People vs.

Ramilla May 8, 1993

Facts: Murder with Aggravating Circumstance of Treachery and Evident Premeditation.
Issue: W/N the decision is faulted by the defense for not applying the equipoise rule and for
giving credence to the lone witness.
Ruling: The equipoise rule is applicable only where the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense are so evenly balanced as to call for the titling of the scales in favor of the accused who
is presumed innocent under the bill of rights. The evidence of the prosecution is heavier than
that of the defense and has overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
appellant. Therefore, the rule is not applicable in this case because there is no equipoise.
Appeal dismissed and challenged decision is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
People vs. Plazo January 29, 2001
Facts: Murder. One Leonor Fabula witnessed the killing her son, Romeo Fabula. By herein
Appellant Edison Plazo with the use of Gatab.
Issue: W/N Human Behavioral Response of a witness considering blood relationship be given
credence in convicting the accused for the crime charged.
Ruling: Having had the opportunity to personally observe the witness demeanor and manner of
testifying, the trial judge is in better position to pass judgment on their credibility. As observed,
Leonor Fabula testified in straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, which is necessary for
single witness to be found worthy of credence to support conviction.
Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from the witnesses
and for which no clear-cut standard form of human behavior response can be drawn when one is
confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience.
Blood relationship between a witness and a victim does not, by itself, impair the credibility of a
witness. On the contrary, relationship strengthens credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely to accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek
justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and
bame one who is innocent of the crime.
Pascor v NLRC & Rances
Re: Authentication
Facts: Due to a POEA decision rendering Rances (employee of Pascor) as being liable for inciting
another officer to insubordination etc., Rances sought to enforce an award allegedly granted him
by a Dubai Court against Pascors foreign principal. Rances presented as evidence what purports
to be an original copy of the decision of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language,
with a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal
letter signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh Honorary Consul for Philippines.
Issue: WON the Dubai decision can be enforced against Pascor.

Held: NEGATIVE.
Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody
of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a
faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a
Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter signed by Mohd Bin
Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines does not comply with the requirements of either the
attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.
The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of
that decision, but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court requires that documents written in a non-official language (like Arabic) shall not be
admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino.
There is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which
respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been
made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government.
Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English
languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to
as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been
agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one
Sps Mapue vs. IAC; GR 70856; Nov. 11, 87
Re: Public Documents are presumed to have been regularly executed
Facts: Sps Mapue obtained a loan from respondents in the amount of P19,500 evidenced by a
promissory note and an original real estate mortgage ratified by a Notary Public. Subsequently,
Sps obtained an additional loan resulting to an amended real estate mortgage ratified by another
Notary Public. Sps failed to pay, thus being the only bidder, defendant extra-judicially foreclosed
the mortgage. Sps moved to set aside the foreclosure on the ground of fraud.
Issue: WON the extrajudicial foreclosure can be set aside on the ground of fraud in the execution
of the original real estate mortgage/amended real estate mortgage.
Held: NEGATIVE.
The evidentiary value of a notarial document guaranteed by public attestation in accordance
with law must be sustained in full force and effect unless impugned by strong, complete and
conclusive proof.
Under the law they are entitled to full faith and credit upon their face. In fact, it has long been
settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary
public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor
the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear.,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.

