January 2010

Examiners Report
NEBOSH National
Diploma in
Occupational Health
and Safety - Unit C

Examiners Report
NEBOSH LEVEL 6 DIPLOMA IN
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
Unit C: Workplace and work equipment
JANUARY 2010

CONTENTS

Introduction

General comments

Comments on individual questions

2010 NEBOSH, Dominus Way, Meridian Business Park, Leicester LE19 1QW
tel: 0116 263 4700

fax: 0116 282 4000

email: info@nebosh.org.uk

website: www.nebosh.org.uk

The National Examination Board in Occupational Safety and Health is a registered charity, number 1010444
T(s):exrpts/D/D-C1001

EXTERNAL

DW/DA/REW

Introduction

NEBOSH (The National Examination Board in Occupational Safety and Health) was formed in 1979 as
an independent examining board and awarding body with charitable status. We offer a comprehensive
range of globally-recognised, vocationally-related qualifications designed to meet the health, safety,
environmental and risk management needs of all places of work in both the private and public sectors.
Courses leading to NEBOSH qualifications attract over 25,000 candidates annually and are offered by
over 400 course providers in 65 countries around the world. Our qualifications are recognised by the
relevant professional membership bodies including the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
(IOSH) and the International Institute of Risk and Safety Management (IIRSM).
NEBOSH is an awarding body to be recognised and regulated by the UK regulatory authorities:

The Office of the Qualifications and Examinations Regulator (Ofqual) in England

The Department for Children, Education, Lifelong Learning and Skills (DCELLS) in Wales
The Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) in Northern Ireland
The Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) in Scotland

NEBOSH follows the GCSE, GCE, VCE, GNVQ and AEA Code of Practice 2007/8 published by the
regulatory authorities in relation to examination setting and marking (available at the Ofqual website
www.ofqual.gov.uk). While not obliged to adhere to this code, NEBOSH regards it as best practice to
do so.
Candidates scripts are marked by a team of Examiners appointed by NEBOSH on the basis of their
qualifications and experience. The standard of the qualification is determined by NEBOSH, which is
overseen by the NEBOSH Council comprising nominees from, amongst others, the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and
the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH). Representatives of course providers, from
both the public and private sectors, are elected to the NEBOSH Council.
This report on the Examination provides information on the performance of candidates which it is
hoped will be useful to candidates and tutors in preparation for future examinations. It is intended to
be constructive and informative and to promote better understanding of the syllabus content and the
application of assessment criteria.
NEBOSH 2010

Any enquiries about this report publication should be addressed to:

NEBOSH
Dominus Way
Meridian Business Park
Leicester
LE10 1QW
Tel:
0116 263 4700
Fax:
0116 282 4000
Email: info@nebosh.org.uk

EXTERNAL

General comments

Many candidates are well prepared for this unit assessment and provide comprehensive and relevant
answers in response to the demands of the question paper. This includes the ability to demonstrate
understanding of knowledge by applying it to workplace situations.
There are always some candidates, however, who appear to be unprepared for the unit assessment
and who show both a lack of knowledge of the syllabus content and a lack of understanding of how
key concepts should be applied to workplace situations.
In order to meet the pass standard for this assessment, acquisition of knowledge and understanding
across the syllabus are prerequisites. However, candidates need to demonstrate their knowledge and
understanding in answering the questions set. Referral of candidates in this unit is invariably because
they are unable to write a full, well-informed answer to the question asked.
Some candidates find it difficult to relate their learning to the questions and as a result offer responses
reliant on recalled knowledge and conjecture and fail to demonstrate any degree of understanding.
Candidates should prepare themselves for this vocational examination by ensuring their
understanding, not rote-learning pre-prepared answers.
Common pitfalls
It is recognised that many candidates are well prepared for their assessments. However, recurrent
issues, as outlined below, continue to prevent some candidates reaching their full potential in the
assessment.

Many candidates fail to apply the basic principles of examination technique and for some
candidates this means the difference between a pass and a referral.

