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Getting Heidegger Off

the West Coast
Carleton B. Christensen
Published online: 06 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: Carleton B. Christensen (1998): Getting Heidegger

Off the West Coast, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy,
41:1, 65-87
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Inquiry, 41, 6587

Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast

Carleton B. Christensen

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Australian National University

According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Heidegger s central innovation is his rejection of

the idea that intentional activity and directedness is always and only a matter of
having representational mental states. This paper examines the central passages to
which Dreyfus appeals in order to motivate this claim. It shows that Dreyfus
misconstrues these passages significantly and that he has no grounds for reading
Heidegger as anticipating contemporary anti-representationalism in the philosophy of
mind. The misunderstanding derives from lack of sensitivity to Heidegger s own
intellectual context. The otherwise laudable strategy of reading Heidegger as a
philosopher of mind becomes an exercise in finding a niche for Heidegger in
Dreyfus s own unquestioned present. Heidegger is thereby mapped on to an
intellectual context which, given its naturalistic commitments, is foreign to him. The
paper concludes by indicating the direction in which a more historically sensitive,
and thus accurate, interpretation of Heidegger must move.

In the last twenty to twenty-five years, interest in the though t of Martin

Heidegger has burgeoned. This is in large part due to Hubert L . Dreyfus s
influential interpretation. Dreyfus s general interpretative strategy is to read
Heidegger as, first and foremost, a genuin ely theoretical philosopher with
im portant thing s to say in opposition to the dominant subject/object model of
cognition and action. He develops this general idea into a fairly detailed
interpretation of Heidegger which sits well with contemporary naturalist
sensibilities, at least if these sensibilities are sufficiently laid-back and nonreductive to assuage fears of crude scientism. In this way, almost singlehandedly, he has secured for Heidegger a certain respectability even in
quarters by nature and tradition hostile to such ostensibly obscurantist,
`unscientific philoso phy.
As Dreyfus reads him, Heidegger s central achievement lies in his anticipating contemporary anti-representationalist critiques of representational
theories of mind. Heidegger s prime innovat ion and novelty is to challenge
the subject/object model of mind which has dominated philosophy and
psychology from Descartes throug h Husserl to the present. The subject/
object model construes the knowing and acting `self as a `subject which is
always related intentionally to the world via `representations of `objects .
Heidegger, according to Dreyfus, rejects this: `Heidegger accepts intentional
directedness as essential to human activity, but he denies that [all]
intentionality is mental, that it is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed,
the distingu ishing characteristic of mental states (pp. 50 51; original

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Carleton B. Christensen

emphasis). In other words, while Heidegger concedes that intentionality is

essential to being a `subject or `self , he rejects the traditional idea that it is
always and only a feature of the standard folk-psychological states and
experiences. Intentionality is not always and only what Dreyfus calls
representational intentionality, i.e. the being in, or having of, the standard
folk-psychological intentional states and experiences (pp. 72 74). W hile `we
sometimes experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects by
way of intentional states such as desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc.
(p. 5), Dreyfus s Heidegger also insists that our actually relating to objects
by way of such standard folk-psychological states and experiences is `a
derivative and intermittent condition (p. 5). Only when our normal,
everyday dealings with familiar thing s become problem atic, or break down
completely do psychological states and experiences with any kind of mental
or representational content arise (p. 76). Speaking both for himself and for
Heidegger, Dreyfus insists that when breakdow n occurs and `I start to
deliberate, I do not just notice m ental states that were already there; I start to
have [such mental states as] beliefs and desires (p. 78). Representational
intentionality itself, whether cognitive or volitiv e, theoretical or practical, is
thus indeed an intermittent condition founded in `a more fundamental sort of
intentionality (p. 49) which Heidegger calls `being-in or `being-amidst
(pp. 44 46). In general, Heidegger maintains that `all relations of mental
states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things
which does not involv e mental activity (p. 52). This more basic form of
being-with-things is an intentional, but quite non-representational skilful
engagement with everyday thing s what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping .
Such skilful coping with everyday thing s only takes place against a
background familiarity with organized wholes of such things, e.g. rooms,
offices, and public places furnished in their typical ways. Dreyfus claims at
least at one place that such background familiarity is what Heidegger m eans
`being-in-the-world (pp. 102 4).
Now the thesis that in everyday skilful engagement with familiar things no
`representations , i.e. no standard folk-psychologic al states or experiences,
are necessarily involve d is rather counterintuit ive, at least when taken
literally. Surely, when I am routinely hammering away, I do see that or how
the nail is going as it should , nam ely, straight, as I intend. Surely, I quite
literally perceive, come the appropriate mom ent, that the nail has been
hammered in as required, so that it is time to stop ham mering. So is Dreyfus
right in attributing the above-m entioned thesis to Heidegg er? Does
Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping with everyday things
there is no representational intentionality, in the quite radical sense that all,
or indeed even most, of the above everyday description s are false? There are
tw o ways to approach this question. One can look to the sources and ask if
the passages Dreyfus adduces as evidence for his interpretation really say

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Getting Heidegger Off the W est Coast

67

what he claims they say. Or one can attempt to draw an alternative overall
picture of Heidegger from which it follows that Heidegger does not say,
perhaps even contradicts, what Dreyfus puts into his mouth. (I have outlined
such an alternative picture in Christensen [1997] .) Althoug h both approaches
are essential for any truly com prehensive critique of Dreyfus s interpretation,
it is clear that they cannot both be undertaken in one paper. Here I concentrate exclusively on the first. Specifically, I examine the most im portant
passages to which Dreyfus appeals to see whether they really say what
Dreyfus claims they do. Having shown that this is not so, I give some further
reasons for rejecting any suggestion that Heidegger is saying the kinds of
thing Dreyfus attributes to him. Finally, I suggest the direction to be taken by
any attempt to develop a more accurate reading of Heidegger as a theoretical
philoso pher with im portant things to say on `mind , `intentionality , and the
like.

I. Dreyfus and Heidegger s Critique of the Traditional Doctrine of

Intentionality
Does Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping there is no
representational intentionality, even in a minimal, folk-psychological sense?
There are three central passages, all from GP, which, at least when taken out
of context, appear more than any others to give Dreyfus the evidence he
needs. I look at them in the order in which Dreyfus appeals to them.
Althoug h I shall be concentrating primarily on these three passages, I will
also occasionally consider passages from other Heidegger texts to which
Dreyfus appeals.
(i) The first passage is from 9 (b), S. 89 (Hofstadter, pp. 63 64). As cited
by Dreyfus (p. 51), it reads as follows:
T he usual concepti on of intentio nality . . . m isconstru es the structur e of the self directed ness-to ward, the intentio n. T his m isinterp retatio n lies in an erroneou s
subjectiv izin g of intentio nality . A n ego or subjec t is supposed , to whose so-calle d
sphere intentio nal experie nces are then suppose d to belong . . . T he idea of a subjec t
w hich has intentio nal experie nces m erely insid e its ow n spher e and is . . .
encapsul ated w ithin itself is an absurdit y which m isconstr ues the basi c ontolog ical
structur e of the bein g that we ourselve s are. (BP, 63 64, origina l em phasis) .

Dreyfus clearly regards this passage as amongst his best evidence for the
central claim that Heidegger is drawing attention to `a new kind of intentionality (absorbed coping ) which is not that of a mind with content directed
toward objects (p. 69). For this passage is adduced precisely in suppor t of
the claim that Heidegger is denyin g that, in all cases, intentionality `is . . .
the disting uishing characteristic of mental states (p. 51; original emphasis).

