UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE

FACING AL-QAEDA & ISIS

Philippe COTTER PhD

Collective humiliations often fuel violence. They converge into

fragile cultures and express themselves through aggressive
ideologies. The new millennium witnessed the emergence of
such an ideology in the shape of Al-Qaeda.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of a wellfunctioning ideology of humiliation. Marxism-Leninism was an
ideology for the humiliated masses, involving violence,
sometimes extreme. But it also had the advantage of providing
a structured outlet for collective suffering, which was easy to
channel in the dual bloc context of the Cold War.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the bipolar
system, people all over the world had to seek new ways of
voicing their feelings. These new modes of expression often
became anarchic and therefore difficult to control through
international mechanisms.

What was surprising in the resurgence of a collective

humiliation leading to international terrorism was therefore not
the fact of its existence, but rather its manifestations. After the
Cold War had ended, most international experts were agreed
that the East-West conflict would become a North-South, rich
versus poor, confrontation that would once again oppose two
large compact blocs.
Because such a confrontation did not happen in the 1990s, the
Western world concluded it had escaped an uprising of the
humiliated, in spite of the glaring political and economic
inequalities of the international system. 9/11 showed us how
wrong we were and to what extent unstable socio-political
entities can generate dangerous emotional reactions.
Why did the North-South conflict not occur? Primarily because
the North-South concept was a by-product of the Cold War. In
reality, what we referred to back then as the South lacked the
means to organise such a conflict. After the end of the Cold
War, the South split up into a multitude of small areas often
beset with bloody conflicts that remained self-contained.
Against these tumultuous backdrops, dangerous collective
humiliations were kindled and reborn.

Religious Revival
The fragmentation of the international system in the post-Cold
War years opened up new avenues for identity crisis. Religious
revival in the 1990s was the initial response to the disquiet
caused by the downfall of world ideologies.
French sociologist Gilles Keppel noted this phenomenon in
1993.
In the face of widespread uncertainty, religious
movements provide a solid base, on which new
structures of communal solidarity can be built.

Observance, ritual and worship give followers a

sense of belonging, in a meaningful world.
Around the same time, another French researcher, Farhad
Khosrokhavar, took Kepel's idea one step further by introducing
the mechanics of conflict which would henceforth underpin the
new international order after the Cold War: the humiliated
rising up against the prevailing superpower, the USA, whose
virtually unlimited attributes looked all the more impressive now
that there was no counterweight to offset them, the USSR
having been disbanded. Khosrokhavar expressed the view that
the concept of world oppression was gradually changing from
being the Leninist definition of imperialism to representing an
abstract receptacle for all the bitterness caused by the
disintegration of the revolutionary movement, projected onto
one enemy America.

The New Face of Humiliation

If we take a closer look at the new vehicles used by the
humiliated masses to express revenge after the end of the Cold
war, Al-Qaeda springs to mind as being the most spectacular
manifestation.
What are Al-Qaeda's essential characteristics? French
sociologist Khosrokhavar likened al-Qaeda to a sect, able to use
to its advantage the religious revival of the end of the last
century, and functioning along similar lines to the Japanese
Aum network, responsible for the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo
subway in 1995.
The next question to consider then is how Al-Qaeda, starting
from a minuscule sectarian base and using the power of
religious revival, managed to spread its network across the five
continents. There can be little doubt that humiliation played a
pivotal role. Al-Qaeda's small nucleus was able to extend its
connections with local groups because it became the flag

bearer of a simple yet effective ideology, based on the new

wave humiliation which developed in international relations
after the end of the Cold War. Al-Qaeda was clever enough to
gauge the true depth and breadth of this collective emotional
distress and to create, through the use of violence, new
solidarity links amongst the humiliated.
The number of victims of the 9/11 attacks was therefore largely
irrelevant. What really mattered for the sake of social impact
was to destroy the symbols of American culture, so that
humiliated populations could enjoy a post Cold-War moment of
revenge. This clever strategy subsequently gave Al-Qaeda its
social base and served to legitimise violence, even when used
indiscriminately.
The inherent weakness of this strategy, however, was its
inability to impact on the new international order. It remained
confined to giving common direction to local outfits around the
globe, without providing a real sense of unity at a state level.
Al-Qaeda therefore never managed to impose any political
agenda. Its only power resided in spectacular, but isolated,
murderous attacks that attempted to gather up and motivate
far flung troops.

Al-Qaeda & Sectarian Terror

Sectarian terror, as epitomised by Al-Qaeda (but not ISIS, as
we will see later), provides a focus for worldwide social
networks lacking cohesion. Unable to initiate any political
process because of its fragile ideological framework, it is more
developed than its mafia counterpart. Whereas mafia
organisations prey on family cells in confusion, sectarian terror
takes hold at a higher level of collective hierarchy, i.e. the social
support networks, which it claims to re-energise by violent
means.

