G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs.

Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a
bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons
allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.
House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment
suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to
grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations.
Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the
protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment
trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria MacapagalArroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th
president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give
up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later
left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in
an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable,
whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly
resign.
2.)

Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the
quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied
resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of
the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held
that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that,
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for
his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the
intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President
Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria MacapagalArroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the
Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m.
of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January
20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her
oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall
from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going
to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to
the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Estrada v. Arroyo

Estrada V. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap
also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.

HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of
Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . .

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power
II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew
the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by
Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any
more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Ayoko na are words of resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given
fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by
the parties during and after transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in
the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under
the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75
which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82
which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of
inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7,
2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden.

LAUREL VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They
posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables,
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.
There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines.
The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light
on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does
not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should

determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional

limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines
does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.