SECTION 15 SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE

OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

LANSANG v. BRGDR. GEN. GARCIA
FACTS:
August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while
the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2)
hand grenades were thrown, one after the
other, at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. As a
consequence, eight (8) persons were killed
and many more injured,
including
practically all of the aforementioned
candidates, some of whom sustained
extensive, as well as serious, injuries
which could have been fatal had it not
been for the timely medical assistance
given to them.
On Aug. 23, the former Pres. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 889, dated August
21, 1971: Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph
(2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
for the persons presently detained, as well
as others who may be hereafter similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion
THE DETAINEES. Presently, petitions for
writ of habeas corpus were filed, TEDORO
LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and
BAYANI ALCALA ROGELIO ARIENDA ,
VICENTE ILAO AND JUAN CARANDANG,
LUZVIMINDA DAVID, NEMESIO PRUDENTE,
ANGELO DELOS REYES, VICTOR FELIPE,
TERESITO
SISON,
GERARDO
TOMAS
(student, SLU), REYNALDO RIMANDO
(student, UPB), SPS. CASTRO, ANTOLIN
ORETA, JR., GRAY OLIVAR
[C]ontinuing detention of the petitioners
as an urgent bona fide precautionary and
preventive measure demanded by the
necessities of public safety, public welfare
and public interest."
AMENDMENT TO PD 889. On August 30,
1971, the President issued Proclamation
No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No.

889:
WHEREAS,
these
lawless
elements, by their acts of rebellion and
insurrection, have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public
safety and security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the
dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally
in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has
resulted in the death and serious injury of
scores of persons
LIFTING SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS.
On September 18, 1971, Proclamation No.
889 was further amended by Proclamation
No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the following provinces, sub-provinces and
cities of the Philippine.
ISSUE: The first major question that the
Court had to consider was whether it
would adhere to the view taken in
Barcelon
v.
Baker, and
reiterated
in Montenegro v. Castaeda, pursuant to
which, "the authority to decide whether
the
exigency
has
arisen
requiring
suspension (of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus) BELONGS TO THE
PRESIDENT?
Upon mature deliberation, a majority of
the Members of the Court had, however,
reached,
although
tentatively,
a
consensus to the contrary, and decided
that the Court had authority to and should
inquire into the existence of the factual
bases required by the Constitution for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ; but
before proceeding to do so, the Court
deemed it necessary to hear the parties
on the nature and extent of the inquiry to
be undertaken, none of them having
previously expressed their views thereof.
Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court
issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and
L-33982, a resolution stating in part that
(COVERAGE: eighteen provinces, two
subprovinces and eighteen cities)
HELD:

Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr.

in L-34265, question the formal validity of
the proclamation suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. In this
connection, it should be noted that, as
originally formulated, Proclamation No.
889 was contested upon the ground that it
did not comply with the pertinent
constitutional
provisions,
namely,
paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of
our Constitution.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation
No. 889 did not declare the existence
of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion
or imminent danger thereof," and that,
consequently, said Proclamation was
invalid.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions
of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the
authority to suspend the privilege to the
writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to
paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution Imminent danger thereof,"
and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension
of
the
privilege.
The
Presidential
Proclamation
under
consideration declares that there has been
and there is actually a state of rebellion
and
that "public
safety
requires
that
immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure
the safety of the people and preserve the
authority of the State."
The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a
precedent, is DILUTED BY TWO (2)
FACTORS, NAMELY: (a) it relied heavily
upon Martin v. Mott involving the U.S.
President's power to call out the militia,
which he being the commander-in-chief
of all the armed forces may be
exercised to suppress or prevent any
lawless violence, even without invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent

danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much

broader than his authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
jeopardizing as the latter does individual
liberty; and (b) the privilege had been
suspended by the American GovernorGeneral, whose act, as representative of
the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of
its subjects, CAN HARDLY BE EQUATED
WITH THAT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES dealing with the freedom of
the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty
resides, and from whom all government
authority emanates.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Upon further
deliberation, the members of the Court are
now unanimous in the conviction that it
has the authority to inquire into the
existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency
thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the
privilege is NEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR
UNQUALIFIED. The authority conferred by
the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights
and
under
the
Executive
Department, is limited and conditional.
EXCEPTION. It permits the suspension of
the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art
VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger
thereof.
For from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ is thus circumscribed, confined and
restricted, not only by the prescribed
setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but, also, as regards the time
when and the place where it may be
exercised.
These
factors
and
the
aforementioned setting or conditions
mark, establish and define the extent, the
confines and the limits of said power,
beyond which it does not exist. And, like
the limitations and restrictions imposed by
the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department,
adherence
thereto
and
compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of
justice.
Otherwise,
the
explicit
constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our

Constitution could not have intended to

engage in such a wasteful exercise in
futility.
Much less may the assumption be
indulged in when we bear in mind that our
political system is essentially democratic
and republican in character and that the
suspension of the privilege affects the
most fundamental element of that system,
namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such
freedom includes and connotes, as well as
demands, the right of every single
member of our citizenry to freely discuss
and dissent from, as well as criticize and
denounce, the views, the policies and the
practices of the government and the party
in power that he deems unwise, improper
or
inimical
to
the
commonwealth,
regardless of whether his own opinion is
objectively
correct
or
not.
The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of
such right which, under certain
conditions, may be a civic duty of the
highest order is vital to the democratic
system and essential to its successful
operation and wholesome growth and
development.
Manifestly,
however,
the
liberty
guaranteed and protected by our Basic
Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in
derogation
thereof,
but
consistently
therewith,
and,
hence,
within
the
framework of the social order established
by the Constitution and the context of the
Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual
freedom is used to destroy that social
order, by means of force and violence, in
defiance of the Rule of Law such as by
rising publicly and taking arms against the
government to overthrow the same,
thereby committing the crime of rebellion
there emerges a circumstance that may
warrant a limited withdrawal of the
aforementioned guarantee or protection,
by suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it. Although we must be
forewarned
against
mistaking
mere
dissent no matter how emphatic or
intemperate it may be for dissidence
amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the
Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse
when the existence of such rebellion or

insurrection has been fairly established or

cannot reasonably be denied to uphold
the finding of the Executive thereon,
without, in effect, encroaching upon a
power vested in him by the Supreme Law
of the land and depriving him, to this
extent, of such power, and, therefore,
without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the
Court is called upon to epitomize.
RULING: Pres. did not act arbitrarily hence
Proclamation
No.
889
IS
NOT
UNOCONSTIL
JACKSON v. MACALINO
FACTS:
SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the PNP filed
an application with the RTC of Angeles
City, Pampanga, for the issuance of a
search
warrant
against
petitioner
Raymond M. Jackson, an American
citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C.
Bueta for the search of the articles listed
therein at No. 17-21 Apple Street,
Hensonville Homes, Balibago, Angeles
City, and the seizure thereof for violation
of Article 176 (Mftg and possession of
instruments
or
implements
for
falsification) of the RPC. Judge Bernardita
G. Erum granted the application and
issued Search Warrant. The search was
conducted on the said date; articles were
seized and the petitioner and Bueta were
apprehended and detained. Among the
articles found in the possession of the
petitioner was U.S. Passport by the U.S.
Embassy in Manila to and in the name of
Raymond Michael Jackson, born in South
Dakota; and another U.S. Passport issued
by the New Orleans Passport Agency,
Louisiana to and under the name of
Steven Bernard Bator, born in Detroit,
Michigan.
Another SW was field and was issued by
Judge Pedro N. Laggui
When apprised of the seizure of the
aforementioned
passports
from
the
petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond
Greene of the United States Embassy
in
the Philippines advised
the
Department of Justice on December

