Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R.

88979. February 07, 1992]

No.

15AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits
for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service
as well as for involuntary separation due
to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated
in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua
believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program, filed an
application with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she
was offered separation benefits equivalent
to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every
year of service commencing from 1980, or
almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects. A
recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results,
citing that her position is co-terminous
with the NIA project which is contractual in
nature and thus excluded by the
enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBMCSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual,
emergency,
temporary
or
regular
employment. Petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari.
ISSUE:

Petitioner was established to be a coterminous employee, a non-career civil

servant,
like casual and emergency employees.
The Supreme Court sees no solid reason
why the latter are extended benefits under
the Early Retirement Law but the former
are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No.
6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees.
But
specifically excluded from the benefits are
uniformed personnel of the AFP including
those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio
unius
est
exclusio
alterius but the applicable maxim in this
case
is
the doctrine
of necessary
implication which holds that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that
the denial by the respondents NIA and
CSC of petitioners application for early
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable
period and she is entitled to the benefits
of said law. In the interest of substantial
justice, her application must be granted;
after all she served the government not
only for two (2) years the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE
UNIONS vs. HON. TORRES (1994)

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to

the benefits granted under Republic Act
No. 6683.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:

FACTS:
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for
certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of
respondents bank employees occupying

supervisory positions. The Bank moved to

dismiss on the ground that said
supervisory employees were actually
managerial/confidential employees, thus,
they are ineligible to join, assist or form a
union. The Med-Arbiter granted the
petition and directed the holding of the
certification election. The Bank appealed
to the Secretary of Labor. Said court
partially granted the appeal ruling that the
Department
Managers,
Assistant
Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and
Controllers
are
declared
managerial
employees and cannot join the union of
the supervisors.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of

necessary implications apply.

Held:
Petitioner
concludes
that
subject
employees are not managerial employees
but supervisors. Even assuming that they
are confidential employees, there is no
legal prohibition against confidential
employees who are not performing
managerial functions to form and join a
union. A confidential employee is one
entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or
care and protection of the employer's
property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code
singles out managerial employees as
ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of
necessary
implication,
confidential
employees are similarly disqualified.
Centeno vs. Villaon-Pornillos
Martin Centeno vs. Hon. Victoria
Villaon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
Regalado, J.:

Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of

1985, the officers of a civic organization
known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner
Martin Centeno, the chairman of the
group,
together
with
Vicente
Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00.
An information was filed against petitioner
Martin Centeno, together with Religio
Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the
Solicitation Permit Law, before the
Municipal Trial Court of Malolos.
Petitioner questions the applicability of
Presidential
Decree
No.
1564
to
solicitations for contributions intended for
religious
purposes
with
the
submission, inter alia, that the term
religious purpose is not expressly
included in the provisions of the statute,
hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.
Issue: Whether the phrase charitable
purposes should be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose.
Held: No. It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule
is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation
or
construction,
be
extended to others. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature
would
not
have
made
specified
enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning

and to confine its terms to those expressly

mentioned.
It will be observed that the 1987
Constitution, as well as several other
statutes, treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently
of each other. Thus, the word charitable
is only one of three descriptive words used
in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution
which
provides
that
charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings,
and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
That
these
legislative
enactments
specifically spelled out charitable and
religious in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely
stated charitable or public welfare
purposes, only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never
intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would
not have so stated expressly.
01 Romualdez vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
FACTS
COMELEC Law Department filed two
separate informations before the RTC
Barauen, Leyte against spouses Carlos S.
Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez for
knowingly making false or untruthful
statement in their application for voters
registration relative to their place of
residence and non registration in other
areas, which are violations of Sections
10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act, to
wit:

SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. xxx The

application shall contain the following
data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in the
Philippines and in the place of registration;
x x x (j) A statement that the application is
not a registered voter of any precinct;
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following
shall be considered election offenses
under this Act: x x x (j) Violation of any of
the provisions of this Act.
Pending the above case, the spouses filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari against
COMELEC, on the ground, among others,
of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j)
for being contrary to the fair notice
requirement Section 14(1) and Section
14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
as such penal provision is vague on its
face.

