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Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before
the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during
such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal
atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the
law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using
as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war
crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in
such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in
the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes
Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is
aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of
international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These
include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of
incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try
persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its
citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere
incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally,
if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue
of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the
rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very
provisions of this special law.

Marcos/Concordia vs. AFP

GR No. L-4663
GR No. L-4671
Alleged that the AFP Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded MARCOS and CONDORDIA from
their right to appear as counsel on the ground that they are
DISQUALIFIED/EXEMPTED/INHIBITED from SEC 17, Article 17 of the Constitution:
SEC. 17: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly
be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Congress during his term of office.
He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil
case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is
the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office
WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is
applicable to the petitioners in the two cases. YES.
MARCOS/CONCORDIA: applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General
Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the
above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
Words any court, used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office, refers not only to civil, but also to
military courts.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]General meaning must prevail over
restricted meaning UNLESS the nature of the subject matter clearly indicates that limited
sense is intended.
It would be a bar to another prosecution for the same case which would result to DOUBLE
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend
the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance.
Restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, the plaintiff in error, having
been acquitted of the crime of homicide, could not be subsequently tried for the
same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.
In Sec 17, it is obvious that the reason of prohibiting appearance of members of the
Senate/House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martials,
as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the

independence of civil courts judges is guaranteed by our Constitution.

Ubi eadem ratio ibi eadem lexi
A court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction; cannot enforce a contract,
collect a debt or award damages in favor of an individual.
Judgment is a criminal sentence, not a civil verdict.
Proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt.
Court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by same authority that any other exists by, and the
military law is a branch of law as valid as the others.
It differs from other laws only because- it applies to officers and soldiers but not to other
members of the body politic, it is limited to beaches of military duty.

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.
En Banc
Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward
the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a
measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened
by some trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out

wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and
had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that
the door and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because
of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating)
circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if
Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it
would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually
Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.