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RESURRECCION
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in contradicting the determination made by both the Labor
Arbiter & NLRC of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
HELD:
YES.
The Court finds that, notwithstanding the nomenclature of their Talent Contracts and/or
Project Assignment Forms and the terms and condition embodied therein, petitioners are
regular employees of ABS-CBN.
To determine the existence of said relation, case law has consistently applied the four-fold
test, to wit:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
(d) the employer's power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the
work is accomplished.
Of these criteria, the so-called control test is generally regarded as the most crucial and
determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.
Under this test, an employer-employee relationship is said to exist where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end result but
also the manner and means utilised to achieve the same.
2. FONTERRA BRANDS PHILS., INC., petitioner, vs. LEONARDO 1 LARGADO and
TEOTIMO ESTRELLADO, respondents. [G.R. No. 205300. March 18, 2015.]
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FACTS: Bernard Tenazas, Jaime Francisco, and Isidro Endraca filed a complaint for
illegaldismissal against R. Villegas Taxi Transport, and/or Romualdo Villegas and Andy Villegas.
PETITIONERS CLAIM
TENAZAS
FRANCISCO
ENDRACA
Dismissed
because
of
the
unfoundedsuspicion that he was
organizing alabor union
Company denies
anemployee
that
Francisco
is
Tenazas, Francisco, and Endraca also filed a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence: (a) Joint Affidavit
of the petitioners; (b) Affidavit of Good Faith of Aloney Rivera (co -driver); (c) pictures of the
petitioners wearing company shirts; (d) Tenazas Certification/Record of Social Security System
(SSS) contributions.
NLRC: Reversed LA; the additional evidence sufficiently established the existence of
employer-employee relationship and illegal dismissal (for all three)
CA: Tenazas and Endraca were indeed employees and were illegally dismissed, but
Francisco failed to establish his relationship with the company
ISSUE: WON there was an employer-employee relationship (re: Francisco) NO
HELD:
The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. As
Francisco was claiming to be an employee of R. Villegas Taxi, it is incumbent upon him to
proffer evidence to prove the existence of the relationship.
There is no hard and fast rule to establish the elements of employer-employee
relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may be admitted, e.g., identification
cards, cash vouchers, social security registration, appointment letters or employment
contracts, payrolls, organization charts, personnel lists.
Francisco failed to present substantial evidence to establish the relationship. No
documentary evidence submitted, like an attendance logbook, payroll, SSS record, or any
personnel file that depicts his status as an employee. He could also have at least presented
his social security records stating his contributions, name and address of employer (which
Tenazas presented). Another taxi operator, Emmanuel Villegas, also claimed to be his
employer a fact not denied or questioned by Francisco in any of his pleadings.
Petition DENIED. SC agreed with CAs order of reinstatement instead of separation pay. (*Strained
relations must be demonstrated as a fact. In this case, no facts demonstrated that the relations
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HELD:
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WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
February 21, 2008 and Resolution dated February 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. CEB-SP No. 02113 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
6. ERNESTO G. YMBONG, petitioner VS ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
VENERANDA SY AND DANTE LUZON, respondents. [G.R. No. 184885, March 7,
2012]
FACTS
Like Ymbong, Leandro Patalinghug also worked for ABS-CBN Cebu. Starting 1995, he
worked as talent, director and scriptwriter for various radio programs aired over DYAB.
On January 1, 1996, the ABS-CBN Head Office in Manila issued the POLICY ON
EMPLOYEES SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE (The Policy for brevity). The pertinent portions
read:
1.
Any employee who intends to run for any public office position, must
file his/her letter of resignation, at least 30 days prior to the official filing of the
certificate of candidacy either for national or local election.
2. Further, any employee who intends to join a political group/party or even
with no political affiliation but who intends to openly and aggressively
campaign for a candidate or group of candidates must file a request for
leave of absence subject to managements approval. at least 30 days prior to
the start of the planned leave period.
Because of the impending May 1998 elections and based on his immediate recollection
of the policy at that time, Dante Luzon, Asst. Station Manager of DYAB issued a
MEMORANDUM stating the ff:
any employee/talent who wants to run for any position in the
coming election will have to file a leave of absence the moment
he/she files his/her certificate of candidacy. The services rendered by
the concerned employee/talent to this company will then be temporarily
suspended for the entire campaign/election period.
Luzon, however, admitted that upon double-checking of the exact text of the Policy and
subsequent confirmation with the ABS-CBN Head Office, he saw that the Policy actually
required SUSPENSION for those who intend to campaign for a political party or candidate
and RESIGNATION for those who will actually run in the elections.
After the issuance of said Memorandum, Luzon claims that Ymbong informed him that he
would leave radio for a couple of months because he will campaign for the
administration ticket. However, it was only after the elections that they found out
that Ymbong actually ran for public office himself at the eleventh hour.
Ymbong, on the other hand, claims that in accordance with the Memorandum, he
informed Luzon through a letter that he would take a few months leave of
absence from March 8, 1998 to May 18, 1998 since he was running for
councilor of Lapu-Lapu City.