In some instances, candidates are failing because they do not attempt all the required
questions or are failing to provide complete answers. Candidates are advised to always
attempt an answer to a compulsory question, even when the mind goes blank. Applying basic
health and safety management principles can generate credit worthy points.

Some candidates fail to answer the question set and instead provide information that may be
relevant to the topic but is irrelevant to the question and cannot therefore be awarded marks.

Many candidates fail to apply the command words (also known as action verbs, eg describe,
outline, etc). Command words are the instructions that guide the candidate on the depth of
answer required. If, for instance, a question asks the candidate to describe something, then
few marks will be awarded to an answer that is an outline.

Some candidates fail to separate their answers into the different sub-sections of the questions.
These candidates could gain marks for the different sections if they clearly indicated which
part of the question they were answering (by using the numbering from the question in their
answer, for example). Structuring their answers to address the different parts of the question
can also help in logically drawing out the points to be made in response.

Candidates need to plan their time effectively. Some candidates fail to make good use of their
time and give excessive detail in some answers leaving insufficient time to address all of the
questions.

Candidates should also be aware that Examiners cannot award marks if handwriting is
illegible.

EXTERNAL

UNIT C Workplace and work equipment

Section A all questions compulsory

Question 1

Outline the main design features of a warehouse and associated traffic

routes intended to reduce the risks associated with internal transport.

(10)

In outlining the design features that should be considered in order to minimise risks
associated with the movement of vehicles in a warehouse, candidates should have
referred to matters such as the provision of traffic routes with a smooth and stable
surface and of sufficient width and headroom for the types of vehicle that will use
them; the elimination of sharp bends, blind corners and steep gradients with the siting
of convex mirrors on those corners that cannot be avoided; the installation of a one
way system to minimise the need for reversing; the inclusion of passing places for
vehicles; the introduction of speed limits and the provision of speed retarders; the
provision of a good standard of lighting for the routes and particularly for the transition
areas between the inside and outside of buildings; the segregation of vehicles and
pedestrians including separate access and egress with vision panels in the access
doors; the provision of clearly marked crossing places for pedestrians and designated
parking spaces for vehicles to avoid congestion; the provision of protection for racking
and other vulnerable items and the use of wheel stops at loading bays and in areas
where tipping is necessary; and the provision of adequate ventilation to clear diesel
exhaust gasses from the building.
While few candidates referred to wheel stops at loading bays and the provision of
designated parking spaces, answers were generally to a good standard containing
practical solutions which were well outlined.

Question 2

A petrol storage tank in a bund containing three other similar tanks is

overfilled during a transfer operation resulting in a large spill of petrol into
the bund. The petrol vapour is ignited from a remote source causing a
catastrophic explosion and fire involving the whole installation.
(a)
(b)

Identify the design and construction measures that could have

prevented such an event.

(4)

Outline the range of measures that would be necessary to

mitigate the effects of such an event.

(6)

For part (a), design and construction measures that could have prevented the incident
include adequate segregation between adjacent tanks and the use of separate
bunding; an interlocked pumping system with high level alarms with at least double
redundancy of the alarms; level detection and vapour detector monitoring systems
fitted in the bunds together with foam vapour suppression; the provision of remote
shut down systems and a good standard of earthing and bonding. Few candidates
referred to the need for vapour detection and monitoring in the bunds or the provision
of remote shut down systems.

EXTERNAL

When candidates came to answer part (b), many appeared to have no understanding
of mitigation measures and consequently repeated many of the preventative and
protective measures they had included in their answers to the first part of the question.
Examiners were looking for an outline of measures such as the provision of adequate
fixed foam installations to spray the surface of pools in the bunded areas and spray
deluge systems; the installation of foam monitors capable of reaching the tops of
tanks; the erection of radiation walls between adjacent bunds to prevent other tanks
being heated; an adequate supply of fire fighting water; the redundancy of water
pressurisation; the installation of remotely operated pumps and valves to empty
affected tanks; easy routes of access for fire fighters; the provision of drainage
interceptors to minimise the environmental effects of fire water run-off; regular draining
and cleaning to remove firewater from bunds; the preparation of an emergency plan to
deal with such an event should it occur and the provision of training for operatives
both in the content of the plan and the actions expected of them. Many of the above
measures for example the provision of foam sprays, spray deluge systems water
supply and the redundancy of water pressurisation rarely appeared in the answers
provided.