People vs Guamos; GR 109662; Feb. 21, 95

Re: Testing the accuracy/credibility of witness

Facts: Guamos was found guilty of raping Michele (then 8 years old). On appeal of the decision of
the trial court, Guamos sought to discredit and exclude the testimony of the rape victim upon the
ground that she had not answered the questions posed to her at cross-examination during trial
(which were complicated to be answered for adults more so for a 9 year old).
Issue: WON the testimony of Michele should be discredited.
Held: NEGATIVE.
It is the right of every party to cross-examine a witness with sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his [or her] accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and
to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. It is also the duty of the witness to answer
questions put to him or her, subject to certain exceptions.In the instant case, defense counsel did
not ask the Court to enforce his right and to compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty.
As noted, the trial judge had instructed defense counsel to simplify his questions. Defense
counsel, for his part, neither complained about this directive nor complied with it.
Counsel for appellant seeks to make much of the fact that Michelle Dolorical did not answer
some of the questions of defense counsel on cross-examination. This failure does not detract
from the admissibility or credibility of Michelles testimony. Firstly, this appears to the Court to be
a case of failure of Michelle to answer some questions rather than an obstinate refusal to do so.
In formulating those questions on cross-examination, defense counsel obviously did not take into
account that he was cross-examining a child of tender age (Michelle was approximately nine [9]
years of age at the time she gave her testimony in open court) susceptible to confusion and
probably easily intimidated.
It is clear, that defense counsel exercised no substantial effort to present intelligible questions to
complaining witness Michelle Dolorical designed to elicit straightforward answers. The Court
considered that she, in all probability, simply failed to grasp some of the questions put to her on
cross-examinations. The defense had made it very difficult if not practically impossible for her to
answer those questions intelligently and truthfully.
People vs. Manalo; GR L-55177; Feb. 27, 87
Re: Court may examine witness for clarificatory questions
Facts: Manalo pleaded guilty in killing his co-convict. On appeal he raised that the intervention
made by the trial judge during cross-examination showed lack of impartiality and objectivity. And
that by such act of intervention, the judge had already concluded that appellant was guilty of
murder and had resolved to convict him; that the trial court had functioned both as judge and
prosecutor asking questions of witnesses calculated to establish treachery, premeditation and
motive; that the questions raised by the trial court were exceptionable ones, being leading,
misleading, caged for opinions or were objectionable on the ground of the witness
incompetence; and that therefore, appellant never had a fair chance.

Issue: WON the act of intervention of the trial judge during cross examination deprived Manalo of
his constitutional rights.
Held: NEGATIVE.
A trial judge is accorded reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be
essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the truth. In such an effort, a judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material

testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the
other party.
In the present case, the trial judge did not transgress the permissible limits of judicial inquiry. It
appears that the judge merely sought to clarify to himself whether or not treachery and evident
premeditation had indeed attended the killing of Alfredo dela Cruz, as alleged by the prosecution.
All that the questions propounded by the judge indicates that he was not particularly skillful in
cross-examination and that he found it difficult to operationalize words which themselves
imported conclusions. Finally, the questions posed by the trial judge did not ultimately impose
any prejudice upon Manalo. The questions raised by the trial judge sought to draw forth answers
which did not relate to whether or not Manalo had in fact killed dela Cruz. Manalo had not only
entered an intelligent and valid plea of guilty; that he had killed his fellow convict dela Cruz was
established by independent and overwhelming evidence.
Villalon vs. IAC; GR 73751; Sept. 4, 86
Facts: A civil case for annulment of a deed of sale, among others, was filed by Neval et al against
Atty. Villalon. Previously, Neval et al also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Villalon.
During the trial of the civil case, Atty. Villalon introduced in evidence some of Neval et als
testimonies in the disbarment proceeding which were allegedly inconsistent with their
testimonies in the civil case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies. The trial court
granted the Motion to Strike filed by Neval et al on the ground that its admission would violate
the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings; and that the same cannot be waived.
Issue: WON the attorney subject of a disbarment proceeding may waive his right to its
confidentiality and thus present the inconsistent testimonies therein in a civil case.
Held: AFFIRMATIVE.
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the
credibility of their adverse parties witnesses (granted under Secs. 15 & 16 of R. 132) by proving
that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the statements made
during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case.
The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the
deed of absolute sale in petitioners favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the
annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the
final order which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be
waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional
reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the
waiver is contrary to public policy, among others.In fact, the Court also notes that even private
respondents counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment
proceedings and which were the subject of cross examination.