10, 1997 that the said passports had

been cancelled.
SUMMARY
DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS
were
initiated
at
immigration. Board had issued order for
the deportation of the petitioner to his
country. IN the meantime, the name of
petitioner was included in the blacklist.
4 more criminal cases ( 1 he posted bail)
were
filed
against
petitioner.
CONTENTION: his deportation from the
Philippines would deprive him of the
opportunity to defend himself in the
criminal cases pending against him. He
appended to his motion a copy of his
marriage contract with Lily Morales and
their childrens birth certificates.
MEANWHILE, passports of petitioners have
been cancelled by US Vice Consul after
having found fraudulent (unmatched
photographs)
Petitioner then filed HABEAS CORPUS w/
the Court against Comm. Of the CID
(Rodriguez) which the Court granted
ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to
whom the case would be raffled to
conduct a hearing of the petition, to
render judgment and to serve a copy of
its decision within two days from its
promulgation. HEARING was conducted.
RTC:
Petitioners petition
for habeas
corpus was premature as there was a
pending petition to lift the summary
deportation order before the BOC filed by
him
ISSUE: Rodriguez cant issue warrants for
oly judges can do so; his rights to due
process was violated
HELD:
Petition is dismissed.
If Commissioner of CID is authorized to
issue WoA this is limited only to those
cases
where
a
final
order
of
deportation had already been issued
by the BOC, and only for the PURPOSE of
implementing the said order.

Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of

Court, as amended, provides that except
as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the
writ
of habeas
corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.
ULTIMATE PURPOSE. The
of the writ
of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a
writ of inquiry and is granted to test
the right under which he is detained.
SEC. 4, RULE 102, RC. When writ not
allowed or discharged authorized. If
detainee is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment; or make the order,
the WRIT SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED; or
if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
Court includes any quasi-judicial
bodies like deportation board of the
Bureau of Immigration.
NOTE: Even if the arrest of a person
is illegal, supervening events may bar
his
release
or
discharge
from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of his detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for a
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may,
by reason of same supervening
events
such
as
the
instances
mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application. Any such
supervening events are the issuance of a

judicial process preventing the discharge

of the detained person.
G.R: Burden of proving legal restraint is on
the petitioner.
Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, provides that if it
appears that the detained person is
in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered prima
facie evidence
of
the
cause
of
restraint. But if he is restrained of his
liberty by any alleged private authority,
the return shall be considered only as a
plea of the facts therein set forth, and the
party claiming the custody must prove
such facts.
RETURN OF THE WRIT.
was
arrested
and
Bicutan, Paranaque.

Petitioner
detained
at

In Schonemann vs.
Commissioner
Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May
1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a
foreign embassy cancels the passport of
an alien, or does not reissue a valid
passport to him, the alien loses the
privilege to remain in the country. This
includes respondent be BLACKLISTED.
The petitioners arrest and detention are
in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to
Section
37(a)(9)
of
the
Philippine
Immigration
Act
of
1940
which
respectively reads:
In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,[32] this Court
held that such documents from a foreign
embassy attesting to the cancellation of
the passports held by their national on the
ground that the said passports were
tampered with; hence, cancelled were
sufficient grounds for the arrest and
deportation of aliens from the Philippines:
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINA DOES NOT
CHANGE STATUS that
the two (2) US
passports purportedly issued to Raymond
Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator
which were used by respondent, were
tampered and subsequently cancelled by
the U.S. Embassy.

LASTLY, By offering to post a bail bond,

the petitioner thereby admitted that
he was under the custody of the CID
and
voluntarily
accepted
the
jurisdiction of the CID.
RULING: PETITION DENIED.