Question 3

A design for a multifuel combined heat and power (CHP) power station
allows for either coal, oil or natural gas burning. The proposed site will
include the necessary fuel storage facilities and water treatment plant.
The installation will be located on the bank of a river estuary and receive
deliveries by road, pipeline and ship.
Identify potential pollutants AND their related source:
(a)

during normal operation;

(5)

(b)

during abnormal operation.

(5)

In answering this question, candidates were expected to identify both the specific
pollutants and their sources in the normal operation of the power station and in any
abnormal conditions that could be foreseen. During normal operation, it would be
likely that there would be emissions of carbon dioxide and oxides of nitrogen during
the burning of fossil fuels and of sulphur dioxide and other sulphur compounds when
coal or oil were the chosen fuels. Other likely pollutants would include soot and coal
dust from incomplete combustion, solid waste from coal and oil ash, VOC emission
from oil storage tank vents, acid and alkali effluents arising from the water treatment
process, emissions from vehicles delivering fuel to the site, the thermal content of
cooling waters and the pollution arising from the inevitable noise and light.
Pollution during abnormal conditions would be caused by leaks from oil storage tanks,
gas supply pipes and acid and alkali storage tanks; spillage of chemical following a
road tanker accident; oil slicks from ships during off-loading operations; carbon
dioxide due to incomplete combustion of fuel; particulate from incomplete combustion
of oil or coal and accidental combustion such as fires in tanks or coal tip ignition with
the resultant fire water run off during fire fighting operations.
The question caused difficulties and some candidates were unable to differentiate
between normal and abnormal operation. In general, there seemed little awareness of
the significant pollutants that might arise from the operation with little reference being
made to VOC emissions, effluent from the water treatment system and noise and light.
There was a tendency to make a general reference to gases, even greenhouse
gases, without further classification and even when pollutants were identified, their
actual sources were not given as required by the question.

EXTERNAL

Question 4

A production plant uses a potentially explosive powder. Pressurised

nitrogen is the transporting and inerting gas within the plant.
(a)

Give the meaning of inerting.

(b)

Outline practical reasons

necessary for this process.

(2)
why

inerting

was

considered
(3)

(c)

Identify the risks from inert atmospheres during maintenance.

(2)

(d)

Outline control measures that reduce the risks from inert

atmospheres during maintenance.

(3)

To obtain the marks available for part (a) of the question, candidates should have
stated that inerting involves the partial or complete substitution of the oxygen content
in a flammable atmosphere with an inert gas.
For part (b), an outline of the reasons for the necessity to inert in the process
described would have referred to the prevention of explosion within the process and
the avoidance of flammable limits; the prevention of air/oxygen being drawn into the
process through pipe work or holes in the equipment; the possible existence of
air/oxygen within the process due to start up conditions or maintenance and repair
work; to negate possible ignition sources from friction or static electricity within the
process and to protect against the possibility of the presence of tramp metal producing
sparks during the process.
In answer to part (c), Examiners were looking for an identification of risks such as cold
burns from cold nitrogen supplies; hypoxia, anoxia and asphyxiation due an
inadequate supply of oxygen and direct and indirect injury from the release of
pressurised gas or product from the plant.
Finally, an outline of control measures that would reduce the risks from inert
atmospheres when maintenance work was being carried out should have referred to:
the effective isolation of the plant by disconnecting the supply of inert gas or by
blanking/spading the supply pipe; measuring and monitoring the oxygen and
flammability levels in the working area; the use of forced ventilation or breathing
apparatus; and establishing control by means of a permit to work system with the
activities being authorised and undertaken by trained and informed personnel.
Few candidates were able to provide either an adequate meaning for inerting nor the
reasons for its use in the process described. Asphyxiation but little else was identified
as a risk during maintenance work. Best answers were provided for part (d) though
there was the occasional reference to the use of a respirator as a control measure. It
was concerning to note in the answers a reference to the fact that oxygen and
nitrogen form an explosive mixture and another to the use of oxygen as an inerting
medium.

