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An approach to earthquake risk

management
E. M. F o u r n i e r d ' A l b e
9 bis, Passage Barrault, 75013 Paris. France

The paper formulates a conceptual basis for regarding earthquakes as a


problem of social and economic risk which is part of everyday life, rather
than regarding them as 'acts of God'. The main elements of the problem
and the relationships between them are identified. It is argued that one
should act to mitigate the impact of an earthquake rather than simply
reacting to the losses it inflicts.
Key words: earthquake, risk management.
Introduction
Earthquakes are usually regarded as essentially unmanageable phenomena. They strike suddenly, without warning,
and bring to an instantaneous halt the normal activities of
the stricken community. The material losses they cause
often represent many years of labour by the community
as a whole. And yet, they are rare events, too rare to be
considered as part of every day life, like fires or car
accidents.
Traditionally, they have been regarded as 'acts of God',
unpredictable and inevitable. All that could be done was to
rescue, relieve and assist the survivors of a disaster to reestablish a normal life in the stricken area as soon as
possible.
Only in the past 50 years has it been realized that it is
technically possible to build in such a way as to reduce or
prevent damage and loss of life in earthquakes. The science
of earthquake engineering has advanced rapidly during the
last 20 years and may do so even more rapidly in the near
future. However, much of the new knowledge and technique is still not applied in practice as widely as it should
be, sometimes for lack of the necessary financial or human
resources but more often because of a lack, at the managerial or political level, of awareness of the nature of earthquake risk and of what can be done to reduce it.
From the point of view of public policy, investment in
seismological and engineering research or in earthquakeresistant construction must be justified not only in scientific
and technical, but in social and economic terms. Costs and
benefits must be analysed and acceptable risks defined. In
other words, there must be a coherent policy of earthquake
risk management. The present paper is an attempt to
identify the main elements of this problem and to discuss
the relations between them.

Definitions
Consider the case of a building damaged by an earthquake
which caused ground motion of intensity i at the site of
0141[0296/82/03147-06/$03.00
1982 Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd

the building. In economic terms, we define the loss suffered


as a result of this damage, as follows:
Loss = Cost of restoring the building to its state just
before the earthquake, or of demolishing it
and replacing it by an identical building at
the same site
(1)
In order to simplify matters, we leave out of consideration
any loss of human life, which is difficult, not to say impossible, to express in economic terms; also, secondary losses
due to interruption of function, which must nevertheless
be taken into account in any complete analysis.
Another useful concept is that of specific loss, defined
as follows:
Specific loss =

cost of restoration or replacement


value of building

(2)

In accordance with the definitions adopted by UNDRO 1,


we define as follows the vulnerability of the building to
earthquake ground motion:
Vulnerability, V/= Specific loss in event of
(to ground
motion of intensity i
motion of
intensity i)

(3)

Note that vulnerability, thus defined, cannot be expressed


by a single figure but by a mathematical function or set of
functions relating vulnerability to one or more parameters
of ground motion. The vulnerability of a building or structure is determined by its dynamical properties only, and
does not depend on whether or not the building is in fact
liable to be subjected to earthquake ground motion.
A building may be vulnerable to earthquake ground
motion but it will be at no risk unless there is a finite probability of such ground motion occurring at the site during
the lifetime of the building. We define risk as follows:
Risk = Probability of loss in a given period of time (4)
By analogy with the notion of specific loss defined above,

Eng. Struct., 1982, Vol. 4, July

147

An approach to earthquake risk management." E. M. Fournier d'Albe

we may introduce the term 'specific risk', defined as


follows:
Specific risk = Probability of specific loss in
given period of time

(5)

Expressing by V/the vulnerability of a building or


structure to seismic ground motion of intensity i, and by
Pi the probability of such ground motion occurring at the
site during a given period of time, we may write:
/max

Specific risk =

V/ Pi " di

(6)

i/
0

Thus, specific risk is obtained by convolution of the


probabilities of all possible intensities of ground motion
with the vulnerability corresponding to each intensity. In
other words:
Specific risk = (vulnerability) x (seismic hazard)

(7)

The vocabulary adopted by UNDRO 1 includes the term


'element at risk', signifying any object situated in an area
subject to earthquakes. If one attaches a value E to one
such element, the risk to that element is:
/max

Risk to element = E

I- Vi "Pi " di

(8)

In equations (6) and (8), the seismic hazard is expressed


by its probability density function Pi di. For actual computation, this may be replaced by a step function, particularly if intensity is measured on a macroseismic scale, or by
the probabilities of exceedance of various intensities. These
details are discussed in reference 1.
Of the three factors which determine seismic risk, (value
of the elements at risk, their vulnerability, and the seismic
hazard), only the first two are amenable to human control.
The art of earthquake risk management is to manipulate
these two factors in such a way as to reduce the risk to a
level acceptable to the community. However, the first need,
in any attempt to define a policy of earthquake risk management, is for accurate information on the seismic hazard, its
spatial distribution and its eventual variations in time.
"

Seismic h a z a r d
The concept o f seismic intensity
We have defined seismic hazard as the aggregate of probabilities of occurrence of seismic ground motion of different intensities at a given site and during a given period of
time. We need to ask what we mean by 'intensity' of
ground motion, and how is it measured.
The concept of intensity is derived from observations
that, in any earthquake, the degree of damage to buildings
and other structures is a function of the magnitude of the
event and of position with respect to the earthquake focus.
In the absence of instruments able to record strong ground
accelerations with accuracy, the inspection of damage has
represented the only way of assessing the severity of ground
motion, and several scales of measurement have been
elaborated (e.g. Rossi-Forel, Mercalli, Medvedev-SponheuerKarnik, etc.). The common characteristic of all such scales
is that they offer a means of expressing the inensity of
ground motion in terms of the observed degrees of damage
suffered by characteristic buildings in certain well-defined

148

Eng.Struct., 1982, Vol. 4, July

categories. It is implicil in all such scales tha~ the vulnerabi


lity of all buildings in a given category is the same for all
types of ground motion. The inferred intensity is expressed
by a single figure on each scale.
This is an obvious over-simplification and it is not surprising that field surveys of the effects of earthquakes often
reveal patterns of damage that are difficult to interpret in
terms of a single parameter of ground motion. Furthermore, laboratory tests have shown that the vulnerability of
a structure is usually a complex function of several parameters (e.g. peak acceleration, frequency spectrum, duration of shaking, etc.) of ground motion.
After a damaging earthquake has occurred, it is customary to prepare a map showing the distribution of intensity
of ground motion caused by the earthouake. Given what we
now know about the response of buildings and structures to
ground motion, such maps can qualify as maps of intensity
only if intensity is expressed in terms of ground motion
parameters actually recorded by appropriate instruments.
Maps on which intensity is expressed as degrees on a
macroseismic scale are not, in fact, maps of intensity of
ground motion but rather maps of specific loss. Similarly,
maps of 'maximum expected intensity', based on statistical analysis of macroseismic intensity data on past earthquakes, must rather be considered as maps of maximum
expected specific loss, or in other words as maps of one
parameter of specific risk.
We will examine some of the practical implications of
these arguments later in the paper.
The mapping o f seismic hazard
To illustrate the procedures followed in the preparation of
seismic hazard maps, we may take as example the maps
prepared for the Balkan region under the auspices of the
UNDP/UNESCO project carried out in that region between
1970 and 1976. z The sequence of steps was the following
(see Figure 1):
Compilation of a regional catalogue of earthquakes including both instrumental data and data from historical records
going back about 2000 years;
Preparation of maps of earthquake epicentres;
Preparation of a seismotectonic map of the region, and
maps of recent crustal movements;
Preparation of maps of seismic origin zones;
Derivation of a magnitude-frequency relation for each zone;
Derivation of attenuation laws governing the propagation of
seismic waves within the region;
Preparation of regional seismic hazard maps on which
hazard is expressed in terms of ground accelerations or
velocities with various probabilities of occurrence.
One such map is reproduced in Figure 2. On others,
ground motion is expressed in terms of peak particle
acceleration and the probabilities relate to other periods of
time.
The choice of parameters in this case was determined by
the needs of engineers concerned with the design of earthquake-resistant structures. They were drawn on a scale of
1 : 2 500 000 and were intended to serve as a basis for the
preparation of larger-scale hazard maps of each country. It
is worth remembering in this connection that, given the
scale of seismic phenomena and the accuracy of the data,
little is to be gained by preparing seismic hazard maps on
scales larger than 1 : 1 000 000, since the general level of
hazard (soil conditions being uniform) does not vary
significantly over distances less than about 10 kin.

An approach to earthquake risk managemen t: E. M. Fournier d'Albe

10 \

0.10

Source

/
0
d

o.0olo-

'

Site

,(;t.

/.

b*

,~Log
"

N=a-bM

10
M=8

1.o

._
1

~ o. 1

o.1
=

,Y,
<

magnitudes would be known in advance. But such measurements are beyond the scope of our present technology and
the cost of obtaining such data might well exceed the losses
inflicted by the earthquakes themselves. The deterministic
prediction of the occurrence of individual earthquakes,
with an accuracy approaching that of astronomical, or even
meteorological, predictions seems therefore beyond our
reach in the foreseeable future, and any predictions
couched in deterministic language should be regarded with
grave suspicion.
Successful predictions have nevertheless been made on
several occasions during the past six years and in at least
one case have been instrumental in reducing loss of life.
They have been based on the observation of geophysical,
geochemical or even biological phenomena which past
experience has shown often to precede the occurrence of
major earthquakes. This method of prediction, essentially
probabilistic in nature, can be summed up in statements of
the type:
'Given a set of data relating to recent observations of
suspected precursory phenomena, a comparison with
data relating to similar phenomena and to earthquakes in the past indicates that the probability of an
earthquake of magnitude M occurring in area A in
the course of the next N days (months, years) is P.'
This seems likely to be the form that predictions
scientific predictions, that is) will take for some consider-

0.01
0.Ol

, 1
10
100
Distance, ( k i n )

"

0.001

I
5

L
8

1P

Figure 1 Elements in the seismic risk method: (a) hypothetical


source area; (A) known earthquakes; ( - - ) known faults; ( - - - --) inferred faults, (b) log N vs M relationship for source area shown in
(a). (c) Attenuation curves. (d) Distribution over time of intensity
of shaking effects at each site. (Figure copied from Algermissen,
S. T. et al. 'Seismic risk evaluation of the Balkan region'. In Proc.
seminar on seismic zoning maps, Vol. 2, UN ESCO, Skopje, 1976)
"B

It is of course well known that the intensity of ground


motion at any site is strongly influenced by the dynamic
properties of the sub-soil at the site. These properties may
vary significantly within distances of the order of tens of
metres. No entirely reliable method has yet been developed
whereby local subsoil effects on seismic intensity can be
accurately predicted. What can be done at the present time
is to make a qualitative classification of subsoil types and of
their responses to seismic wave motion, based on observations of damage distribution in past earthquakes. One may
then prepare seismic microzoning maps on scales of 1: 5 000
or 1:10 000, which, used in conjunction with general
seismic hazard maps, are an essential tool in urban planning
and design in seismic areas.

The prediction of time-variations in seismic hazard


It may be argued that the above sub-title has no meaning,
since seismic hazard has no objective existence in nature,
being just a mental concept. In reality, there are only earthquakes, which occur at times and places determined by the
interplay of stress and strain in the earth's crust. Were it
feasible to measure the stress field and the mechanical
properties of crustal rock at intervals of a few tens of kilometres and down to depths of about 30 km, it would
probably not be necessarv to speak of seismic hazard but
only of expected earthquakes wiaose times, locations and

aT

Ir

IP

Acceleration'with 70% probability ofnot being exceeded


in 200 years. (Figure copied from Algermissen, S. T. etal. 'Seismic
risk evaluation of the Balkan region', In Proc. seminar on seismic
zoning maps, Vol. 2, UN ESCO, Skopje, 1976)
Figure 2

Eng. Struct., 1 9 8 2 , V o l . 4, July

149

An approach to earthquake risk management: E. 114.Fournier d'Albe

able time to come. In this form predictions may in fact be


considered as statements regarding periods of enhanced
seismic hazard in certain areas, and may thus become amenable to some degree of management.

Seismic vulnerability
The problem of assessing the vulnerability of buildings and
structures to seismic ground motion presents itself in radically different terms, depending on whether one is concerned
with new or with old structures.
The evaluation and control of vulnerability, through
engineering calculations and laboratory tests at the design
stage, is part and parcel of earthquake engineering and is
dealt with in detail by other papers in this volume.
The situation is totally different in the case of old, and
even many recent, buildings whose dynamical characteristics are unknown and cannot easily be discovered. In many
parts of the world, including Europe, such buildings represent a large proportion of those in which people live and
work. Any serious attempt to assess seismic risk must therefore take them into account.
In the ongoing UNDP/UNESCO project for earthquake
risk reduction in the Balkan region, this problem is being
attacked in the following manner:
(a) Data on the damage suffered by individual buildings in
the region during recent earthquakes (e.g. Skopje, 1963;
Adapazari (Turkey), 1967 Gediz (Turkey), 1969; Vrancea
(Romania and Bulgaria), 1977;Montenegro (Yugoslavia and
Albania), 1979; Corinth (Greece), 1981) are being compiled
and reduced to a standard format
(b) The degree of damage (specific loss) to each building is
expressed on a standard scale.
(c) Buildings are classified according to type of structure,
materials used, etc., into 12 categories.
(d) Vulnerability functions, relating the degree of damage
to the intensity of ground motion, are derived for each
category of building by statistical analysis of the data.
The major difficulty in carrying through this work is the
definition of intensity. Only in the case of the most recent
earthquakes (Montenegro, 1979; Corinth, 1981), have
instrumentatl records of ground motion been obtained. In
these two cases, the degree of damage can be compared
directly with objective data on ground motion intensity.
In the remaining cases, one is obliged to fall back on
macroseismic scales to express intensity;but since intensity
assessments on such scales are based precisely on observed
degrees of damage to typical structures, one is caught
within a vicious circle. One is trying to discover a relation
between vulnerability (a property of the building) and
intensity (a parameter expressing ground motion) when
intensity is measured on a scale which subsumes certain
vulnerabilities for certain types of structure.
Escape from this logical trap will be possible only when
instrumental records of ground motion are available for a
much larger number of damaging earthquakes. In the meantime, we shall have to be content with vulnerability functions
which simply indicate departures from the vulnerabilities
subsumed in the commonly-used macroseismic intensity
scales.
The number of strong-motion recorders in operation is
increasing rapidly. From less than 10 in 1970, the number
in the Balkan region has by now risen to over 300. We may
therefore expect a more rapid accumulation of objective
data in the future, which will make it possible to derive

150

Eng. Struct., 1982, Vol. 4, July

reliable vulnerability functions for various types of buildings, relating specific loss to one or more physical parameters
of ground motion.
We have spoken so far of the vulnerability of buildings
and structures, but no analysis of seismic risk to an urban
community would be complete without consideration of
the vulnerability of urban lifelines (electricity and water
supply lines, heating and sewerage systems, telecommunications, etc). This introduces problems of great difficulty, not
only because of the physical complexity of the lifelines
themselves but because of the numerous secondary effects
of interruptions in their functioning. Further research into
this problem is urgently needed.
Risk a s s e s s m e n t
As we have already seen, the specific risk to a building or
structure is the product of a convolution of its vulnerability
with the seismic hazard. Provided that adequate data are
available on these two factors, and that intensity of ground
motion is expressed by the same parameters in the two sets
of data, this convolution presents no particular difficulty.
However, as we have seen above, the assessment of the
vulnerability of older buildings presents problems of great
complexity, and in most parts of the world there are simply
no data available on vulnerability. On the other hand, urban
construction goes ahead and architects and planners urgently
need information on seismic risk.
The situation is perhaps not quite so desperate as may
appear at first sight. Records of earthquake damage have
been kept for centuries in many parts of the world, and
such records can be used to compile catalogues and to prepare maps on which the observed 'intensity' is expressed on
a macroseismic scale. In many cases, the amount of data
available is sufficient to permit the derivation of an
intensity-frequency curve. But, as we have seen, 'intensity'
maps of this kind are, in fact, maps of specific risk to buildings of certain types rather than maps of seismic hazard,
and specific risk is precisely what interests planners.
Planners and economists need not therefore despair if
precise data on seismic hazard and vulnerability are lacking.
In order to obtain an approximate evaluation of the risk to
existing buildings, it is not absolutely necessary to know
whether earthquakes are caused by convection in the upper
mantle of the earth or by ancient heroes turning in their
graves. Data on the 'intensity' of past earthquakes are
almost certain to be available wherever a significant seismic
hazard exists, and such data may be used directly to derive
an approximate assessment of risk.
A word of caution must nevertheless be added. The
analysis of macroseismic data will not make possible the
evaluation of the specific risk to any individual building but
only that of the average risk to buildings in the broad
categories specified in whichever scale has been used to
express intensity.
We have spoken so far of the risk to individual buildings
and structures. In order to assess the risk to an aggregate of
buildings, such as a town or village, it is first necessary to
assign a value to each element at risk, since specific risk is
not an additive quantity, and then only can one add
together the risks to a number of elements. At this stage it
must be borne in mind that the risk to an urban settlement
is far greater than the sum of the risks to the individual
elements, and that one must also take into account:
possible losses due to secondary causes such as fire following earthquake;

An approach to earthquake risk management: E. M. Fournier d'Albe


possible losses due to the interruption of essential supplies
or communications;
possible losses due to interruption of industrial production
and eventual loss of markets;
etc.
It will no doubt have been noted that there has been no
reference so far in this paper to the risks to human life. This
is because we have taken as our point of departure a definition of risk couched in economic terms. It has been made
abundantly clear by others how difficult it is to attach an
economic value to human life (indeed, it is easy to show
that, in some circumstances, such a value may be negative).
This does not mean that the method of analysis used in this
paper cannot be adapted to evaluate risk to life.
Human beings are vulnerable to the extent that they live
and work inside vulnerable buildings, and there are sufficient data on casualties in past earthquakes for one to
estimate the specific risk to human life (i.e. probable
percentage of population killed or injured) in a given period
of time), if adequate data are available on seismic hazard
and the vulnerability of buildings and structures. However,
there is one important factor determining human vulnerability which does not affect that of buildings or structures:
the time of day at which an earthquake occurs. Experience
has shown that this may be the most important single
factor determining the number of casualties. Since it is
quite impossible at the present time to foresee at what time
of day an earthquake may occur, there must necessarily be
a great degree of uncertainty in estimating the risk to
human life.

Responses to risk
The notion of acceptable risk
The seminar on 'lessons learnt from recent earthquakes'
would probably never have been held if, in the general
opinion, earthquakes presented no more risk than what can
be accepted as part of everyday life. Response to earthquake risk is motivated by a feeling that the existing risk
is unacceptable and that something should be done to
reduce it. But to what level should it be reduced?
The author knows of no country or community in which
there exists an established procedure for deciding consciously and deliberately on levels of risk which it and its
members, collectively and severally, are prepared to accept.
One cannot decide what is an acceptable level of risk, one
can only observe and take note of what is or is not accepted.
This is particularly true of risks to human life, for which
the level of acceptance varies greatly from one type of
hazard to another (compare, for instance, the accepted risks
of death or injury in car accidents with that of an accident
to a nuclear power plant).
The method of risk analysis summarized in the present
paper offers, on the other hand, a means by which decisions
may be reached objectively with regard to the risk of
material loss through earthquakes. Such risks can be
reduced through control of the spatial distribution of
elements or through control of their vulnerability. The additional costs of such action to reduce risk can be balanced
against reduction in losses, and an acceptable risk level
determined by normal cost-benefit analysis.
Degrees or freedom
Of the three factors determining risk (see equation (8)),
we have to accept that first, seismic hazard, lies outside
human control. There remain two possibilities for action to
reduce seismic risk:

Control of the value and of the spatial distribution of new


investments (settlements, factories, etc);
Control of the vulnerability of the elements at risk.
In addition, the financial risk borne by those who live or
invest in seismically hazardous areas may be reduced by
arranging, through the mechanism of insurance, for it to be
shared by the population as a whole.

The distribution of elements at risk


Since seismic hazard is a function of position, it is
always possible to exert some control over seismic risk by
an appropriate choice of site for new constructions.
Seismic risk is, however, only one of many factors to
be taken into account in the planning of new settlements
or production facilities, and siting in a low-hazard locality
may entail additional costs which outweigh or annul the
advantage to be gained by reducing risk. This is a matter for
analysis by economists and physical planners and has been
discussed in some detail by Ciborowski in his companion
paper.
Here we need only draw attention to the fact that the
seismic hazard at any site depends on two factors: (a) the
location of the site with respect to the seismic origin zones;
and (b) the local subsoil characteristics.
The first of these two factors, which will vary significantly only over distances of the order of 10 km or more,
will be of concern mainly at the level of regional planning.
The second, which may vary significantly over distances of
100 m or less, will be of great importance in detailed urban
planning. Very little experience has yet been acquired in
the use of seismic hazard data in regional or urban planning,
and it remains to be discovered exactly what information is
required, and in what form, for use in the planning process.
An attempt to clarify these issues is now being made in
connection with the elaboration of a physical development
plan and of urban master plans for the Republic of Montenegro (Yugoslavia). The main questions appear to be: (a) map
scales; (b) the period of time for which seismic hazard
should be calculated and (c), whether absolute values of
hazard are required, or only relative variations from place
to place.
The control and reduction of vulnerability
Measures to control and reduce the vulnerability of
structures, of their contents and of the people living and
working in them, may usefully be divided into two categories: (a) long-term or permanent, and (b) short-term or
temporary.
Long-term measures. Seismic building codes and regulations are the principal means by which vulnerability can be
reduced in the long term, provided that they are technically
sound and effectively enforced. Such codes already exist in
many countries.
The rules of design and construction embodied in such
codes and regulations are derived from the technology of
earthquake engineering and will not be discussed here. What
is of greater interest, within the context of this paper, are
their modes of apolication.
Most national building codes are accompanied by a map
or table indicating the seismic intensity to be used as a basis
for design in various parts of the country or in various
administrative areas. In many parts of the world this is still
the best that can be done to specify the seismic hazard. It is
obvious, however, that the use of a single parameter such as
a degree on a macroseismic scale is a gross over-simplification.

Eng. Struct., 1982, Vol. 4, July

151

An approach to earthquake risk management." E. M. Fournier d AIbe

For instance, MSK intensity VIII in Romania represents a


very different type of ground motion to that represented
by the same intensity in California or Turkey, whereas that
in Algeria is likely to be different again. This is due to the
differences in earthquake focal mechanism in different
parts of the world, and even in different parts of the same
country.
Building codes and regulations have to be used by
engineers and architects, most of whom cannot be expected
to have any detailed knowledge of seismology or earthquake engineering. They must therefore be relatively
straightforward and easy to apply in practice. On the other
hand, they must be effective, and to be effective they must
take into account the extreme complexity of seismic
ground motion and of the dynamic response of structures
to this motion. Their formulation thus presents problems
whose difficulty seems likely to increase rather than
decrease with the acquisition of new knowledge. The
introduction of the concepts of risk management may
complicate the matter still further.
The vulnerability of new buildings may be reduced by
the publication of appropriate building codes, but what
can be done about the older buildings which will remain in
use for a long time to come? Their vulnerability is difficult
to assess and their strengthening often presents very difficult technical problems. Furthermore, the cost of strengthening may some times exceed the cost of demolition and
replacement.
In any case, a choice has to be made between three
alternatives: (a) to strengthen the building; (b) to demolish
and replace it; or (c) to leave it as it is. In the case of older
buildings of historical or architectural interest, the decision
will depend not only on risk analysis in economic terms but
on the cultural value attached to the building in its present
form. This will involve subjective judgement, individual or
collective, which is likely to vary widely from case to case.
Short-term and temporary measures. Earthquake prediction may still be far from becoming an exact science, but
the fact remains that predictions are being made and communicated to the public. Whatever their scientific value,
they result in great pressure being put on the authorities
responsible for public safety, to take some action to mitigate the effects of the expected catastrophe. Certain
measures can in fact be taken to reduce vulnerability during
periods of exceptional hazard, real or imaginary, for example:
lowering of water level in reservoirs,
protection of valuable property within buildings;
safe storage of toxic or inflammable substances;
reinforcement or mobilization of fire-fighting and medical
services;
stockpiling of food and emergency shelters;
evactuation of people from vulnerable buildings.
All such measures entail some degree of disturbance to
normal life and, if not justified by the occurrence of the
expected earthquake, will have to be in terms of acceptable
risk. The responsibility for decision-making in such circumstances is extremely heavy and may have important social
and economic consequences. Situations of this kind must
clearly' be envisaged and prepared for in advance.
The basic rule of decision-making may be:
'Take a particular action when the risk to a given area
exceeds a specified value'
The problem before a government or a community is there-

152

Eng. Struct., 1982, Vol. 4, July

fore to decide on a series of threshold values of risk whose


attainment will automatically trigger appropriate precautionary measures planned in advance. A procedure of this
kind seems indispensable if one is to avoid irrational or
'Panic' reactions to emergency situations.
It remains to be seen how such a procedure can be
tbrmulated and put into practice. In most countries, the
civil defence organization is probably the most appropriate
body to take the leading role, on condition that it works in
close cooperation with seismological and engineering
institutions.
Risk-sharing
Insurance and re-insurance offer a means of relieving
those whose property is damaged or destroyed by an earthquake from bearing the full brunt of the disaster, and of
spreading the burden of risk among the population as a
whole. However, except in certain countries (e.g. New
Zeland) where national earthquake insurance schemes exist,
the availability and conditions of insurance against earthquake risk are extremely variable. There is indeed a growing
reluctance among re-insurance companies to underwrite
earthquake insurance because of the magnitude of the risks
involved and the lack of data on vulnerability and seismic
hazard. The Unesco working group which examined this
subject identified the main problem as:
lack of sufficient exchange of knowledge between scientists
and the insurance industry;
insufficient coordination within the insurance industry;
insufficient coordination of ways and means between the
insurance industry and governments for the reduction of
risk;
lack of readily available information on the location and
vulnerability of buildings at risk;
insufficient use of the data available,
impact of inflation on insurance values and catastrophe
reserves.
Furthermore, the existence of predictions may profoundly
modify the conditions under which insurance operates.
Several large re-insurance companies have now set up
their own scientific groups to study and advise on these
problems. At all events, it is clear that insurance is one of the
most important elements of earthquake risk management.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have attempted to formulate a conceptual
basis for regarding earthquakes not as a random series of
catastrophes but as a problem of social and economic risk
which can be dealt with as part of everyday life. The main
idea is that one may act to mitigate their impact rather than
simply react to the losses that they inflict.
Given the complexity of the physical phenomena themselves, and of their social and economic effects, we have
had to gloss over or omit discussion of many important
technical problems. The general principles that we have
adopted will, we hope, withstand closer scrutiny than it has
been possible to give them here.
References
1 UNDRO.'Natural disasters and vulnerability analysis: Report
of expert group meeting', Geneva, 1979
2 UNESCO. 'Proceedings of the seminar on seismic zoning maps',
Skople, 1976

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