As regards Patalinghug, Patalinghug approached Luzon and advised him that he will run
as councilor for Naga, Cebu. According to Luzon, he clarified to Patalinghug that he will
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be considered resigned and not just on leave once he files a certificate of candidacy.
Patalinghug, thereafter submitted to Luzon his Letter of Resignation.
Unfortunately, both Ymbong and Patalinghug lost in the May 1998 elections. Later, both
tried to come back to ABS-CBN Cebu but only to be informed by Luzon that they cannot
work there anymore because of company policy.
ABS-CBN, however, agreed out of pure liberality to give them a chance to wind
up their participation in the radio drama, Nagbabagang Langit, since it was
rating well and to avoid an abrupt ending. The WINDING-UP, however, dragged on for
so long prompting Luzon to issue to Ymbong ANOTHER MEMORANDUM
(dated September 14, 1998) stating that his services are being terminated immediately,
much to the surprise of Ymbong.
Ymbong thus filed an ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINT against ABS-CBN, Luzon and
DYAB Station Manager Veneranda Sy.
Arguing that the ground cited by ABS-CBN for his dismissal was not among those
enumerated in the Labor Code. And even granting without admitting the
existence of the company policy supposed to have been violated, Ymbong
averred that it was necessary that the company policy meet certain requirements
before willful disobedience of the policy may constitute a just cause for
termination. Ymbong further argued that the company policy violates his
constitutional right to suffrage.
ABS-CBN prayed for the dismissal of the complaints arguing that there is no
employer-employee relationship between the company and Ymbong and
Patalinghug. ABS-CBN contended that they are not employees but TALENTS as
evidenced by their talent contracts. However, notwithstanding their status, ABS-CBN
has a standing policy on persons connected with the company whenever they will run for
public office.
LABOR ARBITER
Dismissal of Ymbong and Patalinghug ILLEGAL, directing respondent ABS-CBN to
immediately reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights plus the payment of backwages to each complainant.
LA found that there exists an employer-employee relationship between ABSCBN and Ymbong and Patalinghug considering the stipulations in their
appointment letters/talent contracts.
o
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that although the subject company policy is reasonable and not contrary to law,
the same was not made known to Ymbong and Patalinghug and in fact was
SUPERSEDED by the 1998 Memorandum issued by Luzon. Thus, there is no
valid or authorized cause in terminating Ymbong and Patalinghug from
their employment.
In its Memorandum of Appeal, ABS-CBN contended that the LA has no jurisdiction over
the case because there is no employer-employee relationship between the company
and the complainants
In its Supplemental Appeal, ABS-CBN insisted that Ymbong and Patalinghug were
engaged as radio talents for DYAB dramas and personality programs and their contract is
one between a self-employed contractor and the hiring party which is a standard practice
in the broadcasting industry.
NLRC
MODIFIED the decision of L.A. Nicasio C. Aninon, ordering ABS-CBN to reinstate Ymbong
and to pay his full backwages.
NLRC dismissed ABS-CBNs Supplemental Appeal for being filed out of time.
NLRC also held that ABS-CBN wielded the power of control over Ymbong and
Patalinghug, thereby proving the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them.
As to the issue of whether they were illegally dismissed, the NLRC treated their cases
DIFFERENTLY.
As to YMBONG, NLRC ruled otherwise. That the Memorandum merely states that
an employee who seeks any elected position in the government will only merit
the temporary suspension of his services. It held that under the principle of social
justice, the March 25, 1998 Memorandum shall prevail and ABS-CBN is estopped
from enforcing the September 14, 1998 Memorandum issued to Ymbong stating
that his services had been automatically terminated when he ran for an elective
position.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC, ABS-CBN filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA
CA
REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.
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Declared Ymbong resigned from employment and not to have been illegally
dismissed.
ruled that ABS-CBN is ESTOPPED from claiming that Ymbong was not its
employee after applying the provisions of the Policy. It noted that the guidelines
contained in the Policy specifically pertain to EMPLOYEES and did not even
mention TALENTS or INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. By applying the subject
company policy on Ymbong, ABS-CBN had explicitly recognized him to be
an employee and not merely an independent contractor.
that the subject company policy is the controlling guideline and that there is
no illegal dismissal to speak of in the instant case as Ymbong is
considered resigned when he ran for an elective post pursuant to the
subject company policy.
Luzon had no authority to issue a memorandum that had the effect of repealing
or superseding a subsisting policy.
ISSUES
(1) whether the subject Company Policy is valid; - YES
(2) whether Ymbong, by seeking an elective post, is deemed to have resigned and not
dismissed by ABS-CBN. YES
HELD
1. Policy No. HR-ER-016 is valid.
This is not the first time that this Court has dealt with a policy similar to Policy No. HR-ER016. In the case of Manila Broadcasting Company v. NLRC, this Court ruled:
What is involved in this case is an unwritten company policy
considering any employee who files a certificate of candidacy for any elective
or local office as resigned from the company.