EXTERNAL

Question 5

The owners of a large distribution warehouse business have secured a

contract from a stationery manufacturer. Their insurers have
recommended that the proposed storage facility is sprinkler protected.
Outline the factors to be considered in providing an adequate sprinkler
system for the storage facility.

(10)

An initial design factor to be considered in the provision of an adequate sprinkler

system would be the capacity of water required, the existence of an adequate and
assured water supply and the availability of an alternative if this was to fail for any
reason. The design of the pumping system would also be important with a diesel back
up if the decision was taken to install electrically operated pumps. Other factors would
include the means of activating the system (frangible bulbs or detector activated); the
linkage of the system to alarms; the spray pattern required; the area to be covered
and the presence of other combustibles apart from the stationery; the height of the
storage racks and their distance from the sprinkler heads with a decision to be taken
on the need for in-rack sprinkling; the provision of fire stopping for sprinklers passing
through compartmentalisation; the provision of fire water run off; the arrangements to
be put in place for testing the equipment and issues concerned with the protection of
the sprinkler heads and the electrical system.
Many answers lacked technical depth, did not show an understanding of the particular
issues raised in the wording of the question and were generalised round fire
prevention rather than design measures.

Question 6

With reference to the mechanical hazards associated with the operation

of a hydraulic robotic arm on a production line, outline a range of
measures aimed at minimising the risk of injury.

(10)

From the outset, it was important for candidates to recognise that the question was
asking for an outline of the safety measures needed to protect against the various
mechanical hazards presented by robots and not by machinery in general. Better
responses were provided by those candidates who took a hierarchical approach,
referring to a range of possible technical, procedural and behavioural controls. For
example, while it may not be possible to eliminate the hazards entirely, the elimination
of a crushing hazard between the robot and another object by increasing the distance
between them was one that was worthy of mention. In terms of safeguarding with
respect to the operation described in the scenario, distance guarding of adequate
height, interlocked and allowing authorised access only, the presence of sensing
devices such as photoelectric systems or pressure mats, and the provision of local
fixed guards to eliminate drawing in hazards were all relevant. Procedural measures
might include software checks to avoid aberrant behaviour mainly related to impact
hazards together with maintenance procedures to check the integrity of hydraulic
systems and wiring designed to avoid or reduce electrical or signal interference. In the
operation described, maintenance personnel would be at particular risk and so
procedures involving permit to work systems would be imperative. Additionally,
technical measures should be introduced to allow maintenance work to be performed
remotely as far as possible. This would also apply to teaching which should be done
either remotely or with the robot in slow mode. Should anyone need access to the
robot, then measures should be in place to release any stored energy and to protect
against hydraulic failure. Finally, in terms of behavioural controls, it would be
necessary to provide a warning before the machine starts up and for the workforce to
be informed of the dangers, and instructed and trained in the procedures to be
followed.

EXTERNAL

There were some good answers provided for this question. However, some
candidates showed a lack of knowledge of the principles of machinery guarding and
many referred only to fencing without being specific as to what this would entail.
Others listed a number of hazards associated with robotic systems but then did not
indicate what measures should be taken to mitigate their effect.

Section B three from five questions to be attempted

Question 7

A property development company has acquired a former Victorian grain

warehouse, abandoned for the past twenty years, to convert into luxury
apartments. A Principal Contractor has been appointed for the entire
project which involves total removal of the building internals followed by
construction of the apartments within the building shell. The demolition
work is sub-contracted to a specialist company.
(a)

Under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations

2007 (CDM);

(i)

outline the specific duties of the Principal Contractor with regard

to the demolition phase of the project.
Your answer should exclude requirements to check on
clients duties.

(7)

(ii)

identify additional duties specific to demolition under CDM.

(3)

(b)

Outline the content of the Pre-Construction Information that will

be of specific interest to the demolition contractor.

