PT&T vs NLRC

FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for
employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10,
1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application
form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial,
sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter
handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was
apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services
of an employee.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor
laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were
dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the
labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of
her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible
and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of
the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively
required.

NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC

FACTS: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum
products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and
coremaker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from
May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage. On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass
which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was
treated at a nearby hospital.
Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work
station.There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb. The following day he was asked to resign. Three days after, , private
respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid
and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto
Enterprises and not an apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution
ordering for the reinstatement of Capili and to collecthis back wages. Petitioner, Nitto Enterprises
filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of
Nitto Enterprises?
LAW: Article 280 of the Labor Code
RULING: Yes.
The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executedon May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
maker/molder.However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7,
1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by theDepartment of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. The act of filing theproposed
apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step
towardsits final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.Nitto Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated
that apprenticeshipagreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeshipprogram duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force andeffect; and Capili is
considered to be a regular employee of the company.
OPINION:
I concur with the Courts findings that since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and
private respondenthave no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program
duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent'sassertion that he was hired not as an apprentice
but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He shouldrightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.