People vs. Mercado G.R. No.

116239 November 29,

2000
FACTS:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the
crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them
the punishment of death.
The defendants raised the constitutionality of death
penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in
deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors
committed in convicting the accused.
ISSUES:
Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and
"cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."
Whether or not the trial courts haste in deciding the case
resulted to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of
the defendants.

RULING:
1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled
in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an
exercise of the state's power to "secure society against
the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and
substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are
established.

2. No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the

trial court decided their case resulted in grave and
serious errors to their prejudice. A review of the trial
court's decision shows that its findings were based on the
records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial. The speed with which the
trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed
to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a
judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of
diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case
long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his
decision has arrived. The one-day period between the
filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to
consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the
orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but
reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task
for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial
court in this case committed no reversible errors and,
consequently, except for some modification, its decision
should be affirmed.

counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the

Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance
Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting
collectively & anonymously.
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his tenyear old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother
that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape
against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found
no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the
verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the

FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of
the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three
(3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the
trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of
accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question
of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is
unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion
for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.
Ratio:
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United
States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically
ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death
penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.

Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the

nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the
discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the
death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death
penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was
cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified
all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so
because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial
judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases,
prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges
and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of
life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape
is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it
does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if
no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have
the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in
its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the
rapist who, as such, does not take human life"

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two

grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death
penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the
willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have
any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our
own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous
violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim.
Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated,
provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific
circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had
entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was
a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the
crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times
of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and
arson resulting in death.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a

constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a
cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is
neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who
honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states
that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a
positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime
should first be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse
when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society
what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of
justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize

and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds

compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly
violent manner in which the same was committed or by the
reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and
mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is
an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity
are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
shock the moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life,
and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his
or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her
own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and
needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that

have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry

Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of

the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of
the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.
This was dismissed.

they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their

victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual
threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they
must be permanently prevented from doing so

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the

defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy

of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply
wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which
every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the
victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7,

1997
Per Curiam

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by

the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Facts:
Issue:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accusedappellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death.
The

accused-appellant

timely

filed

Motion

for

Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely

abolished the death penalty.
Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power
to secure society against threatened and actual evil.
Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts

that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive

agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the
form of a constitutional question of whether or not the
death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous,
something
more
than
the
mere
extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who
honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long
as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long
as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain
cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily
show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision

merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed

unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in
which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third
reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7)
negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that
the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty
in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this
amendment, the death penalty was not completely
abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely
suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the

discretion to review it at the propitious time.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element
of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of
death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no
less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by
death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we
are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No.
7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence
in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial
court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes
under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in
the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals
that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors
to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less
quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a
special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous
and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not

completely eradicate, their occurrence.

Be it the
foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez
or the following details of the nature of the heinous
crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental,
there was clearly, among the hundred or so reimpositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly
vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death
penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary
legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to
re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that
Congress define or describe what is meant by
heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances
duly proven in court that characterize the crime to
be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3)
that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill

be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons

involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that
the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness
and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the
most minimum of the human standards of decency or its
effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in
the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as
a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated,
curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that
for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime
should first be perceived and statistically proven
following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites
that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such

crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to

be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what
R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest
of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous
crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes."

Lozano vs Martinez
Facts:
Petitioners

were

charged

with

violation

of

Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved

seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied
by the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected
thus appealed.
Issue:

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional

of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid

provision on non-imprisonment due to debt

upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become

2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract

widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and

3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come

Held:

to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in

commercial and financial transactions. The basis or

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the

foundation of such perception is confidence. If such

police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional

confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as

inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen

currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may

of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and

become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy

issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored

that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of

upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-

worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles

payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law

and the banking community.

is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his

debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check

penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and

transcends the private interests of the parties directly

putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious

involved in the transaction and touches the interests of

effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed

the community at large. The mischief it creates is not

by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense

only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to

against property, but an offense against public order.

the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless

commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere

fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and

undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order

commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt

addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation

the welfare of society and the public interest.

that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the

check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally

presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element

protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts.

Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.

Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part
of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in
question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check,
but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just
as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check,
since without the indispensable participation of the payee
by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime.
This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and
the swindled. The petitioners posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the
laws. The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R.
No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
Cudia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No: 110315 , January 16, 1998

Facts:
Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City
which a preliminary investigation was conducted and as a result
the City Prosecutor filed an information against him.
The case against him was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment,the court called
the attention of the parties and contrary to the information,
Renatio Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in
Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case should be
assigned to a court involving crimes committed outside Angeles
City consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles
City RTC.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an
information charging Renato Cudio with the same crime and it
was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC
which resulted into two Information filed with the same crime. This
prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/
Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted.
Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his continued
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitionfor which he had been arraigned in the first criminal
case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition
would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.

The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner

raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on
the ground that the petition could not have been convicted under

the first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's

motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the
City Prosecutor of Angeles City did not have theauthority to file
the first information.
Ruling:
No.It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City
had no authority to file the first information, theoffense having
been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond
his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.1275, in relation to
Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides
that:
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the
persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral
evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City
Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by
law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or

information in the former prosecution. As the fiscal had no
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent
prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack
of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for
failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.
Thus Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

accused in Double Jeopardy.

People v. Obsania
rape
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may
inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/
double jeopardy attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent dismissal with express consent of the
defendant constitutes waiver
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447;
29 JUN 1968]
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape
before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counselmoved for the dismissal of
the charge for failure to allege vivid designs inthe info.
Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double

jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in
the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent
court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered
by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated
in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed
with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense because his action in having the case is
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the
Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counselthere can
be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the
indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was

dismissed because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving there
defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other
hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to
lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the
same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution
from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and
unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy
rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R.
NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused
Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who
were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with
sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there
was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that
the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it
appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three
accused then were charged with Falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified document. After the
prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the
evidencespresented were not sufficient to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion,
respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on
the ground that the acts committed by the accused do
not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime
of falsification which was charged earlier and that their
case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court

would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in
double jeopardy
Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in
double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that
the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a
motion of the accused however this was a motion filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the
evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be
tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution
of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a
valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there
should be a valid complaint, second would be that such
complaint be filed before a competent court and to which
the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise
terminated without express consent of the accused in
which were all present in the case at bar. There was
indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against
the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at

a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It

was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty
and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case
used against the accused were not sufficient to prove
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore
dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It
explained further that there are two instances when we
can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the
ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the
proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to
violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2
requisites given, it was the first on that is very much
applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of
the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar
the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will
constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused
which the law despises.
ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L54110; 20 FEB 1981]
Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with
grave coercion inthe Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money
worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because
the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment,
petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after
the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an
order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed
the court that it received a telegram stating that the
complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to

speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case

because the trial was already dragging the accused and
that the priests telegram did not have a medical
certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to
reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal
filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the
priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979,
accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case,

which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure
to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double
jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in

double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed already without the consent of the
accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on
the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants
incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself
which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these
three requisites should be present, that one, there is a
valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done
before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that
the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three
conditions were present, as the case filed was grave

coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to

where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the
information. When these three conditions are present
then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the
dismissal or termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was
evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a
speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that respondents had no
expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which
would make the case filed res judicata and has been
dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the
respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which
will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which
would be a bar to further prosecution.

Facts: State Prosecutor filed with the Metropolitan Trial

Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against herein
petitioner Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, Jose J.
Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers
Corporation for nonpayment of deficiency in corporate
income tax for the year 1979 but was later dismissed and
denied upon reconsideration.
Subsequently, the same prosecutor filed two (2)
informations before Regional Trial Court (RTC), for the
same alleged non-payment of deficiency of corporate
income tax for the year 1979, one was raffled to Branch
105 while the other to Branch 86. Respondent Judge Ulep
issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the
information in Branch 86 after discovering that said
information was identical to that filed with Branch 105.
The prosecutor withdrew the information and was
granted. But later on filed a motion to reinstate the same,
stating that the motion to withdraw information was
made through palpable mistake, and the result of
excusable neglectto which the respondent Judge
granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner.
Petitioner files this petition assailing that respondent
Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the information because the offense has
prescribed and exposed her to double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal
information has exposed petitioner to double jeopardy

Tupaz v. Ulep
GR. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Held: Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. The

reinstatement of the information would expose her to
double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy
if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been
convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the

indictment against him was dismissed without his

consent. In the instant case, there was a valid
complaint filed against petitioner to which she
pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at
the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
accused-petitioners consent. This consent cannot
be implied or presumed. Such consent must be
expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds
conformity.
As petitioners consent was not
expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing
of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information
against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally
protected right against double jeopardy.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Article 2, SECTION 21- Philippines Constitution
----- Attachment of jeopardy -----

People v. Ylagan
physical injuries
A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial
in the following conditions:
a. in a court of competent jurisdiction
b. upon a valid complaint or information
c. after he has been arraigned
d. after he has pleaded to the information
without the consent of the accused does not mean
over the objection of the accused or against the will of
the accused ; mere silence or failure to object

People v. Balisacan
homicide
Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that
the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he first
entered a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to
testify on the mitigating circumstances and he said he
acted in self defense: this had the effect of vacating his
plea of guilty; court should have required a new plea.