(10)

Part (a) of the question was designed to test candidates knowledge of the
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations and in particular Regulations 22
to 24. The duties placed upon the Principal Contractor by the Regulations include: the
development of a construction phase plan, providing the demolition contractor with a
copy of the plan relating to demolition, informing them of the minimum time for
planning and preparation before beginning work and ensuring that he/she is
competent to manage a demolition sub contract; planning, managing and monitoring
the demolition phase to ensure it is carried out without risks to health and safety;
ensuring that information relating to their activities is provided to the demolition
contractor and ensuring safe working and co-ordination between them and other subcontractors; ensuring that welfare facilities suitable for demolition work such as
decontamination units and showers are provided; taking steps to prevent access to
the construction site by unauthorised persons; identifying the information relating to
the demolition activity required by the CDM coordinator for inclusion in the health and
safety file; ensuring that all contract and sub-contract employees are given site
induction and any further information and training they might need in relation to health
and safety and consulting with employees or their representatives on health and
safety issues.
The additional duties in the Regulations specific to demolition are found in Regulation
29. They require that the demolition of a structure should be planned and carried out
in such a manner as to prevent danger or where it is not practical to prevent it, to
reduce the danger to as low a level as is reasonably practicable. The arrangements
for carrying out the demolition work should be recorded in writing before the work
begins.

EXTERNAL

For part (c), candidates should have given examples of information such as the
location of site and buried services; details of hazardous and flammable substances
stored on the site; possible contamination of the ground or drains; the location of other
hazards such as asbestos; the possible presence of anthrax contaminated plaster; the
presence of any hazardous machinery or equipment that has been left in the building;
details of weaknesses in the structure such as fragile roofs or the presence of rot;
ground conditions such as possible instability and the existence of culverts;
information on the previous use of the land; means of access to the site and traffic
routes particularly those for the removal of waste; the proximity of neighbours; copies
of the original building plans if available and details of any restrictions on the hours of
work.
This was not a particularly popular question and not well answered by those who did
decide to attempt it. It may have been that candidates did not have too much
knowledge of construction operations. There was a general inability to identify the
specific requirements for demolition with candidates opting to identify in their place the
general duties contained in the Regulations. Some confused pre-construction
information with the design brief. Candidates should again be reminded of the need to
study the wording of the question with great care, since despite the instructions given
in bold type, there were still a number of candidates who referred to the duties of the
client.

Question 8

(a)
(b)

Outline a range of factors that may cause instability of a mobile

crane.

(8)

Outline control measures that should be taken to reduce the

likelihood of a mobile crane overturning during a lifting operation.

(12)

This was a very popular question and generally well answered. Factors affecting crane
stability that could have been outlined include issues connected with the load, those
affecting the crane directly such as lateral or longitudinal stability and other stability
issues. Issues connected with the load include its weight and centre of gravity,
incorrect slinging, snatching of the load or shock loading and the load snagging on
obstructions. Instability issues which might affect the crane directly include unstable
ground that is incapable of bearing the weight of the crane and its load; sloping or
uneven ground; outriggers not fully extended and a failure to use spreader plates;
exceeding the cranes safe working load; overruling the rated capacity indicator and/or
alarm and slewing or hoisting too quickly. Other stability issues include travelling on
gradients under load; driving too fast or extending the jib under load; incorrect rigging
of the luffing jib, blocks or sheaves; incorrect tyre pressures; mechanical failure;
inadvertent contacts and adverse weather conditions.
For part (b), control measures that should be taken involve initially the carrying out of
an area survey including a full assessment of the environment such as ground
conditions including the presence of voids, excavations or soft ground; over head and
proximity hazards; weather forecasts and pre-lift levelling and compaction. This will be
followed by procedural control measures such as the preparation of a lifting plan and
the appointment of a competent person to supervise the lift; ensuring that the statutory
inspections and certification of the crane have been carried out and that it has been
regularly maintained; the selection of the correct lifting accessories; cordoning off the
lifting area and erecting warning signs and carrying out a test lift.
Additionally it will be necessary to ensure that the appropriate engineering controls are
in place and are in good working condition such as a rated capacity indicator and
alarm system, speed limiters, the over-hoist limit switch and the motion and
performance limit device; to ensure the outriggers are fully extended and positioned
on spreader plates; and that visibility is improved where necessary by the provision of
CCTV and/or mirrors. Finally consideration will have to be given to behavioural
controls such as the competence and training of the driver, slinger and banksman.

