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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R.
TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on
February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675
was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder
of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of
San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one
bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since
the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one
bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to
wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section
49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional
district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not
to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21
SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down
the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements
for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in
the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of
the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No.
7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts,
the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of
separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice
of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is
the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Present:

G.R. No. 190582

EN BANC

Baguio City

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY

represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

DECISION

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson

[1]
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even
choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of
public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on
genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among
those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against
[2]
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the
[3]
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No.
09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
[4]
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as

lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang

Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation
was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August
[5]
17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani[6]
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
[7]
governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender,
of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change
the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the
natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men
working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their
error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a people

transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84)
He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the

Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who
are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the
record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or

accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal
Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as
Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form;
the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment
selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature
or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are
prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs,
established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have
not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that
does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in
the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency
of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
[8]
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.

The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

[9]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the
First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and
Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph).
The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I.

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

No substantial differentiation

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the partylist system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests
are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II.

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the
social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals

Legal Provisions

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are
being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions
have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V.

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all
[10]
unlawful.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the
May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its

[11]
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.
Instead of
filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until
[12]
January 16, 2010 to Comment.
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
[13]
support of petitioners application.
Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully
[14]
ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.
The COMELEC, through its Law
[15]
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order
on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
[16]
directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
[17]
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.
The
CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and
principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted
the CHRs motion to intervene.
[18]
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene
which
[19]
motion was granted on February 2, 2010.
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual

orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned,
the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

Our Ruling

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or
related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the partylist system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on

[20]
Elections,
the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The
COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few
[21]
isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground
for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions.
This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence
were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At
best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory,
and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute
at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
[22]
members in its electronic discussion group.
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends

Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte

Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
[23]
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD
LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In
fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City,
which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and
the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non[24]
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly,
[25]
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
[26]
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of
Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse
that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest
roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny
of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a
strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided

[27]
it does not offend compelling state interests.

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads

Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and

homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted
public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because
of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a
sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the
same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized
[28]
society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine
the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage,
family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived
lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual
conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
[29]
transplanted into the realm of law.

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
[30]
groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.
The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more
than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between
thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC
would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this
[31]
is not the intendment of the law.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without
authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize
that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions,
situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly
then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or
[32]
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial
of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.
It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall

any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of
[33]
similar persons.
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
[34]
same place and in like circumstances.

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
[35]
legitimate government end.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
[36]
Pilipinas,
we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
[37]
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it,
the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state
interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for
[38]
the purposes of the equal protection clause.
We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence
to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that
the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
[39]
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
[40]
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment
has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the
bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have
equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a
necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments
is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority,
i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a
constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a
minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,

and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to
impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal
in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same[41]
sex conduct.
European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection
[42]
provisions in foreign and international texts.
To the extent that there is much to learn from
other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to
justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
[43]
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional
structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent
with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the
existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper

opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may
[44]
seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.
A political
group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
[45]
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.
Only if a political
party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall
[46]
outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other
hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They,
too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our
democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude
from consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It
well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid
constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do
not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the
right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity
of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list
elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
[47]
limitations imposed by law. x x x

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate
in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified partylist candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental
rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a
more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate
structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant,
and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as
it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection
of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although
sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26
of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article
[48]
26 should be construed to include sexual orientation.
Additionally, a variety of United Nations
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under
[49]
various international agreements.
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in
the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based
on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to
stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's
candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any
[50]
group or category of persons from elective office.

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of
giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international
law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
[51]
Orientation and Gender Identity),
which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
[52]
International Court of Justice.
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous
analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants
or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be
added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to

further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect
of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights
language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do
not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or
[53]
opinio juris.
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities
are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior.
Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion,
and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous
debate.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby
SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for
party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

EN BANC

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO,
G.R. No. 176970
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

*YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
December 8, 2008

DECISION

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

BRION, J.:

[1]
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed

by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

[2]
from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371
the
law that Resolution No. 7837 implements is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oros then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
[3]
Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro.
This law eventually became
[4]
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one
to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The
constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as
eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the Citys barangays as follows:

Legislative Districts The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi,
Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon,
Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40
[5]
shall comprise the second district.

[6]
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on
[7]
March 27, 2007.
On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the
following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the
Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its
[8]
Board of Canvassers.

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371
without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed
for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC
Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded
according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondents Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,
argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality
of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City
in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this
case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Courts ruling in Del Mar v.
[9]
PAGCOR,
the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voters sovereign
power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily

reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to
vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also
arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for
the other legislative district, and 6) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior
[10]

approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.

THE ISSUES

The core issues, based on the petition and the parties memoranda, can be limited to the
following contentious points:

1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition
be dismissed on this ground?

2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan
de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government
unit?

3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

OUR RULING

Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without
merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
[11]
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
It was pursuant to this original
jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.

[12]
[13]
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
and the RTCs,
a
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special

and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of
practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in
favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise
known as the principle of hierarchy of courts. More generally stated, the principle requires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction
[14]
with a higher court.
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be
exceptions to the rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto
[15]
against our nations lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed.
The
present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised among
them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a
local government unit are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC
en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As
an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules
[16]
of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block
in our consideration of the present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.

The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro
as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the Citys legislative
apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the
constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local
government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the
number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a

[17]
legislative body.
It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
[18]
power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
[19]

constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the
rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment

speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as
municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
[20]
municipalities and barangays.
In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been
defined as a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of
[21]
a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof.
The creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local

government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political unit directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the
[22]
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts,
and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not
much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation
and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be
effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize
[23]
population and voting power among districts.
Hence, emphasis is given to the number
of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the
representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each
district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of
the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province
(irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative
districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with
each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment,
Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. Its concern is the commencement,
the termination, and the modification of local government units corporate existence and
territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in
implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code
and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly

affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of
income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and
[24]
capacity to provide services.
The division or merger of existing units must comply with
the same requirements (since a new local government unit will come into being), provided
that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the unit affected to
[25]

less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is

on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local
[26]
government unit.
In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment
[27]
or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,
a case that arose from the division of
the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a
legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held
for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none
was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite
was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local
Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence.
In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that
none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.

The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one
under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots
of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and
their areas of application.
A Bit of History.

[30]

of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions of some

[28]
In Macias v. COMELEC,
we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of
our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
[29]
Fourteenth Amendment
American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine Assembly,
the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature under the Americans,
with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the members of the
Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the
U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by representative
districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the
mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as
practicable according to population. Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our
country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the
apportionment provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative
districts electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act
specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine
Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with district as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was
equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions as expressed
[31]
in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.
The case ruled that inequality of
representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v.
[32]
COMELEC.
Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever came up in
these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform

and progressive ratio with each district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution,
distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of party-list representatives. In
neither Constitution was a plebiscite required.

The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local
government units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However,
[33]
as early as 1959, R.A. No. 2264
required, in the creation of barrios by Provincial
Boards, that the creation and definition of boundaries be upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected. In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278)
carried this further by requiring that the Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of the
Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality into a city in
a plebiscite. This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a
plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of local government units as well as
[34]
In 1973, the plebiscite

the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.

requirement was accorded constitutional status.

Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite
was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation,
division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never
with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called
a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a

corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district;
it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in
their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality,
which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have
its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice
of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative
district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be
created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in
the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They
[35]
are the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
They possess legal personality
on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution
defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and
[36]
the Legislature.
A local government units corporate existence begins upon the election
and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
[37]
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an instrumentality of the state in
[38]
carrying out the functions of government.
As a corporate entity with a distinct and
separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents. It acts as an agency of the community in the administration of
[39]
local affairs
and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity
[40]
on local concerns.
In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure
the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic

nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite
requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under
the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed
in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan
de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of
this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi,
Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico,
Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to
Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and

corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a
single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains
completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the
delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of
Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of

another congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the
lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod,

[41]
however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law R.A. No. 6636
whose Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City
of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall
have eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the
qualified voters therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod,
Iloilo and other cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors
each and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of
councilors according to their charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into
two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately
[42]
500,000.
By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman,
Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of
the citys population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better access to
their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its
ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In
representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each
individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each
councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are
now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of
congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of
congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the
presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in

Congress.

Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal.
District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is
composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban
[43]
Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
barangays.

A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be
the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters
[44]
therein. We settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC
when we
interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied
to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the
number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official
1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National
Statistics Office.

The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the
National Statistics Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros first
district have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
[45]
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.
The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
[46]
standard in gauging equality of representation.
In fact, for cities, all it asks is that each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative,
while ensuring representation for every province regardless of the size of its population. To
ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not

require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its
requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous,
compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
The petitioners contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de
Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural
barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if
backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the division on the basis of the difference in
the barangays levels of development or developmental focus as these are not part of the
constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the
components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the lawmakers
to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or
violation of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of
[47]
these policies.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870
Petitioner,
- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner,
- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 3, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary

schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo

a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and
accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2)
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with
the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall
consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof
the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election
[1]
in the May 10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He
says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No.
6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or

COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for
being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the
standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS
and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights
[2]
mentioned in their separate petitions.

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a
[3]
bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.
But even with
the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite
[4]
standing to challenge it. To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
[5]
be redressed by a favorable action.

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
[6]
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel,
as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition,
among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to
relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically,
do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only
to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
[7]
or alter or
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,
enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as

it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
[8]
conflicts with the Constitution.
In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
[9]
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers.
The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
[10]
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive
and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and
[11]
the allowable subjects of legislation.
The substantive constitutional limitations are
[12]
chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
[13]
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes
the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged
provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drugtesting requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that
the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a

disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may
be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not
adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public
office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004
synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to
obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on
its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the
process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can
be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning,
[14]
implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.
The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may

even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and

Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug
dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged
from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act
subject to the following conditions:
xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are
more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their
[15]
recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
[16]
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
under Sec. 2,
[17]
Art. III
of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own,
this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion
through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in
this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect

to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School

District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No.
[18]
92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),
both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental
search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug
menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by
school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug
testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation
in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton
forthwith sued, claiming that the schools drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth
[19]
Amendment
of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia,
considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school
children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy
rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe
communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the
athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a student
need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing
because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held
[20]
and 14th Amendments
that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth
and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma

required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities.
Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to
undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes

are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing
even among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority.
In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It
ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and
duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of
search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to
their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students
and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just,
and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the
[21]
country that threatens the well-being of the people,
particularly the youth and school
children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and
tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of
the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations

schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws

against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact
that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the
[22]
entire student body and faculty.
Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided
under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard
that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
[23]
privacy,
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
[24]
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Petitioner
Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings
on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US
courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizens
constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are
[25]
quoted extensively hereinbelow.

[26]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.
In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion
into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary
[27]
sensibilities.
And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the
guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
[28]
particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.

Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of
[29]

the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
[30]
intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged
by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest
[31]
against the promotion of some compelling state interest.
In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165
is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift
and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the
backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to
a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly
set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
[32]
narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place
them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as
may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test
as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated
to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the
test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored
by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
[33]
accurate chain of custody.
In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access
[34]
to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;
that the drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
[35]
confidentiality of the test results.
Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation
of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA
9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the

country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the
deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium,
among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
[36]
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.
To the Court, the need for drug testing to
at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors
dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug
trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day
scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the
threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that
the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on
the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the
random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
[37]
service.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
[38]
responsibility and efficiency.

Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of
undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position,

the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how
drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of
public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo
drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules
as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules. In either
case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to
drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards
against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation
with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education,
and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to
enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that
schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what
conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
[39]
landscape.
In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no
valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to

privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness
and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
[40]
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.
To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193256

March 22, 2011

ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, represented herein by its Chairman, JAMES
MARTY LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 alleging that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Resolution dated August 3, 2010, which reinstated the petition to cancel the registration and accreditation of
petitioner ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List, and directed the Commission Secretary to schedule a
hearing on the petition.
The facts are as follows:
On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition2 with the COMELEC for the cancellation
of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List3 on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious
organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1)4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children of God International, which
is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan, based on the following circumstances:
1. Although its National Chairman, James Marty Lim, was being publicly bruited as its first nominee, the real
number one nominee of the party is Arnulfo "Noel" Molero, who is a known top official of Ang Dating Daan;
2. ABC was organized, established and is being run by Ang Dating Daan not as a party-list organization for
political purposes [envisioned by R.A. No. 7941 (the Party-List System Act)], but as a religious sect for
religious purposes;
3. The resources of Ang Dating Daan are being used to finance the campaign of ABC on a nationwide scale;
and
4. The membership of ABC is composed of the members of Ang Dating Daan.5
Private respondent also alleged that ABC made an untruthful statement in its petition for accreditation, as it stated
that it does not possess any of the disqualifications provided by the Party-List System Act when it is disqualified for
being, in reality, a religious organization. In addition, he alleged that ABC is receiving support from third parties
abroad.
Private respondent prayed that the accreditation of ABC be cancelled, and that it be declared disqualified as a partylist group for violating R.A. No. 7941.
In its Answer,6 petitioner ABC denied private respondents allegations, which were unproven by any material and
convincing evidence. It averred that ABC, as a political party, is allowed by law to be registered and run under the
party-list system of representation. The COMELEC has approved petitioners registration and accreditation as a

party-list group, and petitioner had participated and was voted upon in the 2007 elections.
Moreover, petitioner stated that as a political party of national constituency, it was founded and headed by Mr.
James Marty Lim, who held the position of National President of the Association of Barangay Chairmen for 11 years.
Its stature as a party-list organization with national constituency that could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society should remove
any doubt that it was established for religious purposes. Petitioner averred that it has not been identified with any
religious entity or aggrupation.
On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution7 dismissing the petition based on
procedural and substantial grounds.
The dismissal on procedural grounds was grounded on the lack of proper verification of the petition. According to
the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re: Forum Shopping and Special Power of
Attorney was not duly notarized in accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended. Sections 1
and 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require that the person appearing before a notary public must
be known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity. In this case,
the COMELEC, Second Division found that the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification did not contain the
name of private respondent who supposedly appeared before the notary public, and he was not identified by any
competent evidence of identity as required by the rules on notarial practice.
The COMELEC, Second Division also dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is
not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from registration.
On June 22, 2010, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and
Suspend its Effects.8 He argued that his petition was not defective since attached to the verification were
photocopies of his identification cards. He likewise argued that he should be given the opportunity to present his
evidence to support his Petition in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
On July 6, 2010, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition with Extremely Urgent Motion to Dismiss.9
On July 6, 2010, private respondent submitted a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration10 and his evidence to
support his petition.
In response thereto, petitioner filed on July 21, 2010 a Supplement11 to its Comment/Opposition with Extremely
Urgent Motion to Dismiss that was filed on July 6, 2010. Petitioner urged the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction, since the Secretary General of the House of Representatives had already recognized ABC as a
proclaimed party-list group by asking its first nominee to attend the Orientation Program for the new members of the
House of Representatives, Fifteenth Congress on July 8, 2010 at the plenary hall.
On July 30, 2010, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition12 to petitioner's motion to dismiss, arguing that
ABC was not validly proclaimed; hence, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the case.
On August 3, 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution13 partially granting private respondents Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects dated June 22, 2010. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The petition
is hereby REINSTATED and the Commission Secretary is hereby DIRECTED TO SCHEDULE a hearing on the
petition with notice to the parties.14
Contrary to the findings of the Second Division, the COMELEC en banc found that the petitions verification page
substantially complied with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, thus:
x x x A perusal of the said verification page immediately shows that photostatic copies of Mauricio, Jr.s Community
Tax Certificate No. CCI2009 30975061, Integrated Bar of the Philippines Lifetime Membership Card, and Permit to
Carry Firearms No. 09083204 were attached thereto, thereby making them an integral part of said verification page.
Clearly, Mauricio Jr.s submission of his community tax certificate and two (2) identification cards, with the
verification page substantially complies with the requirements of the 2004 Notarial Rules.15
More importantly, the COMELEC en banc stated that the records of the case showed that the Resolution of the
Second Division was issued without any hearing, which deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to submit evidence in
support of his petition. The COMELEC en banc averred that Section 616 of R.A. No. 7941 requires the sending out

of notices and that an actual hearing is held to ensure that the parties right to due process is respected. It cited the
case of Sandoval v. Commission on Elections,17 which held that procedural due process demands notice and
hearing.
ABC filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Commission en banc has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration
and accreditation since ABC was already proclaimed as winner.
2. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it set the petition of Mauricio for hearing when he
was already given all the time and opportunity to present and substantiate his case.
3. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amountING to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not recognize that on its face the petition of
Mauricio is unmeritorious and procedurally defective.
4. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it singled out the case of ABC, setting the same for
hearing when all the other cases of the same nature were all summarily and motu proprio dismissed by the
COMELEC.
5. Because of the foregoing, the assailed Resolution of August 3, 2010 is a patent nullity; hence, direct resort
to this honorable Supreme Court is proper.18
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of
registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list
elections of May 10, 2010 per National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-00919 promulgated on May 31,
2010.
Petitioner avers that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." Hence, once a candidate for House of
Representatives is proclaimed, the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to pass upon its qualification and the same
is vested with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Petitioner states that in this case, there is no dispute that ABC Party-List has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as
one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010; therefore, any question as to its qualification should be
resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC. Petitioner asserts that once a party-list group has been
proclaimed winner and its nominees have taken their oath, the COMELEC should be divested of its jurisdiction over
both the party-list group and its nominees.
Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, is applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.
According to petitioner, its submission is supported by the fact that one of the grounds for the cancellation of the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party is failure to obtain the required two percent of votes or to
participate in the past two elections which are obviously applicable only to losing party-list groups.
The arguments of petitioner do not persuade.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party, organization or
coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which states:
Sec, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or

candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.20
Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties,
organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said
authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The Comelec may motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
xxx
It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of
the ABC Party-List.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to
their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives,21 but it is the party-list
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
The members of the House of Representatives are provided for in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.22
Thus, the members of the House of Representatives are composed of the members who shall be elected from
legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal23 held:
x x x x [F]rom the Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the
Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations
or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They
have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will
directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years
for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of
the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)24
Since the representative of the elected party-list organization becomes a member of the House of Representatives,
contests relating to the qualifications of the said party-list representative is within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Abayon held:
x x x [P]arty-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.25
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or
representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition is derived
from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
1avvphi1

In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation
of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.
Moreover, petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it still set the petition for hearing despite the fact that private respondent had the
opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process, and he presented his evidence as attachments to his
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
The contention lacks merit.
The COMELEC has the constitutional mandate to register political parties, organizations and coalitions, and to
cancel their registration on legal grounds; hence, the COMELEC en banc, in this case, has the prerogative to direct
that a hearing be conducted on the petition for cancellation of registration of the ABC Party-List. The COMELEC en
banc stated in its Resolution that only then can the petition be resolved on its merits with due regard to private
respondents right to due process.
Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.26 The grave abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.27 It is absent
in this case.
As regards the alleged lack of proper verification of the petition of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc held
that private respondent substantially complied with the requirements of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as he
submitted his community tax certificate and two identification cards with the verification page. The Court agrees with
the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, which has the discretion to liberally construe procedural rules in order to
achieve a just and speedy resolution of every action brought before the COMELEC.
Further, petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it singled out
this case and directed that it be set for hearing when other cases of the same nature were summarily and motu
proprio dismissed by the COMELEC, citing the cases of Barangay Natin Party-List (BANAT) v. Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) Foundation, Inc., and BANAT v. 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy (1-CARE) and
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC).28
The contention is without merit.
In the cited case of BANAT v. CIBAC Foundation, Inc., the COMELEC dismissed the petition for cancellation of the
certificate of registration and accreditation of CIBAC Foundation Inc. on the ground that this Court had already
determined the eligibility of CIBAC as a registered/accredited party-list organization, unlike in this case.29
In regard to the case of BANAT v. 1-CARE and APEC,30 the COMELEC dismissed a similar petition on the ground
that the registration and qualification of APEC and its nominees have been settled affirmatively by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.31
In fine, the COMELEC en banc did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated August 3, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271

July 8, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene
in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and
enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list
representation should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the
party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as
winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32
named party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would
complete the 250 member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it
is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the
total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list
groups which did not attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is,
therefore, sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available
seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more
minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid
down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has
been abandoned.1
On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:

The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in
violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and
APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.2
Following the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court
on 27 April 2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated
the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following
the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM).
Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual winning
party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the
1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives
provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the
number of members of the House of Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law
authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives
is no less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution:
Republic Act

Year Signed
into Law

Legislative District

1 7160

1992

Biliran

2 7675

1994

Mandaluyong City

3 7854

1994

Makati (2nd District)

4 7878

1995

Apayao

5 7896 and 7897

1995

Guimaras

6 7926

1995

Muntinlupa City

7 8470

1998

Compostela Valley

8 8487

1998

Taguig City (2nd District)

9 8526

1998

Valenzuela City (2nd District)

10 9229

2003

Paraaque (2nd District)

11 9230

2003

San Jose del Monte City

12 8508 and 9232

1998 and 2003

Antipolo (1st District)

13 9232

2003

Antipolo (2nd District)

14 9269

2004

Zamboanga City (2nd District)

15 9355

2006

Dinagat Island

16 9357

2006

Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

17 9360

2006

Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)

18 9364

2006

Marikina City (2nd District)

19 9371

2007

Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

20 9387

2007

Navotas City

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a
separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically
applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for
determining the number of seats available to party-list representatives is
Number of seats available
to legislative districts

.20

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the
number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law."
Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list
representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional
legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such
additional party-list seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of
party-list seats for every election year after 1987.
Election
Year

Number of
Legislative
Districts

Number of
Party-List
Seats

Total Number of Members

of the House of
Representatives

1992

200

50

250

1995

206

51

257

52

261

New Districts:
Biliran
Mandaluyong City
Makati (2nd District)
Apayao
Guimaras
Muntinlupa City
1998

209
New Districts:
Compostela Valley
Taguig City (2nd
District)
Valenzuela City (2nd
District)

2001

209

52

261

2004

214

53

267

New Districts:

Paraaque City (2nd

District)
San Jose del Monte
City
Antipolo (1st
District)
Antipolo (2nd
District)
Zamboanga City
(2nd District)
2007

219

54

273

55

275

New Districts:
Dinagat Island
Sultan Kudarat (2nd
District)
Zamboanga
Sibugay (2nd
District)
Marikina City (2nd
District)
Cagayan de Oro
(2nd District)
2010

220
New District:
Navotas City
(assuming no
additional districts
are created)

We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is
already beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats.
However, the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available
seats for party-list representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271
and 179295, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number
of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of
the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for
distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on
the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then,
despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30
because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54
available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2%
threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court
upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.
1avvphi1

In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat
because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be
given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives
as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of
seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election,
such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with
guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties

participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten
parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more
seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all
his opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more
votes than his opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the
barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a candidate
in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning candidate must receive
at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a single vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to
belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list
elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest
ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list
representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the
last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district
representatives.4
The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties.
We used the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued
NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court
with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3
of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the procedure.
1avvphi1

The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires
correction for purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for
party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the
difference between 54, the number of available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the
figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-list organizations, however,
remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELECs computation in NBC No. 09-001 is
shown below:

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes
Garnered over
Total Votes for
Party List, in
%
(A)

Guaranteed Additional
Seat
Seats
(First
(Second
Round)
Round)
(B)
(C)

(B) plus (C),

in whole
integers
(D)

Applying
the three
seat cap
(E)

BUHAY

1,169,338

7.44%

2.68

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,189

6.23%

2.24

N.A.

CIBAC

755,735

4.81%

1.73

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,266

3.95%

1.42

N.A.

APEC

619,733

3.94%

1.42

N.A.

A Teacher

490,853

3.12%

1.12

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,448

2.97%

1.07

N.A.

85

ALAGAD

423,165

2.69%

N.A.

COOPNATCCO

409,987

2.61%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,168

2.60%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,956

2.45%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,349

2.38%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,323

2.36%

N.A.

14

AMIN

347,527

2.21%

N.A.