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA
PARONG, et al. v. MINISTER ENRILE
FACTS:
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
mandamus seeking the following relief: To
immediately issue a writ of habeas
corpus
directing
respondents
to
appear and produce the bodies of Dr.
AURORA
PARONG,
NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE,
SABINO
PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE
LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA,
ZENAIDA
MALLARI,
MARIANO
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY
BALLOGAN,
BIENVENIDA
GARCIA,
EUFRONIO
ORTIZ,
JR.,
JUANITO
GRANADA
and
TOM
VASQUEZ,
forthwith before this Honorable Court and
to make due return of the writ therewith;
The records show that nine (9) of the
fourteen (14) detainees herein were
arrested on July 6, 1982 at about 1:45
p.m. when three (3) teams of the PC/INP
Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst
Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after
securing a Search Warrant issued by Judge
Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Viscaya conducted a raid at the
residence of Dra. Aurora Parong.
Apprehended during the said raid were
Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda,
Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia,
Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto
Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who
were then having a conference in the
dining room of Dra. Parong's residence
which had been doing on since 10:00 a.m.
of that same day.( other four were
arrested the following day)
Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas
corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina

Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained

petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August
13, 1982.
In the resolution of this Court en
banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of
habeas
corpus
was
issued
and
respondents were required to make a
return of the writ. Hearing on the petition
was set on August 26, 1982.
RETURN: The detainees mentioned in the
petition, with the exception of Tom
Vasquez who was temporarily released on
July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15,
1982, are all being detained by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO
pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9,
1982,
in
relation
to
Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045 dated January
17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation
of P.D. No. 885. ..
The corresponding charges against the
said detainees have been filed in court
and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Nueva Viscaya where they are pleading. A
warrant of arrest against detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong was issued on August 4
The persons named in the abovementioned Presidential Commitment Order
were arrested and are being detained for
offenses with respect to which under
Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus continues to be
suspende
ISSUE: W/N petitioners' detention is legal
HELD:
14 detainees were under surveillance as
they were then Identified as members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) engaging in subversive activities
and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya, as their headquarters. Caught
in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees
mentioned scampered towards different
directions leaving in top of their
conference table numerous subversive
documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationaries, and other

papers, including a plan on how they

would infiltrate the youth and student
sector (code-named YORK). Also found
were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight
(8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of
ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen
thousand
six
hundred
fifty
pesos
(P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA
funds, assorted medicine packed and
ready for distribution, as sizeable quantity
of printing paraphernalia, which were then
seized.
ILLEGAL ARREST AS CONTENDED BY
PETITIONERS HAVE NO BASIS. The
crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or
in
connection
therewith
under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of CONTINUING OFFENSES
which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude.
The arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for
a statutory offense
The arrest, therefore, need not follow
the
usual
procedure
in
the
prosecution of offenses which requires
the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable.
ABESENCE OF JUDICIAL WARRANT OF NO
LEGAL
IMPEDIMENT;
WARRANTLESS
ARREST. Since these crimes of committing
overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement are punishable. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that

involves the very survival of society and

its government and duly constituted
authorities.
ARREST
IS
CHARACTER.

PREVENTIVE

IN

PRESIDENTIAL
COMMITMENT
ORDER
(PCO). The function of the PCO is to
validate, on constitutional ground,
the detention of a person for any of
the offenses covered by Proclamation
No. 2045 which continues in force the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, if the arrest has been
made initially without any warrant,
its legal effect is to render the writ
unavailing as a means of judicially
inquiring into the legality of the
detention in view of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ. The grant
of the power to suspend the said privilege
provides the basis for continuing with
perfect legality the detention as long as
the invasion or rebellion has not been
repelled or quelled, and the need therefor
in the interest of public safety continues.
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
THIS
POWER.
Constitutionally
conferred
upon
the
President as Commander-in-Chief, is that
the exercise thereof is not subject to
judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of the
bill of rights guarantee to individual
freedom
This must be so because the suspension
of the privilege is a military measure
the necessity of which the President alone
may determine as an incident of his grave
responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, of protecting not
only public safety but the very life of
the State, the government and duly
constituted authorities. This should be
clear beyond doubt in the case of
"invasion," along which "rebellion" or
"insurrection" is mentioned by the
Constitution, which contingency does not
present a legal question on whether there
is a violation of the right to personal
liberty when any member of the invading
force is captured and detained. In the
discharge of this awesome and sacred

