
null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his

Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7](2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by
the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking
place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]

Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed
to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,
[14]

considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus

deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is
in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the
annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested
after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind,
will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to

declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to
law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though,
in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding
no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiffappellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly
acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien
as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can
not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,

plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn
plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied its
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this
Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen.
He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family
Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial

court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence,
this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family
Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of

cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any

doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated[21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a)

Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be

incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b)

Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c)

Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure

would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the

Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,[23]which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of
the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement

that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court

finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis
for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of

evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated
on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest
son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed
with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance;
her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity
was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus
must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness
and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No
less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one
of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the

Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus

argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his
Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal
law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could
only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall
be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed
before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id.,
at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15
March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule
recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing
and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General,
to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen
days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion
for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen
days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between

respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of
those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every
individual problem.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167109

February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of
bigamy, as well as the Resolution 3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando
divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope
in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had
a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City 7 against Orlando and
Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as
petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. 9 Trial on the merits
ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and
against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null
and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral
damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00
and attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated
is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan
Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision
of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No.
D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO
QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE
QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment
and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not
declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy
discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual
issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized
American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of
facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando
were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988.
However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in
the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent
evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas complaint and the documentary and testimonial
evidence she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American
citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April
1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status
is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who
secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by their national law to be free
to contract another marriage. x x x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute
or contest the allegation in respondents brief, that she and respondent Orlando were
American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to
establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. 17 We note that it was the petitioner who
alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent
Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. 18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 20 A divorce
obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the
issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce
decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict
remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC
would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between
Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated
June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national
law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in
ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other

might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no

existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect
or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and
Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 155635

Present:

- versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
Petitioner,

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
G.R. No. 163979

Promulgated:
November 7, 2008

- versus -

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari [1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution [2] of the CA,
as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, [3] granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial
courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision [5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a
suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC
in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both
cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca,
then 26 years old, to be an American citizen [7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar
Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie
Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship
seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in
the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of
Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,
[8]
ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage and leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and guardianship over
Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling
the couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement [10] they executed on December
14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa.[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition [12] dated January
26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the motion to
withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment [15] stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage [16] on the ground of
Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and
Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss [17] on, inter alia, the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her
application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore,
there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente
filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand,
charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order [18] denying Vicentes motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for support pendente
lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the respondent is DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial
court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude
her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8,
2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
[21]
His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of
the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in
this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20,
2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094,
upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April
30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive
writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA,
by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25,
2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the
RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20,
2001
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and
a
new
one
entered DISMISSINGCivil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the basis
of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states
a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of
action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen
at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her
alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the

time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued
by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that effect
during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she
applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later
withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14,
1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino
father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and
assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce
precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but
this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence,
Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for
the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred
in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which would have entitled her to
support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY

ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties
at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another
Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
resolves itself into the questions of:first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino
citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what
are its consequent legal effects?
The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling
circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still
be, a holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown
in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured
the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a
Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given
only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are
as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to

Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of
Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio
G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued
on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment
of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the
required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 st Indorsement
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the
Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong
valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the
Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to provide
immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing

citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of
any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way
of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall
be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to
an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only
on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to
coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior
to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen.
The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have
been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary
of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition
as a Filipino citizen through the 1 stIndorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But
from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily
withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the
Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino
citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the
date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the
petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix
(Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her
case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID
Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following
material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was only
through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated31 May 2001)
[36]
did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion, with their
respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will
expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino

citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to
govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit
to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of
United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x
x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given
the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to
subscribe all the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
onMarch 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact
and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce
is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,[40] the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is,
as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but
in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do
so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment
[of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
the contrary.[41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For
as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the countrys policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they
are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are
no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced:
[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements.[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject
to a husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended
by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability
of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph

2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.[45]
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of
marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed
citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards
their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples conjugal property
consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and
all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301
dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M.
Bayot, x x x.[46](Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce
court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day
of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce
by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed
to comply with each and every provision of said agreement.[47]
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement.
She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her
and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca
lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack
of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein.A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC,
Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity
of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show
that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been
insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,

reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother
initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the
issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best
litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and
Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that
support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it
were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under
Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case
No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted,
the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R.
No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
\

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and,
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article
26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her

to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that

the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been
done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons
legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries
in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in
the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in

the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

MEROPE
CATALAN,
Petitioner,

ENRIQUEZ

VDA.

- versus -

DE

G. R. No. 183622
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Respondent.

February 8, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining
a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis
pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already
pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an
interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of
the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal
case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial court
ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was
not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner
was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending
action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining
the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been
married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that
the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the
previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was
not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should
have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a
petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an uninterested person, the
defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to
determine who has a better right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should
have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for
review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari
was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under
Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of
the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the
case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil
action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only
party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.
Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration
can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of
the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In
the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the
private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party
to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is
wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render
nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files
his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition

for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had
been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner.Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting
a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of
the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is
therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in
place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. [6] She alleged that the reasoning
of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy,
while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She
insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption
of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate
the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to
Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By
failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between
petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested
party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No.
2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This
doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dornwould become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There,
we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated
in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment

is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered
in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity
of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.(Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner
and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for
further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage,
she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the
daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in

the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued

by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the
estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008
of the Court of Appeals are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case
be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior
to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.

6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] PsdAlabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded
on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4
to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W,
points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area of ONEHUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.

PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a
portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along
lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot
28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36;
por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos

Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S.

gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman
las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37;
por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at
S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered
by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent,
Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878,
respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before

the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the
parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the
sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-squaremeter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,
dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters
of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining
10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed
on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under
the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of
land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural
nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that

the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the
material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of
details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the
deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also
asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the
testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil
Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In
her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child
with Teofilo.[5]

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the

trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between
the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners)
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval
and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E.
Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the
sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate
from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel
of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975,
covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and
ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos,
and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive
name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of

defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents
argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in
declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by
the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in
favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain
a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action
to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and
the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of
the Civil Code expresslyprohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing

safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses
in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo
Carlos onMay 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein
impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and
that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter
is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former
call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material
facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be
proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of theRevised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted.While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license
is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal
as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the
impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a
marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962
as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the
marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk
who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in
turn, may have overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are
of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing
statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license
be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the
trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II
and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively disavowed
appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility
of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or,
for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We
find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely
purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the
whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minors total forfeiture
of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may
be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of
his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in
the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to
thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin
motions.
Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of
this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has
otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in
lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment
on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and,
in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin
for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of
the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows
that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section
17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In
that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application
of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even
if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not
be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity

of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the
belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how
to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital
life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life
play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse
to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity ofVoid Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a

proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in
1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would
govern depends upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot
be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must
be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court
held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of

marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00
and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary,
if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
[29]
(Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a
real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory
heir, he still has a right to succeed to theestate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil
Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children
excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence
of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate,
or
adopted
son
of
Teofilo,
petitioner
would
then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article
1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to

seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother

with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the
nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a
legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the
marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an
adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine
the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is
proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son
of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial
court as to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand
of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned
as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple
is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration
of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad
should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the

mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the
very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This
has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in
controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity
or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late
Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
adopted
son
of
the
late
Teofilo
Carlos,
the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ISIDRO ABLAZA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158298

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,

-versus -

BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
August 11, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the
legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that
purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party
in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.[1] The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re:
Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only
on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to
the marriage being void ab initio.[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby
resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is
filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a
party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B.
Calolot).
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time
and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,[4] however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of
the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from
the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the
same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be
filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition
was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a
party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real
party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not
prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper

party to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who
stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on
appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this appeal.

Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT
CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED
BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in
interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested

according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. [6] As a general rule,
the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.[7] To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family
Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature
of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.[8]
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March
15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Suchlimitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime
of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.[10]
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1.

Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2.

Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of

the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family
Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted
on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to

the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,[12] the
children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration
of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11,
1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void
marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned,
thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as
for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil
Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,[14] the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. [15] Thus, only the party
who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action.[16] Interest within the meaning
of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or
a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[17]
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate

children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceaseds estate.[18]Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the
late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this
case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may
not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresencianos surviving wife,[19] stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated
under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;[20] hence, her participation in this action is made all
the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated
without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable
party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua
non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza
Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the
parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner
is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila,
were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was
another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will
definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the
present action, however, considering that Section 11, [22] Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that
neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for
under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made on
motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the
Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage
Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is
reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in
Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the
petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her
daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late
Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said
deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400

October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a
review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap
Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the
January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner
and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated
August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14,
1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office
(NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was
likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final
and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19,
2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order
which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January
16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo
also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in
this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution, 4 denied the motion for extension of time
considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the following
ISSUES

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V.
SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS
RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION
FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON
APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING
AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is
whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at
bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously
anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not
even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case
constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said
case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for
declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and
decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because
his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of
the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological
incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but
not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated
on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase
"under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather
than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only

room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the
novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a
relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules
of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for
doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the
said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is nonextendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs.
Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier
motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision
has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It
follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a
final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not
to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las
Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure
that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of
marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution.
This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its
permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than
on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178044

January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision 2 and the
12 March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial
court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends
and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in
1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January
1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support
to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the
filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt
of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary
period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of
her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25
May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain
Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which
was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court
found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest
of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that

respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another
man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its
18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias
City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 7 Article
147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case

of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be

delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of
the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous
marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous
marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court
in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article

496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE,
we AFFIRM the
Decision
of
the
trial
court
with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.