Although 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not require mass media commentators
and announcers such as private respondent to resign from their radio or TV
stations but only to go on leave for the duration of the campaign period, we think
that the company may nevertheless validly require them to resign as a matter of
policy.
Working for the government and the company at the same time is clearly
disadvantageous and prejudicial to the rights and interest not only of the
company but the public as well. In the event an employee wins in an
election, he cannot fully serve, as he is expected to do, the interest of his
employer. The employee has to serve two (2) employers, obviously
detrimental to the interest of both the government and the private
employer.
In the event the employee loses in the election, the impartiality and cold
neutrality of an employee as broadcast personality is suspect, thus readily
eroding and adversely affecting the confidence and trust of the listening
public to employers station.
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As Policy No. HR-ER-016 (subject policy) is the subsisting company policy and not Luzons
March 25, 1998 Memorandum, Ymbong is deemed resigned when he ran for councilor.
Since there was no termination to speak of, the requirement of due process in dismissal
cases cannot be applied to Ymbong.
Thus, ABS-CBN is not duty-bound to ask him to explain why he did not tender his
resignation before he ran for public office as mandated by the subject company policy.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.
7. PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) -versus- THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, AND JANDELEON JUEZAN. [G.R. No. 179652, MARCH
6,2012]
FACTS:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal
diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and
Philhealth. The DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of
petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. Hence, there is an employer-employee
ralationship. When the matter was brought before the CA it was held DOLE Secretary had
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jurisdiction over the matter.The case was elevated to the Supreme Court which found that
there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent. It
was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and
enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. From this Decision, the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of
Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
ISSUE:
WON DOLE has jurisdiction to determine the employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
No. If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions
of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is
an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional
Director that there was an employer-employee relationship has been subjected to review by
this Court, with the finding being that there was no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent
presented self-serving allegations as well as self-defeating evidence. The findings of the
Regional Director were not based on substantial evidence, and private respondent failed to
prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction
over the case, as there was no employer-employee relationship present.
8. BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), petitioner VS FLY ACE CORP, FLORDELYN
CASTILLO, respondents [G.R. No. 192558, February 15, 2012]
FACTS
On May 23, 2008, Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for UNDERPAYMENT OF
SALARIES and OTHER LABOR STANDARD BENEFITS.
He alleged:
o
that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various
tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned
items before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he
would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante;
Reporting for work from Monday to Saturday from 7AM 5PM.
o that during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips
by the company;
o that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter
the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Ruben
Ong (Mr. Ong), his superior,
o that after several minutes of begging to the guard to allow him to enter, he saw
Ong whom he approached and asked why he was being barred from entering the
premises to which Ong replied by saying, Tanungin mo anak mo;
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that he discovered Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn, who tried to talk
to Ong and convince him to spare her father from trouble but he refused to
accede;
that thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without
notice; and was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his
dismissal from work.
To support his allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who
alleged that Javier was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace from September 2007 to
January 2008. The said affidavit was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries.
Sometime in December 2007, Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra
helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of 300.00 per trip, which was later
increased to 325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times
only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services,
was not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of
Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no
illegal dismissal. Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling
Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his
contracted services bearing the words, daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay) and the
latters signatures/initials.
LABOR ARBITER
On November 28, 2008, the LA DISMISSED the complaint for lack of merit on the
ground that Javier failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of
Fly Ace.
o His contention that Respondent failed to give him said ID and payslips implies
that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace considering that
complainant was a helper and that Respondent company has contracted a regular
trucking for the delivery of its products.
o Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation
and sales of groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we
give credence to Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on pakiao
basis.
o As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the
Respondents showing salaries of workers on pakiao basis has
evidentiary weight because although the signature of the complainant
appearing thereon are not uniform, they appeared to be his true signature.
NLRC
On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the
argument of Javier and immediately concluded that he was not a regular
employee simply because he failed to present proof. It was of the view that
a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employeremployee relationship.
Finding Javier to be a regular employee, the NLRC ruled that he was entitled to a
security of tenure. For failing to present proof of a valid cause for his termination,
Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal of Javier who was likewise
entitled to backwages (45,770.83) and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
(8,450.00).
CA
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On March 18, 2010, the CA ANNULLED the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a
former employee of Fly Ace and REINSTATED the dismissal of Javiers complaint as
ordered by the LA.
In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can
prosper, an EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP must first be established. it is
incumbent upon private respondent to prove the employee-employer relationship by
substantial evidence.
It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence,
that he is an employee of petitioners, but he failed to discharge his burden.
The non-issuance of a company-issued identification card to private respondent supports
petitioners contention that private respondent was NOT its employee.
Further, it found that Javiers work was NOT necessary and desirable to the
business or trade of the company, as it was only when there were scheduled
deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would contract
the services of Javier as an extra helper. Lastly, the CA declared that the facts alleged by
Javier did not pass the control test.
It must be noted that the issue of Javiers alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the
existence of an EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP between him and Fly Ace. This is
essentially a question of fact.
Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions. However, when
there is conflict among the factual findings of the antecedent deciding bodies
like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, "it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity
jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the
records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings." In dealing with
factual issues in labor cases, "substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient."
As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of employment with Fly
Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10,
Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation of the
rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not
mean a complete dispensation of proof.
In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the ONUS PROBANDI falls on petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto. Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he
was made to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning
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grocery items for delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to fortify his
claim. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful
in strengthening Javiers cause. The Court cannot ignore the inescapable conclusion
that his mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving employment therein. The
supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered Javiers claim of being tasked to
clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was
offered in this subject simply because the witness had no personal knowledge of
Javiers employment
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the wellsettled tests to determine the existence of an EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP, viz:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees conduct not only as to the result of the work
but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
(most important)
In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in
his case.
Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a
stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented
documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on a pakyaw basis per the
acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for
Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to
ignore the documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery."
Considering the above findings, the Court does not see the necessity to
resolve the second issue presented.
The Courts decision does not contradict the settled rule that "payment by the piece is
just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the
relation." Payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment.
"The term wage is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or
earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on
a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact
that the petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship.
However, in determining whether the relationship is that of employer and
employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined
on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for the
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less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
9. RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. TOMAQUIN, Petitioners VS. PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent [G.R. NO. 185251, OCTOBER 2, 2009]
FACTS:
On November 1, 1990, respondent PLDT and the Security and Safety Corporation of the
Philippines (SSCP) entered into a Security Services Agreement whereby the latter would
provide armed security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices. Pursuant
thereto, petitioners Locsin and Tomaquin, among other security guards, were posted at a
PLDT office.
PLDT terminated the Agreement effective October 1, 2001. However, despite such
termination, petitioners continued to secure the premises of their assigned office and were
allegedly directed to remain at their post by PLDT representatives. In support of their
contention, petitioners provided the Labor Arbiter with copies of Locsins pay slips. On
September 30, 2002, petitioners services were terminated. Thus, petitioners filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims such
as overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave
pay, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance, and moral and exemplary damages against PLDT.
LABOR ARBITER
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding PLDT liable for illegal dismissal and ordered to
pay petitioners separation pay and back wages. Petitioners were found to be employees of
PLDT and not of SSCP through the factual finding that petitioners continued to serve as
guards of PLDTs offices.
NLRC
PLDT appealed the above Decision to the NLRC which rendered a Resolution affirming in
toto the Arbiters Decision. Thus, PDLT filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs
Resolution which was also denied.
CA
PLDT filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA asking for the nullification of the Resolution
issued by the NLRC as well as the Labor Arbiters Decision. The CA rendered the assailed
decision granting PLDTs petition and dismissing petitioners complaint. The CA applied the
four-fold test in order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties but did not find such relationship. It determined that SSCP was not a
labor-only contractor and was an independent contractor having substantial capital to
operate and conduct its own business. The CA further bolstered its decision by citing the
Agreement whereby it was stipulated that there shall be no employer-employee relationship
between the security guards and PLDT.
From such assailed decision, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in the assailed resolution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners extended services to PLDT from the effectivity of the termination
constitutes an employer-employee relationship between respondent and the complainants.
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HELD:
YES. An Employer-Employee Relationship Existed Between the Parties. Rule 131, Section 3(y)
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
In the ordinary course of things, responsible business owners or managers would not allow
security guards of an agency with whom the owners or managers have severed ties with to
continue to stay within the business premises, because upon the termination of the owners
or managers agreement with the security agency, the agencys undertaking of liability for
any damage that the security guard would cause has already been terminated.
With the conclusion that respondent directed petitioners to remain at their posts and
continue with their duties, it is clear that respondent exercised the power of control over
them; thus, the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such power of control has
been explained as the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to
be used in reaching such end, and control is the most important element in the
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In Pacific Consultants
International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld, the Court set out the four elements such relationship:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power
of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employees conduct.
Thus, the Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No. 18-2002, Series of 2002,
implementing Art. 106 as follows:
Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting.Labor-only contracting is hereby
declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement
where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform
a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present:
xxx
(ii) the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of
the contractual employee.
The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (C) of the
Labor Code, as amended. xxx
The right to control shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of
the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but
also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.
Evidently, PLDT having the power of control over petitioners must be considered as
petitioners employer from the termination of the Agreement onwards as this was the only
time that any evidence of control was exhibited by respondent over petitioners. Thus,
petitioners were entitled to the rights and benefits of employees of PLDT, including due
process requirements in the termination of their services. Respondent is guilty of illegal
dismissal.
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ISSUE
Whether or not Petitioner Sonza is an employee of the Respondent ABS-CBN.
RULING:
The Court answered in the negative.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals which in turn sustained the
ruling of the NLRC andwhich in turn sustained the Labor Arbiters decision to dismiss the
case because of lack of Jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter found that there exist no employeeemployer relationship between Petitioner and Respondent.
