Escuin vs Escuin

Escuin vs Escuin
Facts:
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos
executed a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that
he was a native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los
Santos, the latter being deceased; that he was married about six months
previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no lawful
descendants; the testator, however, stated in clause three of his will, that in
case he has a duly registered successor, his child would be his sole and
universal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case, there should be
no such heir, then in clause four he named his said father Francisco
Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs,
they to divide the estate in equal shares between them.
The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899, as certified to by the
Municipal court of Magdalena, Sevilla, on the 20th of March, 1990.
Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were
appointed to consider claims against the estate, and, according to a report
presented to the Court of First Instance on the 20th of June, 1907, one
claim was allowed amounting to 3,696.50 pesetas.
On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de
Leon, and the attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, appealed to the Court of First Instance from the findings of
the aforesaid commissioners.
Hence, the decedent designated in his will his father and his wife as his
sole heirs. He ignored his recognized natural child.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid.
Held:

The will is partly valid. It is valid with respect to the 2/3 of the properties
which the testator can freely dispose. The 1/3 should be give to his
recognized natural child.
The above-mentioned will neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the
testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and wife;
testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall
be reduced in so far as they are illegal or excessive.
The late testator did not leave a recognized natural child, the appellant
minor, and a widow; that the said minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the
general heir of his natural father, the said testator who recognized him
while living, and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his estate,
which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child; and for the
reason that the minor was ignored by his natural father in his will, the
designation of heirs made therein was, as matter of fact annulled by force
of law, in so far as legal portion of the said minor was thereby impaired.
Legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not illegal, for
the reason that a testator cannot deprive the heirs of their legal portions,
except in the cases expressly indicated by law.
Palaganas vs Palaganas
IN RE: PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011
Abad, J.:
FACTS
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who
became a naturalized United States citizen, died single and
childless. In the last will and testament she executed in
California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines
and in the US.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate. On October

15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and

Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated
in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel
and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz
and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a
short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for
leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13,
2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum
on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated
in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to
probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as
special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and
Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an
unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the
assailed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed
the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos
submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The
present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers
to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is

governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the

decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
RULING
Yes.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and
allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and
Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate
of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary
to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established.

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
Ponente: CRUZ
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them
transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his
sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such
agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with
their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete
house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but
was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another
coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her
brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right
had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the
sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement
of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of
the New Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court
reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the
30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In
doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that
vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will.
BAUTISTA VS GRINO-AQUINO
Facts: On January 6,1976, the parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of
Facts dated December 15, 1975. And some stipulation are; Parties admit
that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo;
And that Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana
Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949; And
That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial
partition of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late
Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista; And Manuel Bautista
denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property;
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint
with costs against plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was rendered in due
course by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1987, affirming the decision of
the trial court.
Issue: WON the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife.
Ruling: The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent
Appellate Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no
longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that
the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of
Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted
and proven facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial
partition was supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the
estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista,
constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista
appears to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private
respondents.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not
belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of

Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father Mariano Bautista,
which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No. 2210.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement
of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died
without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the
property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot
be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ
Facts : Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y
Siongco. They had no children. llOn April 28,1936, Jacinta
executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir
and executor. On October 26, 1953, herein petitioner Juanita
Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was
declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses
Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner
Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another
will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426,
the will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband,
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Neverthless, both
Alejandro and Juanita executed a project partition, approved by
the lower court on
April 23, 1960 and directed that the records of the case be sent to
the archives, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a
separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of
partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and
pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a
statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately
to Juanita the lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate
Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying
that Alejandro

Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said

lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the separate petition
alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and
terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the
executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is
guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery
of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. The parties
have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said
petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action
aforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied
Juanita's petition on the ground that the parties themselves
agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her
shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of
partition has been finally settled and decided. Hence this petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue : WON the project partition approved by the TC ordering it
closed and terminated terminated the Probate proceeding.
Ruling : No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by
itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as
the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, ); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period has not elapsed.
DELOS SANTOS VS DELA CRUZ
Facts: On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific
performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24,
1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial
partition agreement (a copy of which was attached to the complaint) over a certain
portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m. The defendant refused to perform
his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff
prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation under the
extrajudicial partition agreement.

In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason
that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property,
and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although
he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the
sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the decedent.
Ruling: No. In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz
are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiffappellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the
stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
therein in representation of her deceased mother.
Agustines vs CFI
Facts: In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was subsequently submitted
for probate in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in special proceedings No. 4944. Having no
children, she named her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, but she specified
some be quests. There was opposition to the approval of the will; however, after some negotiations,
the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and nieces of the decedent (the other petitioners in this special
civil action) executed on February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition with the respondent Severo
Valenzuela, expressing conformity with the probate of the testament and dividing the properties of
the deceased.
Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to the parish church of Polo
or to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Then he hastened to submit in September, 1944, in
the testamentary proceeding No. 4944, a motion in which he represented that under the will he had
discretion to determine the area of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that, exercising such
discretion, he elected to assign that tract actually cultivated by the tenant named Benito Salazar in
Quiririt (admittedly one hectare more or less). He asked that this assignment be declared full
compliance with the testamentary directions. The other parties to the testementary proceeding were
not given due notice of this petition. It was approved on December 2, 1944.
Issue: Whether or not the share of the church of Polo under the will and the extrajudicial partition is
not exceeding nine hectares.
Ruling: Yes. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a provision directing her
husband to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not exceeding nine hectares to the Polo church.
After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we reach the conclusion that, as
contended by petitioners and the intervenor, the extrajudicial partition definitely alloted a nine-

hectare parcel to the Polo church. Supposing, that under the will Valenzuela's discretion included the
determination of the area to be transferred and not merely the selection of the site where the
nine-hectare portion is to be segregated still it seems clear that in the partition he elected or
agreed that a nine-hectare portion shall be conveyed to the Polo church for masses.

Cojuangco-Suntay
Facts: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At
the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II,
all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock,
Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was
a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II,
lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father
and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren. Significantly, Federico, after the
death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted
their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the
proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March
13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator

of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be

adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Issue: WON Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
Ruling: Yes. From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding
Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted
son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court
as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that
under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his
share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to
a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive
condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly
inapplicable to the case at bar.
MANUNGAS VS LORETO
Facts: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968.
Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his
adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31,
1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was
the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory
heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas
whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas.
Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on
October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband
in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was
issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the
properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.

Issue: WON the fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas
does mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator
of the Estate of Manungas.
Ruling: No. Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special
administrator lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A.
Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, it was stated that: It is well settled that the statutory
provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes
for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now
Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator.
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is,
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.