ISSUE
WON Section 45(j)
unconstitutional for
election prohibition.

of RA
having

8189 is
uncertain

RULING
No, the Supreme Court held. Using the
void for vagueness doctrine, it the law is
said to be facially invalid only if men of
common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189
makes a recital of election offenses under
the same Act. Section 45(j) clearly
specifies that a violation of any of the
provisions of RA 8189 is an election
offense. The language of Section 45(j) is
precise. The challenged provision renders
itself to no other interpretation and
involves no guesswork.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM

GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005

FACTS:
In
1938,
the
Republic
instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City
for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. The
said lots were registered in the name of
Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic
deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons
the
sum
of
P4,062.10
as
just
compensation. The Denzons appealled to
the CA but it was dismissed on March 11,
1948. An entry of judgment was made on
April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation
a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." On
September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the
claim but expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the
lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons
successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and
Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action
for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in
possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots
were issued in the names of Valdehueza
and Panerio with the annotation "subject
to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of
land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its
Decision in favor of Valdehueza and
Panerio, holding that they are the owners
and have retained their right as such over

lots because of the Republics failure to

pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in
the expropriation proceedings. However,
in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were ordered to execute a
deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the
SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and
Panerio are still the registered owners of
Lots 932 and 939, there having been no
payment of just compensation by the
Republic. SC still ruled that they are not
entitled to recover possession of the lots
but may only demand the payment of
their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and
Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente
Lim, herein respondent, as security for
their loans. For their failure to pay Lim
despite demand, he had the mortgage
foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued
in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint
for quieting of title with the RTC against
the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of Lim,
declaring that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the lot with all the
rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. Petitioners elevated
the case to the CA. In its Decision dated
September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC
Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the
rules of fair play because the concept of
just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just"...
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the
SC a petition for review alleging that they
remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has
retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondents predecessorsin-interest the just compensation therefor
pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD: One of the basic principles
enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and
in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must
be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.7
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our
Constitution mandates: "Private property
shall not be taken for public use without
just
compensation."
The
Republic
disregarded the foregoing provision when
it failed and refused to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest
the
just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in
saying that Republics delay is contrary to
the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar
to ours, where an entry to the
expropriated
property
precedes
the
payment of compensation, it has been
held that if the compensation is not paid in
a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza,
this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the
sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market
value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply and
allowed several decades to pass without
obeying this Courts mandate. It is
tantamount to confiscation of private
property. While it is true that all private
properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government may
take them whenever the necessity or the
exigency of the occasion demands,
however from the taking of private

property by the government under the

power of eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the owner
for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title
to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only
upon
full
payment
of
the
just
compensation.
So, how could the
Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932
when it has not paid its owner the just
compensation, required by law, for more
than 50 years? Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can
be no transfer of title from the landowner
to the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation
of lands consists of two stages. First is
concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise. The second is
concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." It is only
upon the completion of these two stages
that expropriation is said to have been
completed
In
Republic
v.
Salem
Investment Corporation, we ruled that,
"the process is not completed until
payment of just compensation." Thus,
here, the failure of the Republic to pay
respondent and his predecessors-ininterest for a period of 57 years rendered
the expropriation process incomplete.
Thus,
SC
ruled
that
the
special
circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession
of the expropriated lot from the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the
non-payment of just compensation does
not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated
lots, however, in cases where the
government
failed
to
pay
just

compensation within five (5) years from

the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. After all, it is
the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation. In Cosculluela v.
Court of Appeals, we defined just
compensation as not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to
the property owner but also the payment
of the property within a reasonable time.
Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just."
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76.
February 3, 2000]
08OCT
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos
is a full-fledged member of Congress who
is
now
confined
at
the
national
penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including
attendance
at
legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite
his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a
substantial differentiation which removes

the accused-appellant as a prisoner from

the same class as all persons validly
confined under law by reason of the
mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x
x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws., this simply
means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The Court cannot
validate badges of inequality.
The
necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded. Here, election to the
position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes
of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class. Hence, the performance
of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison.