AFIADO vs.

COMELEC
[G.R. No. 141787. September 18, 2000]

Facts:
Election and proclamation of Miranda as Mayor of Santiago City was annulled after the
Supreme Court denied with finality his petition so duly-elected Vice-Mayor Navarro
became the new Mayor by virtue of the law of succession.
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) was constituted to remove the Vice Mayor because
they lost their confidence. It then passed and adopted PRA Resolution No.1 for the recall
of Vice-Mayor Navarro.
Issue:
Whether or not an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be
the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution
which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor.

Held:
An elective official who became city mayor by legal succession cannot be the subject of
a recall election by virtue of a PRA Resolution adopted when the elective official was still
vice-mayor.
The intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to remove the petitioner as
Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as
such. To recall, then, the petitioner when she is already the incumbent City Mayor is to
deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Having, thus, succeeded to the position of
City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of the effects of the PRA
Resolution.
Moreover, Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that
"No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election."
The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of Santiago City on
October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October 11,
2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding
the next regular election in May 2001.

COLUMBRES vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 142038. September 18, 2000]
Facts:
After canvassing, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private
respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr for the position of Mayor as against petitioner,
Rolando Columbres. Petitioner contested 42 precincts and prayed for the
revision of ballots in the said precincts.
Trial court rendered its decision, declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor
but was reversed by the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied and affirmed the decision of the Second Division.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially so in
matters of appreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a
Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
2. Whether or not, in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked,
absent any evidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were
placed by a third person, and therefore, should not invalidate the ballot.
Held:
1. No.
The Court ruled that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in
declaring that the COMELEC Division's findings on the contested ballots are
findings of facts "that may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration".
"Section 1. Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration
may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to
law."
"When protestant/appellee argued that the appreciation of the Division is
erroneous, there is the implication that such finding or ruling is contrary to law
and thus, may be a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration."
To determine the winning candidate, the application of election law and
jurisprudence in appreciating the contested ballots, is essential. Any question on
the appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the declared winner. As the Solicitor General submits in his comment
on the petition, any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
assailed decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper subject
of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
2. Petitioner is correct that there is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal
presumption is that the sanctity of the ballot has been protected and preserved.
Where the ballot, however, shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in the
writing of the names of some candidates from the rest, the ballot is void for
having been written by two hands. A ballot appearing to have been written by two
persons is presumed to have been cast "as is" during the voting, and this

presumption can only be overcome by showing that the ballot was tampered with
after it was deposited in the ballot box.
It should have given a close scrutiny of the questioned ballots and determined for
itself their validity, i.e., whether they were marked ballots or not. There is truly a
need to actually examine the questioned ballots in order to ascertain the real
nature of the alleged markings thereon. One has to see the writings to be able to
determine whether they were written by different persons, and whether they were
intended to identify the ballot.

DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC

( G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20,2001 )

Facts:
Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position
in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo. During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought
the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to
alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts
during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners objections
and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering
more votes than the petitioner.
The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal
filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly
proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for
quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with
COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and
motion declare void petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent
Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo
warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled
the petitioner Dumayas proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent
Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor
of the Municipality.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election
returns of the contested precincts?
Held:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the
petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his
watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that
the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to
be regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election
irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence
which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in
nature.
Petitioner barely alleged that the preparation of said returns was attended by
threats, duress, intimidation or coercion without offering any proof.

Francis King vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127318 August 25, 1999)
Facts:
Francis King L. Marquez and Liberty Santos ran as candidates for the position of
SK Chairman.Marquez garnered the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed SK Chairman on election day, May 6, 1996. Private respondent filed
an election protest before the Metropolitan Trial Court, impugned the election of
petitioner (then protestee) on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to
the office of SK Chairman.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Marquez is eligible or qualified to assume the office of SK
Chairman such that private respondent's right of action is a quo warranto
proceeding.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely erred in holding that the MTC has
jurisdiction to hear and decide disqualification case, by reason of age in
relation to the SK election.
Held:
1. SC held that Commission on Elections correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City over private respondent's petition for
quo warranto. In the disquisition of respondent Commission on Elections which is
noteworthy according to SC, it states that:
We are in accord with the trial court's interpretation that cases involving the eligibility or
qualification of candidates refer to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not
cover those that are filed after the election of SK candidates. The disqualification case
having been filed after the election and proclamation of the winning candidate, the
governing law therefore is second paragraph of Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
which confers upon the respondent court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
disqualification case filed against Marquez. Corollarily, while Sec. 49 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824 speaks of finality of the proclamation of the winning SK candidates,
it does not prevent the herein respondent court from exercising original jurisdiction in the
event an election protest is filed which in our opinion includes matters which could be
raised in a quo warranto proceedings against a proclaimed SK candidate.

