b.

6 By State
G.R. No. L-20322

May 29, 1968

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
MACARIO M. OFILADA, as ex-officio Sheriff of
Manila, and ILDEFONSO ORTIZ, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luis Contreras for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 30915),
dismissing the original action for certiorari and
prohibition filed with said Court by herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, to restrain the
enforcement of a writ of execution (issued by the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil
Case No. 4886) on the trust fund in the account of the
Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National
Bank.
There is no controversy as to the following facts:
On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur Civil Case
No. 4886, against the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., a corporation with principal place
of business in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the
Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the
Department of Public Works and Communications, to
recover possession, with damages, of a 958 square
meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association
allegedly entered and occupied, at the instance of its
co-defendant. For failure to appear and answer the
complaint, therein defendant Irrigation Service Unit
was declared in default.
On June 3, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, claiming that defendant
Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued. By order of June 11, 1960, this
motion was denied, on the ground that the said
defendant although a mere agency of the Republic of
the Philippines, is engaged in the private business of
selling irrigation pumps and construction materials
on installment plan. The Solicitor General's motion

for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also

denied on July 19, 1960. No appeal appears to have
been taken.
On January 29, 1962, the Solicitor General was
served with copy of the writ of execution issued by
the court against the defendants in the abovementioned civil case; and, on February 16, 1962, an
order of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of
Manila against the deposits and/or pump irrigation
trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit
at the Philippine National Bank, Manila, to cover the
sum of P14,874.40.1
On March 8, 1962, the Solicitor General, on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the lower
court an urgent motion to lift the order of
garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject
matter thereof are public funds and exempt from
attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion,
as well as of the motion for reconsideration of said
denial, the Solicitor General commenced the present
certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of
Appeals.1vvphi1.nt
In its decision of August 21, 1962, the appellate court
sustained the propriety of the disputed garnishmentorder, and dismissed the Government's petition, on
the basis of the finding by the trial court that the
Irrigation Service Unit, "formerly an office under the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
created by virtue of a 'Memorandum of Agreement on
the Irrigation Pump Program of the Philippines',
signed by the Chairman of the PHILCUSA (now
NEC), Chief of the MSA Mission (now AID) and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
presently under the Department of Public Works and
Communications to which it was transferred", is
engaged in a private business of purchase and sale of
irrigation pumps and systems. Consequently,
according to the Court of Appeals, and following the
ruling in the case of National Airports Corporation
vs. Teodoro, et al., L-5122, April 30, 1952 (91 Phil.
203), by thus engaging in private business, the
Government, through the Irrigation Service Unit, had
actually consented to the suit. Hence, the present
petition for review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines.
The issue presented by this case is whether or not the
pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the
Philippine National Bank in the account of the
Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy a
money-judgment against the latter. This issue in turn
calls for a determination of the nature of said trust

fund, i.e., whether it is a fund belonging to the

National Government (which was not a party to Civil
Case No. 4886), as maintained by herein petitioner,
or purely the proceeds of a private venture by the
government, as claimed by the respondents.
For a better understanding of the nature, function and
operation of the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which
is necessary for the proper resolution of the issue
herein involved, it is worthwhile to recall that this
office was originally created under the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources by virtue of a
Memorandum Agreement between the governments
of the Philippines and the United States, dated August
13, 1952. It was later transferred to the Department of
Public Works and Communications as an office
directly under the Office of the Secretary, "to
prosecute to completion the rehabilitation of pump
systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump
Administration of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources,2 including the settlement of the
obligations of said administration." The budgetary
requirements to carry out the objectives of the project
were to be financed by withdrawals from the
Counterpart Fund-Special Account. (Memorandum
Agreement of June, 1954.)
This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to
above was established in the Central Bank by the
Government of the Philippines and made up of
deposits in pesos commensurate with the indicated
dollar cost to the Government of the United States of
economic and technical assistance made available to
the Philippines, pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of
April 27, 1951; of deposits accruing to it (Philippine
government) from the sale of commodities or
services supplied under the Agreement or otherwise
accruing to it as a result of the import of such
commodities or service; and of any advance deposits
which the Philippine government may make in the
Special Account (Sec. 1, paragraphs 2[a], [b] and [c],
Annex to Memo. Agreement of April 27, 1951).
Later, on the basis of a supplemental agreement (No.
2, Counterpart Project No. 409 Pump Irrigation),
the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the
Philippine National Bank, to which all authorized
releases to the ISU3 from the Counterpart Fund
Special Account, to finance the peso-cost of the
Irrigation Pump Project, were transferred. This is the
fund on which the disputed writ of execution for
money judgment rendered against the ISU, is being
enforced.

A reading of the records and documents submitted to

the Court of Appeals will readily show that the sales
of irrigation pumps to farmers by ISU are governed
by the terms of the Supplemental Agreement No. 2 to
Counterpart Project No. 409 (signed by
representatives of the Philippine and U. S.
governments) hereunder copied in full:
C. Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under
Contracts of Sale
1. Under the Guiding Principles of the
Irrigation Pump Project, pumps are sold to
farmers' associations under conditional sales
contracts. Periodic payments to ISU by each
association are required. The total payment
required under the contract is stated in the
contract and is equal to the sum of (a) the
landed cost of equipment at the installation
site, (b) the cost of installation and
construction including survey and design,
(c) the cost of fuel and oil financed for the
first crop season, if any, (d) ten per cent of
the total of a and b to cover the cost of
administration, technical assistance
furnished by the ISU, inspection and
collection, and (e) the compensating use tax
to the Philippine Government. Interest is
also payable under each contract at the rate
of six percent per annum on any unpaid
balance of the total amount of the contract.
2. All principal and interest payments
received by the ISU from farmers'
associations shall be deposited immediately
in the Trust Fund. The separate account
established by the project agreement for
Counterpart Project 409, entitled "Irrigation
Pump Sales Proceeds Account" is hereby
abolished and any deposits therein will be
immediately transferred to the Trust Fund.
3. Whenever the total value of all deposits
made to the Trust Fund from contract
principal and interest payments exceeds the
value of total releases made to the Trust
Fund from the Counterpart Fund-Special
Account, these excess deposits shall be
transferred from the Trust Fund to the
Counter Fund-Special Account. Such
transfers shall be considered as "proceeds of
sale" and "advance deposits" as provided in
Annex Section 1, (b) and (c) of the Bilateral
Agreement between the Republic of the

Philippines and the United States of

America.
It was also provided therein that the payments by the
farmers' associations on conditional sales agreements
specified in paragraph C-2, above, will be considered
in the preparation, and shall form part, of the ISU
annual budget, which will finance the costs of supply
and equipment purchases, the installation and
construction of pump units, and the operating
expenses of ISU for which appropriated funds are not
available. (Para. B-1).
It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only
an office in the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, created to promote a specific economic
policy of said government, but also that its activity
(of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment
basis) is not intended to earn profit or financial gain
to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being
collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the
purchased pumps does not convert this economic
project of the government into a corporate activity.
As previously pointed out, the installment payments
and interests receivable from the farmers are to be
used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in
furtherance of the operation of the project.
Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund as a public fund, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the
garnishment order, on the ground that the ISU, by
engaging in the private business of purchasing and
selling irrigation pumps on installment basis, has
waived its governmental immunity and, by
implication, consented to the suit.
It is apparent that this decision of the Court of
Appeals suffers from the erroneous assumption that
because the State has waived its immunity, its
property and funds become liable to seizure under the
legal process. This emphatically is not the law
(Merritt vs. Insular Government, 34 Phil. 311).
Even though the rule as to immunity of a
state from suit is relaxed, the power of the
courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
Although the liability of the state has been
judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty
to determine for itself whether to pay the
judgment or not, and execution can not issue
on a judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of state
property to satisfy judgments recovered, and
only convey implication that the legislature

will recognize such judgment as final and

make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
(49 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, pp. 312-320.)
Judgments against a state, in cases where it
has consented to be sued, generally operate
merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision;
otherwise they can not be enforced by
processes of law; and it is for the legislature
to provide for their payment in such manner
as it sees fit. (59 C.J. sec. 501, p. 331; 81
C.J.S., sec. 232, p. 1343.)
It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under
execution of the ISU funds would amount to
diverting them from the purpose originally
contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement,
and would amount to a disbursement without any
proper appropriation as required by law.
A second infirmity of the decision under appeal
originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial
complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that
it had induced the Handong Irrigation Association,
Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff
Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort
and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule
in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable
only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of
outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt vs.
Insular Government, supra; Rosete vs. Auditor
General, 81 Phil. 453). There being no proof that the
making of the tortious inducement was authorized,
neither the State nor its funds can be made liable
therefor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
under review is reversed and set aside, and the order
of garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila on the
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the
Irrigation Service Unit, with the Philippine National
Bank, is hereby declared null and void. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made
permanent. No costs.

G.R. No. L-11154

March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together
with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court
erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the
plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as
claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the
time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000
as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant
urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the
Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due
to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in
rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum
of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully
supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the
defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, was going toward the western
part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the
west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve
miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue
and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the
General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching
said avenue, instead of turning toward the
south, after passing the center thereof, so
that it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance

and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly

and unexpectedly and long before reaching
the center of the street, into the right side of
Taft Avenue, without having sounded any
whistle or horn, by which movement it
struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post
place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the
plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him
on the very same day that he was taken to
the General Hospital, he was suffering from
a depression in the left parietal region, a
would in the same place and in the back part
of his head, while blood issued from his
nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more
fractures of the skull and that the grey matter
and brain was had suffered material injury.
At ten o'clock of the night in question,
which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so
irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was
broken in such a way that the fracture
extended to the outer skin in such manner
that it might be regarded as double and the
would be exposed to infection, for which
reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the
day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the
plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an
inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a
notable readjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was
slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his
eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
weakness was always noticed when the
plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor,
especially when he attempted to use his
money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who
testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental
and physical condition prior to the accident
was excellent, and that after having received
the injuries that have been discussed, his
physical condition had undergone a
noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the

agility, energy, and ability that he had

constantly displayed before the accident as
one of the best constructors of wooden
buildings and he could not now earn even a
half of the income that he had secured for
his work because he had lost 50 per cent of
his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no
longer, as he had before done, climb up
ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest
parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff
suffered in the efficiency of his work as a
contractor, he had to dissolved the
partnership he had formed with the engineer.
Wilson, because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on
account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a
contract he had for the construction of the
Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord
with the trial court to the effect that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741
and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are
(a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for
the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
nothing in the record which would justify us in
increasing the amount of the first. As to the second,
the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000
per month. The court, however, limited the time to
two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff
was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think
there was error, because it was clearly established
that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a
period of six months. The mere fact that he remained
in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days
while the remainder of the six months was spent in
his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole
time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his
part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the

Government is legally-liable for the damages

resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the
Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr.
E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital on
March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible
for the accident nor is it possible to
determine the amount of damages, if any, to
which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and
the Attorney-General recommended that an
Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing
Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts
against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it
enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized
to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila against the Government
of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr.
E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf
of the Government of said Islands, to
defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its
passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act,

simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the
former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any
new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or
extended the defendant's liability to any case not
previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the
defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without
its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is
one against the Government. As the consent of the
Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely
voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment
accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action
against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on
account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination.
The Act was passed "in order that said questions may
be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was
due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who
was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act
authorize us to hold that the Government is legally
liable for that amount? If not, we must look
elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having
been "modeled after the Federal and State
Governments in the United States," we may look to
the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid
in determining the purpose and scope of Act No.
2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable
for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom
it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment, is well settled. "The
Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake
to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers
or agents whom it employs, since that would involve
it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne,
103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat,
720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How.,
527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the

plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state
institution created by the legislature for the purpose
of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to
disseminate information calculated to educate and
benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such
means the material interests of the state, being objects
similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state's liability for
the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court
said:
No claim arises against any government is
favor of an individual, by reason of the
misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized
exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
(Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269;
Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41
Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State,
73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27
Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec.
319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated
in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced
sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913,
which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to
George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit,
Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit
in such court or courts and in such form or
forms as he may be advised for the purpose
of settling and determining all controversies
which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers
and agents, relative to the mill property of

said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery

of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River,
and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at
the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and
relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county
of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this
law the legislature admitted liability on the
part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would
stand between private parties. It is difficult
to see how the act does, or was intended to
do, more than remove the state's immunity
from suit. It simply gives authority to
commence suit for the purpose of settling
plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or
suggestion that the court or courts in the
disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the
amount of damages is the only question to
be settled. The act opened the door of the
court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just
where it would be in the absence of the
state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature
had intended to change the rule that obtained
in this state so long and to declare liability
on the part of the state, it would not have left
so important a matter to mere inference, but
would have done so in express terms.
(Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth,
152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A.,
399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions
of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter
have, claims on contract or for negligence
against the state not allowed by the state
board of examiners, are hereby authorized,
on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the
state in any of the courts of this state of
competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the
same to final judgment. The rules of practice
in civil cases shall apply to such suits,
except as herein otherwise provided.

And the court said:

This statute has been considered by this
court in at least two cases, arising under
different facts, and in both it was held that
said statute did not create any liability or
cause of action against the state where none
existed before, but merely gave an
additional remedy to enforce such liability
as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State,
121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to
the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against
the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with
an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In
construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate
Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no
intention to create against the state a new
and heretofore unrecognized class of
liabilities, but only an intention to provide a
judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of
the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of
New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for
injuries in the management of the canals such as the
plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks:
"It must be conceded that the state can be made liable
for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents
or servants, only by force of some positive statute
assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not
operate to extend the Government's liability to any
cause not previously recognized, we will now
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's
liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents,
and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the
Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do
the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of

this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for
damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based,
as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15,
Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by
his own fault or negligence, takes part in the
act or omission of the third party who
caused the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of law,
is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge
of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents;
on the contrary, we must presuppose all
foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the
general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these
latter and the state, therefore, no relations of
a private nature governed by the civil law
can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme
Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur.
Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16,
book 4, regulates the obligations which arise
out of fault or negligence; and whereas in
the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the
general principle is laid down that where a
person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another through fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or
indirectly cause the damage, the following
articles refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who
maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage,
because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil
caused by their own fault or negligence is
imputable to them. This legal presumption
gives way to proof, however, because, as
held in the last paragraph of article 1903,
responsibility for acts of third persons ceases

when the persons mentioned in said article

prove that they employed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to avoid the
damage, and among these persons, called
upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to
the mother or the father in a proper case,
guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not
always, except when it acts through the
agency of a special agent, doubtless because
and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the
state.
That although in some cases the state might
by virtue of the general principle set forth in
article 1902 respond for all the damage that
is occasioned to private parties by orders or
resolutions which by fault or negligence are
made by branches of the central
administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the
exercise of its executive powers, yet said
article is not applicable in the case of
damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in
the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property
taxes owing by the owner of the property
which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited
by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which
are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and
the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain,
May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid

down in a decision, among others, of the

18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a
public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can
be held to the proper responsibility in the
manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court
in not so deciding and in sentencing the said
entity to the payment of damages, caused by
an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July
30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the
Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed
from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself
legally liable for the amount of damages above set
forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of
the negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine.
This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not
with the courts.
b.7 By Teachers
G.R. No. L-10134

June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor
A. Alimario for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of
double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on
March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial,
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil
action for damages against the accused. After trial,
Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged
and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the
decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old
when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the
present action against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate
amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro
Caperia. Defendants set up the defense that if any
one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro
Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father
Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former
was not under the control, supervision and custody,
of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower
court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante
Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint.
From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the case was certified to us on the
ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the
Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in
the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he
attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said
city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
From the school Dante, with other students, boarded
a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold
of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his
left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperia, died as a consequence. It further
appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not
with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he
know that his son was going to attend a parade. He
only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended the parade upon instruction
of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether
defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable,
jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages
resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia caused
by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish

Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the
next preceding articles is enforceable not
only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and

trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is
liable for the damages in question jointly and
severally with his son Dante because at the time the
latter committed the negligent act which resulted in
the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are
not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.
And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in
relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the
law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed.,
Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557).
Here Dante capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. And it was in connection with
that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some
companions and while driving it, the accident
occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither
the head of that school, nor the city school's
supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act
of Dante because he was not then a student of an
institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the

10

mother, for any damages that may be caused by the

minor children who live with them, is obvious. This
is necessary consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them and instructing them
in proportion to their means", while, on the other
hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants
failed to prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno
and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the
costs of action.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P.
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V.
VALENTON, owner and President, respectively,
of a school of arts and trades, known under the
name and style of "Manila Technical Institute"
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and
SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee
Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. .

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year

old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising
from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the
hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he
defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the
incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a
member of the Board of Directors of the
institute; 1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the
president thereof; the defendant Santiago M.
Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the
deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the
beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single
proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was
duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son
were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased
Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of
March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were
in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At
that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz
and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon,
in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the
face, which was followed by other fist blows on the
stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist
blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged
blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately
taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness;
finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the
incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this
version of the incident, as testified to by the lone
eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the
protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who
"has no motive or reason to testify one way or
another in favor of any party" and rejected the self-

11

exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that

he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian
of the Manila Police Department who performed the
autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic
fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the
pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage
and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain,"
and his testimony that these internal injuries of the
deceased were caused "probably by strong fist
blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable
for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the
accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong
fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal
organs and caused his death falls within the purview
of this article of the Code." 4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the
three other defendants-officials of the Manila
Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the
provisions of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers
or heads of
establishments of
arts and trades
shall be liable for
damages caused
by their pupils
and students and
apprentices, so
long as they
remain in their
custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this
article of the Code is not applicable
to the case at bar, since this
contemplates the situation where
the control or influence of the
teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct
and actions by the pupil supersedes
those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW:
DAMAGES ART

2180. NEW
CIVIL CODE
CONSTRUED:
The clause "so
long as they
remain in their
custody"
contained in
Article 2180 of
the new civil
code
contemplated a
situation where
the pupil lives
and boards with
the teacher, such
that the control or
influence on the
pupil supersedes
those of the
parents. In those
circumstances the
control or
influence over
the conduct and
actions of the
pupil as well as
the
responsibilities
for their sort
would pass from
the father and
mother to the
teachers. (Ciriaco
L. Mercado,
Petitioner vs. the
Court of Appeals,
Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr.,
et al.,
respondents, G.R.
No. L-14862,
May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the
accused Daffon lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore
be made responsible for the tort of
the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as
follows:

12

1. Sentencing the defendant

Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the
plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased
Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00
for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning
power, considering that the
deceased was only between sixteen
and seventeen years, and in good
health when he died, and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus
the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question
that under the factual findings of the trial court,
which are now beyond review, the trial court erred in
absolving the defendants-school officials instead of
holding them jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages
awarded them as a result of their son's death. The
Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious.
.
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school
officials on the ground that the provisions of Article
2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody,"
are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is
no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted
the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly
on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals, 7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so
long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence
on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a

situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils

appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is
over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor son's
school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon
City [which was not a party to the case] should be
held responsible, rather than him as father, for the
moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him
for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a
classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of
razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical
expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no
scar.] The moral damages award was after all set
aside by the Court on the ground that none of the
specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code,
for awarding moral damages had been established,
petitioner's son being only nine years old and not
having been shown to have "acted with discernment"
in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another
dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno, 8 where the only issue involved as expressly
stated in the decision, was whether the therein
defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages
resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle
accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his
minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely
against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such
earlier case that "It is true that under the law
abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational
institution" was expressly cited and quoted
in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the
school officials and squarely raises the issue of
liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by
their pupils and students against fellow students on
the school premises. Here, the parents of the student
at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic
incident. There is no question, either, that the school
involved is a non-academic school, 9 the Manila
Technical Institute being admittedly a technical
vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article,
defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue,

13

respectively) are liable jointly and severally for

damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the
latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at
the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to
defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the
school's board of directors. The school itself cannot
be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought
to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant
Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower
court found that it had been incorporated since
August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as
thus incorporated, should have been brought in as
party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants
in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had
expressly manifested and made of record that
"defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which
is now a corporation and is not owned by any
individual person." 10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child." 11 This is expressly provided for in Articles
349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of
torts, the governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of
the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that they are
at attendance in the school, including recess time, as
well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves may
inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of
their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school

nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher

while the child is under instruction." The school
itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the
same cited article. 14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving
defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code,
only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on
his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the
school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited
article "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president
and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be
held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having
caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting
from the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants but
complied with their duty of providing adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless
they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180,
Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage." In the light of the factual findings of the
lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove
such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of
P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son
should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court
in People vs. Pantoja, 15 and observed in all death
indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court,
in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its
"considered opinion that the amount of award of

14

compensatory damages for death caused by a crime

orquasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of
"compensatory damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from
the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00,
which amount is to be awarded "even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to
the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the
lower court should have awarded exemplary damages
and imposed legal interest on the total damages
awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's
fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not
been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such
discretion on the part of the trial court. 16 Decisive
here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil
Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may
be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." No gross negligence on the part of
defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the
imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of
interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court
has not been shown in this appeal any compelling
reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L.
Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.
Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for
loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's
fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2.
absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the
complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants'
counterclaims. .

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,

ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.

AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA
TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian,
A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence
of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April
16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would
intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss
of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved . 4

In its decision, which is now the subject of this

petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora
went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972,
and while in its auditorium was shot to death by
Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents. The
private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun
used which the petitioners consider important
because of an earlier incident which they claim
underscores the negligence of the school and at least
one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso,
Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any
further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun
that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this
was the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have been
killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that
the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on
the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their
conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article
reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades

15

shall be liable for damages caused

by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be
briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution
of the case at bar.

In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971,

a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with
fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical
Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was
already of age was not boarding in the school, the
head thereof and the teacher in charge were held
solidarily liable with him. The Court declared
through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article
"so long as (the students) remain
in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach, the pupil
or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in
the school, as erroneously held by
the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the

Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout,
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the
city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so
recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death
of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father was
held solidarily liable with him in damages under
Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for
the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in
an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on
the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino
Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing
that it was the school authorities who should be held
liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed
on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of
arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only
to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and
with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a
razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes
Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of
the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in
another obiter (as the school itself had also not been
sued that the school was not liable because it was not
an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influences on the pupil supersede those
of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part
but the other members of the court concurred in this
decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.

16

This decision was concurred in by five other

members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that
even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of
the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting
with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts
committed by students not yet of age as the school
would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added
that "since the school involved at bar is a nonacademic school, the question as to the applicability
of the cited codal provision to academic institutions
will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is
sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and
unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades

but an academic institution of learning. The parties

herein have also directly raised the question of
whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of
arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student
is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision
in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should
apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads
of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where
he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil
Code to teachers of arts and trades
and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns
the proper supervision and vice
over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from
the duty of watching that his pupils
do not commit a tort to the
detriment of third Persons, so long
as they are in a position to exercise
authority and Supervision over the
pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades"
does not qualify "teachers" but only
"heads of establishments." The
phrase is only an updated version
of the equivalent terms

17

"preceptores y artesanos" used in

the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all
commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 in someculpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority, it
would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher,
the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody,
for the very reason/that the parent
is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that
the provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an
injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the
non-academic school would be held liable, and
simply because the latter is a school of arts and
trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor
is it a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused

by any student regardless of the school where he is

registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching
in an academic school where, on the other hand, the
head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher
of the academic school is to be held answerable for
the torts committed by his students, why is it the head
of the school only who is held liable where the injury
is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why
not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact
that historically the head of the school of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
the head of the academic school. The old schools of
arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts
and trades was such a master and so was personally
involved in the task of teaching his students, who
usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head
of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted
for the acts of the students, the head of the school of
arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.

student is actually undergoing studies during the

school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it
is clear that while the custody requirement, to
repeatPalisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the
student must be boarding with the school authorities,
it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury.
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be
co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such
as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court,
the student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under
the discipline of the school only upon the start of
classes notwithstanding that before that day he has
already registered and thus placed himself under its
rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed
ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding
that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied
for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During
such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from observance
of its rules.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at

present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provision must be interpreted
by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the

school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if
the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the

responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the

During all these occasions, it is obviously the

teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students'
torts, in practically the same way that the parents are
responsible for the child when he is in their custody.

18

The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the

dean, principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is
not necessary that at the time of the injury, the
teacher be physically present and in a position to
prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for
the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not
the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any
time when its authority could be validly exercised
over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the
acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under
the general principle ofrespondeat superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of abonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
directly held to answer for the tort committed by the
student. As long as the defendant can show that he
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting
in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the
student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.

19

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions

expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely
to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school
premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be
held answerable as principal for the acts or omission
of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and
instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among
them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures
are effected through the assistance of an adequate
security force to help the teacher physically enforce
those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the
claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its
students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this
defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him
directly answerable for the damage caused by his
students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence. In this respect,
the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher
the same measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not equal
in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's
dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes
the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being
coterminous with the period of custody is usually
enforced only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las discipline
on the child than the teacher and so should be held to
a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is responsible for the damage caused by
the student or apprentice even if he is already of age
and therefore less tractable than the minor then
there should all the more be justification to require
from the school authorities less accountability as long

as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing

the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has reached
majority age and so is no longer under the former's
control, there is then all the more reason for leniency
in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of
the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has
arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he
was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth
year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if
he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for
what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the
school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean
of boys cannot be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each
of them was exercising only a general authority over
the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties
does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-incharge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school or condoned their non-observance. His
absence when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him because he was not supposed
or required to report to school on that day. And while
it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his laxness
in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the

20

enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining

that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably
the dean of boys who should be held liable especially
in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the
school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that
killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under
the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither
can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any
of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed
by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for
the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as
a balm to their grief, under the law they have
invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO
COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B.
CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and
RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.

Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.

employee (officer) of the AFP. 9Jimmy B. Abon was

also a commerce student of the BCF. 10

Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV
69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter referred
to as the Trial Court), which held, among others,
petitioners solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon,
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and
adopted by reference by the respondent Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an
academic institution ... [However], it is also an
institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself,
as its own evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh. 2)
shows that BCF has a full-fledged technicalvocational department offer Communication,
Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as
Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics
courses... these courses divest BCF of the nature or
character of being purely or exclusively an academic
institution. 3
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth
control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 4 The
ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant to
Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the
Department of Education and Culture, 5 is provided
by the BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building. 6
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. 7 As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received
his appointment from the AFP. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary
from the AFP, 8 as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent
Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an

21

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking

space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro
a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result,
Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of
Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C.
Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus
Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad
D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing,
the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing
defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and
Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and
severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of
Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Napoleon Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for
the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, (c)
P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual
damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
costs; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3)
dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of
merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
Court affirmed with modification the decision of the
Trial Court. The modification consisted in reducing
the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate
damages, and increasing the indemnity for the death
of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
The central issue in this case is whether or not
petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy
B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy
B. Abon.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody." The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the
custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]

called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over

the conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase
used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was
stin in the protective and supervisory custody of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon
Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not
attending any class or school
function at the time of the shooting
incident, which was at about 8
o'clock in the evening; but
considering that Abon was
employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF
ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the evening
was just about dismissal time for
him or soon thereafter. The time
interval is safely within the "recess
time" that the trial court spoke of
and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at
attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school
activities where the student still remains within call
of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity
is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. 18Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled
or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been
"at attendance in the school," or in the custody of
BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

22

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting

incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon
"not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well
guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that
Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
when he committed the act for which the petitioners
are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows
that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in
the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, a school which offers both
academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be
held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled
only in its academic program; however, considering
that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF
when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it
unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. 20
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in the
killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers,

or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child are shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved
that they exercised the proper diligence required
under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs.

WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and
VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well as the
resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner
liable for damages arising from an accident that
resulted in the death of a student who had joined a
campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City
to solicit enrollment.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants

James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby
ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of
damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog
City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the
time of the commission of the tort and who was
under special parental authority of defendant St.
Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the
above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;

The Facts

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby

ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is
hereby DISMISSED.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as

follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records,

pp. 205-206).

Claiming damages for the death of their only son,

Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

From the records it appears that from 13 to 20

February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the
latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result the jeep turned turtle.

On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial

Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos
and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual
damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related
expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for
attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.

23

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he

sustained from the accident.[2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages
to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a
quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.[5]

Hence, this appeal.[6]

The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the award of moral damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys
Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing
a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following
shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person
under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the

24

negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.

For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel
spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary
exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos,
parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not
dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by
the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,

must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The

negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only
a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minors parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
[13]

responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin

Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and
that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case
to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy,
Dipolog City.
No costs.

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver

or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event
over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no
control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

SO ORDERED.
B.8 DEFENSE: DILIGENCE OF GOOD FATHER
OF FAMILY

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot

be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[14]
In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was
not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable
for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to
respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover,
the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.[15] The power of the
court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification.[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees
against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He
never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have
held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being
driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with
the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner
and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held

25

C. PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision. (n)

G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987

BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of: (1) the
decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court in ACG.R. No. 013887-CVBernardino Jimenez v. Asiatic
Integrated Corporation and City of Manila, reversing
the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXII in Civil Case No. 96390
between the same parties, but only insofar as holding
Asiatic Integrated Corporation solely liable for
damages and attorney's fees instead of making the
City of Manila jointly and solidarily liable with it as

prayed for by the petitioner and (2) the resolution of

the same Appellate Court denying his Partial Motion
for Reconsideration (Rollo, p. 2).
The dispositive portion of the Intermediate Appellate
Court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby
REVERSED. A new one is hereby
entered ordering the defendant
Asiatic Integrated Corporation to
pay the plaintiff P221.90 actual
medical expenses, P900.00 for the
amount paid for the operation and
management of a school bus,
P20,000.00 as moral damages due
to pains, sufferings and sleepless
nights and P l0,000.00 as attorney's
fees.

hundred pesos (P900.00). (Decision, AC-G.R. CV

No. 01387, Rollo, pp. 13-20).
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and
the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose
administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been
placed by virtue of a Management and Operating
Contract (Rollo, p. 47).
The lower court decided in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of the decision reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff dismissing
the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff. For lack of sufficient
evidence, the counterclaims of the
defendants are likewise dismissed.
(Decision, Civil Case No. 96390,
Rollo, p. 42).

SO ORDERED. (p. 20, Rollo)

The findings of respondent Appellate Court are as
follows:
The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein)
shows that in the morning of August 15, 1974 he,
together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public
market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public
market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After
purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return
home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which
could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater,
causing a dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside
the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of
plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one
and a half inches. After administering first aid
treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions
helped him hobble home. He felt ill and developed
fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita
Mascardo. Despite the medicine administered to him
by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He
was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital
where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due
to high fever and severe pain.
Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk
around with crutches for fifteen (15) days. His injury
prevented him from attending to the school buses he
is operating. As a result, he had to engage the
services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his
business for an aggregate compensation of nine

26

As above stated, on appeal, the Intermediate

Appellate Court held the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation liable for damages but absolved
respondent City of Manila.
Hence this petition.
The lone assignment of error raised in this petition is
on whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic
Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner
suffered.
In compliance with the resolution of July 1, 1985 of
the First Division of this Court (Rollo, p. 29)
respondent City of Manila filed its comment on
August 13, 1985 (Rollo, p. 34) while petitioner filed
its reply on August 21, 1985 (Reno, p. 51).
Thereafter, the Court in the resolution of September
11, 1985 (Rollo, p. 62) gave due course to the petition
and required both parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda
Petitioner filed his memorandum on October 1, 1985
(Rollo, p. 65) while respondent filed its memorandum
on October 24, 1985 (Rollo, p. 82).
In the resolution of October 13, 1986, this case was
transferred to the Second Division of this Court, the

same having been assigned to a member of said

Division (Rollo, p. 92).
The petition is impressed with merit.
As correctly found by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, there is no doubt that the plaintiff suffered
injuries when he fell into a drainage opening without
any cover in the Sta. Ana Public Market. Defendants
do not deny that plaintiff was in fact injured although
the Asiatic Integrated Corporation tries to minimize
the extent of the injuries, claiming that it was only a
small puncture and that as a war veteran, plaintiff's
hospitalization at the War Veteran's Hospital was free.
(Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 6).
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot
be held liable for the injuries sustained by the
petitioner because under the Management and
Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
assumed all responsibility for damages which may be
suffered by third persons for any cause attributable to
it.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot
be held liable under Article 1, Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila)
which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held
for damages or injuries to persons
or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other City Officer, to
enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of
said Mayor, Municipal Board, or
any other officers while enforcing
or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of
Manila v. Teotico (22 SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where
the Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act
No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury
to persons or property arising from the failure of city
officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or
any other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the
City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."

27

Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code

of the Philippines which provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by any
person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or
supervision.
constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities ... liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any
person by reason" specifically "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No.
409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object, thereof, while
Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due
to "defective streets, public buildings and other
public works" in particular and is therefore decisive
on this specific case.
In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further
that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to
attach, that the defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over the public building in
question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta.
Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and
Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the
control of the former.
For one thing, said contract is explicit in this regard,
when it provides:
II
That immediately after the
execution of this contract, the
SECOND PARTY shall start the
painting, cleaning, sanitizing and
repair of the public markets and
talipapas and within ninety (90)
days thereof, the SECOND PARTY

shall submit a program of

improvement, development,
rehabilitation and reconstruction of
the city public markets and
talipapas subject to prior approval
of the FIRST PARTY. (Rollo, p. 44)

services of the said corporation to

undertake the physical
management, maintenance,
rehabilitation and development of
the City's public markets and'
Talipapas' subject to the control and
supervision of the City.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
VI
That all present personnel of the
City public markets and talipapas
shall be retained by the SECOND
PARTY as long as their services
remain satisfactory and they shall
be extended the same rights and
privileges as heretofore enjoyed by
them. Provided, however, that the
SECOND PARTY shall have the
right, subject to prior approval of
the FIRST PARTY to discharge any
of the present employees for cause.
(Rollo, p. 45).

It is believed that there is nothing

incongruous in the exercise of these
powers vis-a-vis the existence of
the contract, inasmuch as the City
retains the power of supervision
and control over its public markets
and talipapas under the terms of
the contract. (Exhibit "7-A")
(Emphasis supplied.) (Rollo, p. 75).
In fact, the City of Manila employed a market master
for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is
to take direct supervision and control of that
particular market, more specifically, to check the
safety of the place for the public.

VII
That the SECOND PARTY may
from time to time be required by
the FIRST PARTY, or his duly
authorized representative or
representatives, to report, on the
activities and operation of the City
public markets and talipapas and
the facilities and conveniences
installed therein, particularly as to
their cost of construction, operation
and maintenance in connection
with the stipulations contained in
this Contract. (lbid)
The fact of supervision and control of the City over
subject public market was admitted by Mayor Ramon
Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar
Virata which reads:
These cases arose from the
controversy over the Management
and Operating Contract entered into
on December 28, 1972 by and
between the City of Manila and the
Asiatic Integrated Corporation,
whereby in consideration of a fixed
service fee, the City hired the

28

Thus the Asst. Chief of the Market Division and

Deputy Market Administrator of the City of Manila
testified as follows:
Court This
market master is
an employee of
the City of
Manila?
Mr. Ymson Yes,
Your Honor.
Q What are his
functions?
A Direct
supervision and
control over the
market area
assigned to
him."(T.s.n.,pp.
41-42, Hearing of
May 20, 1977.)
xxx xxx xxx

Court As far as
you know there is
or is there any
specific
employee
assigned with the
task of seeing to
it that the Sta.
Ana Market is
safe for the
public?
Mr. Ymson
Actually, as I
stated, Your
Honor, that the
Sta. Ana has its
own market
master. The
primary duty of
that market
master is to make
the direct
supervision and
control of that
particular
market, the check
or verifying
whether the place
is safe for public
safety is vested in
the market
master. (T.s.n.,
pp. 2425,
Hearing of July
27, 1977.)
(Emphasis
supplied.) (Rollo,
p. 76).
Finally, Section 30 (g) of the Local Tax Code as
amended, provides:
The treasurer shall exercise direct
and immediate supervision
administration and control over
public markets and the personnel
thereof, including those whose
duties concern the maintenance and
upkeep of the market and
ordinances and other pertinent rules
and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied.) (Rollo, p. 76)

29

The contention of respondent City of Manila that

petitioner should not have ventured to go to Sta. Ana
Public Market during a stormy weather is indeed
untenable. As observed by respondent Court of
Appeals, it is an error for the trial court to attribute
the negligence to herein petitioner. More specifically
stated, the findings of appellate court are as follows:
... The trial court even chastised the
plaintiff for going to market on a
rainy day just to buy bagoong. A
customer in a store has the right to
assume that the owner will comply
with his duty to keep the premises
safe for customers. If he ventures to
the store on the basis of such
assumption and is injured because
the owner did not comply with his
duty, no negligence can be imputed
to the customer. (Decision, AC-G.
R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 19).
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasidelict, one must have exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public
market reasonably safe for people frequenting the
place for their marketing needs.
While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such
duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods,
it must however, be admitted that ordinary
precautions could have been taken during good
weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb
under those difficult circumstances.
For instance, the drainage hole could have been
placed under the stalls instead of on the passage
ways. Even more important is the fact, that the City
should have seen to it that the openings were
covered. Sadly, the evidence indicates that long
before petitioner fell into the opening, it was already
uncovered, and five (5) months after the incident
happened, the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo,
pp. 57; 59). Moreover, while there are findings that
during floods the vendors remove the iron grills to
hasten the flow of water (Decision, AC-G.R. CV No.
0 1387; Rollo, p. 17), there is no showing that such
practice has ever been prohibited, much less
penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was it
shown that any sign had been placed thereabouts to
warn passersby of the impending danger.

To recapitulate, it appears evident that the City of

Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article
2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having
retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana
Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no
openings in the middle of the passageways and if any,
that they were adequately covered. Had the opening
been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it.
Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the peti- 4
petitioner.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily
liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED, making the
City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
solidarily liable to pay the plaintiff P221.90 actual
medical expenses, P900.00 for the amount paid for
the operation and management of the school bus,
P20,000.00 as moral damages due to pain, sufferings
and sleepless nights and P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23052

January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N.
Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him
down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he
managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the

30

jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an

uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim
of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing
broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As
blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of
the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to
the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper
arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an
abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruption caused by antitetanus injections administered to him in the hospital,
required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence,
Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently,
amended for damages against the City of Manila,
its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision
of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a
practicing public accountant, a businessman
and a professor at the University of the East.
He held responsible positions in various
business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and
Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing
Company and the Sincere Packing
Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack
Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce
of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila
and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the
incident, plaintiff was prevented from
engaging in his customary occupation for
twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income
of about P50.00 during his incapacity to
work. Because of the incident, he was
subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his
business associates and friends. During the
period of his treatment, plaintiff was under
constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of
his minor children since he was their only
support. Due to the filing of this case,
plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his
counsel the sum of P2,000.00.

On the other hand, the defense presented

evidence, oral and documentary, to prove
that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the
City Engineer of Manila, received a report
of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at
the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta
Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the
same was covered on the same day (Exhibit
4); that again the iron cover of the same
catch basin was reported missing on January
30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the
next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the
City Engineer never received any report to
the effect that the catchbasin in question was
not covered between January 25 and 29,
1968; that it has always been a policy of the
said office, which is charged with the duty
of installation, repair and care of storm
drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a
report is received from whatever source of
the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is
immediately attended to, either by
immediately replacing the missing cover or
covering the catchbasin with steel matting
that because of the lucrative scrap iron
business then prevailing, stealing of iron
catchbasin covers was rampant; that the
Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of
said iron covers; that in order to prevent
such thefts, the city government has changed
the position and layout of catchbasins in the
City by constructing them under the
sidewalks with concrete cement covers and
openings on the side of the gutter; and that
these changes had been undertaken by the
city from time to time whenever funds were
available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned
decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and
dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as
the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced
to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the
present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

31

The city shall not be liable or held for

damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a
special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil
Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar
as its territorial application is concerned, Republic
Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter
of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic
Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury
to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of
the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by any person by reason" specifically "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189
governs liability due to "defective streets," in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.

It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held

liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident
involving him took place in a national highway; and
2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent
in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based
upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of
the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint,
as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a street which
is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In
its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in
turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were
and have been constantly kept in good condition and
regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and
the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant
and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue
is a national highway was made, for the first time, in
its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a
question of fact, which had not been put in issue in
the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time,
on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is
not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even
if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City
of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section
18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The
Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx

32

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law

to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and
to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to
provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling
of streets and public places; . . . to provide
for the inspection of, fix the license fees for
and regulate the openings in the same for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes,
the building and repair of tunnels, sewers,
and drains, and all structures in and under
the same and the erecting of poles and the
stringing of wires therein; to provide for and
regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales
upon the streets and other public places; to
provide for the abatement of nuisances in
the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and
maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit
and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which
may annoy persons using the streets and
public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of horses and
other animals, motor and other vehicles,
cars, and locomotives within the limits of
the city; to regulate the lights used on all
vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to
provide for and change the location, grade,
and crossing of railroads, and compel any
such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to
conform to such provisions or changes; and
to require railroad companies to fence their
property, or any part thereof, to provide
suitable protection against injury to persons
or property, and to construct and repair
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along
and under their tracks, so that the natural
drainage of the streets and adjacent property
shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor
restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive
Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the
City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or
appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of
aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities
in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113
merely implements the provisions of said Republic
Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and
appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it

provides that "the construction, maintenance and

improvement of national primary, national secondary
and national aid provincial and city roads shall be
accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and
Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be
financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in
annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P.
Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of
Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our
review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be
as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila. It is so ordered.1wph1.t
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Nolan R. Evangelista for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by
the petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the following
judgment was rendered against the respondent City of
Dagupan:
xxx
(1) Ordering defendant City of
Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual
damages in the amount of P 15,924
(namely P8,054.00 as hospital,
medical and other expenses [Exhs.
H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as lost
income for one (1) year [Exh. F]
and P 450.00 as bonus). P