15

ABONO

340,002

2.16%

N.A.

16

YACAP

331,623

2.11%

N.A.

17

AGAP

328,814

2.09%

N.A.

18

AN WARAY

321,516

2.04%

N.A.

19

UNI-MAD

251,804

1.60%

N.A.

20

ABS

235,152

1.50%

N.A.

21

ALIF

229,267

1.46%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

229,036

1.46%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,700

1.45%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

219,363

1.40%

N.A.

25

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,095

1.36%

N.A.

26

AT

200,030

1.27%

N.A.

27

VFP

196,358

1.25%

N.A.

28

ANAD

188,573

1.20%

N.A.

29

BANAT

177,068

1.13%

N.A.

30

ANG
KASANGGA

170,594

1.08%

N.A.

31

BANTAY

169,869

1.08%

N.A.

32

ABAKADA

166,897

1.06%

N.A.

33

1-UTAK

165,012

1.05%

N.A.

34

TUCP

162,678

1.03%

N.A.

35

COCOFED

156,007

0.99%

N.A.

Total

18

54

Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino
(ALIF) both have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both
BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The
computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS
and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in
future party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference
in the distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the
distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would
mathematically prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated
with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower

fractional seat value after the allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after
receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the
additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's
1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become
material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for
purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats.
However, the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section
5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in
Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the
party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1),
which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly,
there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-list seats in
the House of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this
proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b)8 of the same law which mandates a three-seat
cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b)
also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed
seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require
absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum
number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for
every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization
one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at
least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat
allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this
Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution
does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not
question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list
representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time,
these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the PartyList Act that could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7068

December 22, 1954

PERFECTO FAYPON, petitioner,

vs.
ELISEO QUIRINO, respondent.
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Quirino, Soriano and Crisologo for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
A petition for quo warranto under section 173 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended, was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. By a petition for a writ of certiorari under
Rule 46 the last judgment is now before us for review.
The ground for the quo warranto petition is the respondent's ineligibility for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Sur to which he was proclaimed elected by the provincial board of canvassers in the elections held on 13 November
1951. It is alleged that he lacks the residence in the province, as required in section 2071 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The error claimed to have been committed by the trial court in refusing admission of an amended petition,
presumably to allege an additional ground for disqualification of the respondent is no longer urged, the attempt to file
such petition having been made on the day set for the hearing of the case.
lawphil.net

The second point raised is the irregular constitution in the Court of Appeals of the division of five members that
rendered the judgment in the case. It is claimed that when the unanimous concurrence of the division of three could
not be had, the Presiding Justice chose or designated two additional Associate Justices in violation of the resolution
of the Court in banc promulgated on 15 September 1952 which required that it be by rotation in the order of
seniority. The alleged violation of the resolution of the Court in banc promulgated on 15 September 1952 which
required that it be by rotation in the order of seniority. The alleged violation of the resolution does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear and decide the case before it on appeal. If the alleged irregular
designation be a sufficient ground for the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals and
remanding the case to it for further proceedings, it would unnecessarily delay the disposition of this case to the
detriment of public interest. As the judgment rendered in the case is being reviewed, the hearing and consideration
of the case by this Court sufficiently guarantee and protect the petitioner's right and interest. Also, the fact that after
the designation of two additional Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals to form a division of five, as provided for
in the Judiciary Act of 1948, no hearing was held, is not sufficient to render judgment void, because section 1, Rule
53, allows the consideration and adjudication of an appealed case "by any and all of Justices who are members of
the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were
or were not members of the court and whether they were not present at the date of submission . .".
The third point is the alleged respondent's lack of residence as required by law section 2071 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The Court of Appeals found the following facts:
. . That respondent-appellee was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, in June, 1895; that he went to the United
States in 1919 to study and returned to the Philippines in 1923; that on his return, he taught as professor in
the University of the Philippines for four years. He became owner and editor of the Intelligence, a newspaper
publish in Manila. He went to Iloilo as editor of the Iloilo Times. He became executive secretary and general
manager of the NEPA (National Economic Protectionism Association) from 1936 until December 31, 1951

(Exhibits G, G-1 to G-3). He was editor of Commerce, an official organ of the Chamber of Commerce in
Manila (Exhibits F, F-1 to F-11). He registered as a voter in Pasay City in 1946-1947 (Exhibit A). He owns a
house and resides at 55-11th Street, Quezon City (Exhibits H-H-1).
There is no question then that he was born in the municipality of Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, in June, 1895; came to Manila
to pursue his studies; went to the United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in
the newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo and later on again in Manila. There is also no question that the respondent was
proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur with
49,017 votes cast for him as against 19,466 votes cast for the petitioner.
The crucial and pivotal fact upon which the petitioner relies to have judgment of the respondent as voter in Pasay
City in 1946 and 1947. In several cases we have ruled that mere absence from one's residence or origin domicile
to pursue studies engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence. It is contended, however, that the respondent's registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946
and 1947 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws on the subject, implies and means that
he was a resident thereof during the six months immediately preceding such registration and of the Philippines for
one year; 1 and that such being the case he was ineligible for the office to which he was elected, because
No person shall be eligible to a provincial office unless at the time of the election he is qualified voter of the
province, has been a bona fide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election and is not less than
thirty years of age. 2
Did the respondent's registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 constitute abandonment or loss of his
residence of origin? The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention
which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned
or lost his residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. If we are to take
literally the meaning of the voter's oath 3 which he files with the board of inspectors for his registration as such,
there is no doubt that the respondent having registered in 1946 and 1947 as voter in Pasay City must have acquired
residence in that city and must be deemed to have abandoned his residence of origin. But in several decisions we
have laid down the rule that in which he is elected is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his
residence of origin. In Yra vs. Abano, 52 Phil., 380, the election of the protestee to the office of the municipal
president of Meycauayan, Bulacan, was upheld, notwithstanding the fact that he had registered as voter in Manila.
In Vivero vs. Murillo, 52 Phil., 694, where the protestee had registered as voter in the Municipality of Buraruen,
Leyte, we held that such registration had not caused the loss of his residence of origin (La Paz, same province),
where he has elected municipal president. In Laurena vs. Teves, 61 Phil., 36, 38, we upheld the election of Pedro
Teves to the office of the municipal president of Dumaguete where he was born, because he had his residence of
origin which was Dumaguete, "notwithstanding the fact that in the year 1919 he registered in the list of voters of the
municipal of Bacong; run for representative for the second district of Oriental Negros to which said municipality of
Bacong belongs; again ran for reelection in the year 1992; and launched his candidacy for member (membership) of
(in) the provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
resident of said municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, without having ever registered as elector in any of the
precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete from said year, 1919, up to the present, and having ordered the
cancellation of his name in the list of voters of said municipality of Bacong only on April 5, 1934." And in the case of
Gallego vs. Verra, 73 Phil., 453, where it appears that Pedro Gallego worked in several provinces other than his
native town (Abuyog, Leyte), registered as elector and voted in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in 1938, took his residence
certificate in Malaybalay in 1940 where it appeared that he had resided in that municipality for one and a half years,
we held that he had not lost this residence of origin and the protest against his election in 1940 to the office of
municipal mayor of Abuyog was dismissed.
The rule laid down in the foregoing cases is not devoid of reason and justification. A citizen may leave the place of
his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course, includes study in
other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his professional or business
activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. This
may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to the place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
Counsel for the petitioner argues that in addition to other qualifications residence for at least one year in the
municipality were the municipal officer is elected, as provided for in section 2174 of the Revised Administrative

Code, is sufficient; whereas the residence requirement for a provincial officer such as that of the provincial governor
must be a bona fide residence in the province for at least one prior to his election, and concludes that the rule laid
down in the cases cited and invoked is not applicable to and does not and cannot benefit the respondent. We fail to
see the difference between the requirement of not less than one year bona fide residence for provincial officers. If
any inference is to be drawn from the words "bona fide," it is that in the case of a municipal office in addition to other
qualifications an actual residence in the municipality for at least one year of a candidate for municipal office would
be sufficient to make him eligible for such office; whereas in the case of a provincial office in addition to other
qualifications a residence in good faith in the province for not less than one year of a candidate for provincial office,
although he may not actually be present therein, would be enough to make him eligible for such office. But this
would be a hair-splitting differentiation. The residence requirement for elective provincial and municipal officials is
the same; and the rule that a previous registration as voter of a municipal mayor-elect in a municipality other than
the one in which he is elected is no ground for disqualifying him because of alleged loss or abandonment of his
residence of origin in the municipality where he is elected, applies with equal force to elective provincial officials.
The case of Tanseco vs. Arteche, 57 Phil., 227, upon which the petitioner relies cannot be invoked as authority to
reverse the judgment under review, because apart from a long stay in Manila, where he had engaged in the practice
of his profession, Arteche, elected provincial governor of Samar, admitted in a brief submitted by his law firm in his
behalf in a criminal case where he was charged with serious slander, that he had been a bona fide resident of the
City of Manila years before he ran for the office of Governor. This fact is stated twice in the decision of this Court on
p. 234, supra. So, he admitted that he had lost and abandoned his residence of origin in the province of Samar and
acquired another in Manila. The abandonment or loss of his residence of origin was not denied but admitted but the
only point decided was that he did not reacquire his residence of origin. Two Justices dissented and were of the
opinion that he had not lost his residence of origin in the province of Samar. In the case before us there is no such
admission.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645, referred to in Tanseco vs. Arteche, supra, there was no question as to the intention
of protestee Guray to change his residence from Luna to Balaoan, and the only point decided was that he did not
reacquire his residence of origin in Luna one year before his election to the office of municipal president in the latter
municipality.
Upon the authority of cases decided by this Court, we are of the opinion and so hold that on the evidence found by
the Court of Appeals, the respondent has not lost his residence of origin.
The judgment under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution; sections 98 and 109, Revised Election code, Republic Act No. 180,
as amended.
2 Section 2071, Revised Administrative Code.
3 Section 109, Revised Election code, Republic Act No. 180, as amended.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193314

June 25, 2013

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUPAG and RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA. Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013, filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag
and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) and the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013, filed by
Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) in connection with the Decision of the Court promulgated on 26 February 2013.
Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who between the vice-mayor and the second placer
shall assume office pursuant to the final determination of petitioner's ineligibility to run for office and the lifting of the
07 September 20 1 0 Status Quo Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses
presented by petitioner.
2. Petitioners stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-year residency
requirement in the same municipality.
3. Petitioners registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality at least six months prior
to the registration.
4. Petitioners certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any finding of a deliberate
attempt to deceive the electorate.
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the qualification of petitioner after she
was proclaimed as winner.
We deny the motion of petitioner and grant the partial motion for reconsideration of private respondents.
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted by the statements that
petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yaps house while her residential unit was being constructed; and that by
December 2009, the construction was still ongoing.
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her witnesses who, while claiming that
they personally know her to have been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008, declared in the
same affidavit that while her house was being constructed, she used to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap
(Mrs. Yap) in Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioners witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008" contradicts their statements that (1) they have "started the construction of the residential house
of the owner and other infrastructures of the resort since January 2009"; (2) "until the present (meaning until
December 2009 when they executed their affidavit), the construction and development projects are still on-going";
and (3) "at times when Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas

Diut, Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while her residential house was still being constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and that the statements are
in fact consistent with her claim that she had been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one year
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. She argues as follows:
x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in a different
barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent or contradictory with petitioners assertion and the
witnesses statements that petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas, because petitioner obviously needed a place to stay
while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed. This does not negate the fact that petitioner was
establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few
months (sic) of January 2009.1
Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very
latest during the first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that she herself cannot pinpoint the particular date
when she established her legal residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to the declaration of the
witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that Ms. Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been an actual and physical resident
of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, after she bought the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita
Yap, Jr. on 9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how
modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The
fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she
purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the
declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her witnesses in their joint affidavit
does not refer to the residential structure, but to the other structures in the resort that petitioner was then
establishing. She does not assert, however, that her residential unit had already been completed by that time. In
fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when her claimed residential unit was completed, or when she
transferred to the unit.
It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit states: "We have started the
construction of the residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort since January, 2009."
This was immediately followed by paragraph 2 which reads:
2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To establish the fact of the on-going
construction work, we are attaching herewith as part hereof, pictures we have taken on December 20 and 29, 2009
marked Annexes "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", and "6" hereof, respectively.2
Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and development projects in paragraph
2, it follows that it refers to the "construction of the residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the
resort" found in the prior statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house as of 30 December 2009.
Neither has any occupancy permit been presented by petitioner to definitely establish the date she started
occupying what she claims to be her residential unit in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails to present any photograph of
a completed residential structure, which is more relevant in proving her claimed residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the
residential unit was already completed by December 2009, her witnesses could have easily testified to that fact and
presented photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the resort bolsters the courts
conclusion that at the time the witnesses signed their affidavits in December 2009, or six months prior to the May
2010 elections, her residential unit had not yet been built.
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence.
Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yaps house as proof that she had been a resident of the
Municipality of Baliangao for more than one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that petitioner was staying in Brgy.
Punta Miray as true so as to render the statements of her witnesses inconsistent, then such a consideration should
not have led this Honorable Court to the conclusion that petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao, Misamis

Occidental since Brgy. Punta Miray is located in the municipality of Baliangao like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the
fact that petitioner was staying in a house in Brgy. Punta Miray while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being
constructed during the early part of 2009 would STILL LEAD to the conclusion that petitioner has been residing in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one (1) year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections since Brgy. Punta Miray is
a part of Baliangao.3 (Emphasis in the original and underscoring omitted)
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC4 and Sabili v. COMELEC5 in claiming that "the series of events whereby
petitioner first had her residence constructed ... after she purchased in 2008 the property where her residence was
eventually established, and while she lived in another barangay of the same municipality, and then eventually
moved in to her residence in Brgy. Tugas amounted to an incremental process of transferring residence."
Petitioners case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented not only the notarized lease
contract over the property where he claimed to be residing, but also "a residence certificate ... and an identification
card of the House of Representatives showing Aborlan as his residence."6
In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioners common-law
wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence
and intent to reside in the area."7
Petitioners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a temporary and
intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay,
as she only stayed there at times when she was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.8 Her
temporary stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the declarations of her witnesses
that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort was being built, she presented no other evidence to
show any basis of her right to stay in that particular house as a resident.
Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009, claimed "that
she has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for six (6) months prior to the filing of the
said registration."9 For her claim to be true, she must have resided in Brgy. Tugas on or before 8 November 2008.
The records, however, show that she purchased property in Brgy. Tugas only on December 2008. Thus, her claim
that she had been a resident of Brgy. Tugas for at least six (6) months prior to her application for registration as a
voter on 7 May 2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an affirmation of the
falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy. Tugas. At best, the approval of her
registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant will be able to meet the six-month residency
requirement for the elections in which the registrant intends to vote.10 It does not prove that the registrant has
resided in the locality for more than one year prior to the elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false constitutes a deliberate attempt to
deceive the electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC despite the glaring absence of any
finding made by the respondent COMELEC in its assailed Resolution that petitioner committed a false material
representation in said COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local elective
position in the municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is eligible to run for public
office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove that she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to
the elections reveals the falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective position.
This false material representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.
When the candidates claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to substantiate meeting the
required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC constitutes a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide the fact"11 of ineligibility.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy after the
winner is proclaimed.

The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,12 has amply discussed this
matter, thus:
Petitioners contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the
electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon
the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates. Section 6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after
the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will
not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While
the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646
allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under
Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas
Pambansa 881.13
1wphi1

The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed office renders the officer
a de facto officer.
This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC14 and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC15 that the cancellation of the COC
based on an ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing means that the candidate was never a valid candidate
from the very beginning.16
On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate, this Court amply explained in
Jalosjos, Jr. that:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified
or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first placer was valid at
the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at
any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can
never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before
the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate
of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also
be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning.17 x x x. (Citations omitted)
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must
assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto
officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code18 cannot apply in instances when a de facto
officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a
permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure
officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 08 March 2013 is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013 is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE
V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10
May 2010 elections. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

No part on wellness leave in Main Decision

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9.
2 Rollo, p. 221.
3 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9.
4 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
5 G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 664.
6 Supra note 4.
7 Supra note 5.
8 Rollo, p. 222; Joint Affidavit.
9 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 15.

10 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Omnibus Election Code Sec. 117 reads:

Sec. 117. Qualifications of a voter. - Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law,
eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or
municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election,
may be registered as a voter.
11 Salcedo v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377 (1999).
12 318 Phil. 467 (1995).
13 Id.
14 G.R. No. 195229, 09 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105.
15 G.R. No. 193237, 09 October 2012, 683 SCRA 1.
16 Id. at 31.
17 Id. at 31-3:2.
18 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. -

If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor,
vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor. the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability. the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his pem1anent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns,
or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter; ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192803

December 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is beyond human expectations that we charge voters with knowledge as to which among the many party-list
groups listed in the ballot they are presented with during election day is disqualified. To do so will amount to their
disenfranchisement and the failure to comply with the proportionality for party-list representatives required by the
Constitution and by law.
We are asked to decide the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a party-list group that ran for the 2010 national
elections. The petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the Commission on Elections in determining
and proclaiming the winning party-list groups.1
We rule that the Petition is moot and academic. However, we provide guidance for the bench and the bar with
respect to the formula used in determining the winning party-list groups. We refine the divisor in the formula use din
getting the percentage of votes garnered by a party-list.
The facts as established on record are as follows:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under
Republic Act No. 7941.2Itgarnered a total of one hundred forty-seven thousand two hundred four (147,204) votes in
the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked fiftieth (50th).3 The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of
thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats.4 The result was based on the Commission on Elections count
of one hundred twenty-one (121) Certificates of Canvass or a total of twenty-nine million seven hundred fifty
thousand and forty-one (29,750,041) votes for the Party-List System.5
The winning party-list groups were the following:6
PARTY NUMBER OF SEATS
1 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 2
2 AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY 2
3 GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY 2
4 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY 2
5 ABONO 2
6 BAYAN MUNA 2
7 AN WARAY 2

8 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE SECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 1

9 ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS PARTY 1
10 ANAKPAWIS 1
11 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 1
12 ABANTE MINDANAO, INC. 1
13 ACT TEACHERS 1
14 YOU AGAINST CORRUPTION AND POVERTY 1
15 KASANGGA SA KAUNLARAN, INC. 1
16 BAGONG HENERASYON 1
17 ANG GALING PINOY 1
18 AGBIAG! TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. 1
19 PUWERSA NG BAYANing ATLETA 1
20 ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS 1
21 TRADE UNION CONGRESS PARTY 1
22 ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. 1
23 DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT WORKERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 1
24 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA 1
25 KALINGA-ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND NATION BUILDING THROUGH EASING
POVERTY, INC. 1
26 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 1
27 UNA ANG PAMILYA FORMERLY ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES 1
28 ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS 1
TOTAL SEATS 35
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups listed above.7
Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.8 The
petitioner asks that this Court:
1. modify the Commission on Elections interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC9 by making the
divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for the
disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are
disqualified;
2. enjoin the public respondent Commission on Elections from proclaiming the remaining winning party-list
candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by
the petitioner; and
3. issue a Temporary Restraining Order against the public respondent until it modifies the present formula for
computing the number of seats for the winning party-list candidates to the formula proposed by the petitioner.10This
Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining Order.11By Resolution, the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the winning party-list groups with the following computation:12
WHEREAS, as of May 17, 2010, the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than thirty million

two hundred sixty[-]four thousand five hundred seventy[-]nine (30,264,579)given the following statistical data:
DESCRIPTION REGISTERED VOTERS
Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 29,750,041
Less: Votes garnered by the eight (8) disqualified parties 308,335
Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated after deducting votes of the eight (8) disqualified parties
29,441,706
Add: Party-list votes still uncanvassed Lanao del Sur 515,488
Local Absentee Voting 19,071
Overseas Absentee Voting 9,299
Due to lowering of threshold 92,740
Precincts reporting Final Testing and Sealing results 186,275
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 30,264,579
WHEREAS, since there are twohundred twenty-nine (229) legislative districts, the total number of party-list seats
available for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections is fifty-seven (57) based on the following
formula: number of legislative districts/0.80 x 0.20;
WHEREAS, the provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides, in part, that:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two [sic] (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization or coalitions shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
WHEREAS, applying the formula in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v. Commission on Elections, and [sic] Bayan Muna, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment, Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., and Abono [v.]Commission on Elections, the ranking of the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered as
of May 17, 2010, and the seats that may be obtained by each party to complete the allocation of the available 57
party-list seats, are shown below:13
RANK PARTY VOTES GARNERED VOTES GARNERED OVER TOTAL VOTES FOR PARTY LIST, in %(A)
GUARANTEED SEAT First Round (B) ADDITIONAL SEATS Second Round(C) (B) plus (C), in whole integers (D)
1 AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY 1,522,986 5.0322% 1 2.26 3
2 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 1,292,182 4.2696% 1 1.92
2
3 BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG 1,249,555 4.1288% 1 1.85 2
4 AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY 1,058,6913.4981% 1 1.57 2
5 GABRIELAWOMENS PARTY 1,001,421 3.3089% 11.482
6 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY 943,5293.1176% 1 1.40 2
7 1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY 768,829 2.5404% 1 1.142
8 ABONO 766,615 2.5330% 1 1.132
9 BAYAN MUNA 746,019 2.4650% 1 1.102
10 AN WARAY 711,631 2.3514% 1 1.05 2
11 CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION 647,483 2.1394% 1 0.96 1

12 ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION COOPERATION AND HARMONY

TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS 614,725 2.0312% 1 0.91 1
13 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE SECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 515,501 1.7033% 0 1 1
14 BUTIL FARMERS PARTY 506,703 1.6742% 0 1 1
15 ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS PARTY 469,093 1.5500% 0 1 1
16 ANAKPAWIS 445,628 1.4724% 0 1 1
17 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 417,923 1.3809% 0 1 1
18 LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 417,600 1.3798% 0 1 1
19 ABANTE MINDANAO, INC. 376,011 1.2424% 0 1 1
20 ACT TEACHERS 369,564 1.2211% 0 1 1
21 ANG ASOSASYON SANG MANGUNGUMA NGA BISAYA-OWA MANGUNGUMA, INC. 357,009 1.1796% 0 1 1
22 YOU AGAINST CORRUPTION AND POVERTY 335,635 1.1090% 0 1 1
23 ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 313,359 1.0354% 0 1 1
24 KASANGGA SA KAUNLARAN, INC. 296,368 0.9793% 0 1 1
25 BAGONG HENERASYON 292,875 0.9677% 0 1 1
26 ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 292,057 0.9650% 0 1 1
27 ANG GALING PINOY 269,009 0.8889% 0 1 1
28 AGBIAG! TIMBUYOG ILOCANO, INC. 262,298 0.8667% 0 1 1
29 PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA 258,498 0.8541% 0 1 1
30 ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS 257,301 0.8502% 0 1 1
31 TRADE UNION CONGRESS PARTY 244,623 0.8083% 0 1 1
32 ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. 241,898
0.7993% 0 1 1
33 DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. 238,675 0.7886% 0 1 1
34 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA 234,717 0.7756% 0 1 1
35 KALINGA-ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND NATION BUILDING THROUGH EASING
POVERTY, INC. 229,198 0.7573% 0 1 1
36 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 227,116 0.7504% 0 1 1
37 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON 220,002 0.7269% 0 1 1
38 UNA ANG PAMILYA FORMERLY ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES 217,032 0.7171% 0 1 1
39 ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS 214,760 0.7096% 0 1
14 0AANGAT TAYO 176,074 0.5818% 0 1 1
41 ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA 173,711 0.5740% 0 1 1
42 ANG LABAN NG INDIGONG FILIPINO 170,304 0.5627% 0 1 1
43 ASSOCIATION OF LABORERS AND EMPLOYEES 167,654 0.5540% 0 1 1