2. The contention of herein petitioner that public respondent, COMELEC acted

with grave abuse of discretion when he assumed jurisdiction over the
disqualification proceedings has no legal and factual basis considering that the
election protest which, admittedly, is in the nature of a disqualification proceeding
sought to be dismissed, was filed after the SK election, within the reglemenfary
period of ten (10) days after proclamation of the results of the election, and duly
filed by virtue of the inaction of the election officer of Muntinlupa.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
************************************************************************************
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Petition for Quo Warranto Any voter contesting the election of any
municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty

to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Regional Trial Court or Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of
the election.
Sec. 49 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824:
Finality of Proclamation The proclamation of the winning candidates
shall be final. However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial
Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have
original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be
final. The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a
petition for review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance
with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall
be required, which shall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious.

GO vs. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 147741. May 10, 2001]

Facts:
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy
for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted
to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should
file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her
certificate of candidacy for mayor.
At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel
time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her
affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter
submitted the same to the office of the lection officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28
a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of
Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.
Respondents Montejo and Antoni filed a petition to disqualify the petitioner on the
ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that
for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her
ineligible for both.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc declared the petitioners
disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte,
because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal
of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes
from the deadline.
Issues:
1. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both
positions?
2. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
Held:

The Court GRANTS the petition.

1. The Courts annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified

for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law.

"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- XXXNo person shall be eligible for more
than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy
may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and
cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal
must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved
belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, requires that the withdrawal be
filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was
filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is
not mandatory or jurisdictional.
Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively
withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she
filed certificates of candidacy.
2. "Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
"x x x x. "Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily
after due notice. petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law. The
Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not
give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a
comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of
candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was
not even aware of the proceedings
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation
of the Law Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law.
The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.

MALABAGUIO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 142507. December 1, 2000]
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay in May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. Private respondent was
proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay. Dissatisfied with the results of
the canvass, petitioner filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner-protestant prayed for the revision of the ballots and other election
documents in all the fifteen (15) precincts of Barangay 172. Malabagiuo filed a
petition on the ground that the respondent Comelec gravely abused its discretion
in invalidating fifty seven (57) ballots cast in favor of him which do not bear the
signature of the chairman of the BEIs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Fifty-seven (57) ballots cast in favor of petitioner-protestant
which do not bear the signatures of the chairmen of the board of election
inspectors should be counted in his favor.
Held:
Yes.
Second paragraph of Section 43 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically refers
to such official ballots. These such official ballots referred to in the second
paragraph are the ones required by law to be authenticated, the failure to so
authenticate it renders them invalid. These ballots are the official barangay
ballots provided by the city or municipality concerned. Hence, only those official
barangay ballots provided by the city of municipality concerned that requires
authentication.
In the 1997 Barangay elections, the ballots were not provided by the local
government unit themselves. It was this Commission that furnished and provided
the official barangay ballots during the 1997 Barangay Elections and these
ballots were printed with security markings. During the examination of these
markings, the fifty seven (57) ballots reveal the presence of the security
markings. Although the COMELEC General Instructions (Resolution No. 2888)
requires the chairman of the board to authenticate the ballots, the same does not
provide for the invalidation of the ballot in the event that the board failed to so
authenticate it. Instead, their failure was only considered as an election offense.
It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply the aforequoted legal provisions in this
case and rule that these unsigned ballots are spurious.
Consequently, the absence of the Chairmens signature at the back of the ballot
should not be a reason to invalidate these fifty-seven (57) ballots which are
genuine. Hence, all votes indicated in these ballots must be counted in
favor of protestant-appellee ALFREDO U. MALABAGUIO because the intent
of the voters to vote for him is crystal.
Commissioner Gorospe, thus, suggests that, rather than disenfranchise the
voter for the act or omission committed by a poll officer at the precinct, (R.A.
7166) accords full respect to the voters constitutional right of suffrage.