EXTERNAL

Some candidates successfully outlined a range of factors that might cause instability
but then did not go on in part (b) to suggest the appropriate control measures.

Question 9

A serious accident occurred when a threaded steel rod in the braking

mechanism of a hoist broke. An investigation revealed that the cause of
the breakage was fatigue failure.
(a)

Outline the mechanism and characteristics of fatigue failure.

(6)

(b)

Identify THREE factors which can contribute to such a failure

AND for EACH factor outline ONE circumstance in which it may
occur.

(6)

Outline the measures that could have been taken to minimise

the likelihood of such a failure.

(8)

(c)

This question was designed to test candidates understanding of the mechanisms and
causative factors of fatigue failure and the measures that could minimise the
probability of such failure occurring.
Part (a) required candidates to outline characteristics such as crack propagation from
points of stress concentration, fluctuating stress environments and the characteristic
conchoidal fracture pattern (beach marks) which progress as narrow rings at low load
extending at full load. There is little or no deformation prior to the final failure which
may be ductile or brittle.
In part (b), candidates needed to explore factors which could give rise to fatigue failure
in practice such as stress concentration particularly at sharp corners and holes;
surface and sub surface defects such as flaws, cracks, occlusions and impurities;
design and fatigue strength issues; residual stresses imposed during manufacture or
assembly; and the effects of factors such as corrosion or temperature.
For part (c), candidates should have outlined measures to minimise the likelihood of
fatigue failures such as those connected with design, manufacture and installation
involving the correct specification of materials and components to match service
conditions, correct assembly and quality assurance; the maintenance, inspection and
examination (with NDT) particularly of critical components and their replacement at
planned intervals; and measures connected with use such as avoiding abuse and
remaining within designed operational limits, the provision of training and instruction
for those involved in the use and the keeping of service history records.
This question was not widely attempted and the answers that were produced were
disappointing with most marks being obtained for part (c). Candidates did not seem to
understand the mechanism of fatigue failure with few able to identify its characteristics.
Some took the opportunity to write at length on the subject of NDT while there were
other surprising references to shorelines and beechmarks.

10

EXTERNAL

Question 10

Outline the precautions that can be taken to minimise the risks

associated with a cable strike when excavating near underground
electrical cables.

(20)

This question concerned a topic that must often be encountered. If excavation work is
to be carried out near underground electrical cables, it is essential that the work is
properly planned before it starts. This involves seeking advice from the relevant body
such as the appropriate electricity supply company or the highway/roads authority;
assessing electricity cable plans on the understanding that symbols may vary between
utilities and that high and low voltage cables can be shown on separate plans; making
the supply dead if this can be done or investigating the possibility of diversion;
avoiding the use of mechanical excavation and utilising a permit to work system.
Before the actual excavation work starts, it will be necessary to locate the presence of
cables by the use of cable avoidance tools (CATs) such as Hum or radio frequency
detectors and their identification and routes clearly marked. Should a cable, which is
recorded on a plan, cannot be located, assistance and advice should be sought from
the appropriate authority with extreme care being taken if excavation work begins
before the assistance and advice has been obtained.
The excavation work should be carried out only by personnel who have been trained
and are competent in safe digging practice. They would need to be aware that
although no cables are indicated on plans or located by a detector, they may still be
present and though cable depths are often prescribed, they should not assume that
this is always the case. Additionally, though cables often have protective covers, the
assumption should not be made that this is universal practice. Workers should also be
aware that though a cable has been exposed, there may be further cables at a lower
level and if cables are found which are terminated with pot ended or bottle ended
seals, they may still be live. When cable joints are discovered, they should be
supported, should not be moved and should not be roughly treated.
Further precautions that should be taken during the excavation work include the need
to look out for permanent marker posts or other visible indication of buried cables; to
establish positive location by careful hand digging, exposing the cables by digging
from the side and using hand held power tools only at a distance of 500 mm or more
from the indicated lines of cables. If mechanical excavators have to be used in the
vicinity of cables, then damage should be avoided as far as is reasonably practicable.
Personnel should be kept well away from the excavator and drivers instructed to stay
in the cab if a cable is struck. If they have to leave the cab in such circumstances, they
should jump clear.
Once cables are exposed, any damage noted should be reported to the cable owners
and no work undertaken in the vicinity. Support should be provided if more than one
metre of cable is exposed and protection, such as the use of planks or sandbags
should be provided to prevent damage from ongoing work. Finally, cables should not
be moved aside unless the work is supervised by the cable owners.
Answers to this question were not to a good standard and were often lacking in detail.
The more general and obvious points were mentioned such as the need to provide
shoring for the excavation and to prevent access by the public but there was little
reference to the more technical issues such as the precautions to be taken when
cables are exposed, safe digging practice and mechanical digging. There seemed to
be little understanding of the power and heat involved when high voltage cables are
struck. Many were content to rely on the general principles of safe working without
referring to the detail contained in HSG 47.