Rule 128 Admissibility of Evidence

Reyes v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character. The quantum of evidence required in such cases is no more than substantial evidence.
Facts:

Mendoza owned 2 parcels of farm lots. The lots were tenanted by dela Cruz.
When dela Cruz died, his wife claimed that she subrogated her husband to the tenancy
rights of her husband.
However, she was prevented by Reyes, Parayao and Mananghaya (petitioners) from
entering the premises. These people were barangay officials. They were accused of
interfering with the tenancy relationship.
The Agrarian Court ordered that the Eufrocina be restored to the possession of the said
farm lots and ordered Reyes, Parayao and Mananghaya to pay damages to Eufrocian
solidarily.

Issue:
The petitioners contend that the evidence presented by Eufrocina is insufficient to hold them
accountable. According to them, the Affidavit of Eufrocina is not admissible because the affiant
was not presented in court for cross-examination. Is their contention correct?
Held:
No. The rules on evidence are entirely not applicable to agrarian cases even in suppletory
character.
We rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina
and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the 'Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character.' The same provision states that 'In the bearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.'
People v. Turco
Doctrine: Admissibility of evidence is different from the probative or weight of evidence.

Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (Turco) was charged for allegedly raping his second cousin, 12 year-old
Escelea Tabada (Tabada).
He lured Tabada from her house, then covered her face with a towel and placed his right
hand on her neck, and took her to a grassy area, where he forced himself on her.
Afterwards, he threated to kill her if she told anyone.
The trial court ruled against Turco and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages to Tabada.
Turco argued that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
considering that other than the written statement of Tabada before the Police Station and
before the Clerk of Court of the trial court, and her testimony during direct examination,
no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever raped at all;
that nothing in Tabadas testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to
identify Turco as her rapist, since her face had been covered with a towel; and that no
actual prrof was presented that the rape actually happened since the medico-legal officer
who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue:

Turco argued that since the medico-legal officer was not presented, the medical certificate issued
by the latter cannot be admitted as evidence. Is his contention correct?
Held:
No.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (under
Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued, it could not be given weight or credit unless
the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on
the distinction between admissibility by evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the law or the rules
(Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence us
determined by its by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, an affair of logic and law. On
the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down with the
Court. thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special
rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as
evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate
(stating that there was [h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion as well as foul-smelling
discharges. The diagnosis was [r]uptured hymen secondary to rape [p. 68, Record]). In fact,
reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without
medical examination, is sufficient to convict (people vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is
well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People
vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996];
People vs. Venerable, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victims testimony alone
is credible and sufficient to convict.

Agustin v. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: Ordering a person to undergo DNA testing is not against that persons right against
self-incrimination.
Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite
Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City.
The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated
requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested
to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.

The Court granted such motion.

Issues:
Is the said motion against Agustins right to privacy and right against self incrimination?
Held:
No.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of
the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape
victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar
claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the
testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and
17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, was correct.

Ganaan v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Doctrine: Extension of telephones cannot be considered devices used for wiretaps. Therefore,
any evidence obtained through such medium is admissible under RA 4200 provided that it is not
otherwise excluded by other laws or the Rules of Court.
Facts:

Upon coming up with proposed conditions regarding the withdrawal of a complaint for
direct assault filed against Leonardo Laconico by Manuel Montebon, Montebons lawyer,
Atty. Tito Pintor, called up Laconico.
Laconico requested his own lawyer, Atty. Gaanan, to secretly listen to the phone
conversation through an extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement.
Atty. Gaanan subsequently executed an affidavit stating that he heard Atty. Pintor
demanding an amount for the withdrawal of the case. Such affidavit was attached to a
complaint for robbery or extortion filed against Atty. Pintor.
An entrapment operation was organized and Pintor was arrested through it.
Another case was filed, this time, against Atty. Gaanan for violation of R.A. No. 4200.
Atty. Gaanan was held guilty for violation of Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200, the AntiWiretapping Law.

Issues:
Is the act of Atty. Gaanan of listening to a conversation through a telephone extension
considered a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law?
Held:
No. Extensions cannot be considered as one of the devices used in wiretapping.
In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
"Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the
same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c)
and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that `particularization
followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in
human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the
particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if
they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607; 115 NW 383, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed., pp. 180-181."