33

150,000.00 as moral damages, P

50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses, plus costs
and to appropriate through its
Sangguniang Panglunsod (City
Council) said amounts for said
purpose;
(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint
as against defendant City Engr.
Alfredo G. Tangco; and
(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of
defendant City of Dagupan and
defendant City Engr. Alfredo G.
Tangco, for lack of merit. 2
The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3
It would appear from the evidences
that on July 25, 1978, herein
plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of
Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City,
while she was about to board a
motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a National
Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of
Dagupan) accidentally fell into a
manhole located on said sidewalk,
thereby causing her right leg to be
fractured. As a result thereof, she
had to be hospitalized, operated on,
confined, at first at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to
August 3, 1978 (or for a period of
16 days). She also incurred
hospitalization, medication and
other expenses to the tune of P
8,053.65 (Exh. H to H-60) or a total
of P 10,000.00 in all, as other
receipts were either lost or
misplaced; during the period of her
confinement in said two hospitals,
plaintiff suffered severe or
excruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but
also on all parts of her body; the
pain has persisted even after her
discharge from the Medical City
General Hospital on October 9,
1978, to the present. Despite her
discharge from the Hospital
plaintiff is presently still wearing

crutches and the Court has actually

observed that she has difficulty in
locomotion. From the time of the
mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the
present, plaintiff has not yet
reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of
locomotion in going up the stairs of
her office, located near the city hall
in Dagupan City. She earns at least
P 720.00 a month consisting of her
monthly salary and other means of
income, but since July 25, 1978 up
to the present she has been
deprived of said income as she has
already consumed her accrued
leaves in the government service.
She has lost several pounds as a
result of the accident and she is no
longer her former jovial self, she
has been unable to perform her
religious, social, and other
activities which she used to do
prior to the incident.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr.
Dominado Manzano of the
Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr.
Antonio Sison of the Medical City
General Hospital in Mandaluyong
Rizal (Exh. I; see also Exhs. F, G,
G-1 to G-19) have confirmed
beyond shadow of any doubt the
extent of the fracture and injuries
sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the mishap. On the other hand,
Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and
Cerezo corroborated the testimony
of the plaintiff regarding the
mishap and they have confirmed
the existence of the manhole (Exhs.
A, B, C and sub-exhibits) on the
sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the
time of the incident on July 25,
1978 which was partially covered
by a concrete flower pot by leaving
gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1
1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75
cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see
Exhs. D and D-1).
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City
Engineer of Dagupan City and
admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the

34

Public Works and Building Official

for Dagupan City, admitted the
existence of said manhole along the
sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly
a National Road in front of the
Luzon Colleges. He also admitted
that said manhole (there are at least
11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned
by the National Government and
the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also
owned by the National
Government. But as City Engineer
of Dagupan City, he supervises the
maintenance of said manholes or
drainage system and sees to it that
they are properly covered, and the
job is specifically done by his
subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr.
Ernesto Solermo also a
maintenance Engineer. In his
answer defendant Tangco expressly
admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in
his capacity as ex-officio Highway
Engineer for Dagupan City he
exercises supervision and control
over National roads, including the
Perez Blvd. where the incident
happened.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the
appellate court 4 reversed the lower court findings on
the ground that no evidence was presented by the
plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan
had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. 5
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the
fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is
not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public
Highways that has control or supervision through the
Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of
the trial court and those of the appellate court, as well
as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree
with those of the trial court and of the petitioner.
Hence, we grant the petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the
errors assigned by the petitioner to a single issue:

whether or not control or supervision over a national

road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding
the city to answer for damages in accordance with
article 2189 of the Civil Code.
The liability of public corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.

connection with the public sewer

system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the
laying out, construction and improvement of streets,
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of
the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal
Board . 7Thus the charter clearly indicates that the
city indeed has supervision and control over the
sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city
not liable for damages or injuries sustained by
persons or property due to the failure of any city
officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can
not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar.8

It is not even necessary for the defective road or

street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street. 6

The charter only lays down general rules regulating

the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189
appliesin particular to the liability arising from
"defective streets, public buildings and other public
works." 9

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is

provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer who has the
following duties:

The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits

that he exercises control or supervision over the said
road. But the city can not be excused from liability by
the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to
supervise or control the said provincial road belongs
more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway
Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a
city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an
honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways,
his salary from the city government substantially
exceeds the honorarium.

Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His

powers, duties and compensationThere shall be a city engineer, who
shall be in charge of the department
of Engineering and Public Works.
He shall receive a salary of not
exceeding three thousand pesos per
annum. He shall have the following
duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and
custody of the public system of
waterworks and sewers, and all
sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the
use of the same, in accordance with
the ordinance relating thereto; shall
inspect and regulate the use of all
private systems for supplying water
to the city and its inhabitants, and
all private sewers, and their

35

We do not agree.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City
Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway
Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau
of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as
Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the
following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from
Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public
Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public
Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096,
respectively." 10This function of supervision over
streets, public buildings, and other public works
pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a
Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance
Engineer.11 Although these last two officials are
employees of the National Government, they are

detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive

instruction and supervision from the city through the
City Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer
exercises control or supervision over the public
works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to
the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is
clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to
the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be
reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only.
The trial court should not have rounded off the
amount. In determining actual damages, the court can
not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as
to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the
award of actual damages becomes erroneous. 12
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded
even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the
determination of the amount is discretionary on the
court.13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
moral damages are in the nature of an award to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
but which for some reason can not be proven.
However, in awarding moral damages, the following
should be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the
injury must be the claimee's acts.14
(2) Second, there must be
compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual
basis for damages.15
(3) Third, the award of moral
damages must be predicated on any
of the cases enumerated in the Civil
Code. 16
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental
anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven.
Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified
to the degeneration in her disposition-from being
jovial to depressed. She refrained from attending
social and civic activities.17
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P
150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her treatment
which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral
loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of

36

damages,18 the moderating hand of the law is called

for. The Court has time and again called attention to
the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award
damages without basis,19 resulting in exhorbitant
amounts.20
Although the assessment of the amount is better left
to the discretion of the trial court 21 under preceding
jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should
be reduced to P 20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial
court correctly pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the
public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should
serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of
their duty and responsibility to their
constituents, especially when they
are engaged in construction work
or when there are manholes on their
sidewalks or streets which are
uncovered, to immediately cover
the same, in order to minimize or
prevent accidents to the poor
pedestrians.22
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact"
projects such as beautification drives, the end is more
important than the manner in which the work is
carried out. Because of this obsession for showing
off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots
betray the careless execution of the projects, causing
public inconvenience and inviting accidents.
Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan
from the trial court to the appellate court, the
petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishment
of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine
National Bank, from the then presiding judge, Hon.
Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was
revoked subsequently by the succeeding presiding
judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis
for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which
was also denied. 23
We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial
court pending appeal was premature. We do not find
any good reason to justify the issuance of an order of
execution even before the expiration of the time to
appeal .24

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed decision and resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated
March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is
hereby REINSTATED with the indicated
modifications as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of
Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual
damages in the amount of P 15,924
(namely P 8,054.00 as hospital,
medical and other expenses; P
7,420.00 as lost income for one (1)
year and P 450.00 as bonus); P
20,000.00 as moral damages and P
10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

*DE ROY VS CA, supra

VI. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS

A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or
whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost.
This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure
or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage. (1905)

The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.

