ANAYA VS.

PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint
to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the
complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a
close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages.
Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud
against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties
and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative
that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud
was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.
Issue: Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground
for annulment of marriage?
Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law
does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an
institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
ANAYA VS PALAROAN
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the
marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint
was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While the amount
of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage
with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD: The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action
to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.
AQUINO VS. DELIZO
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at
the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by
another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During
the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino
testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo
did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition
for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage.

HELD: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to
be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month
of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set
aside.
AQUINO VS. DELIZO
FACTS: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo
that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant
by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a
child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition
for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage.
HELD: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to
be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month
of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960
Facts:
In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays for a
decree annulling his marriage to the defendant with the following facts:
(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City;
(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendants genitals was to small to allow the
penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation;
(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
answer.
(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence of the
plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted, or fabricated;
(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit,
within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.
(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply in relation to the order
issued in the preceding number.
(g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show. The Court deemed lack of interest on her part in the
case. The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered upon the
ground that:
(a) The defendants impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;
(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and
(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their
marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.
He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical examination.
On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
Held:
No. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient
to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be
proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage
in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending
or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,
The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with the decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
DE OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not
living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust
by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo
filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
Family Code.
HELD: Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of
the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the
legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
JOSE DE OCAMPO V SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
Facts: Jose De Ocampo was married to Serafina Florenciano in 1938. After several years of marriage, Jose
learned of Serafinas illicit relations with many men. Until in 1955, after having been abandoned by Serafina,
Luis caught her in the act of having illicit relations with another man. Thereafter, he filed a petition for legal
separation on the ground of adultery. Serafina did not answer the suit and when interviewed by the fiscal, she
admitted to having sexual relations with several men. Believing there was confession of judgment on the part

of Serafina, condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription, since it was in 1951 when Luis learned of
the illicit relations but only filed the case in 1955, the court of first instance of Nueva Ecija and the Court of
Appeals dismissed the case.
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court?
Held: Yes. First, on the issue of confession of judgment, the trial court erred in the interpretation of Aritcle 101
of the New Civil Code. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or
confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a
confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand
what the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession
defeats the actionipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment,
purposely to prevent it. Moreover, when the court learned that the defendant equally desires the separation
and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be doubly carefl lest a collusion exists. In Griffiths v
Griffiths, collusion was defined as the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit or to
appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. Second, on the issue of
condonation or consent, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failure to actively search for defendant and
take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations since it was not his duty to
search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
BUGAYONG VS GINEZ
FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at
Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in
said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with
his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved
to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these
communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to
consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the
defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1
day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify
with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left
which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal
of the action.
HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single
voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and
where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
BUGAYONG V. GINEZ (1956)
Facts: 27 August 1949 Benjamin Bugayong (US Navy, on furlough leave) married Leonila Ginez, in Asingan,
Pangasinan couple lived with Benjamins sisters in Pangasinan when Benjamin had to go back to duty, couple
agreed that Leonila would live with Benjamins sisters in Sampaloc, Manila
July 1951 (roughly 2 years later) Leonila left her sister-in-laws, told Benjamin that she went to live with her
mother in Asingan later moved to Dagupan City to study at a local college
July 1951 (around the same time Leonila left Sampaloc) Benjamin began to receive letters from Valeriana
Polangco (his sister-in-law) and others about his wifes alleged infidelity. During cross-examination, Benjamin

admitted being told (through a letter) by his wife that Eliong had kissed her. Benjamin asked for advice from
the Navy chaplain on getting a legal separation (infidelity) was told to consult the Navys legal department.
August 1952 (a bit more than 1 year after receiving the letters) Benjamin went back to Asingan and met his
wife. The couple went to Pedro Bugayongs, lived 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They then went to
Benjamins house where they spent another night as husband and wife. On the 2nd night, Benjamin tried to
verify the truth about the alleged infidelity Leonila responded by packing up and leaving (Benjamin took this
as confirmation of the infidelity). Benjamin then went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte to soothe his wounded feelings
18 November 1952 Benjamin filed for legal separation (Pangasinan CFI), acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery. Leonila denied the accusation
9 June 1953 hearing began
Benjamin testified in his favor, was to present 6 witnesses, but defense moved for the dismissal of the case:
Assuming the infidelity had occurred, cause of action had prescribed. Same assumption, acts were condoned by
Benjamin. Complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action (for the court to render a valid judgment). CFI
ended up dismissing the case, on the ground that the acts of infidelity were indeed condoned by Benjamin (by
sleeping with Leonila, supposedly after finding out that she had been unfaithful). Benjamin filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied. He then filed an appeal to the CA, praying for a review of the lower courts
decision, asserting that the lower court had erred in:
Prematurely dismissing the case
Finding condonation on Benjamins part
Entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal (inasmuch as the same was not raised in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss)
Question of law, thus CA certified the case to the SC
SC focused on the dismissal based on the alleged condonation (the other two grounds for dismissal had not
been raised by the petition in the assignment of errors)
Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
Art 97 [Civil Code]
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal
Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n)
Art 100 [Civil Code]
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of
the petition. (3a, Act No. 2710)
Art 102 [Civil Code]
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. (4a, Act 2710)
Definition: condonation
The forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground of legal separation; conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife or a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.
Issues:

Was adultery sufficiently established during the trial? (NO)

Assuming Leonila had committed adultery, by sleeping with her, did Benjamin, in effect, condone the infidelity?
(YES)
Ruling/Ratio:
NO.
Facts on record are not sufficient to establish the charge of adultery.
Only one testimony: by Benjamin himself
Letter from Valeriana Polangco too vague. Failed to present anonymous letters. Failed to present letter
allegedly from Leonila. Identity of Eliong not established. Leonila did not have an opportunity to deny the
alleged admission. Insufficient evidence to prove/disprove charges due to dismissal of the case early on in the
proceedings
YES.
American jurisprudence: cohabitation w/ the guilty party after the commission of the offense, w/ the
knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission will amount to conclusive evidence of
condonation. A single, voluntary act of marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation; where parties
live in the same house presumption that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
COUNTERPART PROVISIONS IN THE FAMILY CODE:
Art. 55 [Grounds for legal separation]
A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
*** Note that sexual infidelity or perversion is less stringent than adultery or concubinage one of only two
grounds for legal separation in the Civil Code. ***
Art. 56 [Grounds for denying legal separation]
The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the
ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57 [Prescriptive period for cause of action]
An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
(102)
LAPERAL VS REPUBLIC
FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on
March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she
ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing
to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of
Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in
her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in
1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold
otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was
dismissed.
LAPERAL VS REPUBLIC
Case Doctrines:
Legal separation alone is not a ground for wife's change of name. A womans married status is not affected
by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum, and under Article 372 of the New
Civil Code, she must continue using the name and surname employed by her before the separation.
It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which refers to change of name in general, may prevail
over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regard to married women legally
separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone is not
sufficient ground to justify a change of name, because to hold otherwise, would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of said Article 372.
Facts: In 1958, petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed legally separated from her husband Enrique R.
Santamaria. In 1960, she filed a petition to be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume
using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. The City Attorney of Baguio opposed the petition on the ground that
the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned
by the Rules of Court.
The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for
change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who
is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would
give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by
the State.
Issues:

Should petitioner be allowed to change her name or be permitted to resume using her maiden name?
Held:
No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married
status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of
the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all
concerned.
Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition is, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an
easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances
was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958,
necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. (Laperal
vs Republic, GR No. L-18008, October 30, 1962).

PELAYO V. LAURON (12 PHIL 453)

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the
daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00
which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the
judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law had
died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband independently
and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay
there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance rendered to
their daughter-in-law.
HELD: According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by contracts,
by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc.,
are the only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the
spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation
to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on
the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician
at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.

ARTURO PELAYO VS. MAURICIO LAURON

GR No. 4089 June 12 1909
Facts: Mauricio Lauron and Juanita Abella sought the medical services of Dr. Pelayo to attend to the need of
their daughter-in-law about to give birth. Pelayo, in the process, was compelled to obtain the advice of another
physician due to the difficulty of the medical procedure to be done and was prompted to utilize forceps for the
childs safe delivery. Consequently, a medical bill of 500 Philippine pesos was demanded by Dr. Pelayo from the
spouses in exchange for the services he performed but they refused and made the assertion that they should
not be the ones to pay but instead it should be their daughter-in-laws husband. Nevertheless, Dr. Pelayo
contended that since the spouses were the ones who sought for his help, then they should be the one liable for
paying the medical bill.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses are to be held liable for the payment of the medical bill of their daughter-inlaw.
Ruling: No. Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is the obligation of the husband to provide support for his
wife. Thus, Dr. Pelayo should seek payment for the expenses incurred during the delivery of the spouses
daughter-in-law from the latters husband and not from the spouses. The father and mother-in-law are
considered strangers with regard to the obligation of giving support under the law. Therefore, Dr. Pelayo does
not have any action against the spouses and that they are free from any liability arising from the medical
services rendered by Dr. Pelayo.
ILUSORIO VS. BILDNER
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. In
1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They lived together for a period of thirty (30) years until they separated from
bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at
Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in
Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in
Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor.
As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
Potenciano alleging that respondents Sylvia and Bildner refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. The
CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas
corpus.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal
dwelling?
Held: No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant of the petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does
not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say,
this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child
but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is
at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That
is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
Article 68 of the Family Code states: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Since living together and observing mutual love,
respect and fidelity are obligations under the law, the question is, can a wife or husband legally compel his or
her spouse to come home and comply with such obligations? This was answered in the case of: Ilusorio vs.
Bildner.
ILUSORIO VS BILDNER
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in
1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The
children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the
latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit
her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that
would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full
mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.
GOITIA VS CAMPOS-RUEDA
FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support
outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and
stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at
bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
GOITIA V. CAMPOS RUEDA
F: This is an action for support by G (wife) against R (husband). After 1 mo. of marriage, R repeatedly
demanded from G to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on R's genitals." Bec. of G's refusal, R maltreated G
by word and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on G. To escape R's lewd designs and avoid further harm, G left the
conjugal home and took refuge in her parent's house. G filed an action for support w/ the trial court. this was
dismissed on the ground that R could not be compelled to give support if G lived outside of the conjugal home,
unless there was legal sep. G appealed.
HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations
of w/c rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law w/c defines and prescribes those
rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of w/c in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of
any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such
as the law determines from time to time and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into
one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or govt upon principles of public
policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that the H, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the H to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is
driven away from the conjugal home bec. of the H's own wrongful acts. In this case, where the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode bec. of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the H, the W may claim support
from the H for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.