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Carleton B. Christensen

Even a cursory examination of this quotation within its larger context

shows that Heidegger is not claim ing anythin g like this. For if this passage
really were denyin g that all intentionality is representational, then it would
surely have to occur within a larger discussion in which Heidegger talks
precisely of `absorbed coping . After all, `absorbed coping is Dreyfus s only
example of non-representational intentionality and it is hard to see what else
could qualify as such. Yet through out his entire discussion in
9 (b)
Heidegger does not talk, even once, of our `unthinking (p. 94) skilful
engagement with familiar things, but exclusively of perception! Indeed,
Heidegger refers precisely to perception in what Dreyfus has om itted from
the first two sentences of his quotation. Quoted fully, these sentences read:
T he usual concept ion of intentio nality m isunders tand s that tow ard which in the
case of percepti on the perceivi ng directs itself . A ccording ly, it also m isconstru es
the structur e of the self-dir ectedness -tow ard, the intentio . T his m isinterpr etatio n lies
1
in an erroneou s subjecti vizing of intentio nality .

So whatever Heidegger is saying here, whatever the erroneous subjectivizing

is of which he speaks, it is an erroneous subjectivizing of perception. It
would, however, be absurd to say that, pace the tradition, perception is nonrepresentational unless, of course, one understands by `representation
something quite non-minim al, non-folk-psychological, non-Searlean and
non-Husserlian, namely, an entity quite literally in the mind which the mind
in some way manipulates, thereby achieving what is folk-psycholog ically
called perceiving an object. So already there is substantial evidence against
any claim that this passage underwrites the central contention of Dreyfus s
interpretation.
This becomes all the clearer when one investigates what Heidegger
actually means by the erroneous subjectivizing of perception. Heidegger
discusses this in 9 (b) of GP, S. 86 91. There it is introdu ced as the second
of two ways in which the notio n of intentionality has traditionally been
misinterpreted, the first being so to speak its complement, namely, erroneous
objectivizing, which apparently consists in treating intentionality as a
2
relation in a quite standard sense between a subject and an external object. It
is im portant to note how Heidegger opens his discussion of this second kind
of misinterpretation: he describes it as `a new kind of misinterpretation to
3
which non-ph enomenolog ical philoso phy almost universally falls victim .
Heidegger thus clearly associates the tendency to subjectivize intentionality
primarily with non-phenomenolog ical philosophy. So his very openin g
words indicate that he does not wish to accuse Husserl, or for that matter
Scheler, of erroneous subjectivizing. Yet it is essential to Dreyfus s
interpretation that Heidegger should regard Husserl just as guilty of
erroneous subjectivizing as either Descartes or, say, Brentano.

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Getting Heidegger Off the W est Coast

69

That Heidegger is thinking of neither Husserl nor Scheler becomes even

clearer in the course of his discussion. According to Heidegger, the tendency
to subjectivize intentionality arises when, as in erroneous objectivizing, one
persists in the na ve assumption that intentionality is some kind of relation in
the standard sense, yet unlik e the erroneous objectivizer, is sophisticated
enough to appreciate that intentional phenomena such as perceivings can be
in error. Appreciation of this possibility combines with the na vetecommon
to both erroneous objectivizing and erroneous subjectivizing to encourage
the though t that the bearer of intentionality is related to something purely
subjective, som ething which does not exist independently, but rather belong s
in a subjective, im manent sphere.
Intentio nal experie nces (E rlebnisse ), it is said , are qua item s w hich belon g to the
subjecti ve sphere , in them selves related only to what is itself im manent to this
sphere . P erceptio ns as som ethin g psychica l direct them selves towards sensation s,
m ental im ages, m em ory traces and deter mination s which are added by a sim ilarly
4
im m anen t thinkin g to what is in the rst instanc e subjecti vely given .

Given this characterization of erroneous subjectivizing, Heidegger would

perhaps regard Descartes, Locke, and Hum e as at least occasionally guilty of
it. Most likely, he has Brentano in m ind since it is a common, if arguably,
5
mistaken, interpretation of the early Brentano that he was led by the
possibility of error to regard the intentional object as in some way im manent
6
to the mind. It is clear, however, that Heidegger could not possibly have
Husserl in his sights. For Husserl explicitly attacks and ridicules the view
that intentional states and experiences are directed at anything `in the mind .
W hen in this very subsection Heidegger insists that `[t]hat towards which
7
perception . . . is directed is the perceived itself , he is using, and knows
himself to be using, a form of words derived from Husserl. With Husserl, and
by no means against him, Heidegger says:
In everyda y behavio r, say, in movin g aroun d this room, takin g a look aroun d my
environ m ent, I perceiv e the wall and the windo w. T o what am I directe d in this
percepti on? T o sensation s? Or, when I avoid what is perceiv ed, am I turnin g asid e
from represen tationa l images and takin g care not to fall out of these represen tationa l
8
im ages and sensation s into the courtya rd of the university building ?

In no way, then, does Heidegger count Husserl amongst the erroneous

subjectivizers. So whatever the critique of traditional conceptions of
intentionality Heidegger is giving here, it does not touch Husserl. It is
therefore mistaken to subsume Heidegger s critique of Husserl under this
critique of the tradition. Yet this is precisely what Dreyfus does, indeed must
do. If the erroneous subjectivizing m entioned in the passage he quotes in
suppor t of his interpretation really did consist in failure to appreciate that not

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70

Carleton B. Christensen

all intentionality is representational, then Husserl would indeed be guilty of

this offence, and Heidegger would indeed accuse him of it. It is clear,
however, that given what Heidegger means by erroneous subjectivizing,
neither of these two thing s is true. This passage is not directed against
Husserl, and thus not directed against any conception of intentionality
according to which all intentionality is representational in that minimal sense
to which Dreyfus himself, as he fully appreciates (p. 50), must appeal.
In fact, in this whole subsection, as in the account of intentionality he
gives in 5 of PGZ, Heidegger clearly sees himself as buildin g on Husserl s
account of intentionality. T his is shown by the following passage: speaking
of perceptual hallucination Heidegger says:
I can only ostensibl y or apparent ly (Verm eintlic h ) grasp som ethin g if I, as the subjec t
w hich grasps (als E rfassende r), inten d som ethin g at all. Only than can intendin g take
on the modi catio n of m erely ostensibl y or apparen tly intendin g. The intentio nal
relatio n does not arise rst throug h the actua l indepen dent presenc e of the objects ,
but rather lies in the perceivi ng itself, whether or not this perceivi ng be free of
illusio n or deluded . Perceivin g m ust be perceivi ng-of som ethin g in order for m e to be
9
able to be delude d about anythin g.