44 KASOSYO PRODUCER-CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. 166,432 0.5499% 0 1 1

45 ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. 163,164 0.5391% 0 1 1
46 AKSYON MAGSASAKA PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA 161,674 0.5342% 0 1 1
47 KATIPUNAN NG MGA ANAK NG BAYAN ALL FILIPINO DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT 160,745 0.5311% 0 0 0
48 ANAK MINDANAO 157,733 0.5212% 0 0 0
49 VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY 154,183 0.5095% 0 0 0
50 ALLIANCE FOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION, INC. 147,204 0.4864% 0 0 0
51 ATONG PAGLAOM 145,435 0.4805% 0 0 0
52 PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE 143,151
0.4730% 0 0 0
53 ABANTE TRIBUNG MAKABANSA 142,013 0.4692% 0 0 0
54 ANGAT ATING KABUHAYAN PILIPINAS, INC. 141,780 0.4685% 0 0 0
55 PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA 140,000 0.4626% 0 0 0
56 ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG-BUKID AT MANGINGISDA 137,842
0.4555% 0 0 0
57 ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR 136,710 0.4517% 0 0 0
58 KAUNLARAN NG AGRIKULTURA ASENSADONG PROBINSYA ANGAT NG BAYAN 130,270 0.4304% 0 0 0
59 BARANGAY NATIN 126,462 0.4179% 0 0 0
60 1-AKO BABAENG ASTIG AASENSO 120,734 0.3989% 0 0 0
61 1GUARDIANS NATIONALIST OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 120,727 0.3989% 0 0 0
62 BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN 117,299 0.3876% 0 0 0
63 BAGONG BAYAN NAGTATAGUYOD SA DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOHIYA AT LAYUNIN 115,428 0.3814% 0 0 0
64 AHON PINOY 115,197 0.3806% 0 0 0
65 ACTION FOR DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT, INC. 115,058 0.3802% 0 0 0
66 KATRIBU INDIGINOUS PEOPLES SECTORAL PARTY 114,891 0.3796% 0 0 0
67 ANG LADLAD LBGT PARTY 113,187 0.3740% 0 0 0
68 CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, INC. 110,759 0.3660% 0 0 0
69 KABALIKAT NG MGA MAMAMAYAN 109,739 0.3626% 0 0 0
70 ONE ADVOCACY FOR HEALTH, PROGRESS AND OPPORTUNITY 109,682 0.3624% 0 0 0
71 BINHI; PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA 108,005 0.3569% 0 0 0
72 1-AANI 107,970 0.3568% 0 0 0
73 AKAP BATA, INC. 107,154 0.3541% 0 0 0
74 ANG ASOSASYON NG MGA TRABAHADOR AT PAHINANTE 107,135 0.3540% 0 0 0
75 AGILA NG MGA KATUTUBONG PILIPINO, INC. 105,009 0.3470% 0 0 0
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were

spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million
(7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections erroneous interpretation. The figure
presented by petitioner resulted from the following computations:14
37,377,371 (Number of voters who actually voted LESS votes for disqualified party lists)
less 30,264,579 (Number of votes for party-list candidates LESS number of votes for disqualified party-list
candidates)
7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO)
First, the total number of votes for disqualified party-lists is deducted from the total number of voters that actually
voted. The total number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is three hundred eight thousand three hundred
thirty-five (308,335). 15 The total number of voters that actually voted is thirty-seven million six hundred eighty-five
thousand seven hundred six (37,685,706).16 After subtracting the amounts, the result is thirty-seven million three
hundred seventy-seven thousand three hundred seventy-one (37,377,371)votes.
Second, the number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is again deducted from the number of votes for partylist candidates which the petitioner pegged at thirty million five hundred seventy-two thousand nine hundred fourteen
votes (30,572,914).17 The difference then is thirty million two hundred sixty-four thousand five hundred seventy-nine
(30,264,579) votes.
Lastly, to get the total number of votes disregarded by the Commission on Elections interpretation, 30,264,579 is
subtracted from 37,377,371.The computation then results to seven million one hundred twelve thousand seven
hundred ninety-two (7,112,792) votes disregarded using the Commission on Elections interpretation.
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers is the following:
ref - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2013/december2013/192803.pdf
Number of seats available to legislative districts______________________________x .20 =Number of seats
available to party-list representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
229______________________________x .20 =57 .80
The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their
guaranteed seats, where:
Number of votes of party-list
______________________________=
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of votes for party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to 2% or 0.02 to entitle
a party-list candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the total number of
guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of party-list seats available. Thus:
Total number of party-list seats available - Number of seats allocated in first round x Proportion or Percentage of
votes garnered by party-list = Additional seats awarded
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is computed by getting the
sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats awarded in the second round), the next in the
party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list,
however, is imposed on winning groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC
is flawed because it is not in accordance with the law.19 The petitioner distinguishes the phrases, valid votes cast for
party-list candidates on the one hand as against votes cast for the party-list system on the other.

The petitioner puts in issue the interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.7941 or "An Act Providing for
the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
sections provide the guidelines in allocating seats to party-list representatives:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate
in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received
and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis provided)
The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-list Law
does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes, to wit:
Therefore, votes for specific party lists are not the same as votes for the party-list system. Hence, people whose
votes were spoiled for instance (like checking or failure to properly shade the ovals in the ballots, or voted for two
party lists when the requirement is only one, or had erasures on their ballots for instance), or did not vote for any
party-list at all are still voters for the party-list system. The votes for the party-list system [include] all those people
who voted whether their votes were counted or not as long as the mechanism for the selection of party-list is in
place.20 (Emphasis provided)
In its November 12, 2010 Comment,21 the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took
the position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on
Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified partylist candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."24
The issues in this case are as follows:
I. Whether the case is already moot and academic
II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula
used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The options are:
A. All votes cast for the party-list system less the votes cast for subsequently disqualified party-list groups and votes
declared spoiled
B. The total votes cast
C. The total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups listed in the
ballot even if subsequently declared disqualified. The divisor should not include votes that are declared spoiled or
invalid.
We decide as follows:

I
This case is moot and academic. Mendoza v. Villas26 defines a moot and academic case:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.27
Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot and academic. First, the Commission on
Elections En Banc already proclaimed other winning party-list groups.28 Second, the term of office of the winning
party-list groups in the May 2010 national elections ended on June 30, 2013. Finally, the conduct of the May 13,
2013 elections resulted in a new set of party-list groups.
We held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition moot and academic.29
This leaves any ruling on the issues raised by the petitioner with no practical or useful value.30
However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over moot and academic cases are allowed: (1)
there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.31 On the importance of the
assailed formula, this Court will discuss the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet
evading review32 and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.33
II
The petitioner is not the real party in interest
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."34 The partys interest must be direct, substantial, and material.35 In this case, the
petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT. It also proposes its own interpretation of the
formula to determine the proportional representation of party-list candidates in the House of Representatives.
However despite any new computation, ARAROs proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system
whether valid or invalid still fails to secure one seat for ARARO. Reviewing the figures presented by the petitioner:36
With Divisor of total valid votes cast for party-list system minus votes cast for disqualified party-lists or
invalid votes (30,264,579) With Divisor of votes cast for the party-list system as proposed by ARARO
(37,377,371)
Votes garnered 147,204 147,204
Votes garnered over total votes cast for party-lists (%) 0.4864 0.3939
Guaranteed Seat 0 0
This table clearly shows that the petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury from the application
of the formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning party-lists in the assailed National Board of
Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2%
threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has
no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court.
III
However, we review the interpretation of the formula used for the determination of wining party-list candidates with
respect to the divisor used for the guidance of bench and bar and for future elections.
The textual references for determining the formula to be used are found in the Constitution and the statute
interpreting the relevant provisions.
Article VI, Section 5,paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1987 Constitution provide the following:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,thus, provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate
in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received
and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis provided)
In Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,37 we reversed the Commission on Elections ruling that
the respondent parties, coalitions, and organizations were each entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to
reach the 2% threshold in the 1998 party-list election. Veterans also stated that the 20% requirement in the
Constitution is merely a ceiling.
Veterans laid down the "four inviolable parameters" in determining the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election
based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941:
First, the twenty percent allocation-the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold-only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit-each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation-the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."38 (Emphasis provided)
In Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. COMELEC,39 the petitioning party-list groups
sought the immediate proclamation by the Commission on Elections of their respective second nominee, claiming
that they were entitled to one (1) additional seat each in the House of Representatives. We held that the correct
formula to be used is the one used in Veterans and reiterated it in Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC.40 This Court in CIBAC v. COMELEC41 differentiates the formula used in Ang Bagong Bayani but
upholds the validity of the Veterans formula.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,42 we declared the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as void.
We said in that case that:
x x x The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives." (Republic Act No. 7941, Section 2)
xxxx

x x x There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all
of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.43
The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC44 does not in any way modify the formula set in Veterans. It only
corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-list groups maybe national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. We abandoned the requirement introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list
groups should prove that they represent a "marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941.45 BANAT overturned Veterans
interpretation of the phrase in proportion to their total number of votes. We clarified that the interpretation that only
those that obtained at least 2% of the votes may get additional seats will not result in proportional representation
because it will make it impossible for the party-list seats to be filled completely. As demonstrated in BANAT, the 20%
share may never be filled if the 2% threshold is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of party-list groups as intended by the
law. This is part of the index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the House of Representatives.46
It measures the relation between the share of the total seats and the share of the total votes of the party-list.47 In
Veterans, where the 20% requirement in the Constitution was treated only as a ceiling, the mandate for proportional
representation was not achieved, and thus, was held void by this Court.
The petitioner now argues that the votes of all the registered voters who actually voted in the May 2010 elections
should be included in the computation of the divisor whether valid or invalid.48 According to the petitioner, votes cast
for the party-list candidates is not the same as the votes cast under or for the party-list system. Specifically, it said
that: The party list system is not just for the specific party lists as provided in the ballot, but pertains to the system of
selection of the party list to be part of the House of Representatives.49 The petitioner claims that there should be no
distinction in law between valid and invalid votes. Invalid votes include those votes that were made for disqualified
party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did
not vote for any party-list candidate at all.50 All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2%
threshold.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no
cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a
party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do
otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot
but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably
made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included
in the divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the petitioner,
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be
considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. (Emphasisprovided)
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the denominator, may be
votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading or having no shade at all;51
existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based53automated election system. All these are causes that nullify the
count for that vote that can be attributable to the voters action.
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained in the ballot
even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts. Thus, the content of the
divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list component of the House of Representatives
should be amended accordingly.

We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for the partylist system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a substantial portion of
the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes validly cast for all the candidates
listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his or her choices.
To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for an electoral
exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted by the Commission on
Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his or her choice based on the listed
names in the ballot will be counted.
In Reyes v.COMELEC54 as cited in Loreto v. Brion,55 this Court said "that the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified."56 Therefore, the votes cast for
disqualified candidates are presumed to be made with a sincere belief that the voters choices were qualified
candidates and that they were without any intention to misapply their franchise.57 Their votes may not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless58for purposes of the divisor in the party-list elections. Assuming arguendo that petitions
for certiorari do not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,59 the finality
of the disqualification of a candidate should not be a means for the disenfranchisement of the votes cast for the
party-list system.
Section 10 of the Party-list Law should thus be read in conjunction with the intention of the law as seen in Section 2,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis provided)
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7941, which governs party-list elections, states that votes cast for a party-list "not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." It does not specify any reckoning period of the finding of
disqualification or cancellation of registration for the validity or the invalidity of votes unlike that in Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646.60 Taking Sections 2 and 10 together, this
Court must consider the intention of the law and the nature of Philippine style party-list elections. Party-list groups
provide for a different and special representation in Congress. To disregard votes of party-list groups disqualified
after the conduct of the elections means the disenfranchisement of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of
votes, of the Filipino people. Definitely, it is not the voters fault that the party-list group in the ballot it votes for will be
subsequently disqualified. The voter should not be penalized.
The counting of votes for party-list groups in the ballot but subsequently declared as disqualified is, thus, corollary to
the "fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please
to govern them."61 It is also part of the right of suffrage, and the laws intention to ensure a more representative
Congress should be given priority.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently disqualified for so
long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount to a disenfranchisement of a basic
constitutional right to be able to choose representatives of the House of Representatives in two ways. First, his or
her vote will be nullified. Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing another party-list group to represent his or
her interest should the party listed in the ballot be declared disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group in the
ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,we said in Cayat v. Commission on Elections62 that votes cast in favor of a
candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list
group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the
electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the
disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:

Number of votes of party-list ______________________________ = Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by

party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in the ballot
regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their
cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose disqualification
attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is notified of the finality of their
disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not include invalid votes.
WHEREFORE from the above discussion:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified party-list groups is denied for
being moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v.
COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes
garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list
groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but
whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known
by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The
divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.
The refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list elections from the date of finality of this case.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 206844-45

July 23, 2013

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTYLIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY.
GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same
reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organizations incumbent representative in the
House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led
by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organizations erstwhile third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as
the Datol Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO])1 filed
in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr. For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol
Groups petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction)2 filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep. Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the
Arquiza Groups petition.
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 643 in relation to Rule 654 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the
Omnibus Resolution5 dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said Resolution disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May
13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of its registration and accreditation as a party-list organization.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list organization in a
Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required

two percent (2%) of the total votes cast.7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case
of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.8 In
accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system,
SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served
as a member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the
relevant terms of which we quote:
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS
1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M.
Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and representing the Senior Citizens Party-list in my capacity
as President with our General Headquarters at Room 404 West Trade Center, 132 West Avenue,
hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35 Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at North Olympus
Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the THIRD
PARTY;
4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto
Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH PARTY;
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don Francisco, St.
Francis Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred to as the FIFTH PARTY;
xxxx
ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST and in the following order
shall be:
Name

CTC No.

