Manila Railroad Company v.

Insular Collector of Customs

Case No. 167
G.R. No. 30264 (March 12, 1929)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84
FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of
wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from
dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of
the wheel. Under par. 141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909,
manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad
valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehicles for use
on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to 10%
ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields
as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal,
however, the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as
detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of
wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached
parts of vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of
statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear
import of the language used. In case of doubt, they should be construed
strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. And when there
is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in
its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former,
the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular enactment.

Almeda v. Florentino
Case No. 10
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67
FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947),
provides in its Sec. 14 that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be
appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members
thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the
strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended, the
Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to
recognize Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent
Florentino to the position, purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter.
ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the
Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City?
HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that
indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or
modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by
implication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so
intended.

Lichauco vs. Apostol

Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922)
Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 23
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing
carabao and other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn
a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.
However, the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except
upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of
Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest
before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.
Legislations involved in the case: Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code
prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country
APOSTOLS DEFENSE: Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code Bringing of
diseased animal into islands forbidden
LICHAUCOS DEFENSE: Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended
by Act No. 3052 absolute and unrestricted Bringing of animals
imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3052, has been repealed by the implication in Sec. 1770.
HELD: No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec.
1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of
legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not considered as
inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it must be considered as a special
qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains
in full force and effect, being a special law having special contingency not
dealt within Sec. 1762, which extends merely to the importation of draft
animals for purposes of manufacturing serum.

Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino

Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-8500 (February 27, 1956)
FACTS: Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the
houses of the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were
public nuisances built on public streets and river beds. Petitioners
contend that under the Civil Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the district
health officer who should remove public nuisances. Respondent, on the
other hand, argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances, the
health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409.
HELD: The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is
a general law applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a
special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and
a special law are in conflict, the latter prevails.

Laxamana v. Baltazar
Case No. 144
G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225
FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195
of the Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the
office. However, the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the
Revised Election Code, appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office.
HELD: Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of
the Revised Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised
Admin Code, applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of
the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in
particular. A special provision overrides a general one. Also, the
incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but
merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of
suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the
legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous
interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec. 2180, the interpretation is
deemed to have been adopted.

De Joya v. Lantin
Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)
FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile
from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of
Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were
different from those declared. Customs took custody of the shipment.
Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for
Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had
jurisdiction on the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of
Customs. RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.
HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws,
whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws
prevail over general ones.

Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan

Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119
FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399
for an electric light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran,
Agusan, together with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity by the Public Service Commission. However, the City of
Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax
on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. Butuan
Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is
deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the
Petitioner of property without due process of law. On the other hand,
Respondent maintained that it was vested with the power to provide for
the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes as
stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950.
ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls
within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the citys power
of taxation.
HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill,
Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city
under its charter. Neither could the latters power therein granted be
taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the
franchise, considering the absence of an express or specific grant of
power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the
latter general and the terms of the general are broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the
other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered
as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land, while
the other as the law of a particular case.

Lagman v. City of Manila, et al.

Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966)
Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No. 126
FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular
terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight.
The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986,
entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the
City of Manila, and For Other Purposes.
ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
HELD: No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No.
548 and the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the
provisions of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over
both Commonwealth Acts.
Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service
Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power
of local governments over motor traffic.

Arayata v. Joya
Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)
FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the
Government for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited,
he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator.
Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow,
herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the
Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver
the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution.
Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all
deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the
law.
ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or
Act 1120s full conveyance of the property to the widow.
HELD: Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition,
disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil
Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The
special law must prevail.

Bagatsing v. Ramirez
Case No. 28
G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An
Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees
for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and
for other Purposes.
Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for
the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee
was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance
would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on
livestock and animal products.
ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted
by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax
Code.
HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law
creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an
exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of
ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard
therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA

G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:
FACTS: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall,
Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against
the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of
Manila to pay damages.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos
Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
HELD: Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged
that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and
the officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

David v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 85
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the
barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELECs schedule
of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELECs
basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates
barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an
earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that
barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends that
there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the
later legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next
barangay election should be when it stated that the next regular election
involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having
been scheduled in May 1997.
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years It is not to be construed as
prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.