[G.R. No. 103670.

July 10, 1998]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EFREN MANABO and IRENEO
SORIANO, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversing the Labor Arbiters dismissal of private respondents complaints and awarding them separation pay upon the finding that they were regular, not
project employees, who were illegally terminated by petitioner.
Private respondents Efren Manabo and Ireneo Soriano, for about seven and nine years respectively, had been employees of petitioner, a government-owned
and controlled corporation engaged in the business of general construction, both in the Philippines and overseas. On July 19, 1985 private respondents filed
separate complaints against petitioner charging illegal dismissal and claiming separation pay.[1]
Petitioner hired Efren Manabo as a laborer on July 10, 1976 at the petitioners MSEX/Carmona Project, where he was paid P1.35 pesos per hour. On October
11, 1977 he was transferred to the companys international operation in Najran, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia working initially as shovel raker and eventually as asphalt
distributor, for which he was compensated$1.90 per hour. Upon completion of the project, he was repatriated to the Philippines on August 7, 1983. However, after his
return to the Philippines, he was not given any assignment for which reason he claims that he was illegally dismissed. [2]
Ireneo Soriano was hired by petitioner on November 26, 1975 as lead mechanic with the petitioners equipment and management department with a salary
of P4.50 pesos per hour. On August 19, 1981, he was transferred to petitioners international operation in Najran, KSA project, where he also served as a lead
mechanic with a salary of $2.20 per hour. On June 6, 1984, upon completion of the project, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Soriano claimed that petitioner
failed to assign him to any local project upon his arrival in the Philippines which was, according to him, tantamount to his separation from employment. [3]
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that private respondents were project employees; that they were hired for specific projects and their tenure was fixed for
the duration of the project; and it was the termination of the project that ended their employment. Therefore, they are not entitled to any separation pay pursuant to
the provisions of Policy Instruction No. 20.[4]
On June 26, 1990, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for lack of merit declaring private respondents project employees of petitioner. Private
respondents appealed.
In a decision dated January 13, 1992 respondent NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter after finding private respondents to be regular, not project employees, of
the petitioner and therefore entitled to separation pay:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated June 26, 1990 is hereby reversed and respondent Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(now Philippine National Construction Corporation) is hereby ordered to pay as his separation pay to Efren Manabo, the amount of SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED NINETY TWO AND 80/100 PESOS (P74,692.80); and similarly to Ireneo Soriano, the sum of ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED NINETY SIX AND 80/100 PESOS (P111,196.80).[5]
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration stating that it was not aware of the appeal interposed by private respondents, as it was not furnished a copy
of private respondents memorandum of appeal. Instead, petitioner directly filed this petition for certiorari.
We find the petition meritorious.
Petitioner claims that respondent NLRC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained the instant appeal when the same is null and void. In this regard,
the Solicitor General recommends that the NLRC decision be set aside on the ground that petitioner was denied due process and that further proceedings be held to
afford petitioner the opportunity to participate therein.[6]