The Petitioner is clearly an independent contractor. The employee-employer relationship is
between Sonza and MJMDC, and not ABSCBN. MJMDC acted as the agent of Sonza between
him and ABSCBN.
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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1983 and 1984, San Mig entered into contracts for merchandising
services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly
licensed by the DOLE. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the
workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them
were to be deemed employees or agents of San Mig.
There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its
workers, on the one hand, and San Mig on the other.
Petitioner is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of San Mig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement
effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1989. Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides
that "temporary, probationary, or contractemployees and workers are excluded from the
bargaining unit and,therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement."
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In a letter dated 20 November 1988, the Union advised San Mig that some Lipercon
and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of
their employment with SMC. The Union alleged that this group of employees, while
appearing to be contractual workers supposedly independent contractors, have been
continuously working for San Mig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that
their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of San Mig. Thus, it was contended that there
exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It was then demanded that the employment
status of these workers be regularized.
On 12 January 1989 and 30 January 1989, the Union filed two notices of strike for
unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting. Conciliatory meetings were then
held before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of DOLE (NCMB-DOLE).
Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by
Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a
verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before respondent Court enjoining petitioner
from representingand/or acting in behalf of the employees of Lipercon and DRite, and of
calling a strike among others.
Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order, and subsequently, an Order granting the complaint of SanMig.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a labor dispute such that the RTC may notvalidly assume
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NCMB-DOLE.
HELD:
A "LABOR DISPUTE" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions ofemployment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating,fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the
terms and conditions ofemployment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximaterelation of employer and employee."
While it is San Mig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between
itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other,
a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relationship ofemployer and employee" provided the controversy concerns,
among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement"
thereof.
Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not determined by
the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist here is evident.
What the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon
and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter
definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig.
Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are
thus involved bringingthe matter within the purview of a labor dispute.
Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union
membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining.
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SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employeremployee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the
terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of
negotiating the conditions ofemployment are also involved.
Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor
dispute already taken cognizanceof by the NCMB-DOLE. As the case is indisputably linked
with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs tothe labor tribunals.
13. BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNIT MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, [G.R. No. L-48645, JANUARY 7, 1987]
FACTS
Unrebutted evidence and testimony on record establish that the petitioners are workers who
have been employed at the San Miguel Parola Glass Factory since 1961, averaging about
seven (7) years of service at the time of their termination.
They worked as cargadores or pahinantes at the SMC Plant loading, unloading, piling or
palleting empty bottles and wooden shells to and from company trucks and warehouses. At
times, they accompanied the company trucks on their delivery routes.
On their part, respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
the complainants are not and have never been employees of respondent company but
employees of the independent contractor; that respondent company has never had control
over the means and methods followed by the independent contractor who enjoyed full
authority to hire and control said employees; and that the individual complainants are
barred by estoppel from asserting that they are employees of respondent company.
The petitioners strongly argue that there exists an employer-employee relationship between
them and the respondent company and that they were dismissed for unionism, an act
constituting unfair labor practice for which respondents must be made to answer.
Work in the glass factory was neither regular nor continuous, depending wholly on the
volume of bottles manufactured to be loaded and unloaded, as well as the business activity
of the company. Work did not necessarily mean a full eight (8) hour day for the petitioners.
However, work, at times, exceeded the eight (8) hour day and necessitated work on Sundays
and holidays. For this, they were neither paid overtime nor compensation for work on
Sundays and holidays.
Sometime in January, 1969, the petitioner workers - numbering one hundred and forty (140)
organized and affiliated themselves with the petitioner union and engaged in union
activities. Believing themselves entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners pressed
management, airing other grievances such as being paid below the minimum wage law,
inhuman treatment, being forced to borrow at usurious rates of interest and to buy raffle
tickets, coerced by withholding their salaries, and salary deductions made without their
consent. However, their gripes and grievances were not heeded by the respondents.
On February 20, 1969, all the petitioners were dismissed from their jobs and, thereafter,
denied entrance to respondent companys glass factory despite their regularly reporting for
work. A complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice was filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitionersmembers of the Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines (BLUM) and
respondent San Miguel Corporation.
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HELD:
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
(d) the employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods
by which the work is to be accomplished.
It is the so-called control test that is the most important element (Investment Planning
Corp. of the Phils. vs. The Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924; Mafinco Trading Corp. vs.
Ople, supra, and Rosario Brothers, Inc. vs. Ople, 131 SCRA 72).
Applying the above criteria, the evidence strongly indicates the existence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner workers and respondent San Miguel Corporation.
The respondent asserts that the petitioners are employees of the Guaranteed Labor
Contractor, an independent labor contracting firm.
Uncontroverted is the fact that for an average of seven (7) years, each of the petitioners had
worked continuously and exclusively for the respondent companys shipping and
warehousing department. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked
with the respondent company, there is justification to conclude that they were engaged to
perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the respondent,
and the petitioners are, therefore regular employees (Phil. Fishing Boat Officers and
Engineers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 112 SCRA 159 and RJL Martinez Fishing
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 454).
