FRUIT OF THE LOOM V.

CA
133 SCRA 405
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Rhode
Island, USA. It is the registrant of the trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM in the Philippine Patent
Office and was issued two Certificates of Registration, one of which was in 1957 and the other in
1958.
2. Private Respondent, a domestic corporation, is the registrant of the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE
in the Philippine Patent Office.
3. Both are involved in the merchandise of garments.
4. Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against
private respondent, alleging that:
a. The latters trademark is confusingly similar to the formers, both trademarks being used in
womens panties and other textile products.
b. That the hang tags used by private respondent is a colorable imitation of those of the
petitioner.
5. Private respondent alleged that there was no confusing similarity between the trademarks.
6. At the pre-trial, the following admissions were made:
a. That the registered trademark Fruit for Eve bears the notice Reg. Phil. Pat. Off. while that of
Fruit of the Loom does not.
b. That at the time of its registration, the plaintiff filed no opposition thereto.
7. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, permanently enjoining private
respondent from using the trademark Fruit for Eve.
8. Both parties appealed to the former Court of Appeals:
a. Petitioner questioned the lower courts failure to award damages in its favor.
b. Private respondent sought the reversal of the lower courts decision.
9. The former Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the lower courts decision and
dismissing the petitioners complaint. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
HELD:
In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court, it has been consistently
held that there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to
cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or
source of the commodity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the
predominant words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in order that he may
draw his conclusion where one is confusingly similar to the other. The similarities of the
competing trademarks in this case are completely lost in the substantial differences in the design
and general appearance of their respective hang tags. We have examined the two trademarks as
they appear in the hang tags submitted by the parties and We are impressed more by the
dissimilarities than by the similarities appearing therein. We hold that the trademarks Fruit of the
Loom and Fruit for Eve do not resemble each other as to confuse or deceive an ordinary
purchaser. The ordinary purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a
modicum of intelligence to be able to see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in
question.

Conrad and Company, Inc. v. CA, et.al., G.R. No. 115115, July 18, 1995
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction
Facts:
The respondents Fitrite, Inc. and its sister company, Victoria Biscuit Co., Inc. are domestic
corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits and
cookies. Their products bear the trademark "SUNSHINE" in the Philippines which was awarded by
the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) listing Fitrite as principal
registrant.
Since May 20, 1983 when Fitrite was issued the Certificate of Registration for its trademark to the
filing of its complaint against Conrad Company Inc., Fitrite and Victoria Biscuit have been
manufacturing, selling and distributing on a massive scale biscuits and cookies bearing the
"Sunshine" trademark making it popular in Metro Manila and in the provinces.
On May 30, 1990, Conrad's own Import Manager and Executive Assistant, Raul Olaya,
executed an affidavit stating that Conrad had also been importing, selling and distributing
biscuits and cookies, and other items bearing the same trademark as Fitrite and Victoria's. It was
traced by the mentioned domestic corporations that on April 18, 1988, Conrad was designated as
an exclusive importer and dealer of the products of "Sunshine Biscuits, Inc." for sale in the
Philippine market.
A few days later, Conrad started its first importation and continuously did so. Through their
counsel, Fitrite and Victoria addressed a letter to Conrad demanding that it cease and desist from
continuing its operation and use of the subject trademark, but was ignored. This led Fitrite and
Victoria to file a complaint against Conrad for infringement and unfair competition. Conrad
sought to dismiss the complaint by invoking litis pendentia, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
and failure to state a cause of action. Conrad argued that it has been granted distributorship by
Sunshine Biscuits USA over the Philippine territory, and so, it follows that the basis of Fitrite and
Victoria's claim is lodged under the exclusive jurisdiction of the BPTTT. The trial court found merit
on the motion to dismiss the complaint.
Fitrite and Victoria filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the lower court.
The Court of Appeals, however, found merit on their claims and reinstated the complaint. Hence,
this petition by Conrad praying that the Civil Case for "Injunction with Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction" based on infringement and unfair competition filed by Fitrite and Victoria
be dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not Fitrite and Victorias civil action against Conrad which was based on
infringement and unfair competition be dismissed because of the doctrine of litis pendentia.
Held: No, the petition is without merit.
An application for administrative cancellation of a registered trademark on any of the grounds
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 166 or the Trade-Mark Law, as amended, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of BPTTT. But, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy
of injunction and relief for damages, it is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence
and jurisdiction of ordinary courts. As held in an earlier decision by the Supreme Court, that the
registration in the Principal Register gives rise to a presumption of validity of the registration and
of the registrant's ownership and right to the exclusive use of the mark. Such registration can

serve as the basis for an action of infringement which entitles the registrant whose right was
invaded for court protection and relief.
Section 23 and Section 27 of Chapter V, of the Trade-Mark Law provides:
Sec. 23. Actions, and damages and injunction for infringement. Any person entitled to the
exclusive use of a registered mark or trade-name may recover damages in a civil action from any
person who infringes his rights, and the measure of the damages suffered shall be either the
reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringe
his said rights, or the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the
event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable certainty, then
the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales
of the defendant or the value of the services in connection with which the mark or trade-name
was used in the infringement of the rights of the complaining party. In cases where actual intent
to mislead the public or to defraud the complaining party shall be shown, in the discretion of the
court, the damages may be doubled.
The complaining party, upon proper showing, may also be granted injunction.