There is nothin g at all critical of Husserl in this, as the decidedly Husserlian

language shows. There is no reference here to a kind of intentionality which
is not a consciousness of something; indeed the only reference is to Husserl s
own favoured case of intentionality, namely, perception. Dreyfus says that
`(e)verythin g . . . turns on Heidegger s critique of Husserl s theory of
intentionality (p. 50), and in this he is certainly right. A correct interpretation of Heidegger s critique of Husserl s brand of phenomenolog y is
indeed the key to understanding Heidegger himself. To suggest, however, as
Dreyfus does, that the objections raised here to the traditional doctrine of
intentionality constitute even part of Heidegger s critique of Husserl
amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding both of these objections and
of this critique.
To fend off this criticism Dreyfus might appeal to a passage from another
lecture of Heidegger s, namely, M AL. As cited by Dreyfus (pp. 52 53), this
passage reads:
[Existence ] not only brings a modi catio n of the traditio nal concep t of consciou sness
and of m ind; the radica l form ulatio n of the intende d pheno menon in an ontolog y of
D asein leads to a funda mental, `univers al overco m ing of this position . From there
the previou s concep t of intentio nalit y prove s to be a restricte d concepti on . . .
Because of this restricti on, intentio nality is conceive d prim arily as `to take as [as
m eaning- giving] . . . . T hus every act of directin g onesel f toward som ethin g receive s
10
the character istic of knowing, for example, in Husserl.

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Getting Heidegger Off the W est Coast

71

Surely this passage shows that the traditional concept of consciousness and
intentionality which Heidegger is criticizing is one that he regards Husserl as
endorsing.
Once again, however, it is crucial to read the passage in its entirety, i.e.
without Dreyfus s substantial om issions, and in its context. Heidegger begins
by insisting with Husserl, aga inst all erroneous subjectivizing, that
intentional phenomena are related not to subjective entities in the subject s
im m anent sphere, but rather to the very entities they purpor t to relate to,
namely, ordinary things. He then says that intentional phenomena are not
themselves sufficient for such intentional relatedness; they are rather
founded in what he calls being-amidst entities, which is in turn grounded in
existence in Heidegger s special sense of this word. Heidegger then
continu es as follows:
W ith this, the lim its of the previou s interpre tation and functio n of the concep t of
intentio nality , as w ell as its funda mental signi cance, beco m e visible . T his concep t
not only bring s a m odi catio n of the traditio nal concep t of consciou sness and of
m ind; the radica l form ulatio n of the intende d phenom enon in an ontolog y of D asein
lead s to a fundam ental, `univer sal overco ming of this position . F rom the standpoi nt
of such an ontolog y, the previou s concep t of intentio nality proves to be a restricte d
concepti on insofa r as it takes intentio nality to be a com portin g tow ards present- athand entitie s (ein Verhalte n zu Vorhand enem ). This explain s why one is incline d to
regar d self-a warenes s (Selbsterf assun g ) as an internal ly directe d ontic intentio nality .
Further m ore, because of this restricti on, intentio nality is conceiv ed prim arily as `to
m ean (M einen ), w hereb y m eaning is underst ood as an indiffe rent characte r of
know ing. T hus every act of directin g onesel f tow ard som ethin g receive s the
characte risti c of kno wing, for example, in Husserl, who characte rizes the basic
structur e of all intentio nal comportin g as o
. In this w ay, all intentio nality is in
the rst instanc e a know ing intendin g, on which othe r m odes of com portin g to
entitie s are then built up. Scheler rst made clear, in particul ar in the essa y `L ove and
K nowledge , that these intentio nal com portm ents are quit e differen t and that love
and hate, for exam ple, actuall y found know ing. Schele r is appropr iatin g here m otifs
11
from Pasca l and A ugustine .

A crucial first step towards understanding what Heidegger is saying here

consists in appreciating that the subject of the second sentence in this
passage is not existence, as Dreyfus has it, but the concept of intentionality.
This correction puts a quite different spin on the entire passage. In the first
sentence Heidegger speaks amongst other thing s of the limitations of the
previous interpretation of intentionality and it is clear from the rest of the
passage that by this previous interpretation he means the account of
intentionality given by Husserl and his disciples. At the same tim e, it
becomes equally clear that in the next sentence, with which Dreyfus s
quotation begins, it is this Husserlian account of intentionality that is said to
have a fundamental critical significance for traditional notions of mind and
consciousness. Not existence, but Husserl s concept of intentionality brings a

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72

Carleton B. Christensen

modification of these traditional concepts! Indeed, it is the Husserlian

concept of intentionality which, when elaborated with sufficient radicality in
a Heideggerian ontolog y of Dasein, leads to an overcoming of these
traditional conceptions. So here Heidegger is siding with Husserl s concept
of intentionality against traditional notions of m ind and consciousness. Once
again we see that one must not subsume Heidegger s critique of Husserl
under his critique of the tradition.
But of course Heidegger is also criticizing Husserl in this passage. He says
that Husserl s concept of intentionality only leads to such an overcoming
when the phenomenon it intends is formulated radically, i.e. in Heideggerian
fashion. So according to Heidegger, Husserl s concept has, as it stands,
certain limitations which prevent it from realizing its full promise. W hat are
these limitations? The clue lies in the fact that, as the paragraph im mediately
preceding this passage makes quite clear, Heidegger is focused primarily on
perceptual intentionality. This focus on perception intimates what Heidegger
is getting at when he says, in criticism of Husserl, that Husserl s concept of
intentionality is restricted `insofar as it takes intentionality to be a
comportin g towards present-at-hand entities (ein Verhalten zu Vorhande nem ) . Dreyfus has omitted this crucial clause from his version of the
passage, just as he has failed to note Heidegger s focus on perception. He
thus obscures the fact that what Heidegger is alleging against Husserl is that
the latter conceives intentional content, in particular, the intentional content
of perception, in too restricted a way.
How so? Substantiating the following account of what Heidegger is
getting at here would require provid ing an alternative reading which cannot
be undertaken here (see Christensen, 1997) . The general point, however, is
that, as Heidegger sees things, Husserl conceives the objects of perception as
if they were `contextless or subject-indifferent, in the sense of being given
exclusively in ways which do not reflect or presuppose that the subject of
perception is currently engaged in some specific goal-directed activity, with
all the volition s (intentions and desires) and indeed affections (what
Heidegger calls one s Befindlichkeit) that this entails. Thus, this concept of
intentionality tends to exclude from perceptual content such subject-relative
properties and relations as `being too far away to grasp with one s hand ,
`being too hot to drink now or `stepping out in front of one dangerously
close, i.e. so closely that one cannot continu e with what one is currently
doing . Instead, it tends to construe intentional objects objectivistically, as if
they were given only under such `contextless and subject-indifferent
description s as `being approxim ately two metres away from one , `having a
temperature lying within a range high enough to cause painful sensations of
heat , or `stepping out in front of one between tw o to three metres away at
five to eight kilometres per hour .