Despite past shutdowns of the glass plant for repairs, the petitioners, thereafter, promptly
returned to their jobs, never having been replaced, or assigned elsewhere until the present
controversy arose. The term of the petitioners employment appears indefinite. The
continuity and habituality of petitioners work bolsters their claim of employee status vis-avis respondent company.
We find that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither substantial capital nor
investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The premises, tools,
equipment and paraphernalia used by the petitioners in their jobs are admittedly all supplied
by respondent company. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors
supply, suggesting the existence of a labor-only contracting scheme prohibited by law
(Article 106, 109 of the Labor Code; Section 9(b), Rule VIII, Book III, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code).
In fact, even the alleged contractors office, which consists of a space at respondent
companys warehouse, table, chair, typewriter and cabinet, are provided for by respondent
SMC. It is therefore clear that the alleged contractors have no capital outlay involved in the
conduct of its business, in the maintenance thereof or in the payment of its workers
salaries.
The payment of the workers wages is a critical factor in determining the actuality of an
employer-employee relationship whether between respondent company and petitioners or
between the alleged independent contractor and petitioners. It is important to emphasize
that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship, the fees are paid directly to
the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implying that the basis of such
lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers assigned to the
company.
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The San Miguel Corporation is hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioners, with three (3) years
backwages. However, where reinstatement is no longer possible, the respondent SMC is
ordered to pay the petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year
of service.
14. CITY BANK v COURT OF APEALS [G.R. No. 108961. November 27, 1998]
FACTS:
In 1983, Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. (hereafter El Toro) entered into
a contract for the latter to provide security and protective services to safeguard and
protect the bank's premises, situated at 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila.
Citibank renewed the security contract with El Toro yearly until 1990. On April 22, 1990, the
contract between Citibank and El Toro expired.
On June 7, 1990, respondent Citibank Integrated Guards Labor Alliance-SEGATUPAS/FSM (hereafter CIGLA) filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a request for preventive mediation citing Citibank as respondent therein giving
as issues for preventive mediation the following:
a) Unfair labor practice;
b) Dismissal of union officers/members; and
c) Union busting.
On June 10, 1990, petitioner Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the bank would
not renew anymore the service agreement with the latter. Simultaneously, Citibank hired
another security agency, the Golden Pyramid Security Agency.
On the same date, respondent CIGLA manifested with the NCMB that it was
converting its request for preventive mediation into a notice of strike for failure of
the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues.
Security guards formerly assigned to Citibank under the expired agreement loitered around
and near the Citibank premises in large groups of from twenty (20) and at times fifty (50)
persons. On June 14, 1990, respondent CIGLA filed a notice of strike directed at the
premises of the Citibank main office.
Faced with the prospect of disruption of its business operations, on June 5, 1990, petitioner
Citibank filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for injunction and
damages against respondent CIGLA.
On June 18, 1990, respondent CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
complaint. The motion alleged that:
a) The Court had no jurisdiction, this being labor dispute.
b) The guards were employees of the bank.
c) There were pending cases/labor disputes between the guards and the bank at
the different agencies of DOLE.
d) The bank was guilty of forum shopping.
Trial court denied respondent CIGLA's motion to dismiss Jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaints. In the plaintiff's complaint there are
allegations, which negate any employer-employee relationship between it and the CIGLA
members.
Respondent CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
above-mentioned order. On October 1, 1990, the trial court denied the motion.
Respondent CIGLA filed with the trial court its answer to the complaint, and
averred as special and affirmative defense lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject
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matter of the case. Treating the averment as motion to dismiss, the lower court issued an
order denying the motion.
On May 24, 1991, respondent CIGLA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the proceedings had
before the regional trial court.
After due proceedings, on March 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision in respondent CIGLA's favor.
On April 29, 1992, petitioner Citibank filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. On February 12, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint filed by Citibank with the trial court. (Answer: RTC)
2. Whether there is a labor dispute between Citibank and the security guards, members
of respondent CIGLA. (Answer: THERE IS NO LABOR DISPUTE.)
HELD:
1. The Labor Arbiter (labor tribunal) has no jurisdiction over a claim filed
where no employer-employee relationship existed between a company and
the security guards assigned to it by a security service contractor. In this
case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the
watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency that was answerable to
Citibank for the conduct of its guards.
This Court has held in many cases that "in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship, the following elements are generally considered:
1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
2) the payment of wages;
3) the power of dismissal; and
4) the employer's power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the workis to be
accomplished".
It is a basic rule of procedure that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
On the basis of the allegations of the complaint, it is safe to conclude that the
dispute involved is a civil one, not a labor dispute. Consequently, we rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint lies with the
regional trial court.
2. Article 212, paragraph l of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "LABOR
DISPUTE". It "includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
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If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one
regarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is
a civil dispute. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer-employee
relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union
in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's premises and
property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against
the bank.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari.
