A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr.

Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a

511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime
of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall
continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of
Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the
said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply
with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the
land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to
the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence,
since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will
left by Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The near descendants
being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised
property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr.
Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny
Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the

decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear
therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His
failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate
of Aleja.

Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna
Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio
be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted
in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right
ofrepresentation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already
meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea
misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of
the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not

apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a

third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio
on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife
continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.
They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that
her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among
others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with LapuzSy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before
the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her
counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition
was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code
and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights
do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and
there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.