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another.
"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of
which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not
occurred."
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it
and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone
is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone.
Salcedo-Ortaez v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: Under R.A. 4200, it is unlawful for any person , not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. The inadmissibility of such
evidence obtained in violation of said Act is mandatory under the law.
Facts:

Rafael Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of Teresita.

Among the evidence orally formally offered by Ortanez were three cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.

Issues:

Teresita filed an objection/comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence, assailing the admissibility
in evidence of the cassette tapes. Can her objection be sustained?
Held:
Yes. The evidence presented are inadmissible by virtue of RA 4200.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. x x x"
"Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
or meaning of the same or any par, thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation."
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed consider the afore-quoted provisions
of the law in admitting in the casette tapes in question. Absent a clear show that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The term private communication in RA 4200 includes private conversations.
Facts:

Ramirez and Garcia had a confrontation in the latters office.

In the confrontation, Garcia allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated Ramirez in a hostile
and furious manner, and in a manner offensive to the person of Ramirez.

Meanwhile, Ramirez intentionally used a tape recorder to record all what Garica said.

Garcia then filed a criminal case for violation of RA 4200 against Ramirez.

Issues:
Ramirez contends that what was recorded was a private conversation and not a private
communication. Therefore, RA 4200 is not applicable. Is his contention correct?
Held:

First legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section I of R.A, 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides :
Section 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section I of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed."
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section I of R. A. 4200
does not include private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to Impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)."16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22,1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms "conversation" and commurucation" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

At has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as the
undeniable fact that most, if not all. civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not
wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken
seriously. The right to the privacy of Communication, among others, has expressly been assured
by our Constitution, Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's
spiritual nature. of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of
communication between individuals----- free from every justifiable intrusion by whatever means."
Rule 129 What Need Not Be Proved
City of Manila v. Garcia
Doctrine: The Charter of the City of Manila states that all courts sitting therein are required to
take judicial notice of ordinances passed therein.
Facts:

The City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land in Malate, Manila. Sometime between
1945 and 1947, the defendants entered upon these premises without the Citys knowledge
and consent.
They built houses of second-class materials, again without the Citys knowledge and
consent, and without building permits.
In November, 1947, upon discovery of the presence of defendants, they were given by
Mayor Valeriano Fugoso written permits labeled lease contract to occupy specific areas
in the property upon conditions set forth therein. They were charged nominal rental.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which was close, though not contiguous, to the
property had a pressing need to expand.
The City Engineer gave the defendands 30 days each to vacate the premises and to
remove the constructions therein.
This was followed by the City Treasurers demand on each defendant for the payment of
the amount due by reason of the occupancy.
The defendants refused, alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by
reason of the written permits issued them.

Issue:
If the certificates showing the need to expand Epifanio de los Santos Elementary school is held
inadmissible, will this fact help Garcia in this case?
Held:
No. The courts in Manila are required to take judicial notice of ordinances by the City of Manila.
We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that
the city needs the premises for school purposes.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00,
had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of
an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say
that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in
the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that
there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very
document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power,
to make it formable to law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to
the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen
the case solely for this purpose.
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For,
in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken-because he was duty bound to takejudicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all
courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of
Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of
P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants
have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the
mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty day's notice. They have
been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the
city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area
cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in
the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below.
Baguio v. Vda. De Jalagat
Doctrine: A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same
court in a different case.
Facts:

The case started with a complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by Gabriel
Baguio.
Teofila Jalagat, et al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by prior judgment, being identical to a civil case filed by Baguio against Melecio
Malagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint.
Baguio alleged that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it
must be apparent on the fact of the complaint. There was nothing in the complaint from
which such a conclusion may be inferred.
Issues:

In ruling that there is res judicata in this case, the court took judicial cognizance of the fact that
its judgment in another case involving the same parties, issues, and causes of action has
become final and executory. Is the court correct in taking judicial cognizance?
Held:
Yes. A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same court
in a different case.
It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly
could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former
Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration."
There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to
which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has
ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, that a litigant should
not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality.
Prieto v. Arroyo
Doctrine: As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the cases
pending before them, or the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
Facts:

Arroyo Sr. Filed a petition for registration of several parcels of land in 1948. As a result,
OCT no. 39 was issued in his name. That same year, Prieto filed a petition for registration
of an adjoining parcel of land.