Decision of the Court of Appeal REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
15. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GODOFREDO CABLING, respondents. [G.R.
No. 120567. March 20, 1998]
FACTS
Private respondents (Ferdinand Pineda and Godofredo Cabling) are flight stewards of the
petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3,
1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
One person in the name of Joseph Abaca was intercepted at the airport carrying a bag
containing 2.5 million pesos who allegedly found said plastic bag at the Skybed section of
arrival flight PR300/03 where private respondents served as flight attendants. After having
been implicated by Abaca in the incident before the respondents disciplinary board, it is
was Abaca himself who gave exculpating statements to the same board and declared that
the private respondents were not the owners of the said currencies. that just as petitioners
thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received
any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary
Board, that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any
summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary
Board, they were surprised to find out that they were terminated by PAL.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction
praying that:
"I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting
respondents (petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22,
1995, or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;
"II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent
to reinstate petitioners to their former positions pending the hearing of this case, or,
prohibiting respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February 22,1995 while this case is
pending adjudication;
"III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made
permanent, that petitioners be awarded full backwages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00
each and exemplary damages of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percent of whatever amount is awarded, and the costs of suit."
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The NLRC issued the writ of injunction. PAL moved for reconsideration on the ground that
has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only
under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes and
thereby divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal
dismissal cases.
ISSUE: W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion on issuing the writ of injunction
HELD: Yes.
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC"(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which,
if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any
party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:
"Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.-A preliminary injunction or a restraining
order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on
the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving
or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained
or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ
originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which
application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."
The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers
and employees."
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for
illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for:
reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary
damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor
arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1)
Unfair
labor
practice;
(2)
Termination
disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer- employee relations;
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(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement.
The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both
original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take cognizance of, hear
and decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory
arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code.
In short, the
jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it
cannot entertain the private respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the
dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket
authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that
Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an
ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes.
16. CHARLITO PEARANDA, Petitioner, vs. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and
HUDSON CHUA, Respondents. [G.R. No. 159577, May 3, 2006]
Ponente: Panganiban, C.J.
FACTS:
May 2001:Pearanda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC.
The parties failed to settle amicably. They alleged the following before the Labor Arbiter:
Pearanda
1) He was employed by respondent on March 15, 1999 with a monthly salary
of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally
terminated on December 19, 2000.
2) His services were terminated without due process and valid grounds in
accordance with law.
3) He was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working duringholidays/rest
days, night shift differentials and claims for payment of damages and attorneys
fees (having been forced to litigate the complaint).
BPC
1) Complainants separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor
Code.
2) BPC was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance. It applied
for clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No.
XI to shut down and to dismiss employees.
Due to complainants insistence, he was paid his separation benefits.
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When BPC partially reopened in January 2001, Pearanda failed to reapply. Hence,
he was not terminated from employment, much less illegally. He severed
employment when he insisted on payment of his separation benefits.
Furthermore, being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay. If
he ever rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, there was no office
order/or authorization for him to do so.
3) The claim for damages has no legal and factual basis, and the instant complaint
must necessarily fail for lack of merit.
Labor Arbiters Ruling:
There was no illegal dismissal.
Petitioners Complaint was premature, because he was still employed by BPC. The
temporary closure of BPCs plant did not terminate his employment. Hence, he need
not reapply when the plant reopened.
Petitioners money claims for illegal dismissal was weakened by his quitclaim and
admission during the clarificatory conference that he accepted separation benefits,
sick and vacation leave conversions and thirteenth month pay.
Petitioner was entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and
attorneys fees in the total amount of P21,257.98.
NLRCs Ruling (May 8 and August 16, 2002):
Respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, which deleted the award of overtime pay and
premium pay for working on rest days. According to the Commission, petitioner was not
entitled to these awards, because he was a managerial employee.
CAs Ruling:
In its Resolution dated January 27, 2003, the CA dismissed Pearandas Petition for
Certiorari, because he failed to:
1) Attach copies of the pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter and NLRC; and
2) Explain why the filing and service of the Petition was not done by personal
service.
In its Resolution dated July 4, 2003, the CA denied reconsideration on the ground that
petitioner still failed to submit the pleadings filed before the NLRC.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it entertained the respondents appeal despite the lapse of the
mandatory period ten-day period? (NOT LABOR-RELATED ISSUE)
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed RESOLUTIONS REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE
the Labor Arbitersfindings that Pearanda was:
A regular, common employee entitled to monetary benefits under Art. 82 of the Labor
Code, and
Entitled to the payment of OVERTIME PAY and OTHER MONETARY BENEFITS?
HELD:
ISSUE #1:(NOT LABOR-RELATED ISSUE)NO.
Under the Rule VI, Sec. 1 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, an appeal from
the decision of the labor arbiter should be filed within 10 days from receipt
thereof.The parties alleging non-compliance with such rule have the burden of
substantiating their allegations.
Petitioners claim that respondents filed their appeal beyond the required period was
not substantiated.