Cudia v. CA
requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of
double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim of jeopardy

People v. Obsania
rape

a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second

b. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
c. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment
that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may

inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/
double jeopardy attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent dismissal with express consent of the
defendant constitutes waiver

----- Termination of jeopardy -----

Rivera v. People

1. Bustamante v. Maceren
reopening of a case
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal
case after accused has started serving his sentence; a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served
or the defendant ha waived in writing his appeal;
withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of
defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.

transportation of marijuana
VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced
into writing may be set aside by the judge and enter a
new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case
Cuison v. CA
double homicide
The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e.
liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability doctrine on
double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.

People v. Velasco
homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to
successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania);
Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not
distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court
or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly
establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule; An acquittal is
final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before
the Court of Appeals; doctrine that double jeopardy may
not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court
finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process.

safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the

inherent power to amend their decisions to make them
conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the
RTC did not involve the consideration of new evidence but
a mere correction

People v. Cajigal
homicide to murder
The change of the offense charged from homicide to
murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution;

Salcedo v. Mendoza
homicide through reckless imprudence
General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or
with express consent of accused will not be a bar to the
subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when dismissal is
grounded upon the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
This amounts to a judgment of acquittal on the merits
which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused for the
same offense
Oriente v. People
homicide; lead pipe
It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional

----- Same offense; ordinance and states ----People v. Relova

theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the
RPC A person who was charged for violating a city
ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the
offense may not be charged again under the RPC; claim
of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense
charged under an ordinance is different from subsequent
offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring
from the same act; where an offense is punished by
different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose
of double jeopardy, is on identity of offenses charged. In
contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance
and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts;
Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two

offenses); identity of acts (examining the locus or such

acts in time and place); For double jeopardy to be
available, not all technical elements of the first offense
need be present in the definition of the second offense;
Damages, civil liability will continue to be heard
People v. City Court of Manila
the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when
there is no identity of the offenses charged. Evidence
required to prove one offense is not the same evidence
required to prove the other; An appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT
constitute double
jeopardy if:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express
consent of the defendant;
b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is
purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be
remanded to the court of origin)
----- Rule on supervening facts
Melo v. People
physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide The rule
of identity does not apply when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility
for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction, the injured person dies, the charged for

homicide against the same accused does not put him

twice in jeopardy.
People v. Buling
[less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians;
two complaints The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical
injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious physical
injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence
of a fracture when the second examination was made,
this must have been present during the first examination;
There was therefore no supervening fact which would
justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

PEOPLE vs. CA (GR No. 142051)

review disguised as certiorari / acquittal is final
Respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted by the Court of
Appeals. The People, through a writ of certiorari, allege errors of
judgment or misappreciation of evidence on the part of the CA,
not errors of law or jurisdiction. This is an erroneous application of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari because the Supreme Court
cannot inquire into factual matters unless there is a blatant abuse
of authority on the part of the lower court. Regardless of its
nomenclature, the petition is actually one for an ordinary review of
the factual findings of the lower court. It was practically an appeal
disguised as a petition for certiorari and for the SC to entertain
such would violate the constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
Unless there is a mistrial, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable pursuant to double jeopardy. This is regardless of
whether it is decided by the trial court or the CA.

DD: A decision of acquittal becomes final immediately and bars the reopening of the case. The exception is when the prosecution was denied
due process.

PSB v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26,

2005
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner
Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents
Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were
charged with estafa thru falsification of a public
document in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not
guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed,
with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground

that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses

as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case.

(c)
and

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of

Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial
court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence
for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper
identification of the accused. But even assuming that the
trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.

(d)
He was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.[15]

Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the

trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double
jeopardy does not apply in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at
bar?
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7
requires the following elements in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;

The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the

express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to
two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on
insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to
speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence
falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is
based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements
required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case
No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through
falsification of a public document against respondent
spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case
and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent
spouses were arraigned during which they entered not
guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.

Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that

[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order,
except if the accused would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy.
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency
of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of
acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7,
the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it
seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe

1987]
Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was
accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic

Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in
two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila
on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2
cases, the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case
F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA
3060), by alleging that the accused, "conspiring, and
confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and
cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of
motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving
images on the projection screen through the mechanical
application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures
have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures for preview, examination and censorship, nor duly
passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De
Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the
other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for
violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was
amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the
same accused, "conspiring and confederating together and
actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical
application of movie projection equipment and the use of
projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to
wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and
showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with
exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and
lascivious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene
and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to

wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal

Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales
pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused Pangilinan,
was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June
1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2
cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an
offense. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases
were set for trial on 7 August 1972. No hearing was held on 7
August 1972, however, as Gonzales moved for postponement of
the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. On 15
November 1972, Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his
plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without however,
substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the
motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972.
On 27 December 1972, Gonzales moved to quash the information
in Criminal Case F- 147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as
there was according to him, also pending against him Criminal
Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the information
allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in
Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the
City Court dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After
the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348, or on 7 February 1973,
in Criminal Case F-147347, Gonzales changed his plea of "not
guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of RA 3060. He
was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10
February 1973, the People filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of 20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F147348. This was however denied by the court in its order dated

16 March 1973, and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973.

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar
prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code,
constitutes double jeopardy.

indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in

elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here
involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the
other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same
evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double
jeopardy cannot prosper.

Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double

jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2)
informations with which the accused was charged, do not make
out only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in
section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures
not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does
not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article
201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of
indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do
not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws
involved would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct
from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows their
essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum
prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it
is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA ordinance & law / if based on same act

, double jeopardy applies Manuel Opulencia was charged for
violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1974 of Batangas City for

having made unauthorized installations and wirings in his ice

plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (typical jumper). He
pleaded not guilty although he admitted to the presence of such
unauthorized installations w/in his ice plant. However, given the
fact that the case against him has prescribed the trial court was
constrained to dismiss the case against him on the ground of
prescription. Being a light felony, it prescribed 2 months after the
discovery the asst. fiscal filed the case 9 months thereafter,
way beyond the prescriptive period. Later on, the fiscal filed a
case against Opulencia, this time for Theft of electric power,
punishable under the Revised Penal Code . Opulencia answered
w/ a Motion to Quash.
Double jeopardy operates when an ACT is prosecuted under an
ordinance, and then later the same act is prosecuted under a
statute and vice versa. The 2nd sentence of the provision makes
reference to ACTS , not offenses as provided in the 1st sentence.
Conviction or acquittal under either constitutes a bar to
prosecution for the same act . Thus, even if the offenses charged
under the ordinance and the law are different, if the charges
under the law and ordinance are based on the same act, double
jeopardy applies. In this case, there is obviously only one act
sought to be punished although different offenses are alleged.
Thus, double jeopardy protects the accused.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L45129; 6 MAR 1987]

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus,

People of thePhilippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information
for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the groundof
double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police
together with personnel of BatangasElectric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city
judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of
the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel
Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have
been installed without authority from the city government
and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in
the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine
months prior to discovery when it should be 2months
prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and
prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975,
another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the
Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a
Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical
installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City
of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before
arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. TheAssistant fiscals claim is
that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense
charged against the accused was unauthorized
installation of electrical devices without the approval and
necessary authority from the City Government which was
punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was
dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is
theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised

Penal Code making it a different crime charged against

the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443, Opulencia
could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted of
the same act charged in case 16054, in which he has already
been acquitted.
Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of Rights
deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of
clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an
act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the
second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in
the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses
charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If
the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a

prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or

acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy
has attached under one of the informations charging said offense,
the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the
same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor
acquittal in either case. Thus, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of
offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In
contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to
have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the
same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to note that the
rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that
must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second
offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the
second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused
person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Acts of a

person which physically occur on the same occasion and are

infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore
form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it
were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses
under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by
the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the
Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had
already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription
of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense.

PEOPLE VS. BRACAMONTE

G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996
FACTS:
On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together
with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the
crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively
identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the
mother of one of the victims.
Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of
Jehovahs Witnesses and were confounded when their
housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala
was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house.
The three men then dashed off.
Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee
and the Paranalas housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting
to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the
charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon
and Bracamonte were at large until the latters arrest in October
of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and
interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that
there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime
and that Parnala couldnt possible know him to merit
identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamontes defense of alibi and Parnalas lack
of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the
appellant of the crime.

RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since
it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper,
it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the
accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime,
but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him
to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant
Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing
proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims
house at the time the crime was committed.
Positive identification by an independent witness who has not
been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must
prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the
accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any
reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is
also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order
for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of
a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case,
the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most
instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim.
The witness degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused,
although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable
requirement for purposes of positive identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other coaccused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double
homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should
have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons
were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number
of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the
victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.

Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought

for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the
accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero

were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs.

Facts:

mapa.

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the

Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of
the

crime

ammunition.

of

illegal

possession

of

firearm

and

The validity of the conviction was based

upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts

ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the
accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in

Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme
Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:

possession of the revolver and the ammunition described

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant

in the complaint was without the requisite license a

was acquitted.

permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET

AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise

Reason:

subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which

granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was

performance of his official duties as peace officer.

part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time

Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.

appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question

and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the

doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a

doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one
is

adopted,

the

new

doctrine

should

be

applied

prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had

relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

People vs. Jabinal

February 27, 1974
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in
possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit.
He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,although he had
no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his
appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in
People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally
liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were
reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of

the Supreme Courtsrulings in the cases of Macarandang and of
Lucero.
Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court,
although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New
Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal
system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was
originally passed, since the courts construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law
thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported
by numerous authorities isa restatement of the legal maximlegis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant
was found in possession of the firearm and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof.Considering that the appellant possessed a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability
would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant
should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an
act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
_____________________________________
*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as
confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be peace officers.
Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without
license.**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential

agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that
secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from
acquiring a license to carry a firearm.

occasions has found the CPP to be an illegal organization,

engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of overthrowing
the government, etc.
3.

PEOPLE vs. FERRER Anti - Subversion Act The AntiSubversion Act outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and other subversive organizations, and punishes any person
who knowingly and by obvert acts affiliates himself, becomes, or
remains a member of the said Party or any similar subversive
organization. It is alleged to be a bill of attainder. A Bill of
Attainder is a law w/c inflicts punishment w/o trial. It substitutes a
legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. The issues are
resolved as follows:
1.

The mere fact that it singles out the CPP and imposes a
burden upon it is insufficient to deem it as a Bill of Attainder
nevertheless, the said law does not apply solely to the CPP
but to any other organization organized for the purpose of
overthrowing the government. Under the law, the guilt of the
accused must still be judicially determined. The court must
still prove that the accused joined knowingly and w/ intent to
attain its specific objective to overthrow the government;
hence it is not an ex post facto law.

2.

The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the

criminal nature of the CPP is so universally acknowledged
as to be certain and judicially noticeable. The SC on many

If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex

post facto law. The said law, however, punishes acts
committed AFTER the enactment of the law. It applies
prospectively, not retroactively. Members of the CPP have the
opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue their
criminal acts; hence the penalties are not inescapable. The
law is not an ex post facto law; neither is it a bill of attainder.

People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972]

Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano
Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10,
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation
and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the
Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That
on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of
Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously
became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and
placing the government under the control and domination of an
alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung
University, the training school of recruits of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the
following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That

the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to

public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a band;
and (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the AntiSubversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970,
another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970
Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on
the grounds that (1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it
is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in
the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the
laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in
its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused. The Government appealed. The Supreme Court
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of
a Bill of Attainder.
Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.
Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil
that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein,
when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it

will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist
Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In
fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to
be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the
trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e.,
to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other
illegal means and place the country under the control and
domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically
requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be
unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from
the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's
illegal objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render
it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial

trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that the

statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within
the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill
of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy,
then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill
of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act
expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts
committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,
become or remain members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive
association" after 20 June 1957, are punished. Those who were
members of the Party or of any other subversive association at
the time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of
purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under
oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides
that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from
penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore
not inescapable.

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-3261314; 27 DEC 1972]

Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge
that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP)aggravated by circumstances
of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a
band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA,inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The
trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the
powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption
of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved

20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membership therein, and for
other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and
present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section
4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the
illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that
due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the
CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exerciseunder
freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post
facto law.
2. Whether
expression.

or

Not

RA1700

violates

freedom

of

Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY of the Anti-Subversion Act
of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of

guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of

attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the
Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it
must be shown that membership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt
acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof
of a members direct participation. Why is membership
punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to
the organization. Membership makes himself party to its
unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature.
Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the
act. The members of the subversive organizations before the
passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The
statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCEOF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this

matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the

preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech
and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in
the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven
that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.The court did not make any judgment on the crimes
of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.