Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued
by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned
joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death,
and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.[5]
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando
C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado
JJ., concur.
(Chairman),
Puno,
Jr.,
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit
dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic)
BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan
Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; xxx
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO
MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband
BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I
went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN,
MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, respondent.
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law
but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not
only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also
be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to
degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondents
cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down
by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and
made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should
be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his
ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, Judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It
was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. [3]However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)
[7]
in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. [11] This
is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the
5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x
x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
before a party can enter into a second marriage [27] and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
THIRD DIVISION
The Facts
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11,
13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a
second marriage with the petitioner.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the
law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil
Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
February 6, 2007
February 6, 2007
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony
E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set
forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
28
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit. Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province
"in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile
of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make
a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between
a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest
in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983
and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States,
in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case,
Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated
in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP
& GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent
me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the
error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others.
A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to
have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet
of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one
of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then
two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved.
This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely
the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the
exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to
recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985])
cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can
with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
CRASUS L. IYOY,
September 21, 2005
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30
July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus-
Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one,
Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did
file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall
be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another
woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present
their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr.
and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where
the
said
witnesses
reside.
Despite
the
Orders [12] and
[13]
Commissions issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiffappellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiffappellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE
BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN
AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY,
THE
FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph
of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because
he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case
at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired
her American husbands citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina [30] that the root cause of
the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on
behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does
not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints
the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued
will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay
and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of
evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and
Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since
they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of
May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate. [30]
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion
was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice,
and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially
in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount
of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated
in the complaint.
after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel
implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30
xxx
xxx
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and
her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that
petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.54
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers
find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases.
went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage;
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household
and handle their finances.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
Separate Opinions
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of
the spouses.
Separate Opinions
Section 2, Article XV:
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA
B.
MARCOS, petitioner,
MARCOS, respondent.
vs. WILSON
G.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of
a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On
that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm
on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following
day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries
were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[11]
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of
evidence
that
can
adequately
establish
the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the
parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of
the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of
the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner
as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that
one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must
assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that
the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an
award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation
to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary
damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of
litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. [21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to
deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing,
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]
Ynares-
least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence of
a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the
validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that
the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be
submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always
be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a
"final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled
in Landicho v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held
that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy
since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
even be successfully invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. [17] The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the
previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17,
1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion
was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy
case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate
court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case.
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code
and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a
foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a
foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion
for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed
that as the first marriage was validly declared voidab initio, then there
was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner
was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted
two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the
second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however,
Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage
acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the
price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer
Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was
issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married
to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives.
On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the
husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate.
Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish
text of which provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse
el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de
la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes
gananciales.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied
the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed
property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the
trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the
second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became
effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two
marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was
acquired during the second marriage, of which interest she would be
deprived if his share should be declared forfeited in favor of the
second wife.
There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as
to whether such resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the
contemplation of the Spanish Civil Code when it decrees in general
terms in Article 1417 that the spouse who in bad faith has given
cause for nullity (of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal
properties, considering that in the present case the first marriage has
not been terminated and therefore likewise impresses the conjugal
stamp of that marriage upon whatever properties are acquired during
its existence. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to resolve
that question here inasmuch as the facts do not call for the
application of Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article states
two causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1)
dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity. Under the
second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of the
partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse takes place. Now then, when did the conjugal partnership
formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased
Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was
dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was
no longer in force, having been eliminated in the new Civil Code,
which took effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from these facts
is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having
acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise,
just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she
was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, 1 no action lies under
Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband's share in her favor,
much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there are after
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1991,
reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24120, entitled "Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross
Insurance, Inc."
Petitioner's plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October
12, 1989, she filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission
alleging, inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of
P7,535.00, private respondent executed a policy of sickness and
accident insurance; that on August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted
to a hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for
cholecystitis; that petitioner paid the hospital and doctor's bills in the
aggregate sum of P48,934.05, the same being the actual hospital
and professional fees charged to her; and that private respondent
wrongfully refused to pay petitioner the said amount which she is
entitled to recover under the policy.
Private respondent's answer raised the special and affirmative
defenses that under the insurance policy, definitions and exclusions
were clearly specified and among the exclusions are conditions
which pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which
the insured was aware or should reasonably be aware; and that
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence petitioner's sickness
is non-compensable.
On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its
decision in I.C. Case No. 3277 in favor of petitioner ordering private
respondent to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied,
plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. In the main, the Insurance
Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues
raised are mainly factual. The decision of the Insurance Commission
was based on its findings that the illness of private respondent,
cholecystitis, was not a pre-existing ailment and is, therefore, fully
compensable. It further specifically found that private respondent
failed to prove petitioner's awareness of that pre-existing condition
which is excluded under the insurance policy. We find no reason to
disturb the said findings which are supported by the evidence on
record and the conclusions of experts.
SO ORDERED.
VITUG, J.:
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with
the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,
that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity
of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
Separate Opinions
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.
Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage.
I
IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED DEFECTS
ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS
GRAVE AND INCURABLE[, AND]
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE MOLINA CASE AND
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19
Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as
she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the
psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a
declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the
evidence presented does not show Manolitos psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing
that the "defects" of Manolito already existed at the inception of the
marriage or are incurable; and in any event, "belief" cannot substitute
for proof which the law and jurisprudence require.
Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is
not proper in the present case.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10,
1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner.
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which
mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of
the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated
circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same
would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor
of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of
the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted
to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)
years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in
1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law
should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the
same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law
would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners
marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved
in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January
30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial
court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of
Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More
so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of
prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity
of a spouse.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON
L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a.
JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966. [1] The civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born
on September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971; [5] and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to
be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extramarital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and
later a Jordanian national.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINACASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by
the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by
respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does
the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner
fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents
sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
Jr.,
C.J.,
(Chairman),
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004]
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision[1] dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated
October 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107,
entitled, Adriana Chua, Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam,
Respondent-Appellant.
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against
Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married
on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John
Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity
was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and
future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28,
1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have
agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between
her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and
pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22,
1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after service of summons, no
responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an
Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio
Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination whether or not
there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report
thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness
was Adriana herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was
arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her
married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home,
never worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her
to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending for all the
expenses of their only child, John Paul.[3] After her testimony, counsel
for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence
was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John
Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to ReOpen[4] on the ground that she was able to secure additional new
evidence which were significant, material and indispensable.On July
6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and
held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay
RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25,
1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage
Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,
[5]
showing that Jose had been married twice before he married
Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision [6] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam
null and void for being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Office of the Civil Registrar General are
hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and
Jose Lam celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
of the petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12,
1994.[14] But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23, 1994,
the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on July 6,
1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two
previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove
that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for
being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent
Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in
open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by
the admission of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for
nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological
incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose
with two different women with an additional claim for support of the
child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed
with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by
Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase And for
respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this
Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable [15] found at the
ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay
RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was
notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be
present on July 6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana
and to refute the same. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23,
1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the
record does not show that he received the notice in due time; neither
does the record show that he was notified of the subsequent hearing
held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented the marriage
certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the
presence of Jose.
Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of
the Order dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the
Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith
of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority.Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from
school, or to and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles
195[21] and 196,[22] shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article
shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support
on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the
capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family
Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation
of the child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana
regarding her claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is
quoted below in verbatim:
Atty. Lorbes:
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that
the First Party and the Second Party shall initially
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as
required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their
son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the
Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches
majority age.
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order,
and not being contrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is
hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains
existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of
complete separation is established in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The parties are
hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the conditions of their
Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as
between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the
matters treated in the aforesaid settlement.
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be
recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property
at the expense of the herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the
Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.[24]
(Acting
Chairman),
Callejo,
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
SO ORDERED.8
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment
denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise
known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological
incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a
decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was
the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and
separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity
as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains
that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000,
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different
ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage,
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the
rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner
violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this
petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the
matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an
essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be
raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
is a judgment or an order onthe merits; and (4) there is -- between
the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites.
What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard,
the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first
case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions
brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are
anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the
purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action
is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is
the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the
pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy,
that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same
took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence
of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties
are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose
and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court
stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two
actions are not necessarily for different causes of action
simply because the theory of the second would not have
been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot
preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of
the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound
to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or
injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable,
must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his
demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only
a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a
second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They
further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her
version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because
she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of
the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she
was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor
her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget ofP7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures
and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS)
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of
unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of
consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is
one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent.
Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code
revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that
the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36
as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45
(5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted
"[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would
amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though
were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein
the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are
expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do
you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is
the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has
been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the
petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that
her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel
jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological.
If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an
affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the
husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological
capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required
for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient
basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision
in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of
make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning
and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a
criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23,
1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal
Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to
Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of
De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the
one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the
case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was
accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed.
Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the
present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already
rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no
such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner
Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case
for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by
means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as
such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that
prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had
been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and
wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both
petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated
that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital
union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the
fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the
use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978,
when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen
that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no
pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be
undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the
order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City)
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private
respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of
Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant
therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June
25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo
A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In
the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was
the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force
exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it
merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both
her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972
already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence
because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were
compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;"
and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to
allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed
a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact
but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then
Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage
may be invoked only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also voidable
marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there
is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such,
it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
Separate Opinions
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe,
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the
following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family
Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR.,
being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January
28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 983056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and
Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a
concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
VINCENT
PAUL
G.
MERCADO
a.k.a.
VINCENT
G.
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July
14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) [1] in CA-GR CR No.
19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No.
13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G.
Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders]
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4)
months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial
courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the
parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before
MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of]
which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was
single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of
the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in
connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev.
Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the
Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a
church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva
bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired
by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod
City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case
before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on
March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case
was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time
he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having
been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused
posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially
declared null and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into
with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of
such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his
second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when
he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27,
1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife. [3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous
marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage,
but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of
any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in
order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to
Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner
married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City.While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this
time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the
Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable
marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent
court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all.[8] Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to
speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries [9] of former Justice
Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from
the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule
was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code.
Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted
without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was
bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose
earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject
in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a
person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void
marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: [22]
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable
marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the
Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that
the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.
could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
the
assailed
Damages
SO ORDERED.
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA
against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this
Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the
pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this
case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to
be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage
when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies
of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt
said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his
previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen
that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced
that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife
would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already
living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where
she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should
have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the
rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that
effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if the second
marriage were contracted prior to the decree ofannulment), the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being
independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for
bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and
that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist
the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first,
that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have
his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
THIRD DIVISION
his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission
to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November
1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38
Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He
also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no
news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and
later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as
to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to
refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He
also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of
life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried
to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her
son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she
gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on
22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no
information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed
to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility
is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted
as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment
contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain
the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly
asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally
reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even
try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet
Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it
very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead
a well-founded one.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico
was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously
been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at
Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11
February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a
court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter
of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the
sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the
latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond,
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositorappellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of
administration should be granted solely in favor of
oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision
appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and
a new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico
remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City,
belong to the conjugal partnership property with the
concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the
value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of the time
of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's
compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her
husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein
SECOND DIVISION
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICONAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The couple was happy during the first three years of their
married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their
home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only
twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a
bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in
love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him.
Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he
noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned
her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that
his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court
further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that
Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the
trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court
in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
[12]
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil
Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,
[14]
the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the
Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage; the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainants
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since
bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance
of the decision appealed from with modification.
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death
with respect to succession.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS
MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even
knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care
of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she
had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their
house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision
of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law,
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim,
the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes
bigamy, reads:
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code,
to wit:
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. [36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private
complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
(1)
(2)
(3)
With the effectivity of the Family Code, [44] the period of seven
years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court
in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and
the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the
appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where
an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case,
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are
based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that
the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[69]
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental
anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out
of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have
been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article
2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling,
in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) [68]
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society.
SO ORDERED.
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab
initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should
be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior
union, which would have been binding were it not for its being
bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the
answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity.2As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has
underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not,
unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised
by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in)
its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict
interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage
which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a
defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted
prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage
is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40
of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that
the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the
basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil
Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge SempioDiy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a
prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were
contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a
later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 7 the Family
Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for
purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent
marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication
to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to
amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile
the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church
laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential
marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other
grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal
requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence
of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a
party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a
voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is
judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code
considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before
its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a
voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume,
that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a
voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared
void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a
newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family
Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a
valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of
marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license,
mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively
easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity
of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent
Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
SUSAN
NICDAO
CARIO, petitioner,
CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
vs. SUSAN
YEE
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
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When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24,
1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160,
declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also
ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for
their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29,
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.The church
wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to
Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on
April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the
time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He
stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of
his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4,
1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without
a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted
in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980,
which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to
said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were
submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are
therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that
the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null
and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April
4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its
decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the
appellate court:
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that
effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be
conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this
Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity
of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual
milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife,
accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the
second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second
marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the
first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two
subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice
Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez
v.
Lipana,[12] and Consuegra
v.
Consuegra,
[13]
however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered
into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and
in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest
under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra,
and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was
void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he
got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the
second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were
born before the promulgation ofWiegel and the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza andAragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before
he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner
is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present
case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the
appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit and
perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from
her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the
church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent
using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents
allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage
license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was
the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate
was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after
the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud
sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents,
according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has
been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional
evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate
court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision
be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case
be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion,
plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brotherin-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living
at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with
whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from
her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he
is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino,
Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat
vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having
been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull,
Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the
true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of
the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at
defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion,
plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a
quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the
State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither
appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made
by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brotherin-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living
at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with
whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from
her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he
is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino,
and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at
the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate
was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after
the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud
sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents,
according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has
been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional
evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate
court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision
be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case
which must have been almost four months old at the time the
picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant
Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was
representing the Government, to answer the motion for
reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until
after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal
failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of
Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat
vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having
been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996]
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set
aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioners appeal from an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio
R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and
petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot
two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent
fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner
inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to
file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner
used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
[18]
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence.[19]
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious
defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer
should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by
default. He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer
to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance.[20]
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
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Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004]
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO
G. OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.,
On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the verified Complaint[1] of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs.
Macias) dated May 11, 2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias, partiality and
violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition of Civil
Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
entitled Mariano Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias.
The antecedents follow.
Mrs. Macias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on
the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to
Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was
still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: After
the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the
plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias Motion to
Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion
and then waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example
of railroading or procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion
to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr.
Macias evidence ex-parte.
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the
respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more
glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is
grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative
lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over
the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution,
dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable
to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing
of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the
case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Pasig submitted to the Court his report and recommendation, also
dated 3 December 1987.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case
study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case, testified on 27 October 1987
before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in
connection with the present petition. She declared that she had
interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection
with the contemplated adoption of the child. During the interview,
said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have
the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the
full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has
the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is
the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him. 9
SO ORDERED.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship
which went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of
the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task
of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more
suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed
by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant
status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer,
the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with
Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial
court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the
main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in
speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion
that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody
over the children through an automatic and blind application of the
age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again,
the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may
find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or
even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven
years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16,
1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence
of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were
unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony
remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by
the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the
filing by Teresita of the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992.
Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to support
petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an
impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in
the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in
which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must
be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor
of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of
the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations
were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on
matters within their respective knowledge and expertise. On this
matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert
examines certain contested documents, at the
request, not of a public officer or agency of the
Government, but of a private litigant, does not
necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its
purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of
its duty to settle correctly the issues relative to said
documents. Even a non-expert private individual
may examine the same, if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help, the court in the
determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert
private individual, does not, certainly become null
and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an
officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight
they choose upon such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the
province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion,
his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
relative opportunities for study and observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which reserve to illuminate his statements.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion
may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 10561058). The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity
to assess the witnesses' character and to observe their respective
demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we
believe that the trial court was correct in its action.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not
supported by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on
evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto
Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's
Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year
later, she had already driven across the continental United States to
commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in
Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to
dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to
picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo
about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped
by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC
lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given
credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this
Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against
privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is
not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to
the act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if
not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage
only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a
woman who had driven three days and three nights from California,
who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon
arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live
with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the
various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered
into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the
house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio
had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the
project in Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his coemployee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the daughter
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125041
"Atty. Lopez:
I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. & Mrs. Dany
Mangonon, dated October 19, 1991 addressed to Mr. Francisco
Delgado signed by "sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you
remember."
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. LOPEZ:
Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to you and
not to your son, Rico, for reasons we both are aware of." Do you
know what reason that is?
A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and
do not have fix salary and income and they want to depend on the
lolo.
x x x xlavvphi1.net
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and
lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.
parent loan program, she could very well support the college studies
of her daughters.
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to
support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and
Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him,
is at par with that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of the
Family Code on this subject provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to
fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has
a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of
in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to
how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may
give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may
allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option
cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral,
which should be considered.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not
avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that
prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin
daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The
correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound
feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being.
The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits
presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these,
however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered
for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as well as the arrearages due
them in accordance with this Decision within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to proceed
with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the
same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149, Makati,
is further directed to submit a report of his compliance with the
directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days
from compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been
done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in
arrears43 to be computed from the time they entered college until
they had finished their respective studies.
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on
petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is
best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would
be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente
lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid
with legal interest from the dates of actual payment. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March
1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated
12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati,
fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca
Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in
the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this
Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court
for the determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite
March 4, 1927
PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to
annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 10 December
1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private
respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same
respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion
to suspend hearings in the action for legal separation filed against
him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent
Judge from further hearing and trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by
criminal case. Authority for this position is this Court's decision in the
case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of
an action for legal separation would be proper if an allegation of
concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of
the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to
wit:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from
offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the
following rules shall he observed:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action
can not be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ...
(Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules
do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon the filing of a
criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by
the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:
The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon.
Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not
controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is
specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule
107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses
and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles
7 to 108, of the Civil Code." 2
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to
be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.
Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified,
as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute
divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds
for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement,
under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement
has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present
Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao. 5
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his
wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7
Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified
from hearing the case, as the grant of supportpendente lite and the
denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by
the petitioner as a disregard of applicable laws and existing
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution 2 of the CA dated
April 26, 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G.
Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston,
and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct.5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153206
DECISION
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and
William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being
inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang
ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her
hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever
he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William would also
scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the
buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9,
1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest
son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is
none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to
bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of
the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked
her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to
their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. 6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his
wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children
with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita
quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in
their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14,
1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house. 7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal
separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and
defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are
hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper
division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental
decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William)
had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which
made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no
day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had
regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her
wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him
about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
FELIX, J.:
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the case was
dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the
ground that there is absolutely no question of fact involved, the
motion being predicated on the assumption as true of the very facts
testified to by plaintiff-husband.
The facts of the case abridgedly stated are as follows: Benjamin
Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan,
Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their
marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila
Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband
by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to
study in a local college there.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10033
proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiffhusband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and
again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second
day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila,
instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he
took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and
failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his
wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against
his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative
defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a
reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on
June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6
witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor,
counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that
effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following grounds: (1)
Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of
"acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if
any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same
assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiffhusband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action
sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment.
as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the
objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and
petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have
the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that
they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on
30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage;
and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and,
along with several other claims involving money and other properties,
counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with
one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed
(the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy
died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner
duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition
for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for
legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing
the case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the
question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived,
which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to
reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of
the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations
court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969.
The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by
respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S.
Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court
below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that
dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and
void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed
substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion for
substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by
the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity
of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the
proceedings?
such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter,
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after
her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she
had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the
annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263
November 2, 1916
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside
of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's
demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case
after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the
defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his
own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7,
1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month,
when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the
plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who
always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was
unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from
his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she
was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and
follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph,
the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when
the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other
reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding
article.
1. The consorts.
xxx
xxx
xxx
support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was
the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than
the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already
been established by a final judgment in a criminal case.
Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the
proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may
not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the
decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In
this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses
and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to
administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave
her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in
accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large
amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and
being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted
this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for
support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in
reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her
answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not
legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily
conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be
canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the
defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after
due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action
upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that
high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial,
said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code,
providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide
each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the
other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated,
among which duties are those of their living together and
mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the
obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support
to the one who has no property and is in need of it for
other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein
enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the
spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife
seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from
the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In
this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband
who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode
without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the
judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for
divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don
Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he
claims, without however proving his contention, that the
person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she
turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it
results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the
husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he
consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to
support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in
article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article
143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground
that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of
the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates,
has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording
mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations,
so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court
of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did
hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under
consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the
other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final
judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the
other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in
this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every
particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated,
articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and
obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of
the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse
has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce,
such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part
of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results
therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults:
violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force
her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute
his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or
to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or
prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains
or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is
adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This
positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the
case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.
Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed,
the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in
reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since
the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December,
1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It
is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is
equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a
determination of the question whether the wife has a good and
sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the
instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that
the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the
other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the
spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part
of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and
order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in
the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that
date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived
together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when
the wife went away from their common home with the intention of
living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been
made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital
relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to
the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had
left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she
in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of
separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the
defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting
her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the
plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for
his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff
thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to
this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him,
reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his
wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have
carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and are of
the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The
evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are
chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have
attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to
pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a
reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to
record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of
the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has
given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any
person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the
wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no
more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the
spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become
involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be
recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was
without sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient
to dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the
obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife
is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly
expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement
of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned
upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the
existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined
that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to
live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him
to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos
Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses,
including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such
obligation, (Mercado vs.Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.)
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing
the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses
a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should
not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears
to have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition
of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to
her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income,
rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does
not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital
domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use
and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to
the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without
special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G..R. No. 132424
May 2, 2006
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina
(Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz dated June 22, 1994
involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and private respondents legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949
when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as
a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A
few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in
Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia Palang, was born
on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the
Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his yearlong sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in
Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence
that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii.[1] When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with
private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.
PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the
residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house
standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of
agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced
by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his
deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural
land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under
TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the
former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision
becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any
claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of
all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina
Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of
deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate
action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22,
1994 with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and another one entered:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article
148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property
by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that
she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sarisari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on
the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around
twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it
is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no
proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months
before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an
afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their
case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of
the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation
insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount
demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the
defendant appeals.
The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this
case, and its finding of fact, as follows:
It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that
plaintiffs are husband and wife and residents of the city of
Manila; that the defendant is a foreign corporation organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Great Britain
and duly registered in the Philippine Islands, and Smith, Bell
& Co. (limited), a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its principal domicile
in the city of Manila, is the agent in the Philippine Islands of
said defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff
Mrs. Henry E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker
automobile, registered number 2063, in the city of Manila;
that on said date; in consideration of the payment to the
defendant of the premium of P150, by said plaintiff, Mrs.
Henry E. Harding, with the consent of her husband, the
defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell &
Company (limited), made its policy of insurance in writing
upon said automobile was set forth in said policy to be
P3,000 that the value of said automobile was set forth in said
policy (Exhibit A) to be P3,000; that on March 24, 1916, said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that the loss
thereby to plaintiffs was the sum of P3,000; that thereafter,
within the period mentioned in the said policy of insurance,
the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, furnished the defendant
the proofs of her said loss and interest, and otherwise
performed all the conditions of said policy on her part, and
that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part
thereof, although due demand was made upon defendant
therefor.
date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold the
said automobile No. 2063 to J. Brannigan, of Los Baos,
Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of P2,000 (Exhibit 3);
that under date of December 20, 1915, J. C. Graham of Los
Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said automobile
No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the sum
of P2,800 (Exhibit 4 and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on
or about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the
said automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of
the plaintiffs, as a present; that said automobile was repaired
and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900
(testimony of Mr. Server); that while the said automobile was
at the Luneta Garage; the said Luneta Garage, acting as
agent for Smith, Bell & Company, (limited), solicited of the
plaintiff Mrs. Harding the insurance of said automobile by the
defendant Company (testimony of Mrs. Henry Harding and
Mr. Server); that a proposal was filled out by the said agent
and signed by the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding, and in said
proposal under the heading "Price paid by proposer," is the
amount of "3,500" and under another heading "Present
value" is the amount of "3,000" (Exhibit 1).
The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was
made a representative of the Manila agent of defendant went
to the Luneta Garage and examined said automobile No.
2063 and Mr. Server, the General Manager of the Luneta
Garage, an experienced automobile mechanic, testified that
at the time this automobile was insured it was worth about
P3,000, and the defendant, by and through its said agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter issued a policy of
insurance upon proposal in which policy the said automobile
was described as of the "present value" of P3,000 and the
said defendant charged the said plaintiff Mrs. Henry E.
Harding as premium on said policy the sum of P150, or 5 per
cent of the then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)
have been shown that they were incorrect in the absence of proof of
willful misstatement. Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be
regarded as the act of the insurer and not of the insured. This
question was considered in the case of the Union Insurance
Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in which the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
This question has been decided differently by courts of the
highest respectability in cases precisely analogous to the
present. It is not to be denied that the application logically
considered, is the work of the assured, and if left to himself
or to such assistance as he might select, the person so
selected would be his agent, and he alone would be
responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known, so well that
no court would be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that
insurance companies organized under the laws of one State,
and having in that State their principal business office, send
these agents all over the land, with directions to solicit and
procure applications for policies furnishing them with printed
arguments in favor of the value and necessity of life
insurance, and of the special advantages of the corporation
which the agent represents. They pay these agents large
commissions on the premiums thus obtained, and the
policies are delivered at their hands to the assured. The
agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to activity in
procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner
induced to take out a policy, rarely sees or knows anything
about the company or its officers by whom it is issued, but
looks to and relies upon the agent who has persuaded him to
effect insurance as the full and complete representative of
the company, in all that is said or done in making the
contract. Has he not a right to so regard him? It is quite true
that the reports of judicial decisions are filled with the efforts
of these companies, by their counsel, to establish the
doctrine for the acts of these agents to the simple receipt of
the premium and delivery of the policy, the argument being
that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the agent of the
We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that
the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and
from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through
violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the
improbable and biased testimony of appellant's daughter,
Concepcion C. Martelino, whom the trial court, refused to believe,
considering that her version of violence and harassment was
contradicted by Bartolome Gualberto who had lived with the
Rodriguez spouses from 1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of
Rodriguez threatening his stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public
who ratified her signature. Furthermore, as pointed out by the
appealed decision, the charge of duress should be treated with
caution considering that Rodriguez had already died when the suit
was brought, for duress, like fraud, is not to be lightly paid at the door
of men already dead. (Cf. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.] 481,
498; Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).
What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of
consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years
after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in
1962, twenty eight (28) years after the intimidation is claimed to have
occurred, and no less than nine (9) years after the supposed culprit
died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of
subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts
that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is
clearly barred.
Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is
that they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent for lack of
consideration. We shall examine each purported defect separately.
The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of
simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired
or intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it
to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and
control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But
appellant contends that the sale by her to her daughter, and the
subsequent sale by the latter to appellant and her husband, the late
Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the
property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest
in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations from one
spouse to another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If
this is true, then the appellant and her daughter must have intended
the two conveyance to be real and effective; for appellant could not
intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time
vest half of them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then
could not have been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully
operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.
Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts
the law against donations between spouses make them simulated
ones.
Ferrara, in his classic book, "La Simulacion de los Negocios
Juridicos" (Sp. trans, 1926), pp. 95, 105, clearly explains the
difference between simulated transactions and transactions
in fraudem legis:
Otra figura que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el fraus
legis. Tambien aqui se da una gran confusion que persiste
aun en la jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguos
errores. Se debe a Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la
antitesis teorica que existe entre negocio fingido y negocio
fraudulento y haber atacado la doctrina comun que hacia
una mescolanza con los dos conceptos.
Se confunde dice (2) , el negocio in fraudem legis con
el negocio simulado; aunque la naturaleza de ambos sea
totalmente diversa. El negocio fraudulento no es, en
absolute, un negocio aparente. Es perfectamente serio: se
quiere realmente. Es mas, se quiere tal como se ha
realizado, con todas las consecuencias que correspondent a
xxx
xxx
the mortgagor's wife, when her husband died, "found among his
papers Porta's cancellation of the mortgage in his favor and the draft
of the complaint for foreclosure." Plainly, the precedent cited is here
inapplicable.
Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from
the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack
of consideration? We do not find them to be so. In the first
transaction, the price of P2,500.00 is recited in the deed itself (Exh.
A); in the second (Exh. B), the consideration set forth is P3,000.00.
Now, Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when the deeds
were executed) provided that
In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each
contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or
service by the other. (emphasis supplied.)
Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a
definite price in money, such undertaking constituted in themselves
actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the fishponds.
That the prices were not paid (assuming ad arguendo that
Concepcion Martelino's testimony, to this effect is true) does not
make the sales inexistent for want of causa. As ruled in Enriquez de
la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982, "the consideration (causa) need not
pass from one (party) to the other at the time the contract is entered
into x x x . The consideration need not be paid at the time of the
promise. The one promise is a consideration for the other."
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the
fact that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal
prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article
1334, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That
illegal purpose tainted the contracts, for as held by the Spanish
Tribunal Supreme in its decision of 2 April 1941.
ha de ser reputado ineficaz, por exigencias includibles del
caracter social y moral del Derecho, todo contrato que
xxx
xxx
That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the
illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract was
expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 449-450.2
Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of
the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934,
because she was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action
was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of friendly
relations between her and defendants-appellees. Appellant's inaction
to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame
excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of
the effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the
exercise of diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of inexcusable
negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches. (Go Chi Gun,
etc., et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., G.R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955). Even
assuming for the sake of argument that appellant held her peace,
during the lifetime of her husband, out of legitimate fear for her life,
there is no justification for her future to bring the proper action after
his death in 1953. Instead, she entered into a series of agreements
with herein appellees, the children of her husband by a prior
marriage, of partition, usufruct and lease of their share in the
fishponds, transactions that necessarily assumed that Rodriguez had
acquired one-half of the litigated fishponds. In the circumstances,
appellant's cause has become a stale demand and her conduct
placed her in estoppel to question the Validity of the transfer of her
properties. (Manila, et al. vs. Galvan, et al., G.R. No. L-23507, May
24, 1967; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695-696).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
DE
C.
C.
A.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a
deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T.
Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution [3] denying
reconsideration.
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the
common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct and is a
reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts,
and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality
of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent
or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture
or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases;
cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed.,
p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence
from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v.
Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584. [26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only
to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court
the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the
illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of
the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was taken over
by the new owner.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitioner's complaint against the private respondent Lily Yulo and A
& L Industries and ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent Lily
Yulo P660,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as unrealized
profits; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision except for the exemplary damages which it reduced
from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00 and the attorney's fees which
were reduced from P30,000.00 to P20,000.00.
In resolving the question of whether or not the trial court erred in
holding that the signature of respondent Lily Yulo in the special
power of attorney was forged, the Court of Appeals said:
The crucial issue to be determined is whether or not
the signatures of the appellee Lily Yulo in Exhibits B
and B-1 are forged. Atty. Crispin Ordoa, the Notary
Public, admitted in open court that the parties in the
subject documents did not sign their signatures in
his presence. The same were already signed by the
supposed parties and their supposed witnesses at
the time they were brought to him for ratification. We
quote from the records the pertinent testimony of
Atty. Ordoa, thus:
shown not only by the fact that the petitioner did not present the
Deed of Assignment or the construction agreement or any evidence
whatsoever to support its claim of fraud on the part of the private
respondent and to justify the issuance of a preliminary attachment,
but also by the following findings:
Continuing and elaborating further on the
appellant's mala fide actuations in securing the writ
of attachment, the lower court stated as follows:
Plaintiff not satisfied with the instant
case where an order for attachment
has already been issued and
enforced, on the strength of the
same Promissory Note (Exhibit"A"),
utilizing the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage (Exhibit "4"), filed a
foreclosure proceedings before the
Office of the Sheriff of Caloocan
(Exhibit"6") foreclosing the
remaining properties found inside
the premises formerly occupied by
the A & L Industries. A minute
examination of Exhibit "4" will show
that the contracting parties thereto,
as appearing in par. 1 thereof, are
Augusto Yulo, doing business under
the style of A & L Industries (should
be A & L Glass Industries
Corporation), as mortgagor and BA
Finance Corporation as mortgagee,
thus the enforcement of the Chattel
Mortgage against the property of A &
L Industries exclusively owned by
Lily T. Yulo appears to be without
any factual or legal basis
whatsoever. The chattel mortgage,
Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon for the
issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be equated with
bad faith or malicious intent. The steps which were taken by the
petitioner to ensure the security of its claim were premised, on the
firm belief that the properties involved could be made answerable for
the unpaid obligation due it. There is no question that a loan in the
amount of P591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual damages and
not for exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Respondent Lily
Yulo has manifested before this Court that she no longer desires the
return of the attached properties since the said attachment caused
her to close down the business. From that time she has become a
mere employee of the new owner of the premises. She has grave
doubts as to the running condition of the attached machineries and
equipments considering that the attachment was effected way back
in 1975. She states as a matter of fact that the petitioner has already
caused the sale of the machineries for fear that they might be
destroyed due to prolonged litigation. We, therefore, deem it just and
equitable to allow private respondent Lily Yulo to recover actual
damages based on the value of the attached properties as proven in
the trial court, in the amount of P660,000.00. In turn, if there are any
FELICIANO, J.:
The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the Decision
dated 9 December 1986 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
03299. The appellate court affirmed a Decision dated 31 May 1983
of Branch 83 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2896-C filed by petitioner company
against private respondent spouses.
On 2 May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed
between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont Resort Hotel
Enterprises, Inc. ("Marmont"), a corporation engaged in the hotel and
resort business with office and establishment at Olongapo City.
Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and
to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water
supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for a
stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its contract, Maris
Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a
parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, then occupied by
respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang.
during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact,
given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora.
Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the
document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the
second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto
is sufficiently manifested in the document itself.
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no consequence here.
Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over
said land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights
over the same which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor
of third persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer
such rights (over the portion upon which the water pump was
installed) to Maris Trading, as evidenced by the fourth paragraph of
the second Memorandum of Agreement, quoted earlier. Furthermore,
assuming (though only for the sake of argument) that the alienation
to Maris Trading was legally objectionable, respondent spouses are
not the proper parties to raise the issue of invalidity, they and Maris
Trading being in pari delicto. Only the government may raise that
issue.
Finally, respondent spouses allege that dismissal of the complaint by
the trial court was not improper as petitioner Marmont was not privy
to the second Memorandum of Agreement, and that accordingly,
petitioner had no valid cause of action against respondents.
A closer scrutiny of the second and third paragraphs of the second
Memorandum of Agreement discloses that the first Memorandum of
Agreement, including the obligations imposed thereunder upon Maris
Trading, had been acknowledged therein:
That the First Party (i.e., Maris Trading) has dug,
drilled and tapped water source for Marmont Resort,
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in
accordance with their agreement executed on May
2, 1975and notarized before Isagani M. Jungco,
III
The trial court erred in not construing the terms of
the bonds in favor of the plaintiff-appellant PNB and
against the defendant-appellee Luzon Surety
Company, Inc.
IV
I
The trial court erred in holding that defendantappellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. "guaranteed
only the faithful performance of the deed of
assignment, Exh. "C", and nothing else"; in holding
the defense of the appellee Luzon Surety Company,
Inc., that there has been no breach of the terms and
conditions of the bonds Exhs. "D" and "E"; in finding
that the "bonds" can only be therefore understood to
guarantee that the payment due from the GSIS to
Depusoy would be delivered unto the bank.
II
The trial court erred in not finding that the bonds
(Exhs. "D" and "E") should be read jointly with the
resolutions approving the loan (Exhs. "K" to "K-5"),
the promissory notes and the deed of assignment in
the determination of the true intent of the parties in
the execution of the bonds which are the basis of the
liability of the defendant-appellee Luzon Surety
Company, Inc., in not considering resolutions Exhs.
"K" to "K-5"; promissory notes Exhs. "B", "G", and
"H" and the deed of assignment, Exh. "C" as integral
parts of the surety bonds Exhs. "D" and "E" as
therein incorporated by reference in said surety
bonds as such necessarily bound the appellee
Luzon Surety Company to their terms.
VI
The trial court erred in not finding that when appellee
Depusoy incurred breach (sic) in his construction
contract with the Bureau of Public Works said default
on the part of the principal in his contract resulted in
a consequent breach of his undertaking under the
deed of assignment; and that consequently any
breach in the undertaking of the principal in said
deed of assignment communicated liability to the
surety; in not finding likewise that breach on the part
of the appellee Depusoy in his undertaking under the
promissory notes meant breach of the terms of the
deed of assignment which incorporated said
promissory notes and that this breach in the deed of
assignment communicated liability to the surety
under the terms of the bonds; and that trial court
(sic) erred in not finding that there was a breach of
the bonds due to the failure of the appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc. to see to it that the full amount
of P1,309,461.89 remitted by the GSIS to the PNB
was actually received by the PNB; in not finding that
the PNB did not receive all the amounts still due to
the said institutions as remitted by the GSIS under
the terms of the deed of assignment.
VII
The trial court erred in not sentencing defendantappellee Estanislao Depusoy to pay the attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts due and the
costs of the suit.
VIII
The trial court erred in not admitting in the evidence
proof of the amount actually received by the foreign
practice of the
Philippine National
Bank in cases
where a surety
company
guarantees the
account of the
borrower, the
Philippine National
Bank requires the
surety company to
sign the promissory
note as a co-maker,
is it not?
A In case the
condition is
approved, the
surety I remember
very well, the last
accommodation
given to Mr.
Depusoy . . . that
was the condition,
but the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. did not want to
sign, so at the
request of the
Luzon Surety
Company, Inc. and
Mr. Depusoy, the
approved
accommodation
was modified in
such a way as only
to the surety bond.
COURT: Answer.
A As usual, as at
the beginning, we
take it that your
bonding the Deed of
Assignment is the
understanding that
all payments for the
whole contract will
go to us. (TSN, pp.
55-57, July 21,
1958)
COURT: Answer.
A Well, apparently
that was the
intention because
you decided to sign
jointly and severally
the promissory
note.
Q And because that
was our intention
the Philippine
National Bank
agreed to that
desire of Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. by issuing only
a similar surety
bond and not
signing as comaker, and jointly
and severally on the
promissory note?
ATTY. NERI:
Objection Your
Honor, the contract
is the best
evidence.
ATTY. NERI: We
refer to the
document, Your
Honor.
COURT: Sustained.
(TSN, pp. 9-10,
June 26, 1959)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. NERI: Now,
Mr. Depusoy in his
testimony stated
that when you
received these
amounts from the
GSIS and issued
credit memos . . . in
favor of Mr.
Depusoy, you did
not notify the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc. of the fact of
the issuance of this
(sic) credit memos
in favor of Mr.
Depusoy will you
state to this
Honorable Court the
reason why is that
you did not give
notice to the Luzon
Surety Company,
Inc.?
Except for the third assigned error, We find no merit in this petition.
The issues raised are factual.
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals can withstand the most
incisive scrutiny. They are sufficiently supported by the evidence on
record and the conclusions drawn therefrom do not justify a
departure from the deeply rooted and well settled doctrine that
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on this
Court, 19 considering that the recognized exceptions thereto 20 do not
come to the rescue of petitioner.
We are in full accord with the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the bonds executed by private respondent
LSCI were to guarantee the faithful performance of Depusoy of his
obligation under the Deed of Assignment and not to guarantee the
payment of the loans or the debt of Depusoy to petitioner to the
extent of P100,000.00. The language of the bonds is clear, explicit
and unequivocal. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 1370 of
the Civil Code provides:
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
Besides, even if there had been any doubt on the terms and
conditions of the surety agreement, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the surety. As concretely put in Article 2055 of the Civil Code,
"A guaranty is not presumed, it must be expressed and cannot
extend to more than what is stipulated therein."
In the recent case of Umali, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 We
reiterated the unrippled rule that the liability of the surety is measured
by the terms of the contract, and, while he is liable to the full extent
thereof, such liability is strictly limited to that assumed by its terms. 22
In La Insular vs. Machuca Go Tanco, et al., supra., this Court held:
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
as used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the definitions above
reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute abandonment of
the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation.
Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did
not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record
conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family
despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by
the complainant, although she minimized the amount of support
given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good reason to
believe, however, that she and the children received more than this
amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children continued
to draw from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially
corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were not
rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the
plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the
plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently
played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to
spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife
and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the
conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People
v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife,
continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and
that of their minor child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment",
which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
since contributing to their support negatived such intent. In re Hoss'
Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family
where the evidence disclosed that he almost always did give his wife
part of his earnings during the period of their separation and that he
gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a
concubine, we believe, contrary to the findings of the court a quo,
partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a
denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the
husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a
cause of action.1wph1.t
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance
in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic
policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to
preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of
separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and
the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the
Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of
property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in
marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by
formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage
(Article 190, new Civil Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code):
and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for
causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. 8
Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets
where there has been no real abandonment, the separation not
being wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut the door for
possible reconciliation. The estranged spouses may drift irreversibly
further apart; the already broken family solidarity may be irretrievably
shattered; and any flickering hope for a new life together may be
completely and finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the
wife in 1958, long before the devaluation of the Philippine peso in
1962, should be increased to P3,000.
On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the
defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for the
plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask for adequate support,
an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff must be made. Ample
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-08268 1affirming the order
of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's
The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are
undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as found by the trial court
and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A
certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10)
hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with
the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista
and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having
defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates
of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser
thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the
parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included
petitioner as defendant therein.
It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land
were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of
P600,000.00. On the same day, the properties were resold by the
latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for the
purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7,
1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for
P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that private respondent, did
not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service
Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as
not to preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility
of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
1. That the lower court erred in considering the fact that the said
Matea E. Rodriguez did not intervene in said action for partition
between the said Hilarion de la Cruz and his children of the first
marriage as sufficient to show that she had no interest in the lands in
question.
2. That the court erred in declaring that the said Hilarion de la Cruz
was the owner of the lands in question, for simple fact that he had
been administering said lands during the entire period of his
marriage with the present plaintiff.
3. That the court erred in finding from the evidence that the said
Hilarion de la Cruz has acquired said lands during the existence of
his marriage relation with the said Andrea de Leon, his first wife, and
that said lands were not inherited by the present plaintiff from her
deceased father.
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that for the reason that the said Matea E.
Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for partition
between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, her
interest in said lands was in no way prejudiced by the decision of the
court in that cause.
Section 277 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions provides,
among other things, that proceedings in a cause against one person
can not affect the rights of another.
It is admitted by the parties in the present action that the said Matea
E. Rodriguez was not made a party in the former action for the
partition between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la
Cruz, neither is it shown that she had any knowledge or information
concerning the existence or pendency of said action.,
With reference of the second assignment of error above noted, it is
admitted that soon after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz
with the present plaintiff he commenced to administer the property in
question. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a
husband from administering the property of his wife, as her
Promulgated:
MELKI E. PEREZ,
Respondent.
June 8, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SECOND DIVISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DAVID V.
PELAYO,
PELAYO
and
Petitioners,
LORENZA* B.
PUNO, Chairman
- versus -
on April 20, 1999 which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 91-46;
CALLEJO, SR.,
and the CA Resolution dated December 17, 1999 denying petitioners
TINGA, and
motion for reconsideration.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering and
directing the defendants to pay
plaintiff Melki Perez the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos as
principal with 12% interest per
annum starting from the date of filing
of the complaint on August 1, 1991
until plaintiff is fully paid.
The
defendants
shall
likewise pay to plaintiff the sum of
THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) as
attorneys fees.
then promulgated its Decision on April 20, 1999 whereby it ruled that
by Lorenzas signing as witness to the execution of the deed, she had
knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given her
consent to the same; that herein petitioners failed to adduce
sufficient proof to overthrow the presumption that there was
consideration for the deed, and that petitioner David Pelayo, being a
lawyer, is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed
the deed with full knowledge of its contents and import. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, declaring as valid and
declaring the same as null and void for being fictitious or simulated
and on the basis of Art. 491, Par. 2 of the New Civil Code which
prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase properties from his
principal under his charge.
assailed Decision that there was consideration for the contract and
brief.
resolving
the
first
appeal
docketed
as
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
allowed to file their appellees brief as their counsel failed to file the
part of, the landowner-seller retained area and when the total
reconsideration, they did not even cite any errors made by the CA in
its Decision.
does not exceed five (5) hectares; that in this case, the land in
dispute is only 1.3 hectares and there is no proof that the transferees
(herein respondent) total landholding inclusive of the subject land will
exceed 5 hectares, the landholding ceiling prescribed by R.A. No.
6657; that the failure of respondent to register the instrument was not
due to his fault or negligence but can be attributed to Lorenzas
after the effectivity of said law; (b) for lack of marital consent; (c) for
being prohibited under Article 1491 (2) of the Civil Code; and (d) for
lack of consideration.
We rule against petitioners.
The issue of whether or not the deed of sale is null and void
under R.A. No. 6657, for respondents failure to register said
document with the Register of Deeds within three months after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, had been resolved with finality by the CA
in its Decision dated November 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38700.
[4]
Court and the same became final and executory on January 7, 1995.
Thus, under the principle of law of the case, said ruling of the
CA is now binding on petitioners. Such principle was elucidated
in Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals,[6] to wit:
[5]
November 24, 1994 which then attained finality, the ruling that the
to the life of petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal
many feared for being a leftist/activist, offered his help in driving out
said illegal occupants.
contract of sale.
[8]
certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between
her husband and respondent.
husband
property
consent.
consent,
same.
evidence was ever presented to show that Lorenza was in any way
lacking in her mental faculties and, hence, could not have fully
...
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the
court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife
whose consent was not obtained. [11] In the present case, despite
respondents repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on
all the pages of the deed of sale, showing respondents insistence on
enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment
of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a complaint for
...
assailed contract.
...
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that
Lorenza knew of the full import of the transaction between
respondent and her
respondent, are also deemed to have given their consent to the sale
of the subject property in favor of respondent, thereby making the
transaction an exception to the general rule that agents are
Such act is a clear indication that they intended to convey the subject
property to herein respondent and the deed of sale was not merely
simulated or fictitious.
Verily, in the present case, petitioners have not presented proof that
By
movant-defendant-appellees
own
information, his counsel received a copy of the
decision on May 5, 1999. He, therefore, had fifteen
(15) days from said date or up to May 20, 1999 to
file the motion. The motion, however, was sent
through a private courier and, therefore, considered
to have been filed on the date of actual receipt on
June 17, 1999 by the addressee Court of Appeals,
was filed beyond the reglementary period.
motion. The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had
[18]
Definitely,
we held that:
therefore,
the
denial
of
petitioners
motion
for
did not infringe petitioners right to due process as any issue that
petitioners wanted to raise could and should have been contained in
said motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which
affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil
Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were
married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses
purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San
Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real
Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of coownership.[12] Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the
validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s
share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[13] it was held that the sale of a
conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
[14]
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that
the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale. The same principle
in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code
as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on
August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between respondent and her late husband. [15] With
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gainsin the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. [16]
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance.[17] Unlike the absolute community
of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner,[18] the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. [19] Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third
party?
This issue confronts us in this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the November 9, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48107.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real
and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot
of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan,
Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
49158 was levied on.
The RTC rendered its decision3 on June 20, 1994. It held respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally
liable to petitioner for P5,304,000 plus 12% interest per annum and
5% penalty commencing on June 21, 1982 until fully paid,
plus P10,000 as attorneys fees. It, however, found that the obligation
contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on
the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner makes two basic assertions: (1) the RTC and CA erred in
finding that respondent corporation availed ofP9,952,000 only from
its credit line and not the entire P14,000,000 and (2) the RTC and CA
were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez
spouses could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by
individual respondent Martinez.
We uphold the CA.
Factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, will not
be disturbed on appeal but must be accorded great weight. 4 These
findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on this Court as
well.5
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the amount availed of by
respondent corporation from its credit line with petitioner was
only P9,952,000. Both courts correctly pointed out that petitioner
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of
the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit.
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1991,
reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24120, entitled "Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross
Insurance, Inc."
Petitioner's plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October
12, 1989, she filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission
alleging, inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of
P7,535.00, private respondent executed a policy of sickness and
accident insurance; that on August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted
to a hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for
cholecystitis; that petitioner paid the hospital and doctor's bills in the
aggregate sum of P48,934.05, the same being the actual hospital
and professional fees charged to her; and that private respondent
wrongfully refused to pay petitioner the said amount which she is
entitled to recover under the policy.
Private respondent's answer raised the special and affirmative
defenses that under the insurance policy, definitions and exclusions
were clearly specified and among the exclusions are conditions
which pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which
the insured was aware or should reasonably be aware; and that
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence petitioner's sickness
is non-compensable.
On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its
decision in I.C. Case No. 3277 in favor of petitioner ordering private
respondent to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied,
plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. In the main, the Insurance
Commission, after a review of the evidence presented, concluded
that petitioner's illness, contrary to private respondent's defenses,
was not a pre-existing disease and therefore, is fully compensable. 1
It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless ENDING delays
and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 19 For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply
strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to
warrant the Court's suspension of the rules. 20 Otherwise, the rules
must strictly apply, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The challenged resolution of
respondent court dated May 8, 1991 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and its resolution of March 15, 1991 is REINSTATED. The
decision of the Insurance Commission in I.C. Case No. 3277, dated
September 21, 1990, is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 21
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JESUS BERNAS and
REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners
in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as Lot 13, their ownership
being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3239 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas,
adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed on May 2, 1952. The southern portion, described
as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the northern, to
Federico. 1
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his
name from the Capiz Registry of Property, numbered T-1346. He
died on April 20, 1973, at the age of 81 years. His wife, Victoria
Comorro, predeceased him dying at age 70 on July 16, 1971. They
had no children. 2
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate
children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These
two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As security therefor
they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C. In the
"Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage" executed between
them and Bernas on October 30, 1975, they described themselves
as the absolute co-owners of Lot 13-C. A relative, Raymundo Aranas,
signed the agreement as a witness. 3
2) that the wills above described were probated only after the
filing of the case (No. V-4188);
3) that Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas are
not children of either Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro;
of law. This is what Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that
to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter
alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that
which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title." Thus,
even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot
13-C took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot
would nonetheless be his "exclusive property" because acquired by
him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two (2)
years ahead of her husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of
Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never
therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of
Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva
or anybody else.
It would seem, however, that there are improvements standing on Lot
13-C, and it is to these improvements that Consolacion Villanueva's
claims are directed. The question then is, whether or not the
improvements are conjugal property, so that Victoria Comorro may
be said to have acquired a right over them by succession, as
voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either
the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership," and
buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same." 10 Proof, therefore, is needful of the
time of the making or construction of the improvements and the
source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character
of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to
one spouse separately. No such proof was presented or proferred by
Consolacion Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that the
land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of
Modesto Aranas and that where, as here, property is registered in
the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when
precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that it
belongs exclusively to said spouse. 11 It is not therefore possible to
declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.
FIRST DIVISION
SO ORDERED.[1]
The antecedents are as follows:
FIRST DIVISION
its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but recognized
his reluctance to prosecute.[5]
Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan
but they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal
separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on August 31, 1977;[6] that during their marriage, they bought a
residential lot consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 46249[7]and that the funds used in the
construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan
she and her husband secured, although it was her husband and
mother-in-law who drew the loan.[8]
Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried
to establish the following: (a) that the family business, Bel Air Auto
Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982 on account
of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that
Alfonso had no more claim against the family business because he
borrowed heavily on his equity in the family business and from his
brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by
them from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed
money from their sister, Lolita, and as a consequence thereof,
mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso
failed to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question
was constructed using funds from a loan contracted by their mother
from the Social Security System (SSS). [9] No documentary evidence,
however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation
that the property was inherited from their mother.
As above-stated, a Decision[10] dated July 12, 1991 was
rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot with
improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through
installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and
their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot was acquired
during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be
deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal
property of the spouses. However, with respect to the business
dealing in auto spare parts, the same had been dissolved due to
losses.
On September 19, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[11] of the decision contending that the 906-square
meter lot, together with other properties, was actually inherited by the
Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on
December 15, 1968 but said lot was adjudicated to the three (3)
brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8,
1969, xerox copy of which was attached to the motion. [12] The lot was
described in the document as:
A parcel of land (lot 6448-C-5 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd21849 being a portion of Lot 6448-C with an area of 906 sq. meters
and described on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38759. Tax
declaration No. 022318. Assessed at P2,800.00.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs which was the basis
of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot in question
from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during
the trial.[13]
Aggrieved by the ruling, private respondents, the spouses
Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita
Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
reversed and set aside the said judgment. Respondent court ruled
that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage
of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan
brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their
exclusive property.
We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:
x x x. It is true that under the New Civil Code, all properties of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
be proved that it pertains to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160,
NCC).The provision of law on presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property requires the party who invoked it to prove first that the
property in controversy was acquired during marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22300, May 22, 1960, 23 SCRA
637-644).
On the other hand, the herein appellants, thru Maximo Tan, insist that
the property in dispute was acquired by inheritance from their late
mother Trinidad Uy Tan, who died on 15 November 1968 (pp. 17-17a, TSN; Dec. 21, 1990). There is documentary proof to support the
testimony of Maximo Tan that indeed the property in dispute was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother,
Trinidad Uy Tan. We note that the 906-square meter lot is registered
in the name of: ALFONSO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Eteria Teves of Bulacao, Pardo, Cebu City; CELESTINO U. TAN,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Rosario Dy Kushin of Banawa, Hill
No. 2; and MAXIMO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, single; of Banawa,
Hill No. 2, of Cebu City, Philippines, with equal shares. From the very
wording of the title, it can be deduced that 1/3 portion of the property
solely belongs to Alfonso Tan. The property is registered in the
names of the three brothers as married to their respective
spouses. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed:
(H)ad the property been acquired by them (spouses) during
coverture, it would have been registered in the name not of
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez' but the spouses
'Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez' (Ponce de Leon vs.
R.F.C., 36 SCRA 289, 312).
The title further states that the property is subject to the 'liabilities
imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, for a period of
two (2) years, from January 9, 1970, against the estate of the
deceased Trinidad Uy'. (Exh. 'A') [underlines Ours]. This condition
supports the contention of the herein appellants that the lot was
inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. It
shows that the 1/3 portion of the property belongs exclusively to
Alfonso U. Tan, and that it is not part of the conjugal partnership of
gains.[14]
From this ruling, Eteria Teves Tan seeks a second assessment
of the case in the present petition for review raising the following
errors, to wit:
1. That since respondent Court of Appeals had already ruled that 1/3
portion of the lot in litigation was acquired by Alfonso Tan while said
Alfonso Tan and his wife Eteria were still living together, the
presumption of conjugality remains and it is not petitioner but private
respondents who have the burden of proof to prove otherwise.
2. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of
the lot in question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because
the Certificate of Title states that the lot is registered in the name of
ALFONSO U. TAN, xxx married to Eteria Teves xxx; CELESTINO U.
TAN xxx married to Rosario Dy Kushin xxx and MAXIMO U. TAN is
against well-settled jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.[15]
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.[16] It is not necessary, to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. [17] So that when an immovable
was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is considered as
conjugal property.[18] In fact, even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and
it will be considered conjugal property.[19]
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence that the property belongs
exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.[20]
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the
undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the
conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had
inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the
property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan,
married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy
Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear
from TCT No. 46249 that the title was entered on January 9, 1970
and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late
Trinidad Uy to her children when she died intestate and which
property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the
Extrajudicial
Declaration
of
Heirs
and Adjudication
of
Properties. While this document was not admitted as evidence
because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents'
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the
source of the property can be reasonably and materially inferred from
TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is
subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court for a period of two (2) years, from January 9, 1979 against
the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy." [21] Such imposition on
property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived
of their lawful participation of the estate of the decedent. The
presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249, which was carried over
from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of
summary settlement of an estate from where the property was
derived, that of private respondents' deceased mother. There can be
no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to
Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as
Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148
of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
x x x.
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
x x x.
In Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [22] we ruled that
the husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his
marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively
property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by
lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil
Code.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of
the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, has appealed to this court
19. That at the time of the death of the deceased and at all
times thereafter including the date when the said insurance
policy was paid, the insurance policy was not in the hands or
possession of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, nor in the possession of the herein
plaintiff, nor in the possession of her attorney-in-fact the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, but the same was in the
hands of the Head Office of the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, at Montreal, Canada;
20. That on July 13, 1928, the Bank of the Philippine Islands
as administrator of the decedent's estate received from the
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, the
sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance
policy, as shown in the statement of income and expenses of
the estate of the deceased submitted on June 18, 1929, by
the administrator to the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil
case No. 33089;
First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid
Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the
sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on
the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same
date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said
Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's
estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate,
and then returned the money to said widow.
Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 10
of Act No. 2835 and section 1 of Act No. 3031, contains the following
relevant provision:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every
transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest,
gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance,
devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine
Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise
which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any
shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation
or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the
Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares
or rights in any partnership, business or industry established
in the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located
in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:
xxx
xxx
xxx
former state, and is not taxable in the state where it is for the
time being. . . . .
Property merely in transit through a state ordinarily is not
taxable there. Transit begins when an article is committed to
a carrier for transportation to the state of its destination, or
started on its ultimate passage. Transit ends when the goods
arrive at their destination. But intermediate these points
questions may arise as to when a temporary stop in transit is
such as to make the property taxable at the place of
stoppage. Whether the property is taxable in such a case
usually depends on the length of time and the purpose of the
interruption of transit. . . . .
. . . It has been held that property of a construction company,
used in construction of a railroad, acquires a situs at the
place where used for an indefinite period. So tangible
personal property in the state for the purpose of undergoing
a partial finishing process is not to be regarded as in the
course of transit nor as in the state for a mere temporary
purpose. (2 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., pp. 982,
983 and 988, par. 452.)
If the proceeds of the life-insurance policy taken out by the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze and made payable to his estate, were
delivered to the Bank of the Philippine Islands for administration and
distribution, they were not in transit but were more or less
permanently located in the Philippine Islands, according to the
foregoing rules. If this be so, half of the proceeds which is community
property, belongs to the estate of the deceased and is subject to the
inheritance tax, in accordance with the legal provision quoted above,
irrespective of whether or not the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was
domiciled in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death.
By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the
proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the
other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid
partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part;
and (3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to
the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it
is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside.1awphil.net
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the one-half of the tax
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the
insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after
deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium,
without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Ostrand,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
It is stated in the majority opinion that the money with which the
premiums were paid during the marriage of the Schuetzes is
presumed to have been taken from the conjugal funds, according to
article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that "All the property of
the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of
proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This is
the very argument which led to the settlement of the point of law
raised. The provisions of the Civil Code on conjugal property have
been improperly applied without considering that a life-insurance
contract is a peculiar contract governed by special laws, such as Act
No. 2427 with its amendments, and the Code of Commerce, which is
still in force. In Del Val, supra, it was already held:
We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life
insurance is a special contract and the destination of the
proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal
exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no
provisions which relate directly and specially to life insurance
contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds.
That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of
Commerce which provides for the terms of the contract, the
relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of
the policy.
The main point to be decided was not whether the premiums were
paid out of conjugal or personal funds of one of the spouses, but
whether or not the proceeds of the policy became assets of the
insured's estate. If it be admitted that the estate is the sole owner of
the aforesaid proceeds, which cannot be denied, inasmuch as the
policy itself names the estate as the beneficiary, it is beside the point
to discuss the nature and origin of the amounts used to pay the
premiums, as the title to the proceeds of the policy is vested in the
insured's estate, and any right the widow might have should be
vindicated in another action. In such a case she might be entitled to
reimbursement of her share in the conjugal funds, but not in the
present case, for she has been instituted the sole testamentary
heiress.
From the foregoing, it follows that as the proceeds of the policy
belong to Schuetze's estate, and inasmuch as the inheritance tax is
II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely
academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack
consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof
becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show that
the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where
the documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon
consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that
petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents
are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no
other source of income other than what she derives from helping in
the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and
which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted
by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and
her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p.
10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his
wife testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was
involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36,
t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the
business of buying and selling palay and rice even before her
marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing
so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing
and the presumption that a contract is with a consideration (Article
1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove
his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of
alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing
that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase
price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed
value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended
Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the
properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and
Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000,
P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of
Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra
Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the
purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight,
may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a
father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31,
April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of
sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the
parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract
(Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is nothing in the records at all to
indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a
father and his daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance
to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and
cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits
3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position
of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina JocsonVasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he
presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were
enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968,
23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills,
which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the
spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be
considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson,
the burden of proof being on petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on March 30,
appellees.
1960 for failure of the defendants to file their brief on time. After the
record the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of execution
MAKALINTAL., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City
in its Civil Case No. 10485, dated June 28, 1961. This case was
originally brought to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified
to Us on the ground that the issues raised are purely legal.
It appears that on November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action
against the defendant Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual
Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court a
quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:
was issued, and on August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of
land covered by transfer certificate title No. 8192 of Pangasinan in
the name of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction
was published in accordance with law and scheduled for September
16, 1960.
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial
satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and requested
for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960. On October 17,
1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on
November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant
Pascual Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her
half () of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the
(P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from date of the filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid.
With costs against the said defendants.
On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves
de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment
(a) whether or not the decision of the lower court dated June 23,
amended motion dated October 14, 1960. And on June 28, 1961, the
trial court issued the questioned order, the dispositive part of which is
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby grants the motion of counsel for
defendant Nieves de Lozano, dated October 5, 1960, which was
amended on October 14, 1960, and holds that the liability of the said
defendant under the judgment of June 23, 1959, is only joint, or
P1,750.04, which is one-half () of the judgment debt of P3,500.07
awarded to the plaintiff and that the writ of execution be accordingly
modified in the sense that the liability of defendant Nieves de Lozano
be only P1,750.04 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint on November 5, 1948 until fully paid, plus the amount of
Court against the defendant spouses. Let the auction sale of the
1959, which has long become final and in fact partially executed. A
and the further sum of P21.28 representing the costs, unless she
involves not merely clerical errors but the very substance of the
hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is
"nunc pro tunc" order such as that sought in this case. The purpose
Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were
originally paraphernal, it became conjugal property by virtue of the
construction of a house thereon at the expense of the common fund,
pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has
been by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal
expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses doe not
Now then, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959 does not
specify the extent of the liability of each defendant. The rule is that
partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so
when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and
ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is
the partnership (Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby
Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla,
G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961). The record does not show that
there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership
between the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano.
Consequently, the property levied upon, being the separate property
of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the
liability of the other defendant.
after the perfection of the present appeal and which should therefore
FIRST DIVISION
NARVASA, J.:
The petition before this Court sinks the annulment of a writ of
execution issued by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 727 of
her court (RTC Davao del Sur). Said case was instituted by the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to
compel partition of parcel of land located in Barrio Kasuga
Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which said defendant
had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be
the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia
Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as
their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While
said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia
Pichan although he admitted living with her without benefit of
marriage until she allegedly abandoned him as well as paternity of
two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the
Trial Court gave his denials no credence. Said Court, on the basis of
the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been
married to Eustaquia, and that the plaintiffs were his children with
her. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the
homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his
coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs
were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. 1
Martin Lacerna appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court ACG.R. No. 59900-R). That Court affirmed, in a Decision promulgated
on August 31, 1984 which has since become final. 2
It appears that at the time the case was brought, and while it was
being heard in the Trial Court, no certificate of title to the land had yet
been issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied
with all the conditions necessary to a grant thereof. Original
Certificate of Title No. P-11 568 (issued on the basis of Homestead
Patent No. 148869) was issued only on November 22, 1978, while
Lacerna's appeal was pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court.
While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same
land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture with Eustaquia
Pichan, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no
clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ...
MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania
Magallon ... ," the latter being the present petitioner. 3
It appears further that on November 26, 1985, after the confirmative
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court had become final and
executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued
an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff::
... to order the defendant Martin Lacerna to divide
and partition the property located at Casuga,
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, consisting of 10 hectares
designated as Lot No. 5098 Cad. No. 275 covered
by H.A. No. 20-13378 (E-20-12748), of which is
the share of Eustaquia Pichan in the conjugal
property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are
also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5
hectares of the aforedescribed lot to the plaintiffs as
their share to satisfy the said judgment and your
fees thereon. 4
Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin Lacerna and
petitioner herein, for on December 17, 1985, the latter filed with the
Trial Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging
that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and
Martin Lacerna under a certificate of title (OCT No. P-11568) ...
issued way back 1978 (sic) without legal impediments, and ... now
incontestable," as well as ... valid, binding and legal unless declared
otherwise in an independent proceedings, ... and praying that ... the
property of herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of
the writ of execution." 5 Said motion was denied, as also was a
motion for reconsideration of the order of denial. Hence, the present
petition.
The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of
the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer
or the homestead claim or interest would not defeat the action; but,
according to other authorities, where the husband sets up and
litigates a claim for the homestead, an adjudication for or against him
is binding on the wife. 14
As to her community interest in real property, a wife
is in privity with her husband and is represented by
him in an action as fully as though she had expressly
been made a party thereto. Cutting vs. Bryan, 274 P.
326, 206 Cal. 254, certiorari denied 50 S. Ct. 16, 280
U.S. 556,74 L.Ed 611. 15
In the particular circumstances obtaining here, the Court can as it
does in good conscience and without doing violence to doctrine,
adopt the affirmative view and hold the petitioner bound by the
judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact been
impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that
petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as
observed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, no marriage contract
was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner
either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is
clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other
than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere
mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
But whether the petitioner is a lawful wife or a mere "live-in" partner,
the Court simply cannot believe that she never became aware of the
litigation concerning the land until presented with the writ of
execution. What is far more probable and credible is that she has
known of the lawsuit since 1956 when Martin Lacerna "married"
her. 16 Her silence and inaction since then and until barely a year ago
bespeak more than anything else, a confession that she had and has
no right to the land and no defense to offer to the action, either on
her part or on the part of Martin Lacerna. Had she even the
semblance of a right, there is no doubt she would have lost no time
asserting it.
From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner
relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the
land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein,
Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of
title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as
resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud.
Moreover, on the authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 andStuart vs.
Yatco, 18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon written after the
name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does
not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna
and petitioner hereyn. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption
established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired
during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being
no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which
arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of
title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim
on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin
Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private
respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the
presumption does not operate where there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with even
greater force here.
The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the
reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial
Court which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court merely
declared the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land in
question, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them
of said half portion. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the
judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not
clearly included in, what is awarded by said judgment. Even if the
judgment in question is construable as authorizing or directing a
partition of the land, the mechanics of an actual partition should
follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court which
does not contemplate or provide for the intervention of the sheriff in
the manner prescribed in the writ complained of.
Both the Trial Court, in rendering the judgment in question, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in affirming the same, appear to have
overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and
compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise,
consistent with the finding that the half portion of the land sued for
pertained to the late Eustaquia Pichan as her share in the conjugal
partnership with Martin Lacerna, they should have ruled that Martin
Lacerna concurred with the three private respondents in the
succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal
share. 20 Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because Martin
Lacerna allowed the judgment to become final and executory without
raising that point of law, even on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution complained of is set aside and
annulled. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is
ordered to effect the partition of the land in question in accordance
with the terms of its now final and executory decision and the
provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. No pronouncement as to
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48137
October 4, 1943
BOCOBO, J.:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the
late Narciso A. Padilla. In order that his property may be divided
according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to
liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in connection with such
improvements that had been torn down; (3) the lot and improvements
(except the building constructed during the marriage for P4,000) at
401-407 Camba Street; (4) the lot at 613-631 and 634-636 Martin
Ocampo Street, with the original "accesorias" and a camarin which
was destroyed in order that new "accesorias" might be constructed,
these new "accesorias" being of the conjugal partnership; (5) the
property at 620-A-H Callejon De la Fe; (6) one-half of the property at
631 Regidor Street; and (7) nine twenty-ninths (9/29) of the property
at 302-306 R. Hidalgo Street.
We also agree with the finding of the lower court that certain jewels,
namely: two pairs of ear-rings, a bracelet, and a gold watch, belong
to the widow.
In like manner, we see no error in the following findings of the trial
court: (1) that the husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet
his personal obligations; and (2) that the amount of P21,046.52 (the
remainder of P66,046.52) received by the wife during the marriage
was commingled with the conjugal partnership funds.
II
Several questions of law are raised in the present appeal. We shall
discuss them one by one.
1. The first legal controversy is on a sort of no-man's land where
many a legal battle has been fought. The issue is, How far is a
Torrens title conclusive and incontestable? Various manifestations of
this legal question have been decided by the courts, and while
certain of its aspects may still be doubtful, we are persuaded,
however, that there can be no doubt, as will presently be shown, that
what appears in the Torrens certificate in this case is neither final nor
incontrovertible.
Appellant contends that because certain of these real estates (on
Camba, Martin Ocampo and Regidor Streets) have been registered
in the names of both spouses, Narciso Padilla and Concepcion
Paterno de Padilla, and considering the presumption in Art. 1407 of
the Civil Code, these properties must be held to be of the conjugal
partnership. The trial court, however, found that the whole purchase
price of the Camba and Martin Ocampo properties, and one-half of
the purchase price of the Regidor property, were from the wife's
exclusive funds, and therefore the whole of the original Camba and
Ocampo estates and one-half of the Regidor realty must be adjudged
paraphernal, in spite of the fact that the certificates of title are in the
names of both spouses.
There is nothing sacrosanct and definitive in the certificate of title
when the conjugal partnership is liquidated. The true and real owner
may be shown whether it be the husband, or the wife, or both.
Thus, in Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, this Court held that property
acquired during the marriage but registered in the husband's name
still belonged to the conjugal partnership. A similar ruling was
announced when the real estate was registered in the wife's
name. Romero vs. Sheriff, 53 Phil., 51. But the appellant maintains
that the converse is not true; and that even if evidence is admissible
to alter the conjugal character of the property, such evidence must be
clear, strong and convincing (citing Art 1407, Civil Code, and
Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil., 607).
We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made
when the property is registered in the names of both spouses. In
such instances, the property may be shown to be really of either
spouse, though recorded in the names of both. The underlying
reason is the same in all cases, which is the confidential relation
between husband and wife. Because of the feelings of trust existing
between the spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the
name of both, or of either, regardless of the true ownership of the
property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money. It is
thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the trust should be
recognized and enforced, so that the real ownership of the property
may be established. The principle that a trustee who takes a Torrens
title in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a
decree of title. (See Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343). It is
because a certificate of title under the Torrens system should not be
turned into an instrument for deprivation of ownership. The Torrens
plan, created to protect dominion, is not a Frankenstein that destroys
this very dominion. A trust, deriving its strength from confidence,
which runs though with the woof and warp of the social fabric, does
not lose that character on the plea that a Torrens certificate of title is
conclusive. It is meet and seemly that this should be so, for any rule
that permits the violation of a fiduciary duty would be a reproach to
any legal system. These observations apply with peculiar force to the
relations between husband and wife. In a normal marriage, the
spouses trust each other so implicitly that they attach little or no
importance to what appears in legal documents, fully and
unreservedly believing that no technicality would be availed of to
claim what in very truth pertains to one or the other. Things would
indeed come to a sorry pass if the jurisprudence of this country
should harbor any theory which would impair this intimate reliance,
this unquestioning loyalty, this befitting faith between husband and
wife.
There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property
as paraphernal should be allowed, despite the Torrens certificate. It
is this: the manager of the conjugal partnership is the husband. He
may, without let or hindrance, deal with and dispose of any property
appearing in the names of both spouses, even if the property should
really be paraphernal. In the course of years, any such property may
have been sold, transformed or substituted. Upon liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, to forbid an investigation of the true source of
the purchase price of the original property, after many years of
marriage, would make liquidation a mockery, for it would be well nigh
impossible to trace and identity the paraphernal property. The law
positively ordains that the wife's property (dowry and paraphernal)
should be returned, even before the payment of the debts of the
conjugal partnership (Art. 1421 and 1422, Civil Code). But how can
this mandate of the law be complied with when the means to that end
are withheld and forbidden?
As for the appellants proposition that the evidence to rebut the
Torrens certificates and the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership (Art. 1407) should be clear, strong and convincing, we
find that the proof, both oral and documentary, in the record is more
than sufficient to offset and counteract the certificates of title and the
presumption of law.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on
certiorari is the issue of whether or not the execution of a decision in
an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction
are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action
stemmed.
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on
January 6, 1964. 1 They have three children but even during the early
years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the
time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the
latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971,
Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City
for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson 2 with money
borrowed from an officemate. His father need the amount for
investments in Angeles City and Palawan. 3
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to
Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong
dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded
payment of their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a
check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds.
Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV. 5 After trial,
the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the
ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no
estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a
pre-existing obligation. 6
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong
filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action
for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the
aforesaid court. 7 The records of the case show that Atty. Gregorio
Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in behalf of
Katrina. When the case was called for pre-trial, Atty. Albino once
again appeared as counsel for Katrina only. While it is true that
during subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated
with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on
record that said counsel also represented Romarico. In fact, a power
of attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the trial, showed that
the same was executed solely by Katrina. 8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs.
It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs
HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95 with legal interest from May 27,
1975, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid; P20,000 as
expenses for litigation; P15,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs of
the suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots
in Angeles City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950,
30951, 30952 and 30953 all in the name of Romarico Henson ...
married to Katrina Henson. 10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since
said date was declared a public holiday, Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat
reset the sale to November 11, 1977. On said date, the following
properties registered in the name of Romarico Henson "married to
Katrina Henson" were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with
respective areas of 293 and 289 square meters at P145,000 each to
Juanito L. Santos, 11 and (b) two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 with respective areas of
Santos and Joson until the final outcome of the case subject to
Romarico's posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00. 16
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision1 and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Decision rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang [hereinafter referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly
and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de Guzman.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders
as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS
for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six
percent (46%) respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased,
from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was
subscribed by [the spouses Carandang]. Thereafter, on March 3,
1989, MBS again increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3
million, [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the
increase. They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital
stock.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions
were paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital stock
increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase
or a total of P336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a
demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said
total amount.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE IS AN
ALLEGED LOAN FOR WHICH PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE,
CONTRARY TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF BOOK IV, TITLE XI,
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE PERTAINING TO LOANS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
WERE ABLE TO DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE.
IV.
parties,9 jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.10Implied waiver comes in the
form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. 11
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had
been no valid substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and
therefore the judgment cannot be made binding upon them. In the
case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are
actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their
waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal
of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of such view
in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of de
Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
RTC.
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is
a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can
thereby waive it by silence.
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule requiring a
formal substitution of heirs. The underlying principle therefor is not
really because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but
because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation
of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of
the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein.12 Such violation of due process can only be asserted by the
persons whose rights are claimed to have been violated, namely the
heirs to whom the adverse judgment is sought to be enforced.
Care should, however, be taken in applying the foregoing
conclusions. In People v. Florendo,13 where we likewise held that the
proceedings that took place after the death of the party are void, we
gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended
party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of
the latter, the principal x x x." Nevertheless, the case at bar had
already been submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998,
Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the
recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property.
Thus, in Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court
held that "x x x Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join
him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. x x x
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of
alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the
Family Code. x x x."
The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange
the terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.15 On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action, 16 in
contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination
or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 17
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that "(i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action."18 However, what dismissal on this ground entails is
an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all
persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter
query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has
been beneficial to the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, cannot compel the creditor
to subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising from a mortgage,
guarantee, or penalty.
Articles 1236 and 1237 are clear that, even in cases where the
debtor has no knowledge of payment by a third person, and even in
cases where the third person paid against the will of the debtor, such
payment would produce a debt in favor of the paying third person. In
fact, the only consequences for the failure to inform or get the
consent of the debtor are the following: (1) the third person can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor; and (2) the third person is not subrogated to the rights of the
creditor, such as those arising from a mortgage, guarantee or
penalty.35
We say, however, that this is merely a presumption. By virtue of the
parties freedom to contract, the parties could stipulate otherwise and
thus, as suggested by the spouses Carandang, there is indeed a
possibility that such payment by Mr. "A" was purely out of generosity
or that there was a mutual agreement between them. But such
mutual agreement, being an exception to presumed course of events
as laid down by Articles 1236 and 1237, must be adequately proven.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their payment of the
spouses Carandangs stock subscriptions. These payments were, in
fact, admitted by the spouses Carandang. Consequently, it is now up
to the spouses Carandang to prove the existence of the preincorporation agreement that was their defense to the purported
loan.
SO ORDERED.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case involves two appeals, one by the defendant the Manila
Railroad Company, and the other by the plaintiffs Aleko E. Lilius et
al., from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant
company to pay to the plaintiffs, for the purposes above
stated, the total amount of P30,865, with the costs of the
suit. And although the suit brought by the plaintiffs has the
nature of a joint action, it must be understood that of the
amount adjudicated to the said plaintiffs in this judgment, the
sum of P10,000 personally belongs to the plaintiff Sonja
Maria Lilius; the sum of P5,000, to the plaintiff Brita Marianne
Lilius; the sum of P250, to Dr. Marfori of the Calauan
Hospital, Province of Laguna, and the balance to the plaintiff
Aleko E. Lilius.
In support of its appeal, the appellant the Manila Railroad Company
assigns nine alleged errors committed by the trial court in its said
judgment, which will be discussed in the course of this decision.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39587
to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards,
he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to
be locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's train coming
eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the
plaintiff's car right in the center. After dragging the said car a distance
of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force
of the impact was so great that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were
thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer
Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had
gone about seventy meters from the crossing.
On the afternoon of the same day, the plaintiff's entered St. Paul's
Hospital in the City of Manila where they were treated by Dr.
Waterous. The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius suffered from a fractured nose,
a contusion above the left eye and a lacerated wound on the right
leg, in addition to multiple contusions and scratches on various parts
of the body. As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was highly
nervous and very easily irritated, and for several months he had
great difficulty in concentrating his attention on any matter and could
not write articles nor short stories for the newspapers and magazines
to which he was a contributor, thus losing for some time his only
means of livelihood.
The plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius suffered from fractures of the pelvic
bone, the tibia and fibula of the right leg, below the knee, and
received a large lacerated wound on the forehead. She underwent
two surgical operations on the left leg for the purpose of joining the
fractured bones but said operations notwithstanding, the leg in
question still continues deformed. In the opinion of Dr. Waterous, the
deformity is permanent in character and as a result the plaintiff will
have some difficulty in walking. The lacerated wound, which she
received on her forehead, has left a disfiguring scar.
The child Brita Marianne Lilius received two lacerated wounds, one
on the forehead and the other on the left side of the face, in addition
to fractures of both legs, above and below the knees. Her condition
was serious and, for several days, she was hovering between life
and death. Due to a timely and successful surgical operation, she
survived her wounds. The lacerations received by the child have left
deep scars which will permanently disfigure her face, and because of
the fractures of both legs, although now completely cured, she will be
forced to walk with some difficulty and continuous extreme care in
order to keep her balance.
Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the
existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public
of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the
collision, coming from the station with a red flag in one hand and a
green one in the other, both of which were wound on their respective
sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented
himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The
train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed.
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence
which the parties presented at the trial in support of their respective
contentions, and after taking into consideration all the circumstances
of the case, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to
negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company, for not
having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at
Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order
that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees the flagman and
switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in
question to warn passers-by of the approaching train; the
stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to
his post on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the
necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the absence
of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving
at the crossing. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant
entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because,
otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing
and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the
flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at the
crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of
a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not
May 3, 2006
subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold
at public auction on August 11, 1981.
"Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party
Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public
auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property
and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal
obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with
the auction sale despite [respondent's] protest. The subject property
was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as
highest bidder. No redemption having been made during the oneyear period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was eventually issued
on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to
[petitioners].
"On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No. 417R, against [petitioners] and Sheriff Melgar for annulment and
cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the
abovementioned third-party claim. Citing the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No. 2288, which
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed the Register
of Deeds to issue new title in the name of Josephine Go x x x,
[petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was
denied by the trial court.
"In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the
material allegations of the complaint and interposed the following
special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by
prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy
to annul the execution proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity
in the auction sale; and that since the execution sale was made in
accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it
is deemed final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof
will not vitiate its validity.
exclusive paraphernal property and not as property coowned with her husband, the respondent herein.1avvphil.net
"III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that
the subject property is conjugal property between
respondent and Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same
cannot answer for the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de
Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841."13
In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the procedural
question of whether the CA erred in giving due course to
respondent's lapsed appeal; and, second, the substantive issue of
whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Whether Respondent's Appeal Should Be Given Due Course
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the
appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance
of the appeal and in not dismissing the same, despite the
fact that the respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the
15-day reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.
"II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the
subject property as conjugal property, despite the existence
of clear evidence showing that the subject property is the
exclusive paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during
her lifetime, always claimed the said property as her own
appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered
twice to make the same reparation to the appellee." 19
We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in
the present controversy. We have carefully studied the merits of the
case and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to
be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the
conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in Civil Case No.
417-R), must be set aside. It would be far better and more prudent to
attain the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice in the process. Thus, we would
rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the
case on appeal.
Substantive Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.20Accordingly, the
transaction was aptly covered by the then governing provisions of the
New Civil Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the
issue of the nature of the contested property.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."21 As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in
favor of the conjugal partnership,22 the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage.23
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.24 Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted
only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. 25 There
Unilateral Declaration
Respondent's interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in
her Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of land
was her paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a property
-- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law and not by
the will of one of the spouses.31 Thus, no unilateral declaration by
one spouse can change the character of a conjugal property.32
Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the
nature of the subject piece of land being levied upon, but whether
Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that
case, Muriel claimed that she had not officially retained him as
counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship had been established
between them.33
Deed and Title in the Name of One Spouse
stands. The next question before us is, whether the charging lien of
Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land
in question.
Charging Lien Not Chargeable Against Conjugal Property
It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired
during the marriage of respondent and Muriel. The lawyer's legal
services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil
Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the
exclusive property of Muriel and her sisters.46 The recovery was done
during the marriage.47
The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:
"x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the
Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive
interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive
interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty.
De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her
sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested
conjugal property.
"Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be
held liable, levy on execution of the same property should still be
denied in accordance with the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for the
obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove that the
services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil Case No.
1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and Muriel. This
onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge." 48
We find no reason to deviate from the CA's findings, which are amply
supported by evidence. The expenses incurred by Muriel for the
recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal
property are her exclusive responsibility.49 This piece of land may not
be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not
been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership.50 Moreover, her rights to the property are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum;51 when administration of
the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 52 or
by the husband;53 or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity.54 Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the
present case means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to
answer for Muriel's personal obligation.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.55 In this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in
nature -- cannot be levied upon.56
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision 1 promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27556 affirming with some modifications the earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject of
Civil Case No. Q-52058 therein to private respondent Annette H.
Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half of said property
to the three private respondents. all as pro indiviso owners of their
aforesaid respective portions.
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel
Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a lease and
conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon
City Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon,
located at and known as No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife
Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners
herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967,
Daniel married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom
he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil
Martinez and, at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house
on the back portion of the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the
lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter
donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the
lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos
died and his death spawned the present controversy, resulting in the
filing by private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court
below.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court
that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband
while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of
absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor
of her husband, Daniel Jovellanos. who was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 212286 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property,
specifically the lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the
beneficial and equitable title thereto, were acquired by their parents
during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and
conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 3 with the
following dispositions:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows
1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the
second marriage and directing the reimbursement of
the amount advanced by the partnership of the first
marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos
and the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia * J.
Martinez in the acquisition of the lot and bungalow
described in the Lease and Conditional Sale
Agreement (Exhs. D and 1);
2. After such liquidation and reimbursement,
declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos as proindiviso owner of 1/2 of the property described in
TCT No. 212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected
therein;
3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well
as the minors Anna Marie and Ma. Jeannette (sic)
both surnamed Jovellanos and the herein
defendants, as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the
other half of said property;
4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia
Martinez as exclusive owners of the two-storey
house erected on the property at the back of the said
bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as
builders in good faith under Article 448 of the New
Civil Code;
5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyances,
subject to the confirmation of this Court, and if they
are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that
the partition should be made by not more than three
that the provisions of the Family Code are applicable in resolving the
rights of the parties herein. 6
It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied
in determining the successional rights of the party litigants to the
estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so would be to impair their
vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have
acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look
into the nature of the contract entered into by the contracting parties.
As appositely observed by respondent court, the so-called lease
agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do not
lose sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy has the force
of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith. 8Its provisions are binding not only upon them but also
upon their heirs and assigns. 9
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and
Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional
Sale Agreement" over the property involved with a lease period of
twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the
former, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the
property. 10 In a lease agreement, the lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. 11 In fact, Daniel
Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the
property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of
a family, permit inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in
regard to the use and preservation of the property. 12
It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the
lease period herein agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have
fully faithfully complied with all his obligations herein stipulated, the
LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the
LESSEE-VENDEE the property which is the subject matter of this
agreement; . . . 13
The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with
Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would
ripen into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership which,
as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment of the rentals
and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A
vested right as an immediate fixed right of present and future
enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right that is expectant or
contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute,
complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, 21 and which is perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. 22 Thus, for a property right to be vested, there must be
a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have
become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. 23
The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled
that the cases cited by petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar
since said cases involved friar lands which are governed by a special
law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In the
sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate
of sale is delivered to the vendee and such act is considered as a
conveyance of ownership, subject only to the resolutory condition
that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in
full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full
payment of the rentals was a condition precedent before ownership
could be transferred to the vendee. 24
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was
executed in 1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract
between the parties, only after full payment of the rentals. Upon the
execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married
to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his
conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial
conference in the case below that the rentals/installments under the
lease and conditional sale agreement were paid as follows (a) from
September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first
marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of
Daniel Jovellanos; (c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds
of the second marriage; and (d) from 1972 to January 8, 1975, by
conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements
should be made in line with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of
the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
upon liquidation of the partnership."
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of
respondent court, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
It was also found by the Court of Appeals that upon the death of
Marcelo Castillo, Sr., the loan and mortgage in favor of Dr. Jacinto
(later assigned by him to Dr. Antonio Pasco) was still outstanding.
Unable to collect the loan, Dr. Pasco foreclosed the mortgaged, and
the encumbered fishpond was sold to him; but the sale was
subsequently annulled. Later, on September 7, 1949, respondent
Macaria Pasco judicially consigned P12,300 on account of the
mortgage debt and its interest, and completed payment by a second
consignation of P752.43 made on April 24, 1950. As the estate of
Castillo had no assets adequate to pay off the claims against it, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the amounts consigned belonged to
the widow Macaria Pasco, respondent herein.1wph1.t
It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was
the applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous
consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate
property depending on the source of the funds employed for its
acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife
or to the husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:
ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the
spouses only.
which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they
so desired.
In Palanca vs. Smith Bell & Co., 9 Phil. 131., this Court ruled as
follows (cas cit. at p. 133,) .
This P14,000, borrowed by said Emiliano Boncan upon the
credit of the property of his wife became conjugal property
(par. 3, Art. 1401, Civil Code) and when that same was
reinvented in the construction of a house, the house became
e conjugal property and was liable for the payment of the
debts of the husband (Art 1408, Civ. Code).
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wife's
property is conjugal in character, a fortiorishould it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan
becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
The case of Lim Queco vs. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 162, is clearly
distinguishable from the Palanca case in that in the Lim Queco case
the wife alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although
she guaranteed repayment with a mortgage on her parapherna
executed with her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have
the management or representation of the conjugal partnership where
the husband is qualified therefor, the loan to her constituted a
transaction that did not involve the community, and the creditor could
seek repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, as this
Court then held, the money loaned to the wife, as well as the
property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's
exclusive property.
The analogy between the case now before us and the Palanca vs.
Smith Bell case is undeniable, and the Palanca ruling applies. We,
therefore, find that the two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price
of the fishpond were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first
installment of P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money belonging
to the wife Macaria Pasco, appellee herein.
the husband died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for any
amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage debt as aforesaid.
All these details must be settled after proper trial.
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the original complaint is hereby
revoked and set aside, and the records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the
only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo,
which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the
redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on
August 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982,
decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is
granted and the challenged order of the respondent
Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is
hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar
as it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 46309 is, however,
denied. No pronouncement is here made as to costs. x x
x x.[5]
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal
(Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and
academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their
opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that where a third
party who claims ownership of the property attached or levied upon,
a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, two (2)
of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching,
a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other
provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to
donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property.
[21]
Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety
agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal
property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in
danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A.
Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A.
Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V.
Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge
Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City)
granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of
Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P
entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo
Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of
Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of KayBiga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of
Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80,
CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said
spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all
surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was
issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and
82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was
deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19
years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private
respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest."
Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons
was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The exparte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held
(Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case
at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in
Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest
she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by
publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should
have been granted and the amended complaint of private respondent
based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly.
Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the
evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the
roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration
was issued.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to
stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered,
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157
SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of
the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that
they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof
not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.
39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision
dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980
reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
August 4, 1950
This case, here on appeal from the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, involves an interpretation of a pre-war contract of lease
of sugar-cane lands and the liability of the lessee, defendant and
appellant, to pay rent for the period during and immediately following
the Japanese occupation. The defendant resisted payment of that
rent of the theory of force majeure, and claims, besides, right to an
extension of the lease to make-up for the time when no cane was
planted.
The material facts are set forth in the appealed decision as follows:
It appears that on June 2, 1939, the plaintiff, Rosario S. Vda.
de Lacson, as atty.-in-fact of the other plaintiffs leased to the
defendant, Abelardo G. Diaz, lots Nos. 429 and 1179 of the
Talisay Cadastre, together with its sugar quota of about
5,728.50 piculs. The term of the lease was for five crop years
beginning with the crop year 1940-41; with an option in favor
of the defendant for another two years, after the expiration of
the original period. The contract provided that the defendant
was to pay to the plaintiffs an annual rental of 1,000 piculs of
export sugar , of which 500 piculs were to be paid in the
month of January of every year and the rest at the end of
every milling season. The defendant also obligated himself
to pay to the plaintiff 20% of whatever alcohol he receive
from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. corresponding to
the haciendas above-mentioned.
To guarantee the payment of the said annual rentals, the
defendant Abelardo Diaz, loaned to the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000 without interest, which was to be paid by plaintiffs
with the proceeds of the annual rentals in sugar provided
however, that the sum of P7,000 was to be maintained as
the permanent balance until the termination of the lease
period, as security for the payment by the defendant of said
rentals.
On October 23, 1940, a supplementary agreement (was)
entered into between the parties so as to include in the lease
contract the rights and interests also of the plaintiff, Rosario
the number of times sugar crops were raised and not by number of
years that transpired from the inception of the contract.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Civil Code, under the conditions therein specified, recognizes
the liability of the conjugal partnership for fines and indemnities
imposed upon either husband or wife "after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered," in the absence of any
separate property of the offending spouse or its insufficiency. 1 How
such an obligation "may be enforced against the partnership assets"
is the question, one of first impression, raised in this appeal from a
lower court order, based on the assumption of the total exemption of
the conjugal partnership from the liability thus incurred, prior to the
stage of liquidation. The result was to set aside the preliminary
attachment and thereafter the writ of execution in favor of the heirs of
the murdered victim, appellants before us, the judgment against the
accused imposing not only the penalty of reclusion perpetua but also
the indemnification to such heirs having attained the status of finality.
In view of the failure, apparent on the face of the appealed order, to
respect what the Civil Code ordains, we reverse and remand the
case for further proceedings.
The brief of appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, the murdered
victim, discloses that on February 19, 1960 an information was filed
against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for the above murder
committed on February 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar. Thereafter,
appellants as such heirs, filed on February 27, 1960 a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the
accused, such motion being granted in an order of March 5, 1960.
After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as such heirs in the sum of
provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability
are obtaining."
Without departing from the principle thus announced, we make this
further observation. Considering that the obligations mentioned in
Article 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of
the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof
required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the
most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the conjugal
partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its obligation
irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the
offended party. That result is to be avoided. The lower court should
be on the alert, therefore, in the appraisal of whatever evidence may
be offered to assure compliance with this codal provision.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set aside
and the case remanded to the court of origin for the reception of
evidence in accordance with this opinion. With costs against appellee
Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L. and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow
the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of
Court which require procedural due process, particularly the need for
notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even
if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary
proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code,
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced
without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the
conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings.He then
restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be
consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and
pending before Branch 25.
Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot
No. 4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the
accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property
would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had
been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also pointed
out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to
his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental
value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then
conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial
obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza,
Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set
against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which
allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do not
charge anything for their professional services.
On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex G). He
reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly
applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings
found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on
proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not
serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not
require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an
opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is
void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by
this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress
of nullity.[11] A decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.[12] A decision is void
for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard.[13] A void decision may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
vs. NORMA
EDILBERTO
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may
validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wifes written
consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner
Thelma
A. Jader-Manalo allegedly
came
across
an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma
Fernandez C.Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads
Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue,
for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that
in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the
two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real
estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent
spouses.[1] Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with
the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real
property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps
relating to the properties.[2] Thereafter, petitioner met with the
vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a
definite
offer
to
buy
the
properties
to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of
informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because
they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration.
[13]
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell
had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to sign the
same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign
the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to
compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
[14]
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of
four parcels of land between petitioner and respondent spouses;
that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an
agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, and
a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that
respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The issue
thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were
already perfected such that the latter could no longer back out of the
agreement.
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a
summary judgment in favor of respondent spouses there being a
genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether
the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was
perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted
by the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of
a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.[24] A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both
parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts
involved therein.
husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the
trial court rendered a Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992, disposing
as follow: 5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the
plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights
dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null
void and of no effect;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders
the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this
petition for review of the Decision 1 dated January 30, 1996 and the
Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower
court and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an
Amended Complainant 3 against her husband Judie Corpuz and
Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
"3-A"). The new sale (Exh. "3") describes the lot sold
as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is
obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct
lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot
earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners
aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the
"amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay
Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have
resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The trial court
correctly held: 15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil
Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights
(Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable
settlement". The participation by some barangay
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot
otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B")
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent
spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A"). By
express provision of law, such a contract is also
void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the
direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of
Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement"
(Exh. "3") are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.
16
D E C I S I O N
T H I R D
D I V I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES,
Petitioner,
Present:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
versus
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
CORONA,
Gonzales, defendant-appellant.
GARCIA, JJ.
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda
ERMINDA F. GONZALES,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres,
Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
management of the same and that all income from said business are
conjugal in nature.
trial court, and pursuant Section 48 of the Family Code, [1] certified
denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they
business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the
suppressed.
1.
2.
3.
Acropolis property
Baguio City property
Nasugbu, Batangas
property
4.
In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire
generation
of
Fiesta
Pizza
representing
80%
of
the
total
Corinthian
and lot
5.
Sagitarius
condominium
house
Valuation of
respondent
(Record, p.
110)
None
P 10,000,000
5,000,000
18,000,000
2,500,000
30,000,000
10,000,000
7,000,000
Valuation of
petitioner(Record,
p. 111)
P 6,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
23,000,000
2,000,000
24,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
6.
7.
8.
9.
Office
Greenmeadows lot
White Plains
Corinthian lot
12,000,000
None
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested
by his indiscriminate womanizing. The trial court found that:
Galant 83 model
Toyota Corona 79
model
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Coaster 77 model
Pajero 89 model
Corolla 92 model
L-300 90 model
Mercedes Sedan 79
None
-
model
8.
9.
Pick-up 89 model
Mercedes wagon 80
model
10.
Nissan
Sentra
89
model
11.
8Tamaraws
void ab initio.
respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a
man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this
business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during
equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate
salary or allowance.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the
proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that
SO ORDERED.
The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for
review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case
No. CA-G.R. 30916. The case relates to the execution of a joint and
several judgment for money obtained by the said company against
the Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas,
Jr., in a litigation started in 1952 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals with only a slight modification in respect of the
award for attorney's fees.
The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the
decision sought to be reviewed as follows:
When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure
secured on September 20, 1961, from the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 17014 a second alias
writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff
of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for respondent
Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner
at No. 794 Harvard Street, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied
upon a car, some furniture, appliances and personal
properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to
the petitioner with the exception of sewing machine which
belonged to a maid by the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E.
television set which was the property of the minor Jose
Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a
Columbia radio phonograph which belonged to Jose
Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was then abroad, her sister
Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody
and safekeeping of the properties, had made representations
to the deputy sheriff and to the counsel of respondent Manila
Surety regarding the ownership of the petitioner over certain
personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same and
proceeded with the levy.
Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places
notices of sale, preparatory to disposing petitioner's
properties at public auction.
vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the
ground that the questions raised in the appeal of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight
train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November
23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical
injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident,
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16)
years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
(4) In Civil Case No. SP-867 ordering defendants
Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of
P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint
until fully paid and costs of suit;
(5) In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants
Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and
severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased
VITUG, J.:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land
acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having
deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought
by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil
Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned
conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during
the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take
note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
Let us begin by paraphrasing the factual findings of the appellate
court below.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005]
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON
WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and
ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 142, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo
G. Francisco were married on January 15, 1983. [3] Eduardo was then
employed as the vice president in a private corporation. A little more
than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the
Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale
for P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to
Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a
house thereon located at St. Martin de Porres Street, San Antonio
Valley I, Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. One of the lots was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36519, with an area of 342
square meters, while the other lot, with an area of 360 square
meters, was covered by TCT No. 36518. [4] The purchase price of the
property was paid to the Bank via Check No. 002334 in the amount
of P320,000.00 drawn and issued by the Commercial Bank of
Manila, for which the Imus Bank issued Official Receipt No. 121408
on August 31, 1984.[5] On the basis of the said deed of sale, TCT
Nos. 36518 and 36519 were cancelled and, on September 4, 1984,
the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977
(60551) in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to
Eduardo G. Francisco.[6]
On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record
Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This
referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he
declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased
two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with
her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he had
over the property.[7] On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the
said property to Leonila Cando for a loan of P157,000.00.[8] It
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. [9]
the Bank when she was still single with her mothers financial
assistance; she was then engaged in recruitment when Eduardo
executed an affidavit of waiver; she learned that he was previously
married when they already had two children; nevertheless, she
continued cohabiting with him and had three more children by him;
and because of Eduardos first marriage, she decided to have him
execute the affidavit of waiver.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was
the sole and exclusive property of Josefina, applying Articles 144,
160, 175 and 485 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also held that
MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to the
acquisition of the property.
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which it alleged that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE
AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES
OWNED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
RECEPTION OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLEES
MARRIAGE
WITH
EDUARDO
FRANCISCO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
LEVY ON EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT
CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID;
IV.
SO ORDERED.[30]
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal
property of Eduardo and Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut
such presumption. It also held that the affidavit of waiver executed by
Eduardo was contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as
such, had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which was, likewise, denied by the
CA.
Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review,
alleging that:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN
PETITIONER
AND
EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF
PETITIONER;
and sister. The respondents point out that if, as claimed by the
petitioner, the subject properties were, indeed, not conjugal in nature,
then, there was no need for her to obtain marital (Eduardos) consent
when she mortgaged the properties to two different parties sometime
in the first quarter of 1986, or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of
waiver.
We note that the only questions raised in this case are
questions of facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in and resolved by the Court. The
Court may, however, determine and resolve questions of facts in
cases where the findings of facts of the trial court and those of the
CA are inconsistent, where highly meritorious circumstances are
present, and where it is necessary to give substantial justice to the
parties. In the present action, the findings of facts and the
conclusions of the trial court and those of the CA are opposite. There
is thus an imperative need for the Court to delve into and resolve the
factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law raised by the
parties.
The petition has no merit.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with
her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that
she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows
that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property to the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the
property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on
September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15,
1983.
We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil
Code does not apply in the present case. This Court in Tumlos v.
Fernandez[32] held that Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only
to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of
the parties is void from the very beginning. It does not apply to a
from Imus Rural Bank on 31 August 1984, or one year and seven
months after her marriage (Exh. D). In the face of all these
contradictions, plaintiff-appellees uncorroborated testimony that she
acquired the subject properties with funds provided by her mother
and sister should not have been given any weight by the lower court.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At
that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to
purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of
Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that
the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an
afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from
appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.[38]
Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered nothing to
prove her allegation that she borrowed the amount of P320,000.00
from her mother and her sister, which she paid to the Imus Bank on
August 31, 1984 to purchase the subject property. The petitioner
even failed to divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her
income, if any, and that of her sister. When she testified in Civil Case
No. 95-0169, the petitioner declared that she borrowed part of the
purchase price of the property from her brother,[39] but failed to
divulge the latters name, let alone reveal how much money she
borrowed and when. The petitioner even failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that her mother and sister had P320,000.00 in
1984, which, considering the times, was then quite a substantial
amount. Moreover, the petitioners third-party-claim affidavit stating
that the properties are the fruits of my own exclusive effort before I
married Eduardo Francisco belies her testimony in the trial court and
in Civil Case No. 95-0169.
We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued by the Imus
Bank, the payment for the subject property was drawn via Check No.
002334 and issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila in the amount
of P320,000.00.[40] The petitioner failed to testify against whose
account the check was drawn and issued, and whether the said
account was owned by her and/or Eduardo Francisco or her mother,
sister or brother. She even failed to testify whether the check was a
managers check and, if so, whose money was used to purchase the
same.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of
waiver executed by Eduardo on February 15, 1985, stating that the
property is owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative weight. We
are convinced that he executed the said affidavit in anticipation of
claims by third parties against him and hold the property liable for the
said claims. First, the petitioner failed to prove that she had any
savings before her cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite
Eduardos affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless affixed his marital
conformity to the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioner
over the property in favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986. [41] Third,
the petitioner testified that she borrowed the funds for the purchase
of the property from her mother and sister.[42] Fourth, the petitioner
testified that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver because she
discovered that he had a first marriage. [43] Lastly, Eduardo belied the
petitioners testimony when he testified that he executed the affidavit
of waiver because his mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the
property to the petitioner.[44]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
LUPO ATIENZA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint
[2]
land
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action
docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that
Castro.
the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as
with
improvements
located
in
Bel-Air
them.
interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was
still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of
information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the
disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a coowner.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein arguing that the evidence on
record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her
own name with her own money. She maintained that the documents
appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove
who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as
well as Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity to
acquire the disputed property.
the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005, [5] Lupo is now with
this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article
144[6] of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he
contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof, adding that under Article 484 [7] of Civil Code, as long as the
SO ORDERED.
We DENY.
the CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family
the
proven
actual
contribution
of
money,
property
or
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that
here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no
reversible error in rendering the herein challenged decision and
resolution.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
MILAGROS
JOAQUINO
a.k.a.
MILAGROS
J.
REYES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES
REYES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all
surnamed REYES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired
with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal
partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation of the paramours
children must be settled in a probate or special proceeding instituted
for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002 Decision [2] and
the August 14, 2002 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CV No. 45883. The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially
DENIED and the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 9722-P
isMODIFIED to read, as follows:
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages,
dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
containing the following allegations:
x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the
widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981; that
[respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the
legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo
A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino;
that before his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and
Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in
[petitioners] possession and that the real and personal properties in
[petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the
spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half
belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other
half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the
[other respondents] as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore,
pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared
conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A.
Reyes and that [petitioner] be ordered to reconvey the property in
[respondents] favor; that the two cars in [petitioners] possession be
delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be made to pay
xxxxxxxxx
Issues
Petitioner
consideration:
submits
the
following
I.
issues
for
the
Courts
The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house
and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila); and
2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of
petitioners children.
II.
Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a
mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of their [two] 2
illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the
very complaint filed by their mother, the lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows
that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner
Milagros and had lived with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.
III.
Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that
the house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal property of lawfully
wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds
which was used to pay the final bill for the house and lot, this will
prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
IV.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the
parties to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the trial and in [their]
pleadings x x x.
V.
Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes
should respect their fathers desire that his illegitimate children should
have a home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his duty
to love, care and provide for his children even after his death. [7]
First Issue:
The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property
Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some
undisputed facts and guiding principles.
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo
Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes
on January 3, 1947.[8] It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and
while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living with
petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house
and lot was purchased and registered in petitioners name.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of
gains (CPG) is created upon marriage[9] and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial
separation of property.[10] Conjugal properties are by law owned in
common by the husband and wife. [11] As to what constitutes such
properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the
marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife
exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to
have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. [12]
The law places the burden of proof [13] on the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance of
evidence[14] -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing
than that which is offered to oppose it.[15]
On the other hand, Article 144[16] of the Civil Code mandates a
co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living together
but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though,
that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be incapacitated to
contract marriage.[17] It has been held that the Article is inapplicable
to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in
this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a coownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership
between the man and his lawful wife.[18]
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the
Family Code has been applied.[19] The latter Article provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidence of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party which acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper
children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly
established in this case. Thus, she could not have shown that
respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her
children. These are conditions necessary to show that an act
constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19. [51] She also failed to
show that respondents -- in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of
the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of
Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the trial court or
even in the CA. Hence, she should not be permitted to raise it
now. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on appeal issues
that have not been raised on trial.[52]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000]
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO
FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an
actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).[2] The dispositive part of the CA Decision
reads: Jur-is
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED,
and the questioned orders of the court a quo dated
October 7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondents."[3]
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows: Supr-ema
xxxxxxxxx
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily
proven by Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial
court. No other evidence was presented to validate
such claim, except for the said affidavit/position
paper. As previously stated, it was only on appeal
that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the
petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage,
and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to
her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates
of the said children. Such contentions and
documents should not have been considered by the
x x x (RTC), as they were not presented in her
affidavit/position paper before the trial court (MTC).
xxxxxxxxx
"However, even if the said allegations and
documents could be considered, the claim of coownership must still fail. As [herein Respondent]
Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent]
Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract dated
April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.
Thus, the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
xxxxxxxxx
"It is clear that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family
Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first
determining whether to give due course to the Petition, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[12]
The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this
wise: Mi-so
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
establish by the required quantum of proof that the money spent for
the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of
the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the
Court normally eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual
findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the
exception4 to the general rule and proceed to make its own
assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived
together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit
of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991,
Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John
which the latter deposited in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still
in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds
and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction
of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent
therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives
from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money
he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money
in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a
certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner
borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his
affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the
subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the
amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the
construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while
petitioner was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he
failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from
whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a
SO ORDERED.