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Getting Heidegger Off the W est Coast

73

In the middle of this passage, Heidegger begins to intimate what is

responsible for this restricted view of intentionality and its content.
Traditional, non-Husserlian notion s of consciousness and mind embraced
the metaphysical attitude. That is, they all assumed that theoretical activity is
the business of discovering what all phenomena `truly or `really are.
Consequently, they felt compelled to construe intentional relatedness to the
world as in principle explicable in terms of the `contextless , subjectindifferent entities, properties and relations of which theoretical activity
gives us knowledge. With this, however, the tradition has encumbered itself
with the falsely objectivizing picture of everyday perceptual content outlined
above. Relatedly, the tradition is now able to conceive cognition as if it were
a `faculty separable from the non-cognitiv e `faculties of volution and
affection. The tradition now takes a fateful step: on the basis of its restricted
view of perceptual content and perceiving it assumes that cognizing and
perceiving are the same across the board, whether one is talking about
whatever cognizing and perceiving goes on in theoretical activity or about
everyday cognition and perception. Everywhere cognition and perception are
as they are in theoretical activity, namely a disinterested, volitiv ely and
affectively uncond itioned notin g (M einen) of how thing s are to which all
volitio ns and affections are conting ent accretions.
Now Heidegger believes that Husserl, as much as he rejects the idea of
thing s as they `truly are, and a special discipline called metaphysics which
establishes that such and such a level of description gets at thing s as they
`really are, retains a residual allegiance to some consequences of the
metaphysical attitude underlying traditional notion s of mind and consciousness. In particular, because he retains the idea of perception as an intentional
relation to a subject-indifferent, present-at-hand entity (Vorhandenes), he
shares in the traditional prejudice that everyday cognizing and perceiving are
but unsystematic forms of theoretical cognizing and perceiving. So for
Husserl, too, all forms of cognition and perception, even the non-th eoretical
kinds, are disinterested, colourless noting s of how thing s are upon which all
volitio ns and affections are founded. This is why Husserl conceives
intentionality primarily as `meaning something , i.e. M einen `whereby
12
meaning is understood as an indifferent character of knowing . According
to Heidegger, the only significant thinker within the phenomenolog ical
tradition not to have succumbed to this residual prejudice is Max Scheler.
So what Heidegger is doing in this passage, first and foremost, is
criticizing the traditional conception of intentionality for a number of faults
only some of which are shared by Husserl. To do this is obvious ly not to
convict Husserl of endorsing the traditional conception itself. In fact, the
objection that Heidegger is voicing here against Husserl is that he retains a
residual allegiance to an aspect of the traditional conception of intentionality, even thoug h in other respects he has done so much to overcome it. That

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Carleton B. Christensen

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this is Heidegger s positio n is made quite clear in the basically similar

passages of 5 in PGZ. This section of Heidegger s lecture contains his most
detailed presentation of Husserl s theory of intentionality and phenomenology . And here, too, am idst a basically Husserl-inspired account of
intentionality, we find Heidegger registering a similar dissatisfaction with
the way Husserl takes knowing, indeed, theoretical knowing, as exemplary.
Speaking of Husserl, Heidegger says:
Intentio is underst ood in pheno menolog y also as the act of m eanin g [Verm einen ].
T here is a connecti on betw een m eanin g and the m eant, or noesis and noem a. No
m eans to perceiv e [vernehm en ] or com e to awareness , to apprehe nd sim ply, the
perceivi ng itself and the perceive d in the way it is perceive d. I refer to these term s
becaus e they constitu te not m erely a terminology , but also a certain interpre tation of
w hat it is to be directe d intentio nally at som ething . E very directed ness towards
something , fear , hope, love, has the characte r of directed ness which Husserl calls
noesis . Inasm uch as o
is take n from the spher e of theoreti cal kno wing, one give s
13
an accoun t of the practica l sphere as base d in the theoreti cal.

Note two thing s about this passage: first, it shows quite clearly what was said
above, namely, that what Heidegger objects to about Husserl s terminology
of noesis and noem a is that it reflects the traditional assumption that the
intentionality of everyday life can be best understood as an unsystematic
form of what goes on in theoretical activity. Heidegger thus does not reject
Husserl s terminology because it m isconstrues an allegedly non-representational intentionality as if it were representational. Heidegger here is not
interested in defending the non-representational against the representational,
but rather the non-cognitiv e against the cognitive, and the non-th eoretical
against the theoretical. It hardly needs to be said that these three distinctions
are not the same, thoug h Dreyfus tends to link them together, e.g., in the way
he binds Heidegger s account of how the theoretical arises out of the nontheoretical into a larger account of how, in so-called breakdow n, the
representational arises out of the non-representational (pp. 69 84). Second,
while Heidegger rejects the specifically Husserlian terminolog y of noesis
and noema, he nevertheless fully endorses its general spirit and character.
For he adopts what he regards as a less tendentious version of Husserl s
notions for all intentional comportments. In so doing , he uses language
adapted straight from Husserl: in all intentional comportments
[w]e . . . have an inheren t af nity between the w ay something is intende d, the
intentio , and the intentum , whereby intentum , the intended , is to be underst ood in the
sense just develop ed, not the perceive d as entity , but the entit y in the how of its
being-p erceived , the intentum in the how of its being-i ntended . Only with the how of
the being-i ntende d belongi ng to every intentio as such does the basic constitu tion of
14
intentio nality com e into view at all, even thoug h only provisio nally.

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W e find Heidegger here committed to what is basically the standard

Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involv e Husserlian
intentional content. T o all intents and purpos es, then, Heidegger is endorsing
the claim that everything intentional is representational in the sense defined
above, namely, satisfaction of some folk-psychological predicate which
articulates what is misleadingly called a `propositional attitude .
Thus nothin g is achieved by appeal to the passage from M AL which
Dreyfus quotes in truncated form on pages 52 53. When we look at this
passage in its entirety, restore it to its context and compare it with similar
passages in PGZ, we see that it lends no suppor t to Dreyfus at all. It should in
any case be obviou s that this passage and its cousins in PGZ could not be
criticizing Husserl for failing to appreciate that not all forms of intentionality
are representational. For in this and the other passages Heidegger, while
referring to Scheler, does not criticize him. Yet Scheler, no less than Husserl,
overlooks Dreyfus s non-representational `absorbed coping .
In fact, Heidegger, unlik e Dreyfus, does not lump Husserl and Scheler
indiscrim inately together with modern philoso phers from Descartes to
Brentano as if first there was darkness, then there was Heidegger and all
was light. As we have already seen, Heidegger s critique of Husserl is by no
means just a variation on his critique of the tradition and of pre-Husserlian,
pre-phenomenolog ical conceptions of intentionality in particular. A careful
reading of
11 13 of PGZ, where Heidegger elaborates in some detail a
critique of Husserl and previous phenomenolog y, makes it clear that
Heidegger objects not primarily to Husserl s theory of intentionality but to
the latter s methodological attitud e. W hat Heidegger prim arily objects to
about Husserl is the way he unwittingly retains the assumption that
phenomenologic al reflection on consciousness and intentional phenomena
can achieve its goals by idealizing these entities, i.e. by abstracting from
their specificity and individuality.
(ii) W e come now to Dreyfus s second central passage from GP. This is
taken from 21, S. 439 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309), and, as cited by Dreyfus
(p. 65), reads as follows:
W e do not always and continu ally have explici t percepti on of the thing s surroun ding
us in a fam iliar environ m ent, certainl y not in such a way that w e would be aware of
them as expressl y availabl e . . . In the indiffer ent im perturb ability of our custo m ary
com m erce w ith them, they beco m e accessibl e precisel y w ith regar d to their
unobtru sive presence . T he presupp ositio n for the possibl e equani m ity of our dealin g
w ith thing s is, am ong others , the uninterr upted quality of that com merce. It must not
be held up in its progress .

Dreyfus takes this passage to show that, according to Heidegger, when

skilfully using hammer and nail, `I am not aware of any determinate

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characteristics of the hammer or of the nail. All I am aware of is the task, or

perhaps what I need to do when I finish (p. 65).
But once again it is crucial both to restore this passage to its context and to
include that part of it which Dreyfus has excised. Some corrections of the
translation are also useful:
W e do not continu ally and explicit ly perceiv e each one of the thing s surroun ding us
in a fam iliar environ m ent, certainl y not in such a way that we would be aware of
them as expressl y available . Precisel y by not explicit ly ascertain ing and con rm ing
their presenc e at hand w e have them aroun d us in their own distincti ve w ay, just as
they are in them selves . In the indiffe rent equani m ity of our custom ary com m erce
w ith them, they beco m e accessibl e precisel y in their unobtru sive presence . The
presupp ositio n for the possibl e equani m ity of our dealin g with thing s is, am ong
others, the uninterr upted quality of that comm erce . It must not be held up in its
15
progres s.

