MARBURY VS MADISON

William Marbury was an intended recipient of an appointment of Pres. Adams as one

of the justices of the peace. Marbury directly applied for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison to deliver the commission.
DECISION:
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
His writ of mandamus cannot be granted by the Supreme Court simply because by
doing so, it would be like forcing Jefferson and Madison to appoint Marbury, which is,
again, beyond the judicial power.
ANGARA VS COMELEC
The petitioner proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly in his district.
Respondent, Pedro Ynsua filed Motion of Protest against petitioner. Petitioner then
filed Motion to Dismiss the Protest arguing that resolution no.8 (confirmed the
election of all members of the National Assembly without any protests) had already
confirmed his victory.
DECISION:
Judicial Supremacy
In general, has the power to declare invalid an act done by the Congress, the
President and his subordinates, or the Constitutional Commissions.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court (Supreme Court) has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
ENDENCIA vs DAVID
DECISION:
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office.
This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state
is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute
is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
(Evans vs Gore) The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to
benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and
judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and
pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without

respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the
public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the
principle on which it proceeds.
RE: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the SC
Five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court
The COA s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies
granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, which states:rl
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a postaudit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution.
This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court s fiscal autonomy,
but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the
existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
DECISION:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section
501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:
Section 501.
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary,
possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the
properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner
and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit.
The in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division is
legal and valid.
NAPOCOR VS Province of Lanao Del Sur
Petitioner s the owner of certain real properties situated in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur.
Said properties comprised petitioner's Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex.
Petitioner was assessed real estate taxes on said properties in (P154,114,854.82)

covering the period from June 14, 1984 to December 31, 1989, allegedly because
petitioners exemption from realty taxes had been withdrawn by PD 1931.
2 demand letters was sent by respondent provincial treasurer to the petitioner for the
payment of real property taxes due on the abovementioned properties with a warning
that unless the obligation was settled, legal remedies would be resorted to the
respondent province. Thereafter a Notice of Auction (Sale) was served on petitioner
and posted for one month at the main entrance of the provincial capitol building in
Marawi City and at the plant site in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. It was also published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Lake Lanao Times. The auction sale was
scheduled to be held at 10:00 A.M. of January 22, 1991 at the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer in Marawi City.
On January 18, 1991, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition for
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order. On January 21, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from proceeding with and conducting the auction sale of the subject
properties.
The auction sale was however held as scheduled with the Province of Lanao del Sur
as the sole bidder. A certificate of sale was immediately issued and registered with the
Register of Deeds of the province at 1:30 p.m. of the same day.
At 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. of the same day, respondents provincial governor and provincial
treasurer respectively received telegraphic notices of this Courts restraining order.
Respondents submitted their comment to which petitioner filed its reply. Rejoinder was
submitted. Thereafter, this Court gave due course to the petition and the parties thus
filed their respective memoranda.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying
the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the
improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations
and applications.
Petition is hereby GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered:
a) ENJOINING respondents and their agents from selling and disposing of the subject
properties of petitioner;
b) DECLARING the auction sale conducted on January 22, 1991 and the registration
of the same as NULL AND VOID;
c) ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Lanao del Sur to CANCEL the registration of
the auction sale in favor of respondent province; and
d) HOLDING that said properties including the hydroelectric power plant complex
thereat remain in petitioners ownership and control as if the assessment and auction
sale never took place.

In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant
with a 15-ton daily productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several
municipalities of Batangas.
Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public convenience to
operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that their
service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not
require the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera.
Commission ruled in favor of Cabrera. Silva filed petition alleging that Section 3
prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in contested cases;
consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal
and contrary to law.
DECISION:
We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission
and slow down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the
fixing of rates, especially where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the
law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience,
expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same.
Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the
exercise of the authority so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act
as amended, we set aside the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the
proceedings had thereunder to be null and void.
PEOPLE vs MAPA
Mario Mapa is convicted of a illegal possession of firearm (one home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition) pursuant to
Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No.
4.
Accused alleged that he is secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor
of Batangas, and directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission; supported with a certificate.
Lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and one day to two years. Firearm and ammunition is forfeited in favor of the
government.

SILVA vs CABRERA
Since it was a question of law, the appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.

DECISION:
The Court ruled that: No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply
the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
7
that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the
accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Lower Court decision is affirmed.
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT vs MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA
In two separate actions, Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of
the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendantappellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of
satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960,
municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of
P204,300.00.
The lower court rendered a joint decision sustaining the validity of the action taken by
defendant-appellee Municipality of Naga. The case is now before us on appeal.
DECISION:
The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal
treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity
subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required ..." There was
such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time
required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision
therefore came into play.
Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not
change or amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower
court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by
what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY vs SSC
They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for
condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium
remittances in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from September,
1958 to September, 1963.
Respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security
Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium
remittance, to which petitioners filed their opposition.

Respondent Commission dismissed the petition wherein the Commission adopting the
recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation of the Social
Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the
penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social
Security Act."
Hence this appeal, as to whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling that it
has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by
law for late premium remittances.
DECISION:
Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain,
there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is
therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the
authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for
otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law
discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and
defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.
Order appealed is affirmed.
QUIJANO VS DEVT BANK
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in the
amount of P19,500.00 which was approved by appellee bank on April 30, 1953. They
executed the mortgage contract on March 23, 1954, and that the release of the
amount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in installments subject to
certain conditions. That the loan obtained from DBP is to be received in several
releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and conditions specified
in the loan agreement. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954,
and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter, then the balance of the loan
were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953. Rodriguez paid the
installments as they fell due.
When a balance of about P14,000.00 remained unpaid, Quijano offered to pay for the
said outstanding balance with his back pay certificate pursuant to RA 897, The
Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953. The Bank refused to accept the said tender of
payment in certificate on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or
subsisting on June 20, 1953
DECISION:
When said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations
subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.

Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for interpretation or

construction. The Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first
and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit
and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
OSG vs AYALA LAND INC.
The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land),
Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la),
and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking
spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public. Respondents Ayala Land,
Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking facilities.
Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building
specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the lessors account.

requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose
that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can
be considered as unlawful taking of property right without just compensation; and 4)
there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages. They deemed that
the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. CA denied the
appeals of both petitioners and respondents. Hence this Petition.
The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together
with Section 102 of the National Building Code, which declares:
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the
purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and
structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site,
design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy,
and maintenance.

The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the
stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the
vehicles parked in respondents parking facilities.
Senate Committees invited the top executives of respondents, who operate the major
malls in the country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), and other local government officials; and the Philippine Motorists
Association (PMA) as representative of the consumers group.
After 3 public meetings, Senate Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report
No. 225 concluding that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to
the National Building Code and is therefor illegal and to enjoin collection of parking
fees. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against
Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the States policy of
protecting the interest of consumers.
Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should institute
the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation
of National Building Code

DECISION:
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803
of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees,
then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same.

YU vs YUKAYGUAN
Herein petitioners are members of the Yu Family, particularly, the father, Anthony S.
Yu (Anthony); the wife, Rosita G. Yu (Rosita); and their son, Jason G. Yu (Jason).

OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their
practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.

Herein respondents composed the Yukayguan Family, namely, the father, Joseph S.
Yukayguan (Joseph); the wife, Nancy L. Yukayguan (Nancy); and their children Jerald
Nerwin L. Yukayguan (Jerald) and Jill Neslie Yukayguan (Jill).

The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the

Petitioner Anthony is the older half-brother of respondent Joseph.

Petitioners and the respondents were all stockholders of Winchester Industrial Supply,
Inc. (Winchester, Inc.), a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of a general
hardware and industrial supply and equipment business.
respondents filed against petitioners a Complaint for Accounting, Inspection of
Corporate Books and Damages through Embezzlement and Falsification of Corporate
6
Records and Accounts before the RTC of Cebu.
Petitioners were also misappropriating the funds and properties of Winchester, Inc. by
understating the sales, charging their personal and family expenses to the said
corporation, and withdrawing stocks for their personal use without paying for the
same. Respondents attached to the Complaint various receipts to prove the personal
and family expenses charged by petitioners to Winchester, Inc.
After trial, the Cebu Regional Trial Court dismissed the case, saying Yukayguan
failed to follow and observe the essentials for filing of a derivative suit or action. The
ruling was upheld but later reversed by the Court of Appeals, prompting Yu to elevate
the matter to the SC.
DECISION:

Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula
3
Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed
on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now
be accepted as a correct proposition.
DECISION:

The Court is not persuaded.