SO ORDERED.
D. PROPRIETORS OF BUILDING, ENGINEER,
ARCHITECT, CONTRACTOR
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not
been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not
been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to
persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near
highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or
deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding
articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third
person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance
with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)

37

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN
VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID
UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three.
Her parents said she died because she was bitten by a
dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this,
claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The
Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial
court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was
reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now
before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of

the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial

court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while
she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita
Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was
rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was
treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine
by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine
days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August
15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was
certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected
the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal,
and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the
defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion
when the case was appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils
were in possession of the house and the dog and so
should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil
Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held
that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and
not for causes independent thereof as submitted by
the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered
to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00
for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and
hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists
that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog
left by her father as his estate has not yet been
partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her
sister living in Canada would be held responsible for
the acts of the dog simply because she is one of
Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point.
What must be determined is the possession of the dog
that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the
house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:

38

The possessor of an animal or

whoever may make use of the same
is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in
case the damages should come
from force majeure from the fault
of the person who has suffered
damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as
caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground
that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao
from causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in
possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She
said that the occupants of the house left by her father
were related to him ("one way or the other") and
maintained themselves out of a common fund or by
some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she
did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of
such relatives who had stayed in the house at one
time or another although they did not appear to be
close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did not pay
any rent, presumably because of their relation with
Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did
not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the
house, were boarders (or more of boarders than
relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them
with meals and accommodations. It also appears that
Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as,
who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house
for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a
nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared
that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the
house where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another
witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a
boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the
house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita
denied paying the water bills for the house, the
private respondents submitted documentary evidence
of her application for water connection with the Cebu
Water District, which strongly suggested that she was
administering the house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in

question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City

and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her
own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house,
once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the
house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by
the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until
1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is
also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist
the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although
Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that
they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness
there was no clear showing that she died as a result
thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of bronchopneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog
bites for which she had been previously hospitalized.
The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
except to note that, first, Theness developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the
dog bites, and second, that asphyxia bronchopneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid
of water after she was bitten by the dog is established
by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was mention
of rabies in the report in the second
admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously
vomiting just before I referred to
Dr. Co earlier in the morning and
then the father, because the child
was asking for water, the father
tried to give the child water and
this child went under the bed, she
did not like to drink the water and
there was fright in her eyeballs. For
this reason, because I was in danger
there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had
hydrophobia?
A: Yes, sir.

39

18

As for the link between rabies and bronchopneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under
oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, bronchopneumonia can result from
physical, chemical and bacterial
means. ... It can be the result of
infection, now, so if you have any
other disease which can lower your
resistance you can also get
pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person
who has rabies may die of
complication which is bronchopneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting
that this book shown the witness is
know as CURRENT DIANOSIS &
TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry
Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and
Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your
attention, doctor, to page 751 of
this book under the title "Rabies."
There is on this page, "Prognosis"
as a result of rabies and it says:
Once the symptoms, have appeared
death inevitably occurs after 2-3
days as a result of cardiac or
respiratory failure or generalized
paralysis. After a positive diagnosis
of rabies or after a bite by a
suspected animal if the animal
cannot be observed or if the bite is
on the head, give rabies vaccine
(duck embryo). Do you believe in
this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that
persons who have rabies may die of
respiratory failure which leave in
the form of bronco-pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a
complication of rabies. 19

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court

finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily
established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v.
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause
of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the
evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to
convince us that she died because she was bitten by
the dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they
could not be expected to exercise remote control of
the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the
Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed
from his control. And it does not matter either that, as
the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and
was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for
the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the
petitioners are an implied rejection of their original
posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in
their father's house that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by
Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may
cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and
approve the monetary awards except only as to the
medical and hospitalization expenses, which are
reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint.
While there is no recompense that can bring back to
the private respondents the child they have lost, their
pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages
to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is
DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.

40

B. MANUFACTURERS AND PROCESSORS

OF FOODSTUFFS
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused
by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between
them and the consumers. (n)
*GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN

C. HEAD OF FAMILY
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages
caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
(1910)

G.R. No. L-47033

April 25, 1941

JOSE DINGCONG, recurrente-apelante,

vs.
HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y
MICHAEL KANAAN, dedicados al comercio bajo
la razon social de "American Bazar," recurridosapelados.
Sres. Ezpeleta y Salvosa en representacion del
recurrente.
D. Felipe Ysmael en representacion de los
recurridos.
AVANCEA, J.:
Segun la decision del Tribunal del Tribunal de
Apelaciones, los hermanos Loreto Dingcong y Jose
Dingcong son coarrentadarios de los altos de la casa
de Emilia Saenz situada en la Calle Jose Ma. Basa de
la Ciudad de Iloilo, donde establecieron el Central
Hotel, siendo la primera la duea y el ultimo su
manager. El demandado Francisco Echevarria ocupo,
mediante pago de P30 al mes, el cuarto No. 10 de
dicho hotel. Los demandantes acupaban, a su vez los
bajos de este hotel donde tenian establecido su
"American Bazar" dedicado a la compra y venta de
articulos y mencancias. Hacia las once de la noche
del 19 de septiembre de 1933, Echevarria, al retirarse
a la cama, dejo abierto descuidadamente el grifo que
daba sobre una palangana ordinaria sin desague.
Como las tuberias del hotel en aquel tiempo estaban
en reparacion, cuando a la media noche el agua
descorrio por las tuberias, se esparcio por el suelo,
traspasandolo y mojando los articulos y mencancias
en los bajos en el establecimiento "American Bazar,"

causando una perdida, que el Juzgado de Primera

Instancia estimo en P1,089.61.
Se presento esta accion por Halim Kanaan, Nasri
Kanaan y Michael Kanaan en nombre del nombre del
"American Bazar" contra Loreto Dingcong, Jose
Dingcong y Francisco Echevarria por daos y
perjuicios causados a los demandantes. El Jusgado
sobreseyo la causa en cuanto a Loreto Dingcong por
haber fallecido, y condeno a Francisco Echevarria,
absolviendo a Jose Dingcong. Los demandantes
apelaron de esta decision en cuanto absuelve a Jose
dingcong. El Tribunal de Apelaciones, revocando la
decision del Juzgado de Primera Instancia, declaro a
Jose Dingcong responsable y le condeno a pagar a los
demandantes el importe de los daos y perjuicios
causados a los mismos como fue estimado por el
Juzgado. Se presenta ahora ante esta Corte,
mediante certiorari, apelacion de esta decision del
Tribunal de Apelaciones.
Siendo Jose Dingcong coarrendatario y manager del
hotel, con completa posesion de los altos de la casa,
debe responder por los daos causados por las cosas
que se arrojaron o cayeron de la misma (articulo 1910
del Codigo Civil). Francisco Echevarria era huesped
del hotel y fue el que directamente, por su descuido,
al dejar abierto el grifo, permitio que el agua de la
tuberia descorriera por el suelo y se filtrara hacia los
bajos, mojando los articulos y mercancias de los
demandantes. Jose Dingcong, por otra parte, no
practico la diligencia de un buen padre de familia
para prevenir estos daos, no obstante de que sabia
que podian causarse por estar entonces en reparacion
las tuberias, pues, debiendo presumir que Echavarria
podia usar el grifo no le proveyo de algun recipiente
con desague, y si solo puso debajo del mismo una
palangana que, al llenarse, hizo que el agua se
esparciera por el suelo.
Se confirma la decision apelada, con las costas al
apelante.
D. ALLIED LAWS
CORPORATION CODE
Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict
with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting

41

therefrom suffered by the corporation, its

stockholders or members and other persons.
When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire
or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest
adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter
which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to
which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in
his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the
corporation and must account for the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the corporation.

VII. NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF

LIABILITY
A. BETWEEN TORTFEASORS: SOLIDARY
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR SAME
ACT OR OMISSION
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
C. REQUIREMENT AS TO RESERVATION

Rule111, Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed

independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
D. MANNER OF ENFORCEMENT
DISTUINGUISHED FROM
1.

CULPA CRIMINAL

2.

CULPA CONTRACTUAL

42