Issued at

Issued on

1. Godofredo V. Arquiza

S.C.I.D.#2615256

Manila

04-02-04

2. David L. Kho

16836192

Quezon City 03-15-09

3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197

Quezon City 02-10-10

4. Remedios D. Arquiza

S.C.I.D.#50696

Quezon City 01-02-07

5. Linda Gaddi David

CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga

01-04-10

ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as the legal
privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the following circumstances and events:
ELECTION RESULTS

Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the Office of Partylist Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in
Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30,
2013;
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3) years,
and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three years;
No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who
will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years and afterwards shall
relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.
In Fine:
If only one (1) seat is won
No. 1 nominee = 2 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 year
If two (2) seats are won
No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 years
No. 3 nominee = 1 years

If three (3) seats are won:

No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 2 years
No. 3 nominee = 2 years
No. 4 nominee = 1 year
No. 5 nominee = 1 year
All beginning July 1, 2010

SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and qualified
shall observe proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, to include among
others, appointment of persons in his office, projects which may redound to the benefits and privileges
that may be possible under the law.
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON CITY.
(Signed)

(Signed)

Godofredo V. Arquiza
S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila
on 04-02-04

David L. Kho
CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09

(Signed)

(Signed)

Francisco G. Datol, Jr.

CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09

Remedios D. Arquiza
S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
Quezon City on 01-02-07

(Signed)
Linda Gaddi David
CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
San Fernando, Pampanga on
01-04-109
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the
party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was

occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David
L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol
Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27,
2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."10 Further, a
new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected
during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly
elected as the organizations Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of
events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with
Rep. Arquiza.11
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both
groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
The Resignation of Rep. Kho
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr. in a letter12 dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho,
had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee,
Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the
organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition13 dated December 14, 2011 in the name
of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the replacement of
Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the
expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way
of her assumption into the office."14 Before the COMELEC, the petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12040.
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter15 of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The letter stated thus:
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
House of Representatives
Congress
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City
Sir:
I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list in
the House of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats are
won by our party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats are won.
As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. shall
nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.
Please accept my esteem and respect.
Truly yours,
(Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
Party-list Congressman
Copy furnished:
The Board of Trustees
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.16
According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011, notifying them of his
resignation in this wise:
December 31, 2011

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City
Gentlemen/Ladies:
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign as the partylist nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Congress for personal reason already
conveyed to you.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 936618 was promulgated on
February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board
Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Series of 2012
A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012
OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE
REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE
PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;
WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as
representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;
WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution signed
unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in view of his determination to resign and
return to private life, x x x;
WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind and
requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also reconsidered his resignation,
and requested to continue his term;
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in view of the forthcoming
elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L.
Kho to continue his term;
WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing certain
conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the acceptance of the
resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and change of mind, hence allow him
to continue his term subject to conditions stated above.19
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M.
No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Khos tender of
resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the organizations nominees.20 However, said
counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Khos
resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his term.21 Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears
that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the

Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.22

On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution23 in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the petition of the
SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated, thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his nomination is one of the
three (3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed
after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as
akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained however NOT to recognize such resignation but
only in so far as to change the order of petitioners nominees as submitted to the Commission.
xxxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior agreement of
the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot
approve the movement in the order of nominees for being contrary to public policy. The term of office of public
officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be
shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that
should not be reined by individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the Commission
recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizens Party-List null
and void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing arrangementincluding the
resignation of Congressman David Khocannot be recognized and be given effect. Thus, in so far as this
Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and there can be no change in
the list and order of nominees of the petitioner party-list.
Second, the expulsion of Datol
even if proven true has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
xxxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this Commission, is meant to be permanent.
The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its
nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3)
enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or
(c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior
Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds
mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic effect on the organizations representative in the House of
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected" into office and becomes a member of the House, he is
treated similarly and equally with the regular district representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or
suspended upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list
organization.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner organization, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby remains the same as it was
submitted to us there being no legally recognizable ground to cause any changes thereat.24 (Citation omitted.)
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration25 of the above resolution, but the same remained
unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the
Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS.26 The
Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,27 which, inter alia, set for summary evidentiary
hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing party-list organizations, which have
filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24, 2012 and they both
submitted their respective evidence, which established their continuing compliance with the requirements of
accreditation as a party-list organization.28
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution29 in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191
(PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that involved
SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee" and
docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said case, this Commission found that
SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a
term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on
June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Khos term starts on June 30,
2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Khos resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing
agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months
which is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the Constitution on the term
of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by
SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must
be rejected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for cancellation of registration under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the
registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the PartyList System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by filing their respective
petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of
the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the COMELEC
to include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand to the
COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of the petitioners in
the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the Courts Decision, the COMELEC was to determine
whether said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the
party-list system and to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the
COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in SPP Nos. 12157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections],
as well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act,
and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the
petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES
as follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) SENIOR CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of petitioner
Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No.
7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157
(PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution for E.M. No. 12-040
promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was
because of the term-sharing agreement between its nominees, which the Commission En Banc found to be contrary
to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is
nothing in the doctrine enunciated in that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the
Commission En Banc, is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides that Members of the House of
Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal
sense, is a fixed and definite period of time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a
fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service of the term is for the entire
period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who are not entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it was
promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no moment. As it was
in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified and as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941
was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy because it subjects a Constitutionallyordained fixed term to hold public elective office to contractual bargaining and negotiation, and treats the same as
though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To
accept this defense will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render
inutile Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the available seats
for a party-list group or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil of
corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the ends of justice or equity,
such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the
prohibition in the enactment of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the Constitution because the
guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore

in order, and consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed with the Commission should be
denied.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of the
following parties, groups, or organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc.;
xxxx
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and organizations of the
Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for the Party-List System of
Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections thereafter.30 (Citations omitted.)
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS
still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and its disqualification to participate in the May 13,
2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very2 Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order,31 alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of the counting of
votes of the disqualified party-list groups. The Datol Group urged the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante
order during the pendency of its petition.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution,32 which considered as final and
executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On even date, the
COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No.
0006-13,33 proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list organizations as initial winners in the party-list elections of May 13,
2013.
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari,"34 also reiterating
its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13,35 which partially proclaimed the
winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the available fifty-eight (58) seats for
party-list organizations.
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO,36 which ordered the COMELEC to submit a Comment on the
instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from among the party-list candidates
in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to
Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite.37
In a Resolution38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed the COMELEC to refrain from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for
SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the number of votes it garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court,
however, directed the COMELEC to hold in abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned
until the instant petitions are decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to
Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for lack of merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment39 on the
instant petitions. In a Resolution40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its Reply41 to the Comment of the COMELEC.
Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate memoranda.42 On the other hand, the

OSG manifested43 that it was adopting its Comment as its memorandum in the instant case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Groups memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND
(VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTYLIST
GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.
4.2
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONERS
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
4.3
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
4.4
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC
REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY ITS
DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT THE EN BANC CAN
ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.)
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following arguments:
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law
and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the directive of the
Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY ISSUES arising therefrom are:
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be followed by respondent Comelec in
determining which partylist groups are qualified to participate in party-list elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these adhered to by respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees -- a legal ground
to cancel Senior Citizens Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law
and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS (NBOC) RESOLUTION No. 0006-13 of MAY 24,
2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:

a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law
and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications of the candidates
after the election where they have received the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC Resolutions of May 24 and
28, 2013 be annulled and set aside?45
THE COURTS RULING
After reviewing the parties pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find merit in the
petitioners contentions.
1wphi1

SENIOR CITIZENS Right to Due Process

First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS are
actually one in asserting that the organizations disqualification and cancellation of its registration and accreditation
were effected in violation of its right to due process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its
registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR
CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELECs
review therein focused on the groups programs, accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group
asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing
agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the parameters laid down in Atong
Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted
summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed
a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Hearing Or To Be Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013,"
but its counsel found that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were
heard by the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion To Set
Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only found out
after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and the Arquiza Group was not
actually served a copy thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the registration of party-list
organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with
this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections47 the concept of due process as applied
to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal,
are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings.
The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a
hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a
hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the
evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be
based on substantial evidence.

Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a
component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected
person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public
scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. (Emphases
ours, citations omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given
the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list
accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that
the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material
consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013
elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other
words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement
and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.
In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to
present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012.49 Said hearing
was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list
organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS
admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing
was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said
petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on
December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition
filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its
petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing
agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a
party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was
neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair
warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR
CITIZENS registration and accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the disqualification
cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on
the matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a hearing or through written memoranda. This was the
proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about to arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our
Decision in Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the instant cases:
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should
not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive
effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any
law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees
of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the
organizations registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired between the

nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the nominees on the
term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by
the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented, the Arquiza
Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The
term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the promulgation of said resolution on
February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends
that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the general rule is that statutes are prospective. However,
statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power
Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested. This is based on the Latin
maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court
cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its
registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections52 teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a Public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested
right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC
is entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this
function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions
already registered in order to ensure the latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and
the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the
ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the
Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even
during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza
Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Khos replacement.
Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to
recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared
that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no
indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing,
the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of nonimplementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and
served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En
Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted
from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of.
Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have
no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR
CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated

May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the petitioners. In
particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here, should be
threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning
party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013 elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No. 206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 20 13
elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during
the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(No part due to party list affiliation of wife)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

EN BANC
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented
by its President, Mr. Alan Igot,
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),
represented by its President Congressman
Ponciano D. Payuyo,
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x

Petitioner,

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG

NG MASA, represented by its President
Michael Abas Kida,

- versus -

G.R. No. 203766

G.R. Nos. 203818-19

G.R. No. 203922

G.R. No. 203936

Decision

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG
NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------x
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR
RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN

RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO),
Petitioner,
- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------x
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS
ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by
Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin,
the partys Secretary General,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. Nos. 203766, et al.

G.R. No. 203958

G.R. No. 203960

G.R. No. 203976

G.R. No. 203981

G.R.
No.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
204379 12-099
(PLM)

Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8

1

Alagad
ng - The artists sector is not
Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

204426 12-011
(PLM)

204455 12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers
Savings
and
Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)

- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be
considered marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 2012 9

2

Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)
204435 12-057
(PLM)

Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), pp. 26-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204455), pp. 38-55; rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 127-144. Signed by Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting;
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco also concurred except for Ala-Eh.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), pp. 47-55. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

1 Alliance
- Failure of the nominees to
Advocating
qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP)
two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not
belong
to
the
marginalized
and

Resolution dated 27 November 2012 10

4

10

Resolution dated 27 November 2012 11

5

204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay

Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.
204370 12-011 (PP)

Resolution dated 29 November 2012 12

6

underrepresented.
- Failure of the group to show
that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector.

Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a

(AAB)
marginalized
sector
of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 13

7

204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the

12-165
Party (AI)
party
represents
a
marginalized
and
(PLM)
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Rollo (G.R. No. 204367), pp. 30-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), pp. 37-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204436), pp. 45-57. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204485), pp. 42-49. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim with Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance

of - Failure to establish that the
Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks
and sectors;

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 14

8

11

12

13

14

Associations of - The sectors of homeowners

the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized
and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
- Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized
and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 15
9

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng

Mamamahayag
(ALAM)

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 16

10 204402 12-061 (PP)

Kalikasan Party- - The group reflects an

List
advocacy
for
the
(KALIKASAN) environment, and is not
representative
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors
with
conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Rollo (G.R. No. 204139), pp. 505-512. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioners Elias
R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), pp. 22-33. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.

Resolution dated 14 November 2012 17

15

16

11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of

Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor,
Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 2012 18
12 204490 12-073
(PLM)

Failure
to
prove
membership base and track
record;
- Failure to present activities
that sufficiently benefited its
intended constituency; and
- The nominees do not belong
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to represent.

Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the

Pinoy (PPP)
group
represents
a
marginalized
and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record
of
undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc

affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the marginalized and
underrepresented.20

Rollo (G.R. No. 204394), pp. 59-62. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S.
Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo, (G.R. No. 204490), pp. 71-78. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Rene V. Sarmiento concurred but took no part in Ang Ating Damayan. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo, (G.R. No. 204484), pp. 42-45. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S.
Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
PBBs petition is docketed as G.R. No. 204484 before this Court, and as SPP No. 11-002 before
the
COMELEC.

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN,

AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were
17

18

19

20

not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on
7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En

Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups
and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23
(Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R.
No.

AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)

Resolution dated 10 October 2012 24

1

203818- 12-154
19
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized
and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has
representatives
in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized
and
underrepresented.

In the Matter of Clarifying the Inclusion in the Party-List Raffle of New Groups Denied
Accreditation
but were Able to Obtain a Status Quo Ante Order from the Supreme Court.
(2) To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the
guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if non-compliant, cancel the registration of the
following:
(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited and will
participate in the May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has not
passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of Registered
Party-List Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and which
have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System
of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections. (Boldface and italics in the original)
412 Phil. 308 (2001).
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 83-87. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and
Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), pp. 75-99; rollo (G.R. No. 203981), pp. 47-70; rollo (G.R. No. 204002), pp.
53-76; (G.R. No. 204318), pp. 23-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012 25

21
22

24

23

25

204318 12-220
(PLM)

204002 12-188
(PLM)

203981 12-187
(PLM)

203766 12-161
(PLM)

United
Cancelled registration and
Movement
accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation
counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD)
veterans and the youth, are
not
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Alliance
for Cancelled registration and
Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC)
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

Association for Cancelled registration and

Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy
on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership
violation of election laws;
(ARAL)
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

Inc.
(Atong accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
Paglaum)
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo, (G.R. No. 204100), pp. 52-67; rollo (G.R. No. 204122), pp. 36-51; rollo (G.R. No. 204263), pp.
28-43. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26

26

204122 12-223
(PLM)

204100 12-196
(PLM)

1
Guardians Cancelled registration
Nationalist
- The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
- The sector of community
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community
volunteer
workers.

1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc.
(1BROPGBI)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
- The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

204263 12-257
(PLM)

Blessed
Cancelled registration
Federation
of - Three of the seven
Farmers
and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
International,
Inc.
(A to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
BLESSED
registered voters of Region
Party-List)
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
203960 12-260
(PLM)

1st Consumers Cancelled registration

Alliance
for - The sector of rural energy
Rural
Energy, consumers
is
not
Inc. (1-CARE) marginalized
and
underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related
to
electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 2012 27

9

27

N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco. Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 203960), pp. 61-68. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim
also concurred but did not sign. Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
took no part.

Resolution dated 16 October 2012 28

10 203922 12-201
(PLM)

Association of Cancelled registration and

Philippine
accreditation
Electric
- Failure to represent a
marginalized
and
Cooperatives
underrepresented sector; and
(APEC)
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 2012 29

11 204174 12-232
(PLM)

Aangat
Tayo Cancelled registration and
Party-List Party accreditation
(AT)
The
incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 30

12 203976 12-288
(PLM)

Alliance
for Cancelled registration and
Rural
and accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
Agrarian
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and

28
Rollo (G.R. No. 203922), pp. 92-101. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N.
Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. penned a Separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
took no part.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), pp. 158-164. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N.
Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned an extended opinion.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
30
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
203976),
pp.
21-37.
Signed
by
Chairman
Sixto
S.
Brillantes,
Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took
no part.

- Lack of a Board resolution

to participate in the party-list
elections.

14 203936 12-248
(PLM)

13 204240 12-279
(PLM)

Aksyon
Cancelled registration
Magsasaka- Failure to show that
Partido Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA- marginalized
and
PTM)
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

Agri-Agra
na Cancelled registration
Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas
after the May 2010 elections;
Movement
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of peasants and
(AGRI)
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31

15 204126 12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay
ng Cancelled registration
Nagkakaisang
- The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
Pilipinong
appropriate officer of the
Magsasaka
(KAP)
party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and

31
Rollo (G.R. No. 204240), pp. 47-69; rollo (G.R. No. 203936), pp. 128-150; rollo (G.R. No.
204126), pp. 51-73; rollo (G.R. No. 204364), pp. 34-56; rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 31-53; rollo
(G.R. No. 204408), pp. 46-68; rollo (G.R. No. 204153), pp. 24-46; rollo (G.R. No. 203958), pp. 2648. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N.
Tagle. Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor.
Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but inhibited in KAKUSA. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.

18 204408 12-217
(PLM)

17 204141 12-229
(PLM)

16 204364 12-180
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

Nationwide
- The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA)
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor
Youth
Advancement
and
Welfare
(PACYAW)

The
True
Marcos Loyalist
(for
God,
Country
and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

Adhikain
at
Kilusan
ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized
and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken
meaningful
activities for the sector.

- Failure to show that

nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken
meaningful
activities for the sector.

19 204153 12-277
(PLM)

Kapatiran
ng Cancelled registration
mga Nakulong - Failure to prove

that

20 203958 12-015
(PLM)

na Walang Sala, majority of its officers and

Inc. (KAKUSA) members belong to the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
The
incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector
that
the
party
represents
(persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 2012 32
21 204428 12-256
(PLM)

Ang
Galing Cancelled registration and
Pinoy (AG)
accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 33

Alliance
for Cancelled registration and
Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy
- Failure to represent an
(ANAD)
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;

Rollo (G.R. No. 204428), pp. 35-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Christian Robert
S. Lim also concurred but did not sign. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor
but was on official business at the time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took
no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), pp. 30-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.

22 204094 12-185
(PLM)

32

33

The nominees do not

belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
23 204239 12-060
(PLM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 2012 34

24 204236 12-254
(PLM)

Firm
24-K Cancelled registration and
Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K)
The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

Green Force for

the Environment
Sons
and
Daughters
of
Mother
Earth
(GREENFORCE)

25 204341 12-269
(PLM)

Action League Cancelled registration and

of
Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;

34

Rollo, (G.R. No. 204239), pp. 25-42; rollo (G.R. No. 204236), pp. 57-74; rollo (G.R. No. 204341), pp.
29-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito
N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on
official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 35

26 204358 12-204
(PLM)

and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Alliance
of Cancelled registration
Advocates
in - The sector it represents is a
Mining
specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
Advancement
for
National registration under the partylist system; and
Progress
- Failure to establish that the
(AAMA)
nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 36
27 204359 12-272
(PLM)

Social
Cancelled registration
Movement for The
nominees
are
Active Reform disqualified
from
and
representing the sectors that
Transparency
the party represents;
(SMART)
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
Alliance
Bicolnon
(ABP)

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 37

28 204238 12-173
(PLM)

of Cancelled registration and

Party accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the

35
Rollo (G.R. No. 204358), pp. 140-148. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S.
Lim,
and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
.
36
Rollo
(G.R.
No.
204359),
pp. 42-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner
Christian Robert S.
Lim also concurred but was on official business at the time of signing.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204238), pp. 54-58. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
37

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 38

29 204323 12-210
(PLM)

construction industry, the

sector it claims to represent.
Bayani
Party Cancelled registration and
List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized
and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 39

30 204321 12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

Natin
Isulong accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
(AANI)
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented
farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Agapay
ng Cancelled registration and
Indigenous
accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance,
Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA)
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees
actively
participated
in
the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 40

31 204125 12-292
(PLM)

38

39

40

Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204321), pp. 43-51. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204125), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no
part.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 41

32 204216 12-202
(PLM)

nominees
members.

are

bona

fide

Philippine
Cancelled registration and
Coconut
accreditation
Producers
- The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private
and
government
(COCOFED)
agencies
and
is
not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government
in
various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 42
33 204220 12-238
(PLM)

and

Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

Party-List
- Failure to establish a track
(ABANG
record
of
continuously
representing the peasant
LINGKOD)
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively
participated
in
programs
for
the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012 43

Action
Cancelled registration
Brotherhood for accreditation

Rollo (G.R. No. 204216), pp. 23-28. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim penned a separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204220), pp. 39-44. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204158), pp. 59-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S.
Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

34 204158 12-158
(PLM)
41

42

43

Active
- Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD)
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012 44
35 204374 12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga The
party
receives
Magsasaka
assistance
from
the
(BINHI)
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 2012 45

36 204356 12-136
(PLM)

and

Butil
Farmers Cancelled registration and
Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

Resolution dated 3 December 2012 46

1st Kabalikat ng Cancelled registration
Bayan
accreditation

Rollo (G.R. No. 204374), pp. 36-41. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S.
Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204356), pp. 56-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S.
Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204486), pp. 42-47. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

37 204486 12-194
(PLM)
44

45

46

Cancelled registration
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had
a
term-sharing
agreement.

Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
(1- and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Ginhawang
- Declaration of untruthful
Sangkatauhan
statements;
(1st KABAGIS) - Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong
to
the
labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous
cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 47
38 204410 12-198
(PLM)

1-United
Transport
Koalisyon
UTAK)

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 48

39 204421, 12-157
204425 (PLM),
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition
of
Senior Citizens
in
the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD,

1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE,
APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY,
PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE,
FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS,
1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction
from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

47

48

Rollo (G.R. No. 204410), pp. 63-67. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Lucenito N.
Tagle penned a Dissenting Opinion and joined by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph. Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca took no part.
Rollo (G.R. No. 204421), pp. 43-50; rollo (G.R. No. 204425), pp. 21-28. Signed by Chairman Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph,
dissenting.

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)

204174

204263

204318

203766

204122

12-263
(PLM)

12-232
(PLM)

12-257
(PLM)

12-220
(PLM)

12-161
(PLM)

12-223
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

1 Guardians Nationalist
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19 12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

Inc.

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

204126

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Philippines,

12-187
(PLM)

204364

12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

12-180
(PLM)

Abang
Lingkod
LINGKOD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

203981
12-188
(PLM)
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC)

204139

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante
Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

204002
12-201
(PLM)
1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

Group

203922
12-260
(PLM)
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(AKMA-PTM)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

SPP No.

203960
12-248
(PLM)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)

12-173
(PLM)

G.R. No.

203936
12-015
(PLM)

204238

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204359

204358

204341

204323

204321

204239

12-272
(PLM)

12-204
(PLM)

12-269
(PLM)

12-210
(PLM)

12-252
(PLM)

12-060
(PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Social Movement for Active Reform and

Transparency (SMART)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

(ABANG

203958

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

Inc. (ARARO)

204141

12-229
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

12-136
(PLM)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204356

Party-List

203976

12-288
(PLM)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

Alliance for
(ANAD)

Democracy

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)

and

204125

12-292
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

Nationalism

204100

12-196
(PLM)

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204216

12-202
(PLM)

204421,
204425

204410

204486

204435

204370

204374

204455

204426

204367

204379

204490

204428

204408

204394

204402

12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

12-157
(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)

12-198
(PLM)

12-194
(PLM)

12-057
(PLM)

12-041
(PLM)

12-011
(PLM)

12-073
(PLM)

12-256
(PLM)

12-217
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat
ng
Bayan
Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

1 Alliance
(1AAAP)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

12-099
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

12-228
(PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

Ginhawang

Party

204436

12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Autonomy

204485
11-002

Advocating

204484

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections.

The Courts Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since
the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions
for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 566-567 (1 August 1986).

Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

49
50

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,

and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system
as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance
with law.

II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986).

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the

proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors.
In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the
problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have
reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would
mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose
among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have
the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9,
the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students,
professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups.
So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had
in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to
stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the
exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14
sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude
those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who
comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These
days, there are many citizens who are called hyphenated citizens. A doctor

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list

system, stressed that the party-list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation. 51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list
system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

51

may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the

discretion of the person to say I am a farmer so he would be included in
that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of

sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people
two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by
presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral
party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates
of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list
system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will
vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that
same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you
wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of
the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the
COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party,
a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in
Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to
be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end
of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered
by each party or each organization one does not have to be a political
party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and
from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a
party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that
50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30
percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of
these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15
names. They have to submit these names because these nominees

have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National

Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes;
KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who
has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned
among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative
districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a
sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National
Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent
or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So,
they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they
should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party
list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who really have

a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a

seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have
the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be
able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that
when we speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would
be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list
system, we do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be
included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the
party list system.
xxxx

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we

suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We
are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can
sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats
is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to
classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties
that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as
well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is
adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field
district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list
system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO

participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field

candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN

group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list
system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is
a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin

ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that
they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political

parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang

UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list
system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat
sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there.
But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral

candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register
for the party list system.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he

shares that answer?

lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng

UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado
ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to
solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose
UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether
or not a political party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If
such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector
the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in
the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral
organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable. 52
(Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list

system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution. 53

II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986), 256-257 (25 July 1986).
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 257 (25 July 1986).

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,

subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions
the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per
centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors
that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development
into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the
other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the
lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties
ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it
banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent

seats to sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to
reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
As clearly
explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong
Bayani:

52
53

party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented
and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by
allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from
the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority
was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able
to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which
time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and
brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran
political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There
can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly
rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is

that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can
garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will
be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both
these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district
elections.

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not

more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to

include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

54
55

412 Phil. 347, 350 (2001).

Party-List System: The Philippine Experience, Fritzie Palma Tangkia and Ma. Araceli Basco
Habaradas, Ateneo School of Government and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Philippine Office,
April 2001, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50076.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there

shall be a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. The commas after the words national[,] and
regional[,] separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to
be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated national and regional
sectoral parties. They did not, precisely because it was never their intention
to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section
5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups.
The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1)
national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after
this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot
be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also
for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law
that implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a

coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens

advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of
its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the

geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional
party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens

belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition

of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,

regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political

party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides
that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that
a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No.
7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system

to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude,

by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who
cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if
they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear
intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented
political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need
not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It
is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. 56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by
definition marginalized and underrepresented, not even the elderly, women,
and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and
concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for
holding that the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as
certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the
COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after
due notice and hearing.
56

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days
from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before
election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the marginalized and underrepresented.

The phrase marginalized and underrepresented appears only once

in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through the party-list system, which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies, to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
57

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest
scheme
possible. (Emphasis supplied)

marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, the

specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require
that the sectors, organizations or parties must be marginalized and
underrepresented. On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and underrepresented would lead to
absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2
of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind
the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only
to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral
party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below
the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and
underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by
the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral
parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and
underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and
underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
58

The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSDB) classifies the population into three income
groups: the high income, the middle income, and the low income group. See Table 2. Annual
Family
Income
of
the Low, Middle, and
High Income
Classes:
1997,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/papers/contributed%20papers/cps-12/cps12-01.pdf
(accessed 30 March 2013).

interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they
attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the
legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the
party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined political
constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are
necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This
automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list
system to those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them
the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline

for the accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that while even
major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution
to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.
However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that
the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has
been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the
prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress from participating in the
May 1988 party-list elections. 59
Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major
political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies, will
facilitate the entry of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who

59

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 provides in part:

x x x For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x.

lack well-defined political constituencies as members of the House of

Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties
to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that
fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral
wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or
youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and
members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The
sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list
nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the
nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization

which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed

in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the
guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list
system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must

represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by

RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to
the House of Representatives. x x x.
xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. x x x.
xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under

Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,

foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections

or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project

organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
follows:
SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration
of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major
political parties from participating in party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the
lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258 citing CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII,
1.
Id. at 251.

Sec.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties

can participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The
minority expressed that [e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. 61
The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in
confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in
clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.

60
61

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing

jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we
must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this
Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang
Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, even as we
acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may
appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

3.

2.

1.

Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they

register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.

National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do

not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)

national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In

determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

4.

Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and

underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies.
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
62

5.

A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that

represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent
those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies

include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

6.

National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Petitioners may
have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. Also, petitioners' nominees who do not
belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to
any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more
of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and
their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this
Court.

Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015

Abang Lingkod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206952, 22 October 2013

Decision, Reyes [J]
Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206952

October 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by (Abang Lingkod
Party-List ABANG LINGKOD) assailing the Resolution1 dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections
COMELEC) En Bane in SPP No. 12-238 PLM}, which, alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration as a party-list group.
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and
was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but
failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia required previously
registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary
hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.4
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary evidentiary hearing of
previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3,
2012 -for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its
continuing qualification under the party-list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with
the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party list group. The COMELEC En Bane pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further
opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented
or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition5 for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the
separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were
denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to

obtain status quo ante orders from this Court.

On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections,6 laid down new parameters to be
observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or
accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties
can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including that of
ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new
parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list
elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution,7 which, inter alia affirmed the cancellation
of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10,
2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13 2013 elections as the reason
therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous en bane ruling cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups
and organizations consistent participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just seasonal
and sporadic programs which are unrelated to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical Mission on 11 November
2010, Disaster Management Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1
December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have been edited to show in the banners
that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on
some banners to feign participation in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its
petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements.

It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD s registration.8

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC s Resolution dated May 10, 2013.
However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC
and, instead, instituted the instant petition9 with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the
COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were
already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
affirmed the cancellation of its registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing for that purpose, asserting that the
COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to
Atong Paglaum. It claims that there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering
that it complied with the six-point parameters m screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. It
asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its
registration since it was given every reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not
abuse its discretion when it cancelled ABANG LINGKODs registration on the ground that it failed to establish a
track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding
of facts may not be passed upon by this Court as the same is supported by substantial evidence.
The Issues
In sum, the issues presented for the Court s resolution are the following: first whether ABANG LINGKOD was
denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its registration under the patiy-list system sans
any summary evidentiary hearing; and second whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
ABANG LINGKODs registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that the COMELEC
had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list
group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That
ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three
separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKODs Manifestation of Intent and all
the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the
COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG
LINGKOD s qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKODs claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the COMELEC to
conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein
pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups. The dispositive portion of Atong Paglaum reads:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo
Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under
the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list

elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary
evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were remanded to the
COMELEC so that it may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted by the former, whether they are
qualified to participate in the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The
Court did not require the COMELEC to conduct a hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of said party-list
groups. Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the option to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing
should it deem appropriate to do so.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.12
Second Issue: Cancellation of
ABANG LINGKODs Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new parameters in
screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful
statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately
submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that
it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present
evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance.13 As a
requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track
record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes
of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
(Emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof of their track
record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
xxx
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Secdon 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)

Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list
of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC," which are but
mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said
documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seek to achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record has certain
consequences in a group's bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups
intending to register under the party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are
merely required to attach to their verified petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under
the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration
under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral
organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-list elections are still required
to present a track record, viz:
x x x In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
xxxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer
required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further
the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only
required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented
who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending
to register under the party-list system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum that the track record that would have to be presented would only differ as to the
nature of their group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized
and underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as
a bona fide organization.
To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track records, which are required of those intending to register under
the party-list system, depending on the nature of their group, would result into an absurd and unjust situation. Under
the varying track record requirement, sectoral organizations must present evidence showing their track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented, i.e. actual activities conducted by them to further uplift the
cause of the sector/s they represent. On the other hand, national and regional parties or organizations need only
prove that they exist as bona fide organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be done through the
submission of their constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information required by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group's constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement,
and other relevant information required by the COMELEC, as explained earlier, is not synonymous with the track
record requirement. In such case, only sectoral organizations would be required to present a track record (actual
activities conducted by them to further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented); while national and
regional organizations need not present their track record as they are only required to submit documentary evidence

showing that they are bona fide organizations.

There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or organizations as
regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. The varying track record requirement suggested by the
dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to register as national and regional parties or
organizations as against those intending to register as sectoral organizations The imposition of an additional burden
on sectoral organizations, i.e. submission of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in tong Paglaum does not mean
that groups intending to register under the party-list system are still required to submit a track record. The track
record of groups intending to register under the party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang
Bagong Bayani for a very specific purpose to show that the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
that would be allowed to participate in the party-list elections are truly representative of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors It was necessary-then to require groups seeking registration under the party-list system
since representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, as understood in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani
is easy to claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system to submit evidence
showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum not all groups are required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since there would be no reason for them to
feign representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional
party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the party-list
system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the partylist system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its qualification as a partylist group since it seriously puts in question the existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a group per se and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely on the ground of the lack
of its track record -that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally altered photographs of its supposed activities,
that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG
LINGKOD as a party-list group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were
never raised in the proceedings before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in this
certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the genuineness of
its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of its registration, when the issue is
limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in fact it participated in the
May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number of votes in the May 2013 party-list
elections to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that
ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May 13, 2013
elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722 131 votes that were cast for the party-list,14
thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives. This is indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of
the electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and medical missions, which
are activities it conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said activities do not specifically or directly pertain to the
interest or advocacy espoused by ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the misrepresentation committed by ABANG
LINGKOD with regard to said activities would not necessarily militate against its representation of the farmers and
fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG LINGKOD in connection
with its bid for continued registration under the party-list system. That ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track

record, submitted photographs that were edited to make it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating
the plight of the sectors it represents is a factual finding by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is
supported by substantial evidence, will not disturb. The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort to
chicanery and its shabby treatment of the requirements for registration under the party-list system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a groups misrepresentation as to its track
record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration -it is no longer material to its qualification under
the party-list system. In this case, ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be
considered material to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part, reads:
Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other document pertinent to the
registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground for the refusal or cancellation of registration
under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, is akin to material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy filed by an
individual candidate under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both provisions disallow prospective
candidates from participating in an election for declaring false statements in their eligibility requirements. Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v. Commission on Elections,15 explained that:
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material
when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate s eligibility. x x x Third a
misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s certificate of candidacy to be
denied due course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the
office sought by the candidate.16 (Emphasis ours)
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,17 the Court further clarified that a false representation under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. Thus:
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention must necessarily pertain
to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity:
a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she
can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate s
qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a registered
voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be
reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the
local government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it
must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public
office.18 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, in
order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the party-list system, must pertain to the
qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or
refusal of registration of a group, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which

would otherwise render the group disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its continuing qualification
under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer a requirement under
the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG
LINGKOD as a party-list group and, hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its registration under the partylist system. Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated November 7 2012, asserted that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track record of its five nominees, composed of a
non-government organization worker, an employee and three farmers, in uplifting the cause of the sector that the
group represents. The COMELEC opined that the failure of ABANG LINGKOD to present a track record of its
nominees justified the cancellation of its registration as a party-list group.
1wphi1

The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as opined by the
COMELEC, indeed do not have track records showing their participation in activities aimed at improving the
conditions of the sector that the group represents, the same would not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD
as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack 'well-defined political
constituencies,' either must belong to their respective sectors or must have a track record o advocacy for their
respective sectors. Stated otherwise, the nominee of a party-list groups may either be: first one who actually
belongs to the sector which the party-list group represents, in which case the track record requirement does not
apply; or second one who does not actually belong to the sector which the party-list group represents but has a
track record showing the nominee's active participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector which
the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus, are not
required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which
ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not
actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in tong
Paglaum which states that "national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least,
ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation.
Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not automatically result in
the disqualification of the group. Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same significance, which the law
holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is
material to consider. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office
or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list
group must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be
considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.
1avvphi1

In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived
from a simplistic reading of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in tong
Paglaum. Not every misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would
merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate to
their qualification as a party-list group. In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted
on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer
required pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it was able to obtain
sufficient number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than to subvert the will of the
electorate who voted to give ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated
May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections in SPP Case No. 12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration and disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of the winning partylist groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total
number of votes it garnered during the said elections.