Mamba Perez vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999
Facts:

Private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed
in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the
ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately
before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondent's certificates of candidacy for
governor of Cagayan and his voter registration record in all of which it is stated that he is a
resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third
District of Cagayan.
Private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990,
he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment in order to hide
his mistress from public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was still
subsisting. In addition, private respondent presented the contract of lease of another
residential apartment, the marriage certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma
Dumaguit, the birth certificate of their daughter, various letters, all of which show that he had
been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998
elections.
Issue:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually
pass upon private respondent's eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of
private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner's action. In the same vein,
considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent
was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private
respondent's ineligibility.
In any event, even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve the instant petition for
certiorari, we find no merit in petitioner's allegation that private respondent is ineligible for the
office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. There is substantial evidence
supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of
Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.
Moreover, petitioners contention that the private respondent was a resident of Gattaran is
without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he
is not domiciled in another district. The Court held that the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost
his residence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Miranda vs. Abaya

(G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999)
Facts:
Private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. He
prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio
because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was
supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course. After the
Comelec dismissed the said petition, petitioner sought Supreme Court's intercession via
a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled
the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was allowed to substitute for disqualified the candidate Jose "Pempe"
Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of discretion for the
Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the winning candidate in the
May 11, 1998 election.
Issue:
1. Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued
without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
1. The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the
annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. On the matter of jurisdiction,
there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Comelec.
The Court finds that the Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation
of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been
disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled
under Section 78 of the Code.
2. Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in
favor of private respondent.
The result in the dispositive portion of the resolution pertaining to the issues involved in
SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G.
Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed
error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed
in the present petition for certiorari.
While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of
its jurisdiction when it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in
which was by then already final, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec also
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private respondent's motion for
reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G. Miranda.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to
ANNUL the election and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is,
however, hereby GRANTED so as to MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No.
98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene
and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11,
1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining
order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED.

NAVARRO vs. CA
[G.R. No. 141307. March 28, 2001]
Facts:
The elected mayor of the Municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan died. A vacancy was
thus created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, Section 44 of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, then Vice-Mayor
Baltazar Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, the highest ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, i.e. the one who garnered the highest number of votes, was
elevated to the position of the Vice-Mayor, pursuant to the same law. This was petitioned
by Danny B. Tamayo who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of petitioner
Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor, Governor Victor Agbayani appointed herein
petitioner Purto J. Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Navarro belonged to
the same political party as that of petitioner Tamayo.
Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it was the former vicemayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in
the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the
Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor's political
party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.
Petitioners, contended that pursuant to Section 45, (b) of RA 7160, the person to be
appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party
affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor
Agbayani to petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the
REFORMA-LM, is valid.
Thus, a petition was filed by the petitioners which granted the petition for certiorari filed
by herein respondents and declared as null and void the appointment of herein petitioner
Purto J. Navarro.
Issue:
WON the appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro is null and void.
Held:
The appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of Mapandan,
Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and legal.
Rationale:
Sec. 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. XXX(b) Except for the
sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the
sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position
next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party
as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the
unexpired term of the vacant office
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position
of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with
someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LM's representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the
Sanggunian Bayan of Mapandan, Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and legal.

Ong vs. COMELEC

[G. R. No. 144197. December 13, 2000]
Facts:
Petitioner William P. Ong and respondent Isagani B. Rizon were candidates for the
position of mayor of the municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte during the May 11, 1998
local elections. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed William P. Ong as the
winner with a margin of fifty-one (51) votes. Respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Lanao del Norte an election protest contesting petitioners votes in five (5)
clustered precincts. Only the ballot boxes for two (2) precincts were opened since
respondent waived the revision of the ballots in the other precincts. , The Comelec en
banc promulgated a resolution affirming the Second Divisions resolution but reduced by
one (1) vote the lead of respondent over petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the Comelec en banc resolution, aside from being patently
illegal, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. On the whole, the petition disputed the sixty one (61) invalidated ballots of
petitioner and seven (7) ballots of respondent.
A thorough evaluation and visual examination of the contested ballots reveal the
following findings:
In Exhibits A, C, N and OO of Precinct 8A, slot No. 1 for senators contained the
name NIKKI and all the other spaces for senators were left blank. The name NIKKI
was written in print and the rest were written in script.
In the same manner, in Exhibit C and II, the name NORMAN was written on slot No.
1 for senators. In Exhibit UU of Precinct 28A/28A1 contained the name SINA was
written on the slot No. 1 for senators. In Exhibit B, the vote for Ong was in bold letters
while the rests were written in different strokes.
Comelec invalidated all the above described ballots for being marked and written by two
persons.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC is right in their decision for invalidating the below described ballots.
Held:
1. the Court constrained to reverse the Comelec finding that Exhibits Y and XX were
valid for Ong. Considering that there was no candidate for senator with the name
PACETE or PACITE, such writings served to identify the ballots. The ballots are,
therefore, invalid for Ong.
2. The term None that I know written on the space for party list does not render the
ballot marked. The term simply implies that the voter did not know any candidate or did
not wish to vote for any candidate to the position
3. The words ANG TINGOG NG BARANGAY and PARE KO, respectively, were
written, are valid. The phrases were mere appellations of affection and friendship that
do not invalidate the whole ballot.
4. where the names of the candidates for councilors were repeated in the first four lines
for Senators do not render the ballot marked. The Comelec was correct in upholding the
validity of the ballot since it was obviously shown by the penmanship that the voter was
unlettered and that there was no intention to identify the ballot.