11

EXTERNAL

Question 11

An enclosed reactor vessel 30 metres high with a diameter of 10 metres

needs cleaning, inspection and repair. The reactor was previously used
for reacting flammable solids and gases that formed a toxic, acidic
product.
It is not possible to avoid entry and the relevant personnel are suitably fit,
trained, informed and supervised.
Outline additional arrangements that should be considered in order to
comply with the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997.

(20)

In answering this question, candidates should firstly have referred to the necessity to
carry out a risk assessment of the operation which would identify that: the remaining
residues of reactants and product in the reactor could be toxic by inhalation and/or
contact; a flammable atmosphere may persist; there is the possibility of contamination
from adjacent sources and plants; access to surfaces inside the tank involves work at
height; the atmosphere within the reactor could be contaminated by the cleaning and
repair methods adopted; heat exhaustion may be a factor during internal jetting and
repairs; and there is the possibility of oxygen depletion or enrichment.
In the light of the above, it would be necessary to take appropriate precautions such
as: the need to purge the tank with an inert gas; the use of forced ventilation;
atmospheric testing before entry and while the work is being carried out; the provision
of full body personal protective equipment possibly including air-fed breathing
apparatus; the erection of staging within the reactor and the provision of fall arrest
equipment; provision of adequate lighting which together with other electrical
equipment should be intrinsically safe or flameproof with arrangements provided for
earthing; isolation of the reactor to prevent inadvertent entry of products; the use of
non-sparking tools; the operation of a permit to work system for entry to the reactor
with means of communication with stand-by personnel on the outside; and
consideration of issues such as job rotation and fluid intake.
There would also be a need to consider the emergency arrangements required by
Regulation 5 of the Confined Spaces Regulations which would have to be in place
before entry to the reactor was allowed. These should include the provision and
maintenance of cutting equipment if access proves impossible or non-existent at low
level and a powered hoist for top entry rescue; breathing apparatus together with
harnesses and lines; first aid facilities including rescue stretchers and resuscitation
apparatus; fire fighting arrangements and liaison with the emergency services.
Some candidates referred to the toxic nature of the material that had been stored but
did not mention the effect that cleaning might have on the atmosphere in the vessel
while others did not identify issues connected with working at height. Some made
reference to emergency plans without giving further detail whilst others seemed to
confuse a permit to work with a safe system of work.
While answers to this question generally addressed the relevant issues, Examiners
did note that the presentation and layout of the information could have been improved
- a remark that could well have been applied to other questions on the paper.

12

EXTERNAL

The National Examination

Board in Occupational
Safety and Health
Dominus Way
Meridian Business Park
Leicester LE19 1QW
telephone +44 (0)116 2634700
fax +44 (0)116 2824000
email info@nebosh.org.uk
www.nebosh.org.uk