Unlike mafia terrorism, which relies on a limited clan-based

ideology, sectarian terror is founded on a value-system,
disseminated amongst the members of the affiliated networks
in search of cultural and identity markers. In this way a social
movement is created, with small groups of extremists, a
charismatic leader and sympathising populations. Sectarian
terror's rudimentary ideological framework, reduced to a few
fundamental principles, allows local operational cells to function
quasi-autonomously with minimal input from the centre.
The absence of a geographical base however represents a
major drawback for the members of a sectarian network like AlQaeda: lacking political power, they have to rely on spectacular
acts of cruelty to attract attention. Media manipulation, the
spread of terror and the use of modern technology (especially
the Internet and social networks) therefore become essential
tools of this particular brand of terrorists.

Al-Qaeda's Network
Sectarian networks such as Al-Qaeda are organised in circles
around a leader who conveys the movement's doctrine, with:

An inner circle consisting of a small group of "professional"

terrorists remaining in permanent contact with the leader.
A middle circle of secret sub-networks developing informal
links between them, and capable of independently
organising acts of violence. The leader uses them as
regional support bases.
An outer circle consisting of local disenfranchised networks
that sympathise with the movement. Whilst condemning
acts of extreme violence, they lend their active or tacit
support to the leader and his fanatical followers in order to
feel part of the new solidarity created.

The link between the leader of the terror network and his
sympathisers of the outer circle is crucial. In our case, it
transformed the actions of a small, unknown sect into an
effective international platform: Al-Qaeda.

Bin Laden. A Hero's Welcome

Where did Al-Qaeda's redemptive power - so strong that it
managed to turn its followers' resentment into triumphant
exultation - stem from? Social scientists have put forward the
origins of this form of sectarian violence. It developed in
parallel with the rapid economic growth of Saudi Arabia, the
cradle of Islam. Wealth propelled the country onto the
international scene. In the hands of a few super-rich Middle
Eastern producers, petrol became a formidable bargaining tool
during the energy crisis of the early 1970s, taking over from
Nasser's Arab nationalist rhetoric, which had lost its credibility
after the defeat against Israel in 1967.
At the time, so called Petro-Islam carried the hopes of a new
generation of Arab militants, inspired by young intellectuals and
local communities left adrift as a consequence of the autocratic
nature of postcolonial systems in the Middle East. Osama Bin
Laden and his incendiary sectarianism found a warm welcome
on this sociological fertile ground, nurtured by the success of
the Iranian Shi'ite Revolution of 1979 and by the war to expel
the Soviets from Afghanistan in the 1980's.
Having been defeated once in Afghanistan, the superpowers
were seen as vulnerable, and liable to collapse in the face of
repeated attacks by radical elements, who in the wake of the
Second Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait) in 1990 proclaimed themselves
the saviours of a Muslim civilisation destined from time
immemorial to world domination, but ridiculed by the West.
After the 9/11 attacks, French sociologist Fahrad Khosrokhavar
explained:

For people seeking to boost their self-esteem,

unable to tackle the numerous problems of
everyday life, America's symbolic defeat at the
hands of Bin Laden is sufficient to make him a
hero, destined to be a martyr, and ultimately, a
saint.

Focused Dialogue
State bodies, often impatient, find it difficult to make any
headway against sectarian networks such as Al-Qaeda (BaaderMeinhof worked along similar lines in Germany in the 1970s).
When relying purely on fire power, their interventions are
ineffective because the strength of terror networks depends on
their ability to raise support amongst local populations who feel
humiliated, not on their military power. While air strikes are
useful in destroying terrorists' infrastructures, they have no
impact on global networks, where the most effective terror
groups find inspiration and gather strength.
An effective policy should therefore concentrate on multiplying
communication channels with populations harbouring toxic
feelings and on exercising repression only against the (very
few) instigators of acts of extreme violence. Engaging in
focused dialogue is the only way to overcome emotional
responses.
This method has worked in Northern Ireland and in Sicily (in
the struggle, not yet won, to eradicate Cosa Nostra). The aim,
as explained by terrorism expert Xavier Raufer, is to separate
the humiliated from the fanatics in an attempt to rebuild
stable communities, free from emotional wounds and from the
excesses of extreme violence.

ISIS. Power, Prestige and Profit

Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda galvanised frustrated masses. The
sudden burst of enthusiasm remained fragile, however, because
it was subjected to the rules governing all forms of collective
violence: popular support melts away when peoples
resentment against the fanatics extremism grows stronger than
that against their initial object of frustration.
Adding to that, the fact that its adherents were scattered
around the world was Al Qaedas weakness, not its strength,
contrary to what its name might imply (Al-Qaeda means base,
foundation in Arabic). This explains why, in common with all
sects, Al-Qaeda had to give its operatives the illusion of postmortem, pseudo-religious gratification. Because a sect lacks the
power to influence the structures of modern communities, it
cannot promise its adherents the material advantages offered
by more complex forms of terrorism (ethnic or state
sponsored). It must therefore find a substitute which is
immaterial to these inducements. Sectarianisms appeal,
packaged in the religious life after death imaginary, is that it
provides a dual outlet for the resentment of its members in the
absence of geographical unity: it names those responsible for
their difficulties and it promises extra-terrestrial sanctification of
violence.
ISIS, on the other hand, has become extremely powerful, and
surpassed Al-Qaeda very quickly because it has been able to
offer to its followers the most sought after advantages of
collective violence: power, prestige and profit.