5. Erasures would not invalidate the ballot absent any showing that another person
wrote the name of Ong after the erasure was made. In fact, the rules on appreciation of
ballots provide that:
When in a space in the ballot there appears a name of candidate that is erased and
another clearly written, the vote is valid for the latter.
6. Incorrect spelling of a candidates name does not invalidate the ballot. Even the most
literate person is bound to commit a mistake in spelling.
7. where X-MEN was written on the space for party-list representative would not
invalidate the whole ballot. The word X-MEN invalidates the vote for the party list
representative but the ballot itself is valid.
8. where the name LITO in big bold letters occupies all the spaces for councilor should
be invalidated inasmuch as there is evident intent to mark the ballot.
9. where TIRBOG is written on the space for governor is not a marked ballot. Absent
any showing that the word/name TIRBOG meant to identify the ballot or the voter, the
ballot remains valid.
10. The numbers were written after the names of some candidates and the word CRIS
appears on the first slot for senators, respectively. The voter obviously did not have the
intention to mark the ballot.
11. with initial DLR on it is invalid. The initial DLR serves no other purpose than to
mark the ballot as it is unnecessary, impertinent and irrelevant.
The law is clear:
Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter to
serve as identification marks, comma, dots, lines, or hyphens between the first name
and surname of a candidate, or in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter T, J,
and other similar ones, the first letters or syllables of names which the voter does not
continue, the use of two or more kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental
flourishes, strokes or strains, shall not invalidate the ballot.
Consequently, candidate William P. Ong won by a margin of twelve (12) votes.
The Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated August 15, 2000
of the Commission on Elections en banc declaring respondent Isagani B. Rizon as the
winner in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Victoriano Salcedo vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 135886 August 16, 1999)
Facts:
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage is evidenced by a certified true
copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar. Without his first
marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita
Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage
with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of
the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran
for the position of mayor. However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking
the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo."
Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because
she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as
the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
Issue:
Whether the use of such surname constitutes a material misrepresentation under section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy.
Held:
The Court hold that it does not.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.

Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondent's qualifications to run

for the office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in
the use of the surname "Salcedo," petitioner does not claim that private respondent
lacks the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary
to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Thus,
petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the misrepresentation
allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains to a
material matter.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a
surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not
within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of
Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent.
In upholding the validity of private respondent's certificate of candidacy, the Court
reiterate that "the sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our
nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a
democratic voice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in

finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy
dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number
of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications
however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution
that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our
democratic institutions."31 Since there appears to be no dispute as to private
respondent's qualifications to hold the office of municipal mayor, the will of the electorate
must prevail.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission
on Elections, denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.

VILLAROSA vs. HRET

[G.R. No. 143351. September 14, 2000]
Facts:
Petitioner VILLAROSA and Private respondent QUINTOS were the only
candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May 1998 synchronized national and local
elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the
winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes.
QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of
the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental
Mindoro. Petitioner is the wife of JOSE T. VILLAROSA, who was Representative
of the District in question for two terms, the last of which ended on June 30,
1998; in his certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995, JOSE T.
VILLAROSA wrote as his nickname or stage name: JOE-JTV. In her certificate
of candidacy, Protestee wrote JTV as her nickname/stage name.
Issue:
WON public respondent HRET did commit any abuse of discretion in holding that
the only issue for its determination was whether JTV votes or variations thereof
should be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray
votes
Held:

No.

Rule 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code:

14. Any vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which does not
sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall be considered as a
stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
Under this rule three kinds of votes are considered stray: (1) a vote containing
initials only, (2) a vote which is illegible, and (3) a vote which does not sufficiently
identify the candidate for whom it is intended. The only error of the HRET is its
ruling that if the votes are in initials only, they are to be considered stray votes if
they do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom the votes are intended.
The first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third
category in the sense that votes in initials only may be counted for a candidate
provided that the initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such
construction of the rule fails to give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction OR
separating the first category from the second, and the second from the third.
Furthermore, since votes for GIRLIE written in the space for Representative
were in fact claimed by VILLAROSA and credited in her favor, under the idem
sonans rule, cannot be counted for VILLAROSA because only one nickname or
stage name is allowed. From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of
VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy and campaign
materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the
incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to
succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is
essential in preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua
propia. No one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
The petitions in these cases are DISMISSED for lack of merit.