The wordings of Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies are simple and do not leave room for statutory construction.
The second paragraph thereof requires that the stockholder filing a derivative suit
should have exerted all reasonable efforts to exhaust all remedies available under the
articles of incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules governing the corporation or
partnership to obtain the relief he desires; and to allege such fact with particularity in
the complaint. The obvious intent behind the rule is to make the derivative suit the final
recourse of the stockholder, after all other remedies to obtain the relief sought had
failed.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the
crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery.
There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every
sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such
change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is
needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

PETITION for REVIEW GRANTED. CA DECISION Set Aside.

Charged with Simple Rebellion only with provisionary bail and remanded to
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail.

ENRILE VS SALAZAR

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator

June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, failed to take the required precautions for the
due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and allowed
great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above
which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below
it, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the
collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately
500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface

boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of
approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit,
thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those
named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
Out of the 48 mine workers, five (5) were able to escape; 22 were rescued within the
next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to
then, a great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but
were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations,
in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation. Petitioners moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission.
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sued Philex for additional damages.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benefits under the WCA.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the
rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American
Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307
US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852,
853).
PHIL. BRITISH ASSOCIATION VS IAC
Whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the
said bond.
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a
sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in
attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a
3
supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,
4
000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached
properties were released.
RTC rendered decision in favor of plaintiff.

Respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in
accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims
for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of
whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence
results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of
the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
DECISION:
there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but
grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the
assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may
degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice
Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf
Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal
commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of
the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the
exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and
application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression
or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare,
particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin
then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in
respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the
Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal as
prayed for. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to
deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition dated
August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein
petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond.
Hence this petition.
DECISION:
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed
reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that
the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules
nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory
judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment that
maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution of
any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged
against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not

distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The
rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one
part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the
law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought
to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

dispute was presented for Arbitration; and Atty. Ceasar Querubin was designated as
the Arbitrator.

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception,
courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it.

Hence this petition which maintains that the PCHC is not clothed with jurisdiction
because the Clearing House Rules and Regulations of PCHC cover and apply only to
checks that are genuinely negotiable.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not
only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
Petition DISMISSED.
BDO vs EQUITABLE BANK
plaintiff through its Visa Card Department, drew six crossed Manager's check having
an aggregate amount of (P45,982.23) Pesos and payable to certain member
establishments of Visa Card. Subsequently, the Checks were deposited with the
defendant to the credit of its depositor, a certain Aida Trencio.
plaintiff discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of the Checks and
purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise
belong to persons other than the payees.
Pursuant to the PCHC Clearing Rules and Regulations, plaintiff presented the Checks
directly to the defendant for the purpose of claiming reimbursement from the latter.
However, defendant refused to accept such direct presentation and to reimburse the
plaintiff for the value of the Checks; hence, this case.
In its Complaint, plaintiff prays for judgment to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P45,982.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the
complaint plus attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 as well as the cost of the
suit.
In accordance with Section 38 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations, the

After an exhaustive investigation and hearing the Arbiter rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiff.
In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Board of Directors of the
PCHC affirmed the decision of the said Arbiter.

Petitioner alleges that with the cancellation of the printed words "or bearer from the
face of the check, it becomes non-negotiable so the PCHC has no jurisdiction over the
case.
DECISION:
In a previous case, this Court had occasion to rule: "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos
distinguere debemos." It was enunciated in Loc Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636
(1946):
The rule, founded on logic is a corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated.
There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated
for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They
should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences.
PCHC Rules and Regulations should not be interpreted to be applicable only to
checks which are negotiable instruments but also to non-negotiable instruments and
that the PCHC has jurisdiction over this case even as the checks subject of this
litigation are admittedly non-negotiable.
Moreover, petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of non-negotiability of the
checks in question. It stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks and
subsequently presented these checks for clearing and it was on the basis of these

endorsements by the petitioner that the proceeds were credited in its clearing account.
The petitioner by its own acts and representation can not now deny liability because it
assumed the liabilities of an endorser by stamping its guarantee at the back of the
checks.
PETITION is DISMISSED
SALENILLAS vs CA
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1248, issued in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel
Enciso. The patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Salenillas for a consideration of
P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the
aforementioned sale, the TCT was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling
Original Certificate of Title. Petitioners mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank of
Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released after the petitioners paid the
amount of P1,000.00. Later, petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in
favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a
loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, was
instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was
sold at a public auction. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the
highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale"
was issued to him.
The Philippine National Bank filed with the RTC of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion
for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial
court, acting on the motion, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however,
attempted to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the
petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by
the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners opposed the private
respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. The
trial court judge on issued the alias writ of possession. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but was denied.

Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their
motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the
appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT
No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on
February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas
and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for
in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started.
From this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that
the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners.
The five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge Case is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property
on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to
repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
Hence, this petition.
DECISION:
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal
heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of
repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale,
has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate
court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in

clearing and cultivating it. Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the
spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing
her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping
with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Petition GRANTED, RTC Decision is REVERED and SET ASIDE.
LEE vs DELA PAZ
Gabriel Danga executed a notarized Transfer of Rights to respondent,
for the consideration of P150,000.00, all his rights, interest, and title over a parcel of
agricultural land located in Barrio Pinagbarilan (later known as Barangay San Isidro
and now Barangay San Juan), Antipolo City.
However, Danga, previous to the transfer of his rights over the property
to respondent, transferred the very same rights to Josefina Delos Reyes. Delos Reyes
was able to secure the issuance, of an Order of Transfer of Homestead Rights in her
favor, from then Director of Lands Abelardo Palad. Respondent instituted before
DENR Region IV an administrative case for the cancellation of the Order of Transfer of
Homestead Rights in Delos Reyes favor.
Respondent filed before the MTCC a Complaint for Forcible Entry with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner.
Respondent later amended her Complaint to implead other defendants, namely: Jesus
E. Viola (Viola), Juanito Magsino (Magsino), Evelyn Pestano (Pestano), and Victorio
Datu (Datu).
Respondent alleged in her Complaint that she became the owner of the
property by virtue of the Transfer of Rights executed in her favor by the former owner,
Danga. Since the transfer, respondent possessed the property peacefully, publicly,
and adversely. She introduced valuable improvements thereon.
Respondent avowed that petitioner and the other defendants deprived
her of possession of certain portions of her property. Taking advantage of
respondents absence due to her lingering sickness, petitioner and his co-defendants
unlawfully entered said portions by means of stealth and strategy, and without
respondents knowledge and consent. Up to the present time, petitioner and his codefendants remain in illegal possession of portions of respondents property, despite
respondents repeated demands that possession of said portions be restored to her.
Petitioner even went as far as assigning security men to the portions of the property
he occupied to prevent respondent from recovering possession thereof.
In his Answer to respondents Complaint, petitioner claimed to be the
owner and occupant of the two parcels of land, which respondent averred to be part of

her property. In fact, petitioner was already granted Free Patent for these two parcels
of land, and pursuant to which, he was issued Original Certificate of Title in his name.
Additionally, the 143,417-square-meter property, which respondent was claiming, was
still under the administration of the DENR, and had not yet been declared alienable
and disposable; hence, the property was still public land.
Petitioner further maintained that he never saw respondent occupy her
alleged property. Respondent herself failed to introduce evidence of her prior physical
possession of the property. Petitioner also did not receive from respondent any
demand to vacate prior to the latters filing of the Complaint for Forcible Entry before
the MTCC.
Lastly, petitioner argued that respondent was guilty of forum shopping,
because DENR 4 Case No. 5723 was still pending before DENR Region IV.
Before the MTCC could render judgment in Civil Case No. 68-00, DENR
Region IV issued on 30 October 2000 its Resolution in DENR 4 Case No. 5723,
finding that:
In the case of the first transfer of right in favor
of Delos Reyes, we are of the considered opinion that the
same is bereft of validity.
The transfer of right executed by in favor
of Josefina Delos Reyes was never sanctioned nor had
the prior consent or approval of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources.
The DENR Region IV finally adjudged:
WHEREFORE, the claim of Rosita dela Paz
BE GIVEN DUE COURSE. Consequently, the Order of
Transfer of Rights issued and the subsequent Homestead
Application of Josefina Delos Reyes, is hereby declared
CANCELLED and without force and effect.
On 3 May 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner.
The MTCC dismissed respondents Complaint for Forcible Entry on the ground that
respondent failed to prove prior physical possession of the parcels of land in question.
Prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff is an indispensable
requirement in the successful prosecution of a forcible entry case.
Appealed to RTC. Respondent presented before the RTC the free patent
and certificate of title issued in her name for the property. The RTC favored

respondent, reversed and set aside MTCC Decision. The RTC gave great weight and
consideration to the DENR Region IV Resolution dated 30 October 2000 in DENR 4
Case No. 5723. The RTC ordered petitioner and his co-defendants in Civil Case No.
68-00 to vacate the portions of respondents property that they were occupying.
Petitioner and his co-defendants in moved for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid RTC judgment, but they were all denied.
Petitioner, by himself, filed a Petition for Review of the RTC Decision
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed Petition and, thus,
affirmed the RTC Decision.
Hence this petition.
DECISION:
Primarily, this case stemmed from a forcible entry case filed by
respondent against petitioner. A forcible entry case is an ejectment suit. In ejectment
suits or ejectment proceedings, the only issue involved is: who is entitled to physical
or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not
possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved
in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for
forcible entry is prior possession and that the same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore
possession regardless of title or ownership.
The character of the property involved, as to whether it is still public land
or not, is also of no moment. Even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry
cases. The Court, in David v. Cordova, categorically declared that the land spoken of
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land. The Court
applied the well-known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
In view of the fact that respondent failed to substantiate with preponderance of
evidence her prior possession of the two disputed parcels of land, she cannot
consequently claim, and this Court cannot make a finding, that she has been
subsequently ousted from said property or dispossessed of the same by petitioner.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED. RTC DECISION Reversed & Set Aside.
PEOPLE vs JACINTO
appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening
more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor
child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the
victim being only five years old. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and
orders him to pay rape indemnity and moral damages.
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating
that appellant was only 17 years old when the crime was committed. The trial court
appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its
disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS
Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE" by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then
the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction."
DECISION:
The provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the
child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said

P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence
would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of
sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous
crime.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of
origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.

As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after
stating that the deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore
Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence
in Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of quarters were provided by
the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to
commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week. While
the respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time production manager,
Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed the claimants declarations that the company provided a
service pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very
same testimonial evidence does not support this denial, but on the contrary tends to
bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish transportation." As a result, it
reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional office in Davao City and
awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount
of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorneys fees.
Hence, this petition for review

MACABENTA VS DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL CO

DECISION:

The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting

plausibility to the novel question raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased
employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child
could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation
Act may be gauged by the fact that we gave due course to the petition for the review
of a decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission answering the question in
the affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora
Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel
Macabenta.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally
plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains to
defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not
totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that
intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not
inappropriate.

After hearing the parties and in the right of the language of the law, its manifest
purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor, we
answer the question similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmens
Compensation Commission.
In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del
Rosario, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the
vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29,
1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had
already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However.
on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony
solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the deceased was hospitalized
up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was facilitated through the
intercession of the general manager of the respondent company. The decision
likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.

There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a

misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.
The employer in this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to
such a temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite
obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit.
WCC Decision is Affirmed.
DE CASTRO VS JBC
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments

within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on
the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures,
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after
May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
DECISION:

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the

other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of
the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general
limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of
any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and distinction.
G.R. No. 191002
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve
the constitutional question of whether the incumbent
President can appoint a Chief Justice during the
election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and
authority to appoint during the election ban the
successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates
the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on
May 17, 2010?

c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or

not to include and submit the names of nominees
who manifested interest to be nominated for the
position of Chief Justice on the understanding that
his/her nomination will be submitted to the next
President in view of the prohibition against
presidential appointments from March 11, 2010 until
June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to
appointments to positions in the Judiciary under
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution?
b.

G.R. No. 191149

a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the
submission of the short list to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo?

G.R. No. 191032

a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the
Supreme Court en banc?
G.R. No. 191057
a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
applicable only to positions in the Executive
Department?
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution also applies to members of
the Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted
because they are impressed with public interest or
are demanded by the exigencies of public service,
thereby justifying these appointments during the
period of prohibition?

May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make

appointments to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010,
including that for the position of Chief Justice after
Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?

G.R. No. 191342

a.

Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of

nominees to the incumbent President without
committing a grave violation of the Constitution and
jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President
from making midnight appointments two months
immediately preceding the next presidential
elections until the end of her term?

b.
Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the
candidates for the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBCs
illegal composition allowing each member from the Senate and the House of
Representatives to have one vote each?
Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002
and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being
premature;

2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R.
No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs
the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies
in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding
thereto in accordance with this decision.