Oposa vs.

Facturan
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter
alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers'

class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled
to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and
chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known
as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of

Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with
the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island
of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k)
the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land
mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft
of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to

the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations

yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and
their successors who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant
to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full

and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."

(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section
2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation
and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only

was the defendant's claim that the complaint states

no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again,
the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states
a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal
Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192,
to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged

grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found,
after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common
and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world
in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably

include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,

management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and

healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'

assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without
doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the

right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they
are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna
who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the
State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution
air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The
right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may
be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental
balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President

Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.

No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided

for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the

benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof
makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1

thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State
shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality
of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a
true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be
in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June

1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of

each generation as trustee and guardian of the

environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter
statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the

question submitted to the court for resolution involves

the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself.
No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive

or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.

What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-avis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished

member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to
the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23

Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for

this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his

motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he

would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court

held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are

contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance

Co.

vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property
and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.