When Arroyos Sr. died, OCT 39 was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of his
heirs.

Thereafter, the heirs filed a case to correct the technical descriptions of the land covered
by the TCT.

The court granted the said petition.

Prieto then sought to annul the aforesaid decision, however this was dismissed by the
court on the ground of res judicata.

Issue:

Prieto contends that the court should not have dismissed his first case for annulment because no
parole evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being part of the
records of the cases, which are well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the court. He
also contends that there is no res judicata in this case. Is his contention correct?
Held:
No.
In the first place, as a general rule courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna, et al., vs. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil., 318). Secondly, if appellant had
really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records he should have presented the
proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic
motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by
counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and
said order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.
Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant seeks that
the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact
that in the complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some
157 square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For that
area would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief
asked for by him being that "the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend
Certificate of Title No. 332 by incorporating therein only and solely the description of Lot No. 2,
Plan Psu-106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and maintaining consequently the
description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner, Lot No. 3, Plan Psu117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The claim for
damages as well as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not
materially different from his prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises"
contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases, the
order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
Doctrine: To establish a valid foreign law, its existence as a question of fact and the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence must be proven. In the absence of such proof, the
foreign law is presumed to be the same as Philippine Law.
Facts:
Sy Kiat died and left properties.
He was allegedly married to Yao Kee in China through a customary Chinese wedding
ceremony - they had children.
He also had illegitimate children with Ascuncion Gillego. Gillegos children filed a petition
for the grant of letters of administration of Sy Kiats properties.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal declared all children from both Gillego and Yao Kee as
natural children of Sy Kiat. The court did not recognize Sy Kiats alleged marriage to Yao
Kee.

Issue:
Whether or not the court should acknowledge the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee.
Held :
No, the court should not recognize the said marriage. It was told that Sy Kiat and Yao Kee married
in China. According to Article 12 of the Civil Code, customs must be proven in order for it to be
admissible as evidence. However, Yao Kees party failed to establish such customs binding
between the relationship of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee. Therefore, the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee
cannot be recognized for there is no proof of its existence.
In the absence of such proof, the foreign law is presumed to be the same as Philippine law.
Therefore, applying Philippine law, Yao Kees marriage is void because of non-compliance the
essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Tabuena v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: There are exceptions to the rule that the court cannot take judicial notice of contents
of other cases pending before it.
Facts:

In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Makato,

Aklan, was filed in the RTC of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena. The trial court found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Tabernilla while
they were in the United States.
Peraltas mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latters return. At the same
time, she asked to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she did. Upon
her death, Tabuena, the half-brother of Peralta, took possession of the property. He refused
demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property, claiming it as his won.
The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property.
Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of documents which had
never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in another
case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the ownership of
the subject lot.

Issues:
Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuenas testimony in Civil Case
No. 1327?
Held:
Yes.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and

notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge." Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection,"
"with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the
parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was
completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial
court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up
at the trial and was "unfairly sprung upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
People v. Godoy
Doctrine: The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines,
young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is
observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings
dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.
Facts:

Godoy was charged with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the
complainant to the accused.

Issue:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape?
Held:
No. They were in fact lovers.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that
crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact
that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted,
several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and
cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother

wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort
to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural
community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Tax Appeals

Doctrine: There are exceptions to the rule that the court cannot take judicial notice of contents
of other cases pending before it.
Facts:

BPI filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,000 with the CIR alleging that it
did not apply the 1989 refundable amoun to fP279,000 to its 1990 Annual income Tax
Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same
year.

Issue:
Is BPI entitled to the claimed refund?
Held:
Yes.
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision
rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990.
In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 x x
x."18 [Decision in CTA Case No. 4897, p. 7; rollo, p. 59.] Respondent, however, urges this Court
not to take judicial notice of the said case.19 [Respondents Memorandum, pp. 9-10.]
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge.
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that
a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before
this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or
nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely
that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had
really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it
did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the
fact appearing therein -- that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 - in the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioners other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is
merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund
to pay its taxes for 1990.

Calamba Steel v. CIR

Doctrine:
Facts:

Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996
declaring a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due
in the amount of P3,311,559.00.

Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in
the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.

It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995, several of its clients withheld
taxes from their income payments to [p]etitioner and remitted the same to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) in the sum of P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further alleged that due to
its income/loss positions for the three quarters of 1996, it was unable to use the excess
tax paid for and in its behalf by the withholding agents.

Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the [p]etitioner on April 10, 1997 for the refund
of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or unused creditable withholding taxes for the year
1995. The instant petition was subsequently filed on April 18, 1997.

Issue:
The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is whether or not [p]etitioner is entitled to the
refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or overpaid income tax for the taxable year 1995.
Held:
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment return which
had been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal
force.
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in
other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are
actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when
reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties:
. . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well-aware of the
existence of another case pending before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and
causes of action. Because of the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy, the

CTA could have easily taken judicial notice of the contested document attached in that other
case.
Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment
return in petitioners Reply to Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a
reference made with the knowledge of respondent, the latter still failed to controvert petitioners
claim. The appellate court should have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on
the basis of such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to take judicial notice of its
records and of the facts [that] the record establishes.
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters x x x ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. If the lower courts really believed that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to
ascertain its veracity and accuracy and to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in
1996.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA (on which it rests its
entire arguments) is not on all fours with the facts of this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax refund, and likewise failed to
present its 1990 corporate annual income tax return, it nonetheless offered in evidence its topranking officials testimony and certification pertaining to only two taxable years (1989 and
1990). The said return was attached only to its Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA.
Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that extended beyond two
taxable years, because the excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used up
during the second (1996) taxable year, and because the claim for the refund of those credits had
been filed during the third (1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead attached
to its Reply to Comment filed before the CA.
Moreover, in BPI-Family Savings Bank, petitioner was able to show the undisputed fact: that
petitioner had suffered a net loss in 1990 x x x. In the instant case, there is no such undisputed
fact as yet. The mere admission into the records of petitioners 1996 final adjustment return is
not a sufficient proof of the truth of the contents of or entries in that return.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert the veracity of the return or file
an opposition to the Motion and the return. Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both
the CA and the CTA, the latter even declared in another case (CTA Case No. 4897) that petitioner
had suffered a net loss for taxable year 1990. When attached to the Petition for Review filed
before this Court, that Decision was not at all claimed by the BIR to be fraudulent or nonexistent.
The Bureau merely contended that this Court should not take judicial notice of the said Decision.
In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to challenge the veracity of
petitioners final adjustment return. Neither has the CTA decided any other case categorically
declaring a net loss for petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this return was attached to
petitioners Reply to Comment before the CA, the appellate court should have required the filing
of other responsive pleadings from respondent, as was necessary and proper for it to rule upon
the return.

Lucido v. Calupitan
Doctrine: The whole modern tendency is to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in
the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances
in each case.
Facts:

Some chattels and real estate belonging to Leonardo Lucido were regularly sold at an
execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the next day transferred a
interest in the property to Zolaivar.
On March 30, 1903, all the parties and Gelasio Calupitan executed and signed a public
document wherein Rosales and Zolaiver, with Lucidos consent, sold all their rights and
obligations over the property to Caluptan for the amount of the purchase price with 1%
interest per month up to the time of redemption.
On the same day, Lucido and Calupitan executed a document whereby Calupitan certified
that he had ceded to Lucido all the irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase
said lands from Calupitan, as well as some of the chattels.
Their agreement is to permit three whole years to elapse from the date of the instrument
before Lucido may repurchase the land.
The trial court held that the document consituted a sale with the right to conventional
redemption, and that the redemption period had not expired.
It further found that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the redemption
price to Calupitan, who refused it, and that this offer was a sufficient compliance with
Article 1513 of the Civil Code.
Calupitan claims that the transaction involved a sale to him of the rights of the execution
purchasers to the property. Therefore, the redemption period should only be within one
year from the date of the sale. However, in his original answer, he expressly stated
that the transaction was one of sale with the right to repurchase.

Issues:
Whether the answer of Calupitan can be considered as an admission?
Held:
Yes. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon
the first question, if the document executed by the execution purchasers and the parties to this
action stood alone. In that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and
obligations of the execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and
obligations are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property sold,
subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner,
within one year from the date of the sale. (Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of
the transaction between the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would be
wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested party is at least some
indication that the parties intended something more or different by the document in question
than a simple assignment of the rights and obligations of the execution purchasers to a third
person.

Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement entered
into between Lucido and Calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly stipulated
that the right to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration
of three years. The right to repurchase must necessarily imply a former ownership of the
property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to
conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original
answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its
admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who
was at the time acting as his own attorney.
Jones on Evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were not in harmony
on the point, says:
"Many of the cases holding that pleadings were inadmissible as admissions were based on the
theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader's matter-fiction stated by counsel and
sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat
pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties,
having weight according to the circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still hold
that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has authorized
it.
"On the same principle where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original
pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless
formally offered in evidence."
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right
to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished $120
Mexican of the amount necessary to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. It
therefore appears beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the execution
purchasers was made by the plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant
Calupitan, who took possesion of the major portion of the land as his security for its redemption.
The ruling of the lower court that the transaction between Lucido and Calupitan was one of
purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore correct.

Torres v. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: The amended complaint takes place of the original. Therefore, the admissions made
in the original pleading, superseded by the amended complaint will be considered extrajudicial
admission that must be alleged and proven in court.
Facts:

Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan, and they had two children: Vicente and
Antonina. Antonina married and had six children.
After the death of her husband, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole without the
benefit of marriage, and they had a child, Macaria Torres. Subsequently, Arbole and
Margarita were married, and Macaria lived with and was reared by her parents.
Lot 551 had been leased temporarily by the Government to Margarita who was the actual
occupant of the lot. On December 13, 1910, the Director of Lands issued to Margarita a
Sale Certificate over said lot, payable in 20 annual installments. 20 years before his death,
Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed his rights and interest to the portion of
the lot in favor of Macaria.
On June 6, 1953, about 22 years after the death of Margarita and 20 years after the death
of Arbole, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and
asking for the issuance of title in his name. A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita.
Santillan and the children of Antonina filed a case of forcible entry against Macaria,
alleging that the latter had entered a portion of the lot without their consent, constructed
a house thereon and refused to vacate upon demand.
Macaria claimed to be a co-owner of the lot, being one of Margaritas daughters. She
instituted an action for partition of the lot, alleging that said lot was the conjugal property
of Margarita and Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child.
The trial court ruled that the lot was Margaritas paraphernal property and adjudicated 2/3
to her heirs by Claro Santillan and 1/3 to Macaria. Macarias share was later increased to
4/6, then reduced by the Court of Appeals to . The CA declared that she is not a
legitimated child.

Issues:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct such that the respondent court has
overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admissions made by Vicente Santilan and the
heirs of Antonina Santillan?
Held:
No. To warrant review, petitioner has summarized her submission based on two assignments of
error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated
child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its findings
of facts the admission nude by Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein
respondents) that Macaria A Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and
sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of
relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an

incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property
solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan." (Italics ours)
As we understand it petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account
of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her
parents. Continuous possession of the status of a. natural child, fact of delivery by the mother,
etc. will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still
necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents,
subject to certain exceptions.
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in
the Ejectment Case reading:
"the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of
Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931."
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in
the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same
Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:
"That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza
Cavite, on December 20, 1931";
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is retarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading, The original complaint no
longer forms part of the record.13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of
which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore, there
can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it
in evidence.14
It should also be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (par. 4),
denied the legitimacy of petitioner.

JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III
[G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the
contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter,
petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the
sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad
faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer,
respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the
cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.
The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of
damages. The respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court.
The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.
ISSUES:
Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.
HELD:
Yes.
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an alleged
property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount
of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the
amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents'
counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The
stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of
judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing
that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made.
Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are
binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the
same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible
and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters
dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real
essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore,
an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as
an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an
admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents'
evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

Alvarez vs. Ramirez

GRN 143439
Sandoval Gutierrez, J.;
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the testimony
of petitioners wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom. Private
prosecutor in the said criminal case called the petitioners wife without objection from
petitioners counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband who poured and set the
house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to
rules on martial disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.
RULING:
The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk
of an occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.
The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes the
evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner
and his wife is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

Dasmarias Garments vs. Reyes/American Pres. Lines

GRN 108229
Narvasa, J.;
FACTS:

August 24, 1993

APL sued Dasmarias Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its
witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan
nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in compliance with the rules on
taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in
a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.
RULING:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court is not
necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pretrial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial the law
authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC
to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court or during the
process of execution of a final and executor judgment.
Jonathan Landoil vs. Mangudadatu
GRN 155010

August 16, 2001

Panganiban, J.;
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the lower court. Trial
proceeded without the participation of petitioner and declared it in default. Petitioner filed a
motion for new trial but was denied. When the writ of execution was served, petitioner alleged
that it is yet to receive the order of denial for the motion for new trial. A petition for prohibition
was filed with CA and respondents submitted its opposition and attached to their pleading is a
certification that the order denying the motion for new trial was no longer available for a
deposition since trial, had already been terminated. It also opined that the alleged error
committed by the trial court of disregarding the oral depositions, was certiorari or prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of oral deposition was proper under the circumstances.
RULING:
(A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of 1) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against ordinary prudence, and by
reason of which the aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; 2) newly discovered

evidence, that, with reasonable diligence,. The aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial; 3) and that if presented, would probably alter the result.)
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over
any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or without such leave after an
answer has been served. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witness in open court where
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge.
As a rule, depositions should be allowed absent any showing that taking them would
prejudice any party.

Lechugas vs. CA
GRN L-39972 & L-40300
August 6, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent the Lozas. Another
case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly.
Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent
contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner
in 1941. Plaintiffs vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the
land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims.
IISUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection
of petitioner.
RULING:
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial courts action in admitting the
testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia,
who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court the parol evidence
rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written
instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she
really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the
good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.

SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008

FACTS:Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator,
Model 1994 from respondent Autocorp Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle
Sales Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Seaoil issued 12 checks as
payment therefor; however 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that
payment be stopped. Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages
and replevin in the Regional Trial Court.
Seaoil claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation of
one foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point
International, Incorporated. The real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money
to Focus. In lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to
be paid by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by
Uniline.
Petitioner Seaoil in sum alleges that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, thus parol evidence is admissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable in this case.
HELD:
No. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are
not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract.
The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The terms of the subject sales
invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid
for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera.

GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA

[G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a
dormitory-apartment building. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la
Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover of
the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33%
of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02
more than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the
overpayment but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell
on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot. Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for

insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only
paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel
Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the
effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies
during the making of the additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was
paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum was
P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of
P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never
received any demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the
overpaid amount. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial
admission of respondent's evidence.
HELD:
Yes.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from
negligence of his own counsel. The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself
cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in
court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the
records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court
observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or
correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He
was given every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also
presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de
la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he would
admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his testimony,
and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if
he will admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of
witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that
admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of
judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open
court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the
proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed
thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[] an attorney who is employed to manage a
party's conduct of a lawsuit [] has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by

pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are

conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of
the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such
admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, [] they bind
the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be
contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through
palpable mistake.
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of
admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus: The Court sees no
cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as
summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the
said admission, the testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by
opposing counsel.