After a careful examination of the records, the Court fully agrees with the Solicitor Generals view that the proceedings before the NLRC were tainted with due
process violation. It appears that petitioner was not a participant in the appeal interposed by private respondents. Apparently, such non-participation was never
petitioners choice as the record is bereft of any indication that petitioner was ever informed or notified of private respondents appeal. There is no proof that petitioner
was furnished a copy of private respondents Memorandum of Appeal, nor was it required to comment thereon. No reference is made whatsoever in the NLRC
Decision to any argument, position or comment raised by petitioner in response to the appeal. That petitioner was denied due process is well-substantiated.
The NLRCs grave omission to afford petitioner a chance to be heard on appeal is a clear violation of its constitutional right and has the effect of rendering its
judgment null and void.[7]
It is a cardinal rule in law that a decision or judgment is fatally defective if rendered in violation of a party-litigants right to due process.
Petitioners non-filing of a motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs decision is understandable considering that it was deprived of due process. The Court has
ruled that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with prior to commencement of an action for certiorari where the decision is a patent nullity[8] or where
petitioner was deprived of due process.[9]
It must be pointed out though, that the fault lies with the NLRC and not with private respondents. While the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC require proof
of service on the other party of the appeal (Rule VI, Sec. 3[a]), non-compliance thereof will present no obstacle to the perfection of the appeal nor does it amount to a
jurisdictional defect to the NLRCs taking cognizance thereof. [10] However, while the law excuses private respondents from notifying the other party of their appeal, no
reason can be given by the NLRC that would exempt it from informing the latter of the appeal and giving it an opportunity to be heard. Such an omission is of the
gravest nature and cannot be sanctioned for whatever reason by the Court.
The right of due process is fundamental in our legal system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons of convenience or merely to comply with technical
formalities but because of a strong conviction that every man must have his day in court. As the Solicitor General stated, in a society that professes belief in the
presumptive innocence of persons and human actions, it is only proper that condemnation be preceded by a fair and impartial hearing where the parties are equally
afforded the opportunity to present their respective positions on the matter at issue.
In its most basic sense, the right to due process is simply that every man is accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [11] Its very concept contemplates
freedom from arbitrariness, as what it requires is fairness or justice.[12] It abhors all attempts to make an accusation synonymous with liability.[13]
While the intendment of our laws is to favor the employee, it in no way implies that the employer is not entitled to due process. For a tribunal such as the NLRC
to wantonly disregard the employers constitutional right to be heard is a matter that causes great concern to the Court. Such an action can only result in public
mistrust of our entire legal system, and we strongly remind the NLRC of their duty to uphold and inspire confidence in the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is hereby REMANDED to the NLRC for further proceedings to afford petitioner
the opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, the NLRC is hereby strongly reminded that all proceedings before it must satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999]

CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR.,
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CITY
TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC, ZAMBALES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The constitutional right to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to
businesses and residents within the secured area of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such fencedin territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the

same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection
clause.
The Case

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision [1] promulgated on August 29, 1996,
and Resolution[2] dated November 13, 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 37788. [3] The challenged Decision upheld the constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. 97-A
(EO 97-A), according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business
enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts

On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes. Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges, as follows:
SEC. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. -- Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang
bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and
the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of
Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a
proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its
resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around
the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within,
into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be
subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone
shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their
population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and
enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic,
and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor
of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic
Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign
banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;

(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her
spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall
have the freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign
executives and other aliens possessing highly technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of
Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof;
(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own security and fire-fighting forces; and
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall
be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives thus:
Section 1. On Import Taxes and Duties -- Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business
enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to
taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws.
The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under
relevant Philippine laws.
Section 2. On All Other Taxes. -- In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay
the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege
was operative, viz.:
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ
[Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone].Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw
materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of
raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual
taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein
On October 26, 1994, the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection
of the laws. In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, this Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
Incidentally, on February 1, 1995, Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special
Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent Court held that there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the Secured Area is
precise and well-defined as xxx the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, xxx. The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners
could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the secured area and not to include the entire
Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law. It relied on the following deliberations in the Senate:
Senator Paterno. Thank you, Mr. President. My first question is the extent of the economic zone. Since this will be a free port, in effect, I believe that it is
important to delineate or make sure that the delineation will be quite precise[. M]y question is: Is it the intention that the entire of Olongapo City, the Municipality of
Subic and the Municipality of Dinalupihan will be covered by the special economic zone or only portions thereof?

Senator Shahani. Only portions, Mr. President. In other words, where the actual operations of the free port will take place.
Senator Paterno. I see. So, we should say, COVERING THE DESIGNATED PORTIONS OR CERTAIN PORTIONS OF OLONGAPO CITY, SUBIC AND
DINALUPIHAN to make it clear that it is not supposed to cover the entire area of all of these territories.
Senator Shahani. So, the Gentleman is proposing that the words CERTAIN AREAS ...
The President. The Chair would want to invite the attention of the Sponsor and Senator Paterno to letter C, which says: THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO PROCLAIM, DELINEATE AND SPECIFY THE METES AND BOUNDS OF OTHER SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
WHICH MAY BE CREATED IN THE CLARK MILITARY RESERVATIONS AND ITS EXTENSIONS.
Probably, this provision can be expanded since, apparently, the intention is that what is referred to in Olongapo as Metro Olongapo is not by itself ipso jure
already a special economic zone.
Senator Paterno. That is correct.
The President. Someone, some authority must declare which portions of the same shall be the economic zone. Is it the intention of the author that it is the
President of the Philippines who will make such delineation?
Senator Shahani. Yes, Mr. President.
The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its avowed
purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest. It ruled that EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227].
Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.

The Issue

Petitioners submit the following issue for the resolution of the Court:
[W]hether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Specifically the issue is whether the provisions of Executive Order
No. 97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not. [4]
The Courts Ruling

The petition[5] is bereft of merit.

Main Issue: The Constitutionality of EO 97-A

Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the
area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the
entire zone would apply to the present fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from
enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection
guarantee.
On the other hand, the solicitor general defends, on behalf of respondents, the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the
President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.
We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it
discriminatory. Rather, we find real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby
justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. [6] The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. [7] Explaining the nature of the equal protection guarantee, the Court in
Ichong v. Hernandez[8] said:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[9]
We first determine the purpose of the law. From the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations
into productive uses. Obviously, the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement are its object. Thus, the law avows this policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Station and Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps, and to apply said funds as provided herein
for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America, as amended.
To undertake the above objectives, the same law created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, some of whose relevant defined purposes are:
(b) To adopt, prepare and implement a comprehensive and detailed development plan embodying a list of projects including but not limited to those provided in the
Legislative-Executive Bases Council (LEBC) framework plan for the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions
consistent with ecological and environmental standards, into other productive uses to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular
and the country in general;
(c) To encourage the active participation of the private sector in transforming the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into other productive uses;
Further, in creating the SSEZ, the law declared it a policy to develop the zone into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center. [10]
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military
bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage
investors, both local and foreign. Among such enticements are:[11] (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured
income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of
resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers.
We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this
specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for big
investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the
Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes,
The intent of a statute is the law.[12]
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area
and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand,
definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities
outside the secured area are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the
benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the secured area, which is already fenced off, to prevent fraudulent
importation of merchandise or smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. [13] As long as there are actual and material differences
between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can
always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to
establish a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such
investment center and the areas outside it.

Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the secured area. The residents, being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and
in obligations required.
All told, the Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or
unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y.
PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner
Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura
Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the
incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without having participated as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing said
complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani `Arthur Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with
Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law.[1]
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B.
Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo
Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case
transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by
private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:

1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani `Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to
the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the
State Prosecutors Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual trial is held after
all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother,
who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and live normally
once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the
State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information has not been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases,
whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form, against
members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer"[2]
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become
moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not
aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who
had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.

On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus
incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not
fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna to the
City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle
Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume
Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the opposition of the public
prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the
Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution." [3]
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC
Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to
abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion
without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's]
desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in
his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The
proceedings forthwith went on.Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. [4] According to Alonte, however, Judge
Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. [5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her
parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive
testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to
desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii)that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance,
and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of
desistance and their consent to their daughters decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the
affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and
voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same
date, stated that the State interposed no objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting
of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it
proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.

The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a
Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge
Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying him
of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the
scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the
decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel
would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, for which each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to forty (40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered without any further
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam" for"Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC
Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition forcertiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A)
without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of
the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule
120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and
existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayans and Balbins) which
were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in
violation of petitioners right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without
conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous
precedent where heinous offenses can result in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the same result). [8]
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having been rendered
without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation of the petitioners right to due process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the
case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to
a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only as an
accomplice in the information.[9]

The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court
could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of
the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that "The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the
contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they
rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough for their
purposes. They left everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the private complainant."[10]
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was
merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit
of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had
not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone
to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that "x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused
requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.

"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or
defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by
one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.[15]
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that "Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an
intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and
truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The
rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." [16] Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. [17] The Solicitor General has
aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; [18] (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor
have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; [19] and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification
in the order of trial.[20] There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process,
rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully
avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The
Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint
against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case
of People vs. Junio,[21] should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her mother supported the `inherent incredibility of
prosecutions evidence is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having accused-appellant
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then
repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing
De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce and
withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant
what she had said during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in
prosecuting the case against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit
of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my fathers desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is
subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus
hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessies affidavit. He testified
that accused-appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.

