RULE 112

CASE 1
BAUTISTA VS SARMIENTO
FACTS:
An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with Estafa
was filed before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento (Court of First Instance of
Pampanga Branch 1)
Third accused, Teresita Vergere was granted a separate trial.
The prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap,
as its only witness
Petitioners believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, moved to the dismissal of the case by way of demurrer to evidence
The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are as follows:
1. The information alleges that the two accused received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C.
Yap on consignment, by virtue of purchase and sale.
2. That the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove
misappropriation on the part of the accused.
Respondent judge denied the motion
A motion for reconsideration was duly filed but was likewise denied for lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer
to evidence
RULING:
The remedy of certiorari is improper. The respondent Judges order denying the
petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to the evidence is
merely an interlocutory order. It cannot, therefore, be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. What should have been done was to continue with the trial of the case and
had the decision been adverse, to raise the issue on appeal. There was no arbitrary
exercise of judicial authority.
A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not
encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it
improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a
prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the
opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.
When the trial court denies petitioners motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case
against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners
to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against
them.
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It is the burden of evidence which shifts
from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the
trial. Defendants evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiffs evidence or puts
the case in equipoise is sufficient.
The order of denying petitioners motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt.

If the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it,
the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by
the prosecution alone.

RULE 112
CASE 2
TALUSAN VS OFIANA
FACTS:

A criminal complaint for frustrated murder was filed by petitioner against private
respondents Ventura Bartolome, Renato Valdecantos, Alfredo Valdecantos, Valentin
Valdecantos, and Pito Valdecantos with the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan (Criminal
Case No. 1112)

On the same date, a preliminary investigation (first stage) was conducted ex-parte by
the municipal court which accepted the complaint and issued a warrant for the arrest of
accused Ventura Bartolome and Alfredo Valdecantos, and also fixing their bail for their
provisional release in the amount of P10,000.00 each.

Subsequently, the order was reconsidered by a new judge of the same municipal
court, who issued a warrant of arrest for Renato Valdecantos and Pito Valdecantos as well,
likewise fixing their bail at P10,000.00 each.

In a letter-complaint, private respondents Valentin and Alfredo Valdecantos, as

complainants, filed two charges each for attempted murder against petitioner (I.S. Nos. 3607
and 3607-A) with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.

The said charges arose out of the same incident which is also the basis of the
complaint for frustrated murder filed by the petitioner.

Second stage of the preliminary investigation (Criminal Case No. 1112) was waived
by private respondents and prayed that the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan (Baliwag), later docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 50-B.

In a petition filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, private respondents asked for
the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 50-B and its joint hearing with the preliminary
investigation of I.S. Nos. 3607 and 3607-A.

The said petition for reinvestigation and joint hearing was opposed by the herein
petitioner.

The petition was granted, with respondent assistant fiscal Ofiana scheduling the joint
hearing of the aforesaid cases.

Petitioner-accused did not appear at the said hearing, despite notice, but instead filed
the subject Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction (Civil Case No.
68-B) questioning respondent Provincial Fiscal and/or his assistants authority to proceed
with the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 50-B jointly with the preliminary investigation
Of I.S. Nos. 3607 and 3607-A.

Civil Case No. 68-B was dismissed for lack of merit.

Talusan then filed the herein petition, praying for a reversal of the said decision,
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the respondent Provincial Fiscal
and/or his assistant can properly and legally further reinvestigate Criminal Case No. 50-B
2.
Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the accused are estopped to
make the countercharges, I.S. Nos. 3607 and 3607-A, in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
because:
(1)
Accused waived the regular preliminary investigation in the municipal court
(2)
The countercharges are their very defenses which should have been made and/or
filed in the municipal court
(3)
The municipal court had first acquired jurisdiction over the case and the parties

3.
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the respondent Provincial Fiscal
and/or his assistant can properly and legally conduct a joint hearing of the reinvestigation in
Crim. Case No. 50-B and the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 3607 and 3607-A.
RULING:
1.
No. The lower court did not err.
2.
The private respondents should not be held in estoppel to file countercharges against
petitioner, it has been stated that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the
people in criminal prosecutions. Attempted murder is a public offense, wherein it is the
social and public interest that demand the punishment of the offender, hence, criminal
actions for public offenses cannot be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of
estoppel.
3.
No. R.A. No. 5180, prescribing a uniform system of investigation by provincial fiscals
and their assistants, expressly grants to said officers the ought to conduct a preliminary
investigation of offenses cable by the Court of First Instance. The attempted murders
charged in I.S. Nos. 3607 and 3607-A are also cognizable by the Bulacan CFI and arose out
of the same incident which occurred in San Rafael, Bulacan. Since respondent fiscals can
reinvestigate Criminal Case No. 50-B, there is no reason why the same cannot be heard by
the Fiscal jointly with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 3067 and 3607-A. the joint
hearing will save the time of the fiscal, of the parties and of their witnesses.
Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, L-72801, July 31, 1987 (Rule 112 Section 2)
FACTS:

Shortly after noon on September 20, 1985, an attempt was made by firemen and
soldiers to disperse a crowd of demonstrators massed in front of the Municipal Building of
Escalante, Negros Occidental, with the use first, of water spewed from fire hoses, and later,
tear gas. Eventually there was gunfire. Within moments, rallyists lay dead on and by the
National Road. The fatalities numbered fifteen (15), according to the military officers;
twenty-nine (29), according to the demonstrators.

In the afternoon of that day, Escalante Town Mayor Braulio Lumayno, in view of the
absence of the Municipal Circuit Court Judge (Emilio Ignalaga), took cognizance of a
complaint filed by the Military Station Commander charging some of the rallyists with the
felony of inciting to sedition, and after avowedly conducting an investigation of the
witnesses presented by the complainant, issued an order for the arrest of certain of the
demonstrators.

The petitioners however give a different version of the facts. What happened,
according to them, was that at 9 o'clock in the morning on that day, a group of
demonstrators, "composed mostly of laid-off sugar field workers," gathered in front of
Escalante Municipal Hall "in the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom
of expression and to assemble peacefully to petition the government for redress of
grievances."10 About an hour afterwards, fire trucks arrived one after another, as well as
jeeploads of soldiers and CHDF members, in full combat gear, Shortly after noon, after
"going thru the motions of negotiating with the demonstrators," the military officers ordered
the crowd to disperse; but without warning, fire hoses were trained on and sprayed water at
the demonstrators. When the rallyists did not budge, tear gas canisters were thrown at
them. A demonstrator picked up a canister and threw it at an "empty space in the plaza" The
soldier and CHDF members thereupon fired indiscriminately at the crowd, killing 29 and
injuring at least 30 persons.

After the Mayor had referred the case to Municipal Trial Court Judge Ignalaga on
September 24, 1985,12 an "URGENT MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT OF ARREST" was filed on
September 26, 1985 by petitioners' counsel on the ground that a mayor no longer has
authority to conduct preliminary investigations or issue warrants of arrest that authority
having been "withheld in the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure."


This was opposed by the Station Commander14 who invoked Section 143 of the Local
Government Code providing that "(i)n case of temporary absence of the Judge assigned to
the municipality, the mayor may conduct the preliminary examination in criminal cases
when, in his opinion the investigation cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interest of
justice."

A reply was filed by the petitioners after their receipt of the opposition "only last
October 8, 1985."15 They contended that the "power of the municipal mayor to conduct
preliminary investigation and issue a warrant of arrest under the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court** (had been) impliedly repealed by the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure;" that
"the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure being a special law, controls over provisions of
the Local Government Code (BP 337, 1983), which is a general law;" and in any case,
"subject t warrants of arrest should be reviewed and revoked as done without observance of
legal requisites."

By Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1985,16 the Judge confirmed the mayor's arrest order.
He opined that in the absence of the judge, the mayor still has authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and issue arrest warrants, since Rule 112, Sec. 2 (d), of the 1985
Rules, includes as among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, "Such
other officers as may be authorized by law;" and the Local G government Code of 1983,
Section 143, grants a town mayor authority to conduct preliminary examinations in case of
the temporary absence of the judge when such investigation cannot be delayed without
prejudice to the interest of justice. The Judge declared that in the case at bar, the mayor had
conducted the examination personally, and having in the exercise of his discretion found
probable cause, issued the warrants of arrest in question; and conceding arguendo
irregularity in that the preliminary examination was conducted without according the parties
the assistance of lawyers , this does not render the proceedings void because at any rate,
the mayor had duly observed the uniform procedure under PD.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 143 of the Local Government Code granting power to the
municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and order the arrest of the accused,
was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
HELD:

As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation,
the authority to do so being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1)
provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (2) judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and regional state prosecutors; and (d) such other
officers as may be authorized by law.57 But only "the judge" may issue search and arrest
warrants after due determination of probable cause.

The evidence cannot justify the action taken by the respondent Mayor and Judge. The
Court thus declares as sorely inadequate and mortally defective the avowed evidentiary
foundation for Mayor Lumayno's finding of probable cause respecting the commission by the
petitioners of the crime of inciting to sedition. The affiants declarations in their sworn
statements which might otherwise be pertinent to the offense, are generalities, mere
conclusions of their, not positive averments of particular facts within their personal
knowledge.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The order of
respondent Mayor Lumayno issued on September 20, 1985 and the resolution promulgated
by respondent Judge Ignalaga on October 11, 1985 are annulled and set aside, and the
respondents are perpetually forbidden to enforce or in any way implement the orders for the
arrest of any of the petitioners.
People vs. Villanueva L-56443, Dec. 19, 1981 (Rule 112 Section 6, Revised Rules
of Court)
FACTS:


The city fiscal and an assistant fiscal of Butuan City filed in the city court on
September 15, 1980 an information charging Rogelim Yee with serious slander by deed. It
was alleged therein that in the afternoon of July 14, 1980 Yee with the deliberate intent of
bringing one Ofelia V. Torralba, a fourth year student, into discredit, disrepute and contempt,
willfully attacked and assaulted her and inflicted a contusion in her left cheek in the
presence of her visitors, teachers and classmates to her great embarrassment and
inconvenience (Criminal Case No. 11500).

The fiscal certified that he conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation and
that there was probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that serious slander by deed
was committed by Yee. He recommended bail in the amount of P600.

Respondent judge, instead of issuing a warrant of arrest, as has been the timehonored practice, conducted an ex parte preliminary examination by scanning the record to
determine once more the existence of probable cause.

After a perusal of the affidavits, he concluded that the offense committed was either
slight slander by deed committed in the heat of anger or slight physical injuries, a light
felony. Because the information was filed sixty-four days after the offense was committed,
respondent judge dismissed the case sua sponte on the ground of prescription. The
dismissal order was issued on September 17, 1980 or two days after the filing of the
information.

Respondent judge denied the fiscal's motion for reconsideration. The fiscal received a
copy of the order of denial on January 6, 1981. The prosecution failed to appeal the order of
dismissal to this Court, a procedure sanctioned by Republic Act No. 5440 in relation to
section 5 of Republic Act No. 5967, a 1969 law which expanded the jurisdiction of city courts
and which up to this time is not known to some lawyers and judges.

Long after the issuance of the order of dismissal, or on March 17, 1981, the city fiscal
and his assistant filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus wherein
they assailed the order of dismissal on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

The fiscals' petition cannot be entertained because, as expressly indicated in sections

1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, generally, certiorari and mandamus are not proper
when ordinary appeal is available as an adequate remedy. As a rule, certiorari is not a
substitute for an appeal.
ISSUE:

WoN Judges have the authority to dismiss outright the information if the judge
believes that there is no probable cause?
HELD:

Undoubtedly, respondent judge, before issuing the warrant of arrest, is clothed with
the prerogative of ascertaining probable cause. That power is granted to him by section 3,
Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce".

The power is also granted to any judge authorized to conduct preliminary

investigations and respondent judge is given that authority by section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and by the charter of Butuan City, Republic Act No. 523.

But that power does not include the authority to dismiss outright the information if
the judge believes that there is no probable cause. The judge should require the fiscal to
present additional evidence to show probable cause. If the fiscal refuses to do so, then the
case may be dismissed for "lack of prosecution" (Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 743).


The fiscal is also authorized to determine probable cause not only by the Bill of Rights
but also by the law or rule empowering him to conduct preliminary investigations (Secs. 2
and 14, Rule 112, Rules of Court: Sec. 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended
by Republic Acts Nos. 732 and 1799 and Republic Act No. 5180 as amended by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 77 and 911).

The fiscal is a "responsible officer authorized by law" within the meaning of section 3
of the Bill of Rights. His determination of probable cause is a sufficient justification for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Thus, it was held that "in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate
and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those
of the fiscal's should normally prevail" (People vs. Pineda, 65 O.G. 2595, 20 SCRA 748, 756).

This case illustrates the mischief or prejudice arising from the act of the city judge in
duplicating the preliminary examination held by the fiscal. Here, respondent judge on the
pretext of determining probable cause arrived at the conclusion (before arraignment) that
the criminal liability of the accused was extinguished by prescription.

What respondent judge actually did was not to verify whether the fiscal's
determination of probable cause was correct but to find out whether the criminal liability of
the accused was already extinguished, which is a different matter. Extinction of criminal
liability presupposes not merely probable cause but the guilt of the accused.

Although in the instant case we find that the city court erred in dismissing the case
on its own motion on the controversial ground of prescription, nevertheless, the petition has
to be dismissed because no appeal was seasonably made from the dismissal order and
certiorari and mandamus are not substitutes for an appeal that had lapsed.
Sol. Gen. vs. Garrido L-28535, Oct. 10, 1980
Facts:

A complaint against Director Quiason and a certain P. Portugal for violation of the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations was filed in the court of first instance.

Court ruled that at such stage of the investigation before the office of the City Fiscal,
a government official, like petitioner Director Quiason in this litigation, can avail himself of
the services of the Office of the Solicitor General, if the offense imputed to him arose from
the exercise of an official function.

During the preliminary investigation held by Assistant Fiscal Solidum, the counsel for
the complainant objected to the appearance of Solicitor [Raquel-Santos] in representation of
the Solicitor General on the ground that the Solicitor General is not authorized by law to
appear as counsel on behalf of a public official who is being accused criminally in his private
capacity.

a preliminary injunction was issued by respondent Judge Francisco Geronimo,

restraining the Solicitor General or any of his Assistants from further appearing in the
preliminary investigation of this case in the office of the City Fiscal and the City Fiscal or any
of his Assistants from allowing the Solicitor General or any of his Assistants to appear
thereat, until further orders from the Court.

A petition for certiorari was filed in the SC

Issue:

WON the Solicitor General is authorized by law to appear as counsel on behalf of a

public official who is being accused criminally in his private capacity.
Held:


Yes. what is involved is the exercise of executive authority. Not much reflection is
needed to show that if in the performance thereof not only by the President by officials in
the executive department, they could be subjected to suits, whether ill-founded or not, the
possibility of delay in the implementation of applicable statutes and decrees would not be
remote, For parties adversely affected could, by threats of possible criminal prosecution stay
the hand of the officials concerned.
6. URBANO VS CHAVEZ
FACTS:
This is a case of consolidated petitions of G.R. No. 87977and G.R. No. 88578
G.R. 87977
- Petitioners Urbano and Acapulco instituted a criminal case against Secretary Luis
Santos et al, for alleged violation of the provisions of RA No. 3019, known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
- The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
- The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel for the
respondents as far as the preliminary investigation of the case is concerned.
- A special civil action for prohibition was filed by the petitioners seeking to enjoin
the Solicitor General from acting as counsel for the said respondents in the course
of the preliminary investigation.
G.R. 88578
- Petitioner Nemesio G. Co filed an Amended Complaint for damages against
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez et al with RTC Branch 165 Pasig
- The Amended Complaint alleged that defendant Chavez caused to be published
defamatory imputations against the petitioner in an article appeared in the
December 4, 1987 issue of Business World, a periodical publication in Metro
Manila, and that he caused the publication thereof by way of an interview
characterized by bad faith and actual malice; and that the defamatory remarks
impute that he was involved in some anomalous transactions relating to the funds
of the national government during the time that President Marcos was in office.
- At the time of the publication of the questioned article, SolGen Chavez was the
counsel of the PCGG responsible for the investigation of alleged graft and corrupt
practices relating to the former President, his relatives and his close associates.
- Private defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss
- Office of the Solicitor General sought an extension of time to file the required
responsive pleading, then filed a Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, the trial court set
the case for oral argument.
- During the scheduled oral argument, the counsel of the petitioner objected to the
appearance of the OSG. The court issued an Order suspending the proceedings
and instructed the parties to submit their respective positions on the propriety of
the appearance of the said Office for the SolGen himself, from which the parties
complied.
- By way of a Motion seeking the disqualification of the OSG to act as counsel of
SolGen Chavez, the petitioner manifested that he is suing SolGen in his personal
capacity for acts which he committed beyond the scope of his authority and as
such he cannot be represented by the said office.
- OSG, on the other hand, manifested the objection of the petitioner and that
notwithstanding, it is authorized to represent any public official even if the said
official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of
PD No. 478 and EO No. 300, citing the ruling in Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. in support of the contention; and also maintained that the cause
of action against the SolGen is for acts committed by him in his official capacity.
- Petitioner submitted his Reply thereto, alleging therein, among others, that the
argument of the SolGen is untenable inasmuch as the expression of his views by
way of an interview subsequently featured in an article is not an official function

The Court denied the Motion of the petitioner for lack of merit
Petitioner sought a reconsideration
OSG opposed the reconsideration
Petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition
OSG, in turn, file a Rejoinder to the Reply
The Court denied the reconsideration
Thus, the Order of the trial court is challenged on the ground that the same
amounts to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court; and to order the OSG to desist from representing the
SolGen in the civil suit for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG can represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary
investigation of a criminal action against him or in a civil action for damages against
him
RULING:
The Court consolidated the petitions and treated them as Petitions for certiorari on
pure questions of law in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court
No. The OSG cannot represent a public officer in either criminal or civil action against
the latter.
The rationale behind the rule:
(1) OSG to represent a public official during the preliminary investigation of his case,
and which prohibits the said office from further representing the said public
official when an information is filed against him with the appropriate court:
- In Anti-Graft League of the Philippines Inc., this Court stressed that in the
performance of their duties, public officials can be subjected to numerous suits,
whether ill-founded or not, and that by threats of possible criminal prosecution,
parties adversely affected by official action can stay the hand of the public
official concerned.
- The Court concluded that as an assurance against timidity, the OSG sees to it
that the public officials concerned are duly represented by counsel
(2) To why the public official concerned may no longer be represented by the OSG:
- The said Office may no longer represent him considering that its position as
counsel for the accused will be in direct conflict with its responsibilities as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases
This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the law,
its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It is a situation which cannot
be countenanced by the Court.
Thus, the Court rules that the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at
any stage of a criminal case. For this reason, the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Ortega and SolGen v. Garrido, and all decided
cases affirming the same; in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement,
should be deemed abandoned.
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a
civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. The OSG
likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.
Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds that the OSG is not authorized
to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony. This pronouncement applies to all public officials and
employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government.
Placer vs. Villanueva L-60349-62, Dec. 29, 1983
Facts:


Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan an
information for slight physical injuries, violation of PD 1306, violation of BP 22, estafa,
malicious mischief, usurpation of authority, alarm and scandal, and Grave oral defamation
(Criminal cases 1209-1222) against the herein accused after conducting a preliminary
investigation.

Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on

April 5, 1982 the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety
of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the
questioned orders dated April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the
court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support
of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of
probable cause by petitioners.

Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending
that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a
probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the
existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
court. On April 28, 1982, respondent judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to
petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents within five (5) days from
notice.

Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
aforesaid orders and to compel respondent Judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Meanwhile, the respondent, in addition to his duties as presiding judge of Branch I of

the City Court of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court, as Judge
Jesus Ruiz, presiding judge of said sala, had retired from the service. The informations filed
by petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant because of respondent's firm refusal to
issue the corresponding warrants of arrest for want of affidavits of the witnesses. Thus, as
disclosed by petitioner's urgent motion, no warrants had been issued in 113 informations as
of July 15, 1982.

On July 12, 1982 the respondent Judge received the resolution requiring him
comment on the petition. However, despite the said order the respondent Judge issued an
Omnibus Order directing the petitioners to submit immediately the supporting affidavits and
other evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to secure a
reconsideration of said Omnibus Order, petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits
and documents on July 15, 1982 in order to avoid further delay in the prosecution of these
cases which rendered the instant petition moot and academic.

But while respondent gave due course to some of said cases either by issuing the
warrants of arrest or taking some other appropriate action, he refused to issue the warrants
in Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422, (alarm and scandal, Grave
oral defamation, estafa, estafa, and estafa respectively) and instead ordered the records
thereof remanded to the City Fiscal "for further preliminary investigation or reinvestigation,"
for on the bases of said affidavits, respondent found no prima facie case against the
accused.

Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to restrain respondent from
enforcing the orders subject of the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take
cognizance of, all the informations filed in his court. They contend that the fiscal's
certification in the information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient
justification for the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that such certification binds the
judge, it being supported by the presumption that the investigating fiscal had performed his
duties regularly and completely.

The respondent Judge justifies his orders as an exercise of his judicial power to review
the fiscals findings of probable cause and failure on the part of the petitioners to file the
required affidavit destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
petitioners official duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office
of the City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affidavits

of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.
Issue:

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the
supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.
Ruling:

The SC sustained the position of the respondent Judge.

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But does
such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the
negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing, a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of
the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause.
Abdula vs. Guiani L-118821, Feb. 18, 2000
Facts:

One June 24 1994, a complaint for murder was filed before the Criminal Investigation
Service Command ARMM Regional Office XII against herein petitioners and six (6) other
persons in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC
Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid
the six other respondents the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen.

The provincial prosecutor Salik Panda dismissed the said complaint for lack of prima
facie case for murder against the accused. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the
filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama.
Pursuant to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan
Mama before the sala of respondent Judge.

The respondent Judge in an order dated Sept. 13 1994 ordered that the case be
returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, respondent
judge noted that although there were eight (8) respondents in the murder case, the
information filed with the court "charged only one (1) of the eight (8) respondents in the
name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a
conclusion." As such, the respondent judge reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant
of arrest against Kasan Mama.

Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further
investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the
murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of
murder against herein petitioners and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus,
Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a refiling of the murder charge and pursuant to
law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On December 6, 1994, herein
petitioners submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits.

After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28

December 1994, found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners and three (3)
other respondents. He thus recommended the filing of charges against herein petitioners Bai

Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by inducement, and against the three (3)
others, as principals by direct participation.

Prosecutor Panda inhibits himself from the case for the victim was the father-in-law of
his son.

On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994 was filed
against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of respondent judge.
This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was
likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason
for his inhibition.

The following day, or on 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a warrant for
the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, petitioners filed
on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on
4 January 1995. In this motion, petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of
arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed
and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.

Subsequently an information was filed against the petitioners.

On January 3, 1995 the respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest. Upon knowledge
of the said warrant, an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest
on 4 January 1995. In this motion, petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of
arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed
and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.
And a petition for review was filed before the DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent judge did
not act upon petitioners pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition wherein petitioners pray for the
following:
"1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
implementation and execution of the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 and enjoining the
respondent judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 2376 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al. upon such bond as may be required by the
Honorable Court;
2. this petition be given due course and the respondent be required to answer;
3. after due hearing, the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 be set aside and declared
void ab initio and the respondent judge be disqualified from hearing Criminal Case No. 2376
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the alleged information charging petitioners with murder is null and void
because it was filed without the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor.
2. Whether or not the warrants of arrest was validly issued.
Ruling:
1st issue:

Petitioners contention is not well-taken.

The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on this matter state that "no complaint or
information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor." In other words,
a complaint or information can only be filed if it is approved or authorized by the provincial
or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.

In the case at bench, while the Resolution and the Information were not approved by
Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, the filing of the same even without his approval was
authorized. Both the Resolution and information contain the following notation:
"The herein Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting himself from this case and Investigating
Prosecutor Enok Dimaraw may dispose of the case without his approval on the following
ground:

That this case has been previously handled by him, and whose findings differ from the
findings of Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw; and the victim is a relative by affinity, he
being a father-in-law of his son.

It must be stressed that the Rules of Court speak of authority or approval by the
provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor. The notation made by Prosecutor Panda clearly
shows that Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw was authorized to "dispose of the case without
his approval." In issuing the resolution and in filing the information, the investigating
prosecutor was acting well within the authority granted to him by the provincial prosecutor.
Thus, this resolution is sufficient compliance with the aforecited provision of the Rules of
Court.
2nd issue:

After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in the contention of

petitioners. To wit: that the respondent judge "did not personally examine the evidence nor
did he call the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts." As
proof, he points to the fact that the information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January
2, 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on January 3,
1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order stating that
there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, a clear violation of the
guidelines set forth in the Allado case.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

"Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine
probable cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to
place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous
Constitutions.

In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as
there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause
was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an
admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause as his own.

Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty
under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is

GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 20 February 1995 in favor of
petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and execution of the order of arrest
dated 3 January 1995 is made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376 is REMANDED to Branch
14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a proper determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued and for further proceedings.
Sales Vs Sandiganbayan GR 143802
FACTS


On August 2, 1999, petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte,
fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged
shootout in Barangay Caparispisan of said municipality after a heated altercation between
them. After the shooting incident, petitioner surrendered and placed himself under the
custody of the municipal police then asked that he be brought to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters in Laoag City.

Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary examination of the witnesses, found the
existence of probable cause, and thereafter issued an order dated August 3, 1999 for the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner with no bail recommended. By virtue of the
warrant of arrest, petitioner was transferred on August 4, 1999 from the Provincial PNP
Headquarters to the Provincial Jail.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. SP No 54416, alleging that: 1.] the order and warrant of arrest for which petitioner was
detained is null and void for being issued by respondent judge who was disqualified by law
from acting on the case by reason of his affinity to private respondent Thelma Benemerito
(Respondent judge is married to Susana Benemerito-Calvan, whose father is a brother of the
victim.); and 2.] the preliminary examination by respondent judge was so illegally and
irregularly conducted as to oust the said judge of jurisdiction over the case.

In a Decision dated November 18, 1999, the appellate court granted the petition for
habeas corpus and ordered the release of petitioner from detention subject to the outcome
of the proper preliminary investigation.

There are four affidavits on record which state in categorical terms that it was the
victim who first fired at petitioner with his Armalite rifle and that petitioner merely returned
fire. An Armalite rifle and empty shells were recovered from the scene of the incident by the
PNP and impounded by it. some of the shells correspond to the Armalite rifle, thereby
indicating that the firearm was fired. The Ombudsman, however, neither called for the
production of the firearm and the empty shells, nor did he ask for the production of the
ballistic and laboratory examinations of the bloodstains on the Armalite rifle despite the
statement by the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte that these pieces of evidence were all
available.

On May 25, 2000, Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Murder against petitioner and four other
before the Sandiganbayan. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June
16, 2000.

The petitioner then filed a Motion To Defer Issuance Of Warrant Of Arrest pending
determination of probable cause dated June 22, 2000. The motion was denied by
Sandiganbayans Fourth Division in the challenged Resolution of July 13, 2000.
ISSUES

Whether or not the Ombudsman followed the proper procedure in conducting a

preliminary investigation and, corollarily, whether or not petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence.

Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process due to lack of preliminary
investigation.
HELD

SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated July 13, 2000 and the
Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar dated May 25, 2000 in Criminal
Case No. 26115;

Ordering the Sandiganbayan to QUASH the warrant of arrest it issued against

petitioner;

REMANDING the case to the Ombudsman for completion of the preliminary

investigation

RATIO DECIDENDI : The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some
other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accuseds claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of
his right to due process. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the
State. More important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the
birthrights of all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once
it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Matalam Vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS

An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan

charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga
and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for
their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan,
Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura
and Faizal I. Hadil.

On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.

After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid
Matalam[6] to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to
Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam.
[7]Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply[8] to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.

In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an
entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his
alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the
alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.
He insists that the amended information charging a separate and entirely different offense
cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due process of law. He
claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being
charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given
the opportunity to explain.

On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to

Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P.
Matalam. It admitted the Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004
and 03 November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without
conducting a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that a new preliminary investigation should have been ordered
because the corpus delicti in the Amended Information is the termination of services of the
complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the Original Information is the alleged
refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. In other words, there being a
new and distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new preliminary investigation.
ISSUE

Whether or not the Amendment made in the information was in Substance or in

Form. (Substance)

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a new preliminary investigation. (YES)

HELD:

Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent courts resolutions dated 12 January
2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent court is directed to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a
preliminary investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended Information filed against
petitioner.
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under the
Rules. This Court is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to trial.
What we are looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity to
present countervailing evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that petitioner
was not given the chance to fully present his evidence on the amended information which
contained a substantial amendment, a new preliminary investigation is in order. As to
statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be
merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold
back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused may be
afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary
investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
SALUDAGA and GENIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in a
Criminal Case denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who
were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008.

Quintin Saludaga, municipal mayor of Lavesares, Northern Samar and SPO2 Fiel
Genio were charged in the Sandiganbayan of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019) by causing undue injury to the government.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege
and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of
the crime charged.

The Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to study the possibility
of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.

The OSP re-filed the Information. Now, charging the petitioners for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of
the government.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation.

Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary
investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law
because the latter charged a different offensethat is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving
unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first
Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least,
there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should
have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.


Petitioners also highlighted that newly discovered evidence mandates due reexamination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case which necessitates a new
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
a.
Whether or not the presence of newly discovered evidence necessitates a new
preliminary investigation.
b.
Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:

No. The piece of evidence sought to be considered by the Petitioners cannot be

considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing
of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the
preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners Supplement to
Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was
conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.

The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan

acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the
conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a
new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the
nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary
investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in
futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively participated by
both petitioners.

The Petition is denied.

Adasa vs. Abalos GR 16817 Feb. 10 2007

Yambot et al vs. Armovit GR 172677 Sept. 12, 2008