Ethnic Racism
Ethnic racism, the third form of terror, is more complex than
mafia terror (Cosa Nostra) or sectarian terror (Al-Qaeda). Its
support, more organised and centralised, takes hold in regional

units in crisis and is based on dogmatic principles of social

exclusion. The hallmarks of ethnic racism are expulsion of
minorities (ethnic cleansing), segregation (apartheid) or wars of
conquest (imperialism). Terror is triggered by extremists taking
advantage of the resentment felt by regional units that fail to
operate and cannot therefore integrate to form a coherent
political system.
ISIS belongs to this level, in common with other forms of
contemporary violent social movements like apartheid in preMandela South-Africa or ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia.
Hannah Arendt said:
The organic doctrine of a history for which
every race is a separate, complete whole was
invented by men who needed ideological
definitions of national unity as a substitute for
political nationhood.
Ethnic racism is so dangerous because it sits next to the most
extreme forms of collective violence. If its victims are not yet
precisely defined by its embryonic, feudal ideology, they are
carefully selected by the bureaucracy of the next stage on the
social continuum of extreme violence, state terrorism. The most
evolved form of collective crime makes use of an efficient
administrative machinery to pinpoint and murder members of
stigmatised subgroups. Racist ideology is the link between
ethnic terror (ISIS) and state sponsored terrorism (Nazism),
which reaches its direst consequences in genocide, the vain
attempt to murder a whole community.

Stylised Murder
Assessing Al-Qaedas failure to impose any international
agenda, ISIS has been trying to achieve political power

differently, at a regional level, taking advantage of the

disastrous effects of the Syrian and Iraq conflicts.
Al-Qaedas was a circular form of terror, starting from a very
small, personalised base and recruiting followers through the
magnitude of its deadly operations. ISIS has used a regional
base instead, spreading images of stylised murders through
social media in order to attract disillusioned youngsters from
the West to its so-called caliphate, promising them a golden
future based on power, prestige and profit.
Ultimately though, ISIS will fail, as did its mentor Abu Mousab
Al-Zarkawi, killed in 2006. Extreme violence, even stylised, is
always short-lived. After an initial wave of success, due to the
advantages it can offer to its members, extreme violence
unifies all healthy minds against it.
Isolated by the sordid nature of its murders, ISIS will be
destroyed by the very forces it has unleashed. But in the
meantime, many victims (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) will
have to suffer the consequences of a process which has done
nothing to clarify the post-Cold War order.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS will, in the end, leave only one legacy: tears
and bitterness, merging into new forms of vengeance. Breaking
this new cycle of violence, inaugurated after the end of the Cold
War, will require strong minds and valiant hearts.

Quote
GRAEME WOOD. What ISIS Really Wants
Al-Qaeda is ineradicable because it can
survive, cockroach-like, by going underground.

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The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on

its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be
a caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as
underground movements, because territorial
authority is a requirement: take away its
command of territory, and all those oaths of
allegiance are no longer binding.
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References
1. BRISARD Jean-Charles, Zarkaoui. Le nouveau visage dAl-Qaida, Paris,
Fayard, 2005
2. BURKE Jason, Al-Qaeda. The True Story of Radical Islam, London,
Penguin, 2004
3. 9/11 COMMISSION, The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New
York, Norton, 2004
4. FOUDA Yosri and FIELDING Nick, Masterminds of Terror, London,
Mainstream Publishing, 2003
5. GUIDRE Mathieu, MORGAN Nicole (Eds.), Le Manuel de recrutement
dAl-Qada, Paris, 2004
6. JACQUARD Roland, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden, Durham, Duke
University Press, 2002
7. KEPEL Gilles, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge Mass.,
Belknap Press, 2002
8. KHOSROKHAVAR Farhad, Suicide Bombers. Allahs New Martyrs,
London, Pluto, 2005
9. KHOSROKHAVAR Farhad, Radicalisation, Paris, Editions de la Maison
des Sciences de lHomme, 2014
10.
SAGEMAN Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004
11.
STERN Jessica, Terror in the Name of God. Why Religious
Militants Kill, New York, Harper Collins, 2003
12.
WOOD Graeme, What ISIS Really Wants, www.theatlantic.com

The Author
Philippe Cotter PhD is the author of Nazism, Terrorism and Serial Killers. Evil
Unmasked and Humiliation and War. Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Bosnia, with
Gilbert Holleufer, former International Committee of the Red Cross Executive.

Philippe Cotter PhD is preparing a new book on ordinary, everyday violence (families,
workplace and political world). For several years he has been engaged in researching
the common roots of all forms of violence.
The sections of this paper were first published on 60 Seconds, The Pulse, LinkedIn,
March 1, 2015, March 7, 2015, March 13, 2015, March 22, 2015, March 28, 2015,
May 2, 2015, May 8, 2015

See also
Why Serial Killers Enjoy Killing (Understanding Violence,
part 1)
Mafia & Social Terror (Understanding Violence, part 2)

Next
State Terrorism & Genocide (Understanding Violence, part 4)

Visit my website
www.philippecotter.com

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