responsibility, the President should be free

from interference.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS ONE
SUCH MEASURE. To be effective, the
occasion for its application on specific
individuals should be left to the
exclusive and sound judgment of the
President, at least while the exigencies
of invasion, rebellion or insurrection
persist, and the public safety requires it, a
matter, likewise, which should be left for
the sole determination of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed
forces. The need for a unified command in
such contingencies is imperative-even
axiomatic-as a basic military concept in
the art of warfare.
PREVENTIVE
DETENTION.
What,
therefore, should determine the legality of
imposing what is commonly referred to as
"preventive detention" resulting from the
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, is the necessity of its adoption as
a measure to suppress or quell the
rebellion, or beat off an invasion.
WHAT IS THE NECESSITY FOR THIS?
means
of
defense
for
national
survival quite clearly transcends in
importance and urgency the claim of
those detained to the right to bail to
obtain their freedom.
NOTE: Not only rebellion but also other
offenses, including subversion which
is not mentioned in the Constitution,
committed by reason or on the occasion of
the rebellion, or in connection therewith,
or in the furtherance thereof.
AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND VESTED TO
PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF AFP together with the related power
to call out the armed forces to suppress
lawless violence and impose martial law.
"REBELLION AND INSURRECTION" are also
mentioned therein not in their concept as
statutorily-defined public crimes, but as a
state
or
condition
of
extreme
emergency
resulting
from
the
existence of the aforesaid events.

MAY NOT CLAIM BAIL. It is obvious

that persons engaged in rebellion or
insurrection may not claim the right
to be released on bail when similarly
captured or arrested during the
continuance
of
the
aforesaid
contingency.
NO
RIGHT
TO
BE
DISCHARGED
IMMEDIATELY. WHY? According to legal
writers or publicists, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus "has the sole effect of
allowing the executive to defer the
trials of persons charged with certain
offenses
during
the
period
of
emergency." 6 This clearly means denial
of the right to be released on bail on being
charged in court with bailable offenses.
NOTE: The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension
of the right to bail, if the government's
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective.
Otherwise, they would, without the least
doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field
thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
In Buscayno vs. Military Commission,
decided after Proclamation No. 2045 was
issued, which in terms clear and
categorical, held that the constitutional
right to bail is unavailing when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Lansang case went no further than
to pronounce the suspension of the writ of
the privilege of habeas corpus on August
21, 1971, valid and constitutional, on a
finding that there was no arbitrariness
attendant to the suspension.
GUIDELINES IN
PROC.NO.2045:

THE

ARREST

UNDER

1. The arrest and detention effected

by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge;
2. The arrest and detention effected by a
military commander or the head of a law

enforcement agency after it is determined

that the person or persons to be arrested
would probably escape or commit further
acts which would endanger public order
and safety. After the arrest, however, the
case shall be immediately referred to
the city or provincial fiscal or to the
municipal, city, circuit, or district
judge for preliminary examination or
investigation who, if the evidence
warrants, shall file the corresponding
charges and, thereafter, we a warrant of
arrest;
3. The military commander or the head of
the law enforcement agency may apply to
the President thru the Minister of National
Defense, for a Presidential Commitment
Order under the following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial process is not
possible or expedient without endangering
public order and safety; or
(b) When the release on bail of the person
or persons already under arrest by virtue
of a judicial warrant would endanger said
public order and safety.
NOTE: This well-settled ruling was diluted
in the Lansang case which declared that
the "function of the Court is merely to
check not to supplant the
Executive, or ascertain merely whether
he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act. Accdg to J. Fernando
in his separate opinion in Lansang case,
power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is his alone,
and
in
his
own
language,
is
"ordinarily beyond the ken of the
Court.
For the power is intended as a limitation of
the right, in much the same way as
individual freedom yields to the exercise of

the police power of the State in the

interest of general welfare.
SC: Accordingly, We hold that in times of
war and similar emergency as expressly
provided in the Constitution, the President
may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, which has the effect of

allowing the Executive to defer the

prosecution of any of the offenses covered
by Proclamation No. 204
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.