1) He failed to indicate when respondents received the labor arbiters Decision.
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He supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler (i.e. oversaw the
operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering
section). This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent
judgment. As supervisor, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff.
Even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated
that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term
foreman implies that he was the representative of management over the workers
and the operation of the department.
Petitioners evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant.
His classification as supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was
paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondents 354 employees who were paid on a
monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.
The Court finds no justification to award overtime pay and premium pay for rest days to
petitioner.
Petition denied with costs against petitioner.
17. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS
JERRY VICTORIO-Union President, Petitioner, vs.CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 169717, March 16, 2011]
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
18. JUMUAD V. HI-FLYER FOOD, INC [G.R. No. 187887 September 7, 2011]
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
1. Jumuad was Area Manager in KFC Gaisano Mall, Cebu City (KFC-Gaisano); in
Cocomall, Cebu City (KFC-Cocomall); and in Island City Mall, Bohol (KFC-Bohol).
2. Hi Flyer conducted a food safety, service and sanitation audit at KFC-Gaisano.
Several sanitation violations were found, such as presence of rodents and a defective
chiller used for food storage.
3. Hi-Flyer audited the accounts of KFC-Bohol. It was discovered that there was, 1) cash
shortage amounting to 62,290.85; 2) delay in the deposits of cash sales by an
average of three days; 3) the presence of two sealed cash-for-deposit envelopes
containing paper cut-outs instead of cash; 4) falsified entries in the deposit logbook;
5) lapses in inventory control; and 6) material product spoilage.
4. In KFC-Cocomall branch, grout and leaks at the branchs kitchen wall, dried up spills
from the marinator, as well as a live rat under postmix, and signs of rodent
gnawing/infestation were found.
5. Hi-Flyer served Jumuad a Notice of Dismissal.
6. Jumuad filed a Complaint against Hi-Flyer and/or Jesus R. Montemayor for ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL before the NLRC on October 17, 2005, praying for reinstatement and
payment of separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
7. The LA (Labor Arbiter) ruled that Jumuad was illegally dismissed. No serious cause for
termination existed.
8. Jumuad appealed to the NLRC. He faulted the LA for not awarding backwages and
damages despite its finding that she was illegally dismissed.
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9. Hi-Flyer and Montemayor also appealed to the NLRC. Assailed the finding thatJumuad
was illegally dismissed.
10. The NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision. Dismissal of Jumuad was too harsh. Even
before the Irregularities Report and Notice of Charges to Jumuad, e-mails between
Montemayor and officers of Hi-Flyer showed that Hi-Flyer was already determined to
terminate Jumuad. Proof that Jumuad was denied due process considering that no
matter how she would refute the charges hurled against her, the decision of Hi-Flyer
to terminate her would not change.
11. Both Jumuad and Hi-Flyer sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision but their
motions were denied.
12. Hi-Flyer appealed the case before the CA in Cebu City. Alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.
13. CA reversed the decision of the labor tribunal. Requirements of substantive and
procedural due process were complied with. Jumuad had an opportunity to be heard
when she submitted her written explanation and then, when she was informed of the
decision and the basis of her termination.
The e-mails did not equate to a predetermination of Jumuads termination. The e-mail
exchanges were mere discussions between Montemayor and other officers of Hi-Flyer
on whether grounds for disciplinary action or termination existed. The e-mails just
showed that Hi-Flyer extensively deliberated the nature and cause of the charges
against Jumuad.
The unacceptable sanitary conditions and the cash shortages at 3 of the 7 KFC
branches supervised by Jumuad are enough bases for Hi-Flyer to lose its trust and
confidence in her.
14. Hence, Jumuad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: W/N Jumuad was illegally dismissed.
HELD: No. Art. 282. Termination by Employer. An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
To warrant removal from service for gross and habitual neglect of duty, it must be shown
that the negligence should not merely be gross, but also habitual. In breach of trust and
confidence, so long as it is shown there is some basis for management to lose its trust and
confidence and that the dismissal was not used as an occasion for abuse. In this case,
Jumuad willfully breached her duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of HiFlyer.Jumuad was a managerial employee. Jumuad executed management policies
and had the power to discipline the employees of KFC. Article 212 (m) of the
Labor Code defines a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
The reports show that there were anomalies committed in the branches Jumuad managed.
On the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad
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may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not
have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but she also did not
perform her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day operations of the branches and
ensure that all the facilities and equipment were properly maintained and serviced which
could have prevented the anomalies.Rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the
anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the restaurant
business where the health and well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not
suffice.
Based on established facts, the mere existence of the grounds for the loss of trust and
confidence justifies petitioners dismissal.Hi-Flyer exercised in good faith its management
prerogative as there is no dispute that it has lost trust and confidence in her and her
managerial abilities, to its damage and prejudice. Her dismissal, was therefore, justified.
The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation to
workers, observance of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination
of employment. On the other hand, the law also recognizes the right of the employer to
expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also
good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such
persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to its interests.
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