Now this passage is located in a very long paragraph in which Heidegger

claims that `(b)ecause everything positiv e becomes particularly clear when
16
seen from the side of the privative , we must orient ourselves on how
thing s show themselves in breakdown if we wish to understand the particular
temporal character of equipment. This indicates that Heidegger s use of the
adverbs `explicitly and `expressly are to be taken seriously: Heidegger is
saying that, when operating in a familiar environm ent, we have no explicit
awareness of the things we are dealing with. Heidegger s real positio n thus
could be, and I think is in fact, the following: in any familiar environm ent we
are always seeing the familiar thing s around us as a group , as a diffuse and
inexplicit totality, i.e. precisely in their unobtru sive presence as the thing s in
the room. Precisely because we have this background awareness we are able
to see what is relevant, and able not to see what is not `see here taken in
the sense of what Heidegger calls natural perception of individual things, e.g.
of the chair we need to avoid, in contrast to the picture on the wall, whose
presence is irrelevant to what we are currently doing . W e are aware of the
totality and it is for this reason that we are able to see some thing s (the
relevant things) in their relevance, while not having to see other things. The
passage quoted above from GP is clearly com patible with this positio n and
thus in no way says what Dreyfus think s it does, namely, that we have no
awareness of individ ual things and their determinate characteristics.
But surely, one might object, Heidegger cannot be simply making the
point that when dealing with familiar things we have no explicit awareness
of these things. The point is so obviou s as not to be worth making. But once
again the appropriate response lies in taking seriously the sentence om itted
by Dreyfus, namely, `Precisely by not explicitly ascertaining and confirming
their presence at hand we have them around us in their own distinctive way,
just as they are in themselves . For this sentence indicates why it is indeed

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worth Heidegger s while to make an otherwise insigni ficant point : hovering

in the background here is Heidegger s desire to counter the traditional
metaphysical notio n that the being of thing s as they appear to us in our
unprob lem atic dealings with them is somehow subjective, less `real and `in
itself , than how they appear in theoretical observing and examining . W hat
and how thing s are at the level of practical dealing with them, their everyday
identity and appearance, is just as real as the identity they have under
theoretical description and explanation. If, however, we wish to get at this
everyday being, we must recognize that because we are not expressly or
explicitly aware of fam iliar thing s in our dealings with them , we must access
this being via its privative form, that is, by examining how these thing s show
themselves when there is a hitch or, to use Dreyfus s word, a breakdown.
(iii) T he third of Dreyfus s three central passages from GP is taken from
15, S. 232 (Hofstadter, p. 163); it is quoted by Dreyfus (p. 66; original
emphasis) as follows:
T he equipm enta l nexu s of things , for exam ple, the nexus of things as they surroun d
us here, stand s in view , but not for the contem plato r as though w e were sitting here in
order to describ e the things . . . . The view in which the equip mental nexu s stand s at
rst, com pletely unobtru sive and unthoug ht, is the view and sight of practica l
circum spectio n , of our practica l everyda y orientat ion. `U nthough t means that it is
not them aticall y apprehe nded for delibera te thinkin g abou t things; instead , in
circu m spection , we nd our bearing s in regard to them . . . . W hen we enter here
throug h the door , we do not apprehe nd the seats, and the sam e hold s for the
doorkn ob. N everthel ess, they are ther e in this peculia r way: w e go by them
circu m spectly , avoid them circu mspectly , . . . and the like .

The crucial words and phrases here are `unthought (unbeda cht) and
`deliberate thinking about things (ein Bedenken der Dinge). Heidegger says
that `untho ught means here not `thematically apprehended ; as he says in
the sentence im m ediately following the quoted passage, `[t]he stairs, the
corridors, windows, chair and set, board and the other thing s are not
17
thematically given . As elsewhere, so, too, here, thematic apprehension
means explicit, deliberate awareness in the sense of deliberately thinkin g to
oneself, e.g. `That red chair there is broken, so I had better avoid it , `T hat
book which someone has dropped on the floor in front of me , and so on. It is
obvious that, all else being equal, we are not aware of thing s in the room in
this sense; if we were, there would be a combinatorial explosion of thing s we
apprehended upon entering the room.
It is equally obvious, however, that to say this is not to say that we have no
awareness of individ ual things, and thus of these thing s as thus and so. That
Heidegger fully appreciates this obviou s point, and is thus not saying what
Dreyfus im putes to him, becom es even clearer once a crucial mistranslation
of this passage is corrected. T he last sentence of the quoted passage reads in

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Carleton B. Christensen

Hofstadter s translation as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this

peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly,
18
stumble against them, and the like.
The German, however, reads as
follows: `Gleichwohl sind sie da in dieser eigentu mlichen W eise, da wir
um sichtig an ihnen vorbeigehen, um sichtig vermeiden, da wir uns sto en
19
und dergleichen. Notice that the verb `vermeiden in this sentence does
not have the accusative plural pronou n `sie as its object. This m eans that the
nominal clause `da wir uns sto en is its true object. So the sentence must
be translated as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this peculiar
way: we go by them circum spectly, we circum spectly avoid stumbling
against them and the like. So translated, this sentence intimates that our
skilfully avoiding the thing s in the room is not at all as `extensional as
Dreyfus would have it. It is not just a matter of automatically responding to
the presence of such thing s as chairs by going around rather than runnin g
into them. Rather, our everyday dealings with the thing s in a room are quite
`intensional `intensional in the sense that they essentially involv e seeing
things in their specificity as chairs to be avoided, and so on. It is a matter of
circumspectly behaving with regard to, or even with care tow ards, them .
This intimates the im portance of taking seriously the preposition `zu in
Heidegger s notion of `Sichverhalten-zu (self-com portment towards). Pace
Dreyfus, there is something subjectively circum spect and purpos eful about
Umgang mit innerweltlichem Seienden.
This suggests something already hinted at in the discussion of the previous
passage: Heidegger s practical circumspection, while not explicit, i.e. selfconscious, is certainly an ever-present seeing of the individ ual things
relevant to what one is doing in their relevance for what one is doing against
a backgroun d awareness of a diffusely present totality of thing s what
Heidegger calls the equipmental nexus (Zeugzusammenhang). It is, as
20
Heidegger himself says, a sight which guides: the individ ual entities seen,
because seen in their relevance, are seen as internally related to this
background nexus against which they so to speak stand out. L et us note that
just as awareness of these individ uals is embedded in the background
awareness, so, too, the background awareness of the equipmental nexus only
occurs with this foreground-seeing embedded in it. Practical circumspection
is a foreground seeing of relevance moving around within this background
awareness.

II. Som e Ancillary Objections

Given the disparity which the previous section has shown to exist between
how Dreyfus interprets Heidegger s critique of traditional intentionality and
what Heidegger appears to intend, one must expect to find other mismatches

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between Dreyfus s interpretation and Heidegger s texts. There are in fact at

least three ways in which Dreyfus s Heidegger seems not to be present in the
texts:
(i) C learly, both in the account of the proper role of so-called
representational intentionality, which emerges at the level of deliberate
coping , and in the account of originary transcendence, which consists in an
ostensibly completely general, always activated skill of knowing how to
bring one s specific skills to bear in familiar situations, the notio n of
`absorbed coping has a lot of work to do. Yet Heidegger himself, who is
notorious for thinkin g up distinctions, real or otherwise, and givin g them
neolog istic titles, has no term for what on Dreyfus s account must be one of
his most central concepts. Absorbed coping is certainly not what Heidegger
21
calls `Umgang in der Welt und mit dem innerweltichen Seienden , i.e.
dealing within the world with entities in the world. For Heidegger explicitly
introdu ces this term as another name for our everyday being-in-the-world; it
therefore encompasses at least both absorbed coping and deliberate coping .
Furthermore, some kinds of Umgang can have a theoretical rather than a
practical point, since that kind of Umgang which Heidegger calls B esorgen,
i.e. concern, our dealings with entities as non-`selves , includes the everyday
22
practice of science. Yet Dreyfus contrasts `coping , both absorbed and
deliberate, with so-called detached, objectifying theoretical reflection (pp.
70 83). Finally, while Dreyfus s notio n of `absorbed coping is in one way
too narrow to encompass all of what Heidegger regards as Besorgen, in
another, it is too broad. For Dreyfus uses the notio n as encompassing not
merely Besorgen, i.e. our dealings with entities as non-selves, but also what
23
Heidegger calls Fu rsorge, i.e. solicitude, or dealings with entities as other`selves . Thus, Dreyfus speaks of `our shared transparent activity of coping
with equipment (concern) and coping with people (solicitude) (p. 150).
Not merely does Heidegger, however, not bother to disting uish what on
Dreyfus s interpretation one must surely expect him to disting uish. Dreyfus s
notio n of coping , whether absorbed or deliberate, fails to map in any easy
way onto certain very im portant distinctions Heidegger does make.
Consequently, it threatens to obliterate these genuinely Heideggerian
distinctions, or at least obscure their significance. Heidegger distingu ishes
in the first instance concern (Besorgen), solicitude (Fu rsorge), and care itself
(Sorge ). Besorgen comprises all our dealings and interactions, whether
theoretical or practical, with entities in their capacity as non-`selves .
Fu rsorge comprises all our dealings with others in their capacity as such
other `selves or `subjects . Heidegger s central concept of Sorge or care is,
in the first instance, the `genus of the first two; this is intimated by the way
Heidegger deliberately exploits the fact that the first two terms have the noun
Sorge and the verb sorgen as their root. In the second instance, however,

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Carleton B. Christensen

Sorge is not just what is common to Besorgen and Fu rsorge , it is also one s
relation to self, a relation which is realized only in and throug h one s relation
to entities as such (Besorgen) and one s relation to others (F u rsorge) and
which can be either authentic or inauthentic. The crucial thing to note here is
that Besorgen is distinct from F u rsorge in virtue of what it, so to speak,
operates on: it operates on entities as non-selves.
Dreyfus s coping , on the other hand, is much m ore diffuse; it seems we are
coping absorbedly, whether we are working with wood or playing in a
basketball team or teaching a class. Yet it would be clearly wrong to regard
such `coping as what is common to Besorgen and Fu rsorge . Certainly, if
such `coping is in any way com mon to these two, it is not so in the way in
which Heidegger holds Sorge to be comm on to both. So Dreyfus s notion
cuts completely across Heidegger s distinctions between B esorgen and
Fu rsorge . It maps in no straightforward way on to distinctions and concepts
in Heidegger s own texts; the claim that it is to be found in Heidegger, that
indeed it constitutes the heart of Heidegger s critique of Husserl, intentionality, and the tradition, and is the core notion in Heidegger s account of
everydayness, must constitute at best an extremely radical reconstruction of
Heidegger.

(ii) Dreyfus insists that, according to Heidegger, traditional representational

intentionality beliefs, intentions, desires, and so on only arises at the level
of deliberate coping , when some kind of hitch forces one to deliberate about
what one is doing and what one is operating with (p. 78; cited above). If this
is right, then Heidegger cannot maintain that deliberation (U berlegung ) is a
feature of all kinds of Besorgen as such. For if it were, then representational
intentionality would be im plicated in all kinds of practical Besorgen; not
merely would there, there could be, no distinction in Heidegger between
absorbed and deliberate coping . This would im mediately falsify Dreyfus s
central contention that Heidegger wants to draw our attention to a nonrepresentational form of intentionality.
Unfortunately for Dreyfus s interpretation, Heidegger does indeed allow
deliberation as just such a general feature. He says:
In any particul ar usin g or m anipulat ing of entitie s the synopti c circum spectio n
(`u bersichtl iche Um sicht ) of concer n (Besorgen ) brings the ready-t o-han d closer
to Dasei n in that it lays out (A uslegung ) what has been sighted . This speci c,
circu m spectly interpr etiv e bringin g-close r of what is to be taken care of we call
delibera tion. The schem e peculia r to delibera tion is the `if-the n ; for exam ple, if this
or that is to be made, put to use, or averted , then these or those m eans, circu m stance s
or opport unities are require d. Circu m spect delibera tion illuminates the particul ar
given situatio n of D asein in the practica l settin g (U mwelt) with w hich it is
concern ed. . . . D eliberati on can be perfor m ed even when that which in delibera tion
is circu m spectly brough t closer is not palpabl y ready-t o-han d and within imm ediate

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sight . T he bringin g-close r of the surroun ding practica l settin g in circu mspect
delibera tion has the existenti al sense of being a makin g presen t. For envisagi ng is
only a m ode of makin g present . In envisagi ng, delibera tion sees directl y w hat is
needed but unavaila ble. E nvisagin g circu mspectio n does not relate itself to `m ere
24
represen tations .

It is clear enough from this passage, murky as it is, that Heidegger is talking
25
about the practical circumspection which guides all concern, all taking care
of things (Besorgen). But if this should be doubted , one need only note the
very last sentence on the previous page, where Heidegger speaks of
exhibiting the genesis of science by characterizing the circumspection
26
`which guides ``practical concern (``das praktische Besorgen ). So the
deliberation of which Heidegger speaks here is not at all something that
comes only with a hitch in so-called absorbed coping ; it is an integral feature
and character of the practical circumspection which guides all engaged
activity with entities.
Interestingly, on page 73 of his book Dreyfus himself uses elements of the
passage just quoted. Using a slightly altered version of the Macquarrie and
Robinso n translation, he has Heidegger say:
D eliberati on can be perfor m ed even when that w hich is brough t close in it
circu m spectivel y is not palpabl y availabl e and does not have presenc e within the
closes t range . . . . In envisagi ng, one s delibera tion catche s sigh t directl y of that
w hich is needed but which is unavaila ble.

W hat is interesting about this passage, apart from the unnecessarily obscure
translation of `in der na chsten Sichtweite anwesend ist as `have presence
within the closest range , is a rather surprising om ission. Right in its
middle, Dreyfus has left out tw o sentences which make it clear that
deliberation is associated quite generally with what Heidegger calls
`making-present (Gegenw a rtigen), and not just with envisaging (Vergegenwa rtigen). In other words, deliberation consists in a quite general
seeing of needed means, relevant circumstances or opportunities to be
exploited, whether or not these means, circumstances or opportunities are
actually given in the context of practical activity. It is thus not exclusively
associated with the long-ra nge planning (pp. 72 73) and anticipation of
means, relevant circum stances, or op portun ities which according to
Dreyfus is what Heidegger means by envisaging, and which Dreyfus
clearly regards as involving representational intentionality (pp. 73 74).
Given this generality, what Heidegger means by deliberation is precisely
an anticipation of relevant means, circumstances, and opportunities which
may well be quite context-boun d and thus the kind of making-present to be
found even in engaged practical activity which is going smoothly, i.e. in
what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping .

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Carleton B. Christensen

(iii) Dreyfus s Heidegger is out to attack the identification of intentionality

with representational intentionality. Dreyfus says, as we saw earlier, that
while `Heidegger does not deny that we sometimes experience ourselves as
conscious subjects relating to objects by way of intentional states such as
desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc., . . . he thinks of this as a
derivative and intermittent condition that presupposes a more fundamental
way of being-in-the-world that cannot be understood in subject/object terms
(p. 5). In such everyday intentional behaviour as my hammering a nail,
provid ed everything is going well, I have no representational states or
experiences at all. So where Heidegger talks about such activity, we must
expect to find him not describing such activity in any representational ways
at all.
This, however, is precisely what Heidegger does. In 5 of PGZ Heidegger
speaks precisely of `a concrete and natural perception, the perception of a
chair which I find upon entering a room and push aside, since it stands in my
27
way . Here Heidegger is speaking of a perceiving which is embedded in
what Dreyfus would surely have to regard as a paradigm case of allegedly
representationless `absorbed coping , namely, everyday dealing with household objects in the organized totality of equipment which constitutes a room
full of furniture and other accoutrements. Indeed, Dreyfus himself appeals to
this case as a prime example of `absorbed coping , speaking extremely
vaguely of my `set or `readiness to cope with chairs, which is nothing
representational but rather a skill for dealing with them (p. 103). It is true
that Heidegger, having spoken of the concrete, natural perception we have
when dealing with everyday things, goes on to say that he is talking here of
`the m ost common kind of everyday perception and not perception in the
28
emphatic sense, in which we observe only for the sake of observing . But
this harms rather than helps Dreyfus s cause because it intimates fairly
directly that Heidegger is not at all pleading the case of the nonrepresentational against the (minimally) representational, but rather defending the non-theoretical against the primacy of the theoretical and the noncognitive against the primacy of the cognitive.
In fact, the whole account of intentionality which Heidegger gives here is
perfectly compatible with, is indeed an endorsement of, Husserl s account of
intentionality. Heidegger says, for example, that in his lecture he `will
attempt to show that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences
29
(Erlebnisse ) as such . So, for Heidegger as for Husserl, intentionality is a
structure of lived experience, just as the word `E rlebnis is, pace Dreyfus
(p. 68), just as much Heidegger s term as Husserl s. Adm ittedly, Heidegger
does say that intentionality, being a structure of lived experience as such, is
`not a coordination relative to other realities, something added to the
30
experiences taken as psychic states . But this is hardly un-Husserlian; in
fact, at this point Heidegger is attacking the conception of intentionality he

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Getting Heidegger Off the W est Coast

83

attributes, rightly or wrongly, to thinkers other than Husserl, in particular, to

Brentano.
In the meantime, let us note how Heidegger uses the word `Verhaltung in
5 of P GZ. Dreyfus m akes much of the fact that Heidegger uses the term
`Verhaltung (compo rtment) to designate wha t has the structure of
intentionality. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger does this because the word
`comportment has no mentalistic, representational connot ations, unlik e the
more traditional terminolog y of `lived experience (Erlebnis) and the more
Husserlian terminology of `acts . In this way, think s Dreyfus, Heidegger
intimates that what has intentionality need not be psychologic al, hence
representational in any standard sense, and thus need not have any
representational content, any noema, in Husserl s sense. As we have seen,
however, while Heidegger does reject Husserl s terminolog y of noesis and
noema, he does not do so for the reasons Dreyfus claims. Indeed, Heidegger
remains, as we have seen, fundamentally committed to the standard
Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involv e Husserlian
intentional content. Precisely in this section, where he uses the word
`Verhaltung repeatedly, he adopts the positio n that everything intentional is
representational in a minimal sense that is perfectly Husserlian. So
Heidegger s actual use of the word `Verhaltung in this section simply does
not bear Dreyfus out.
W hy, then, does Heidegger speak of `Verhaltungen , i.e. comportments?
Dreyfus is right to say that Heidegger chooses this word because it does not
have certain traditional connotations to which he objects. But these
connot ations, and Heidegger s objections to them, are not what Dreyfus
claims they are. Before one can truly understand Heidegger s preference for
the word `Verhaltung , however, one must first understand what Heidegger
really objects to about the subject/object model of the `subject , `self , or
`mind . This brings us back to the need for a positiv e alternative to complement a purely negative critique. I will thus conclude by indicating the
general form and desiderata of an alternative interpretation.

III. Retrieving Heidegger

In order to identify Heidegger s real innovat ion and novelty regarding the
concepts of `self and of intentionality, one must understand what he m eans
by Dasein. In particular, one must determine what Heidegger means when he
says that Dasein is the entity `which, in its very Being, comports itself
31
understanding ly towards that Being .
That this is Heidegger s most
fundamental preliminary characterization of Dasein is shown by his
32
description of it as indicating `the formal concept of existence . It is thus

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Carleton B. Christensen

that characterization the unpacking of which brings one to the most

fundamental understanding of what it is to be a `subject or `self .
Curiously, Dreyfus does not appreciate the architectonic significance of
this fundamental initial characterization. A remarkable feature of Dreyfus s
account is just how cursory his interpretation of this is; in his hands, it plays
no structuring, unifying role at all. T his is perhaps not surprising, since
Dreyfus seems not to appreciate Heidegger s methodo logical notio n of
33
formal indication.
At no point, for example, does he consider the
significance of Heidegger s remark that `[i]n our preparatory discussions
(Section 9) we have brough t out some characteristics of [Dasein s C.B.C.]
Being which will provid e us with a steady light for our further investigation,
but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as the
34
investigation continu es . Because he fails to see that the enterprise of
Being and Time consists precisely in unpacking such formal indications,
Dreyfus sees no need to show how the various insights and novelties he
attributes to Heidegger, in particular the latter s alleged insight into nonrepresentational `absorbed coping , flow from the abstract structure which
formal indications such as this most fundamental one mark. True, on page 52
he does quote Heidegger as saying that `[t]o exist . . . means, among other
35
things, to be as relating to oneself by comportin g with beings . He also
begins his fourth chapter by recalling how an essential feature of Dasein s
ontolog ical make-up is that it takes a stand on itself and its existence (p. 61).
Even so, no real effort is made to explain how Heidegger s initial
characterizations lead, when elaborated, to Dreyfus s `absorbed coping as
an essential ontolog ical feature of Dasein. This general failure to understand
how Heidegger proceeds in Being and Time also explains Dreyfus s even
more remarkable insensitivity to the special significance Heidegger gives to
the notio n of understanding . For Dreyfus, understanding is just one more
`Existential alongside others. Indeed, when Dreyfus roundly declares that
for Heidegger `primordial understanding is know-how (p. 184), thereby
acquiescing in the fashionable assimilation of Heidegger to Ryle and Dewey,
he reduces the significance of Heidegger s concept of understanding to zero.
Any truly adequate account of the early Heidegger will consciously
reverse this reduction of central concepts to a number of details listed
alongside many. It will read him in a way which brings out the essentially
systematic thrust of his earlier work. And it will achieve this by reading
Heidegger in a far more historically oriented way than Dreyfus does. For
Dreyfus simply does not read Heidegger in context; this is presumably what
36
Haberm as was getting at when he remarked that Dreyfus treats Being and
Time as if it had just washed up as flotsam on the shores of some Californian
beach. In the otherwise commendable effort to make Heidegger intelligible,
Dreyfus one-sidedly maps him on to debates and problems within contemporary cognitive science and North American philoso phy of psychology.

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In so doing , he misconstrues Heidegger s undoub ted opposition to the

traditional subject/object model as an anticipation of contemporary antirepresentationalist positio ns, which attack computationalism and classical AI
for using computational analogues of Cartesian representations in their
psychological theories and m odels. Once he has in this way been brough t up
to speed with Dreyfus s own unquestioned present, Heidegger now appears
as a proto-p articipant in contemporary North American debates, hence as
someone who accepts the almost universal naturalist consensus which
governs such debates.
Greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, Heidegger s ow n intellectual
background would guard against such aberrations. Only it would allow one
genuin ely to realize Dreyfus s guidin g exegetical idea that Heidegger is to be
read first and foremost as a theoretical philoso pher. At the very least, such
sensitivity would preclude the, at times, quite surprising scholarly defects of
Dreyfus s account, for example, his reading of a passage quoted from
38
Dilthey as a comment on Dilthey (p. 69). More im portantly, however,
greater awareness of context would allow one to see that Heidegger s views
on `mind are not pale shadows of contemporary views about intentionality
and the `self which, for all their anti-representationalism, are nevertheless
trenchantly naturalist. It would also allow one to see that Heidegger is not at
all concerned to reject, even in part, the idea of representation as such.
Rather, his concern is to show that much early modern philoso phy
dramatically fails to understand the true nature of `representations , that is,
of intentionality. Heidegger s critique of the subject/object model actually
runs tangentially to the concerns of contemporary anti-representationalism.
Unlike Rorty and so many others, he correctly sees that the distinctive
character of the subject/object model lies not in any appeal to `representation as such, but rather in its distinctive interpretation of `representation ,
and thus of the subject of `representation . W hat distinguishes the subject/
object model and gives it its genuinely `Cartesian character is its
interpretation of `representation as a psycho-physical transaction taking
place within a psycho-physical unity which can be modelled in a unified,
natural scientific psycho-physical theory. Heidegger is thus not out to
eliminate `representations , not even from a mere portion of the self s
intentional activity. Rather, he seeks to understand what it is to be a
representation, and in pa rticular wha t it is to be som ething with
representations. Nor is this endeavour driven by some facile desire to
liberate culture, and in particular science, from the yoke of first philosophy.
Rather, it is driven by a concern to `destroy the metaphysical tradition so as
to liberate human though t from this tradition s currently hegemonic form.
This currently hegemonic form is precisely the metaphysics of naturalism so
rampant in contemporary North America. Heidegger joins with Husserl and
Dilthey in anti-naturalist opposition to the likes of Ernst Haeckel; for this

86

Carleton B. Christensen

reason, what he has to say constitutes a much more radical challenge to

contemporary orthod oxies than Dreyfus either appreciates or desires. For
Dreyfus would not himself reject the very idea of psycho-physics and the
contemporary naturalist consensus.

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NOTES
1 GP, 9, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63).
2 Heidegger rst uses the term `erroneous objectivising on S. 91 (Hofstadter, p. 65), 9 b) of
GP. His discussion of it, however, occurs much earlier in this subsection, namely, on S.
83 85.
3 GP, 9 b, S. 86 (Hofstadter, p. 61).
4 GP, 9 b, S. 87 (Hofstadter, p. 62); trans. modi ed.
5 That this interpretation is mistaken has been ably argued by Andrew Gardiner, `Keeping
Consciousness in Mind (MA thesis, Department of Philosophy, Australian National
University, 1997).
6 In a similar sounding passage in M AL Heidegger explicitly mentions Brentano see 9, S.
168 (K isiel, p. 134). He also mentions Brentano in 5 c . of PGZ, S. 61 62 (K isiel, p. 46).
7 GP, 9 b, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63).
8 GP, 9 b, S. 88 (Hofstadter, p. 63).
9 GP, 9, S. 85 (Hofstadter, p. 60); trans. modi ed.
10 M AL, 9, S. 168 9 (Kisiel, p. 134); Dreyfus s italics and gloss in the second brackets.
11 M AL, 9, S. 168 9; my trans.
12 M AL, 9, S. 168 9; my trans.
13 PGZ, 5 c. ., S. 60 61.
14 PGZ, 5 c. ., S. 61.
15 GP, 21, S. 439 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309); trans. modi ed.
16 GP, 21, S. 439 (Hofstadter, p. 309).
17 GP, 15, S. 232 3 (H ofstadter, p. 163); trans. modi ed.
18 GP, 15, p. 163.
19 GP, 15, S. 232.
20 See SZ, 15, S. 69.
21 SZ, 15, S. 66.
22 See SZ, 69 b, S. 358 and S. 364.
23 See SZ, 26, S. 121.
24 SZ, 69 a, S. 359; p. 410; trans. modi ed.
25 See SZ, 15, S. 69.
26 SZ, 69 a, S. 358.
27 PGZ, 5 a, S. 37.
28 PGZ, 5 a, S. 37.
29 PGZ, 5 a, S. 36.
30 PGZ, 5 a, S. 36.
31 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78; see also GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157).
32 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78. See also SZ, 9, S. 41; p. 67.
33 A formal indication (formale Anzeige) is an abstract characterization drawn from the
preceding tradition which both guides explication and is eshed out in this explication at
the same time. See, e.g., GP, , S. (Hofstadter, p.). For a brief exposition, see Kisiel (1993),
pp. 164 and 178.
34 SZ, 12, S. 52; p. 78.
35 GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157).
36 In Frankfurt in 1989, at a joint seminar on Heidegger held by Apel, Dreyfus, and Habermas.
37 See, e.g., van Gelder (1991), esp. p. 380.
38 See Sein und Zeit, 43 b, S. 209.

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REFERENCES
Christensen, Carleton B. 1997. `H eidegger s Representationalism , Review of M etaphysics 51,
77104.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1991. Being-in-the-W orld (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Referred to in the
text simply by page number.
Hannay, Alastair. 1990. Human Consciousness (London: Routledge).
Heidegger, Martin. 1989. Grundprobleme der Pha nomenologie (Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann, 2.te Au age). Trans. A. Hofstadter (1988) as Basic P roblems of
Phenomenology (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as GP.
Heidegger, Martin. 1978. M etaphysische Anfangsgru nde der Logik (Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1980) as M etaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington,
IN . Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as M AL.
Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1985) as History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as PGZ.
Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Sein und Zeit, 15.te Au age, (Tu bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag).
Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (1962) as B eing and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Referred to in the text as SZ.
Kisiel, T heodore. 1993. The Genesis of Heidegger s Being and Time (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press).
Olafson, Frederick. `H eidegger a la Wittgenstein or ``Coping with Professor Dreyfus .
Inquiry 37, 45 64.
Scharff, Robert C. 1992. `Rorty and Analytic Heideggerian Epistemology and Heidegger .
M an and World 25, 483 504.
Received 23 June 1997
Carleton B. Christensen, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia