Bernardo v.

CA, 7 SCRA 367

BERNARDO v. CA, G.R. No. L-18148, 7 SCRA 367, February 28, 1963 | BARRERA, J.:
FACTS: The properties in the will of testator Eusebio was disposed to his wife
Hermogena and his cousins. The wife died and was substituted by her collateral
relatives, upon executor Bernardo's petition. Petitioner-executor filed his project of
partition, but was opposed by collateral relatives claiming that of the properties
disposed of in the will are part of the spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court
heard evidence. Petitioner contended that it was donated by the wife to the
husband so it was not part of CPG and that the oppositors cannot question the
validity of the donation in the probate proceedings. Oppositors rebutted that since it
was donated during marriage, it was void; hence, the husband did not own it and
cannot dispose it by will. Probate court ordered the donation voided and that
executor submit another project of partition. Petitioner filed Motion for New trial
(MNT) on the ground that probate court had no jurisdiction, but was denied.
Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also denied. Hence, this petition for review
by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a probate court can determine a question of ownership over
property during distribution.
HELD: YES. Probate court has to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the
testator's estate to be distributed to the heirs who are parties to the proceedings.
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate
or intestate proceedings," except:
a. where a party prays merely for inclusion or exclusion from inventory of the
property; and
b. when interested parties are all heirs and submit a question as to title to property,
provided third persons are not prejudiced.

Fule vs. CA [G.R. No. L-79094. June 22, 1988]

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch
LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered
into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the
Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its
evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant
waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed
the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant
contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of
the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the
cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts
made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118)
[Emphasis supplied]Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is
applicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.

HELD:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby
ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
RATIO:

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820
[1954]). The use of the term shall further emphasizes its mandatory character
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced
(Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more
importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor
of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA
648).

Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance33 SCRA 252May 29, 1970Facts of the Case:
Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in thePhilippines.
Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of thedeceased, filed a
petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased inthe Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was opposed bythe
nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain,
acopy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the
estate inthe court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the deceased.Vicente
filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manilastating that the
court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlementIn
the CFI of Negros.Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
dismissal of theintestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.
Issue:
Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Case:
The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is
proper.Under the Rules on the settlement of estate of the deceased person,
testateproceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case
intestatesettlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then
the intestateproceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate
proceeding.

Matute vs. Court of Appeals

26 SCRA 768G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106January 31,
1969(L-26751)Facts:On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute

heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent
Matias S. Matute, filed in Special Proceeding (settlementof the Matute estate) a
petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and hisappointment
in such capacity.Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the
date of his appointment, saidMatias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just
and complete account of his administration andthat he is not only incompetent but
also negligent in his management of the estate under his chargeconsisting of five
haciendas.The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely
without basis and false.Records show that he made an accounting and the same
was submitted to the court. That hiscompetence to act as administrator has been
established to the satisfaction of the court.It appears that during the reception of
evidence conducted on December 29, 1965 by theprobate court, Carlos S. Matute
and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits in supportof their
motion to ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the
admission of
the movants exhibits on the ground that the same were
hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or merephotostatic copies of supposed originals
which never properly identified nor shown in court. four days
later, the Counsel for Matias filed with leave of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or
Demurrer toEvidence
which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the
motionsfor the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute.The probate
court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence,
thecertiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him as coadministrator is apatent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the
reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the
respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence butthe latter resorted to
dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to
evidence.Issue:Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to
evidenceis applicable to special proceedings s
uch that its disregard by the
probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.Held:Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions,the rules
provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
specialproceedings. The application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings,
like the case at bar, isauthorized by the Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing
motion, the probate judge issued thecontroverted order removing the respondent as
co-administrator without giving him the opportunity toadduce his own evidence
despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduceevidence
in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to

evidence. TheCourt view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted
grave abuse of discretion whichdooms his improvident order as nullity.