In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had
made a retraction, this circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants
his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be
given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165
SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court correctly ruled.[24]
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is
not precluded from invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative
value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be, [Third par. of
Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal action. [People
vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to
which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case.And, affiant did not appear to be serious in `signifying (her) intention to
refrain from testifying since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it
was dated `April 1992, it was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quoon 6 April 1992, perhaps
dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the case.[26]
In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states "Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit
the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes." the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case
may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the
dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage
between the offended and the offended party."[28]
In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in
which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which is in question reads:'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in
any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: 'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed
to be remitted.' These provisions of the old Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the
same. The Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its provisions which were
not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for

adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to
be effective - circumstances which do not concur in this case."[30]
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this
Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan[31]could again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the
fairness and integrity of the Judge.[32] It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his
client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. [33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many
times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that (a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal
Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE;
accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance.
The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions
which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage.
Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually

engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the
nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged
in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of
the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue
involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between
police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be
clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or
scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent
of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is
the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse
of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title
indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from
engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops
and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes
into existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and
standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of
capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing
forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the
vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer,
therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day
existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns
and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away
nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It
is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and
forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he
heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the
nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he
has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar,
flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his
control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in
another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so
many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration.
The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the
fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the

nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as
witness the following tables:

Assets

Year
Nationality

and

Retailers No.Establishments

Gross Sales

Pesos

Per
cent
Pesos
Distribution

Per
cent
Distribution

1941:

Filipino ..........

106,671

200,323,138

55.82

174,181,924

51.74

Chinese ...........

15,356

118,348,692

32.98

148,813,239

44.21

Others ............

1,646

40,187,090

11.20

13,630,239

4.05

Filipino ..........

111,107

208,658,946

65.05

279,583,333

57.03

Chinese ...........

13,774

106,156,218

33.56

205,701,134

41.96

Others ...........

354

8,761,260

.49

4,927,168

1.01

Filipino ..........

113,631

213,342,264

67.30

467,161,667

60.51

Chinese ..........

12,087

93,155,459

29.38

294,894,227

38.20

Others ..........

422

10,514,675

3.32

9,995,402

1.29

Filipino ..........

113,659

213,451,602

60.89

462,532,901

53.47

1947:

1948:

(Census)

1949:

Chinese ..........

16,248

125,223,336

35.72

392,414,875

45.36

Others ..........

486

12,056,365

3.39

10,078,364

1.17

Filipino .........

119,352

224,053,620

61.09

466,058,052

53.07

Chinese ..........

17,429

134,325,303

36.60

404,481,384

46.06

Others ..........

347

8,614,025

2.31

7,645,327

87

1951:

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is
necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course,
that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average
between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks
that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino
retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization
would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution
categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not
been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that
the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain,
political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the
control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the
government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic
freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized
movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in
the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the
dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the
Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control
but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance
may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and
even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete
subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at
their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them
sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail
trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a
general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial
scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming
public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic
Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control
prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their
demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out
of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in
corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling
about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the
big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups
of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in
the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency.
While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but
the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has
unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out
above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the
country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his
living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that
the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the
legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes
to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The
alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their
utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices,
manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for
the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative
classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the
prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as
it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative
and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is
purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in
various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in
issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the
United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The
legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We
held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I,
as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The
act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place
them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade;
and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give
the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her
American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves
into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along
the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a
license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the
legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question
this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the
traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance
of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited,
but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of
permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local
conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to
the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public
interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright
vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have
different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law
prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens
does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power
over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for
the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the
theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law
which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was
no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid
ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of
racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United
States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other
local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the
Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of
something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent
in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for
the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47
A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation
to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard
for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor
the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and
instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the
reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our
own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural
and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control
have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they
as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have
said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the
classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

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So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test
used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to
individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
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. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a
particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not
constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety,
morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of
happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments
overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so
engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic
peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the
nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future
of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have
heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am.
Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose
into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon
our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no
profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood.
While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of
our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive
if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles
of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that
seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom
from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and
power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly

made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared
the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to
promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the
conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its
natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would
have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt
a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty
bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes
the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case,
attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire
into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of
any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul
the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against
the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase
because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown;
that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the
bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of
Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the
law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the
presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City
of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the
sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of
getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with
the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such
meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs.
Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead
of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the

scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes,
under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it
cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It
cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights
and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of
the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from
engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that
the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the
more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.

Case Digest : Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1.
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
2.
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3.
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4.
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit
of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the
State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of
crisis and emergency.