Afghanistan
Public Policy Research Organization
Patterns of State-Civil Society Interactions in
Turkey: Retrospect and Prospects
August
2015
Project
Report
Acknowledgements
The
funding
for
this
research
was
provided
by
Oxfam
Novib
as
part
of
the
project,
Citizens
First,
and
collaboration
between
Oxfam
Novib,
Peace,
Training
and
Research
Organization
(PTRO),
and
Afghanistan
Public
Policy
Research
Organization
(APPRO).
About the Researchers
This paper is based on the original research by Aylin zman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasda with
additional desk research by Saeed Parto. Aylin zman is Professor of Political Science and the Chair of
the Department of Political Science and International Relations at TED University in Ankara, Turkey.
Berrin Koyuncu Lorasda is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science and
Public Administration and Director of Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hacettepe University, Ankara,
Turkey.
About
APPRO
Afghanistan
Public
Policy
Research
Organization
(APPRO)
is
an
independent
social
research
organization
promoting
social
and
policy
learning
to
benefit
development
and
reconstruction
efforts
in
Afghanistan.
APPRO
is
a
non-profit,
non-government
organization,
headquartered
in
Kabul,
Afghanistan,
with
satellite
offices
in
Herat,
Mazar-e
Sharif,
Jalalabad,
and
Kandahar.
APPRO
is
a
founding
member
of
APPRO-
Europe.
APPROs
mission
is
to
provide
insights
on
how
to
improve
performance
against
the
development
milestones
set
by
the
Afghan
government
and
international
donors.
APPRO
conducts
applied
research,
carries
out
evaluations,
and
provides
training
on
policy
analysis,
Monitoring
and
Evaluations,
advocacy,
and
research
methods.
For
more
information,
see:
www.appro.org.af
Contact:
mail@appro.org.af
Cover
Photo:
Hanife
zata
APPRO
takes
full
responsibility
for
all
omissions
and
errors
in
this
report.
2015.
Afghanistan
Public
Policy
Research
Organization
and
Aylin
zman
and
Berrin
Koyuncu
Lorasda.
Some
rights
reserved.
This
publication
may
be
reproduced,
stored
in
a
retrieval
system
or
transmitted
only
for
non-commercial
purposes
and
with
written
credit
to
APPRO
and
the
authors.
Where
this
publication
is
reproduced,
stored
or
transmitted
electronically,
a
link
to
APPROs
website
at
www.appro.org.af
should
be
provided.
Any
other
use
of
this
publication
requires
prior
written
permission
which
may
be
obtained
by
writing
to:
mail@appro.org.af
www.appro.org.af
List
of
Abbreviations
AKDER
AKP
APPRO
CSO
CEDAW
ECLN
EU
GONGO
GREVIO
KADEM
KA-DER
KASAD-D
KSGM
LGBT
ICLN
HD
MAZLUMDER
MOR
ATI
TACSO
THK
TOBB
TRK-
TSEV
TSAD
Ayrmcla Kar Kadn Haklar Dernei/Association of Women Against
Discrimination
Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi / Justice and Development Party
Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization
Civil Society Organization
Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discriminations Against Women
European Civil Liberties Network
European Union
Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations
Group of Experts on Action Against Violence Against women and Domestic
Violence
Kadn ve Demokrasi Dernei/Woman and Democracy Association
Kadn Adaylar Destekleme Dernei / The Association for the Support and
Training of Women Candidates
Kadn Salklar Dayanma Dernei/Women Health Providers Association
Kadnn Stats Genel Mdrl / The Turkish General Directorate on the
Status of Women
Lezbiyen, Gay, Biseksel, Transgender ve Interseks Birlii /International Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
nsan Haklar Dernei / Human Rights Association
nsan Haklar ve Mazlumlar iin Dayanma Dernei / Human Rights and
Solidarity Association for the Oppressed
Mor at Kadn Sna Vakf / Purple Roof Womens Shelter Foundation
Technical Assistance to Civil Society Organization
Trkiye nsan Haklar Kurumu / National Human Rights Institution of Turkey
Trkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birlii / The Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges of Turkey
Trkiye i Sendikalar Konfederasyonu / Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
Trkiye nc Sektr Vakf / Third Sector Foundation of Turkey
Trkiye Sanayici ve Adamlar Dernei / Industrialists and Businessmen
Association of Turkey
www.appro.org.af
Table
of
Contents
1.
Introduction................................................................................................................... 4
2.
Objectives...................................................................................................................... 4
3.
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 4
4.
State-CSO
Relations
and
Good
Governance.................................................................... 5
5.
State-CSO
Relations
in
Turkey
A
Historical
Overview................................................... 8
State-CSO
Relations:
1923-1980 ................................................................................................ 8
State-CSO
Relations:
1980-2002 ................................................................................................ 9
State-CSO
Relations:
2002-Present ...........................................................................................11
6.
Current
State-CSO
Relations
in
Turkey ......................................................................... 12
7.
Key
Findings................................................................................................................. 20
8.
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 21
Implications
for
Afghanistan.....................................................................................................21
Recommendations ...................................................................................................................22
For
Governments......................................................................................................................... 22
For
CSOs....................................................................................................................................... 22
For
International
Donors ............................................................................................................. 23
References....................................................................................................................... 24
Appendix
1:
Profiles
of
CSOs
Used
as
Case
Examples ....................................................... 27
KA-DER
(The
Association
for
the
Support
and
Training
of
Women
Candidates).........................27
MOR
ATI
KADIN
SIINMA
VAKFI
(Purple
Roof
Womens
Shelter
Foundation).........................28
HD
(Human
Rights
Association) ...............................................................................................29
MAZLUMDER
(Human
Rights
and
Solidarity
Association
for
the
Oppressed).............................30
Appendix
2:
Legal
Framework
Governing
CSOs
In
Turkey................................................. 31
Appendix
3:
CSO
Interview
Questions.............................................................................. 35
Appendix
4:
Expert
Interview
Questions .......................................................................... 36
www.appro.org.af
1.
Introduction
This
paper
examines
the
patterns
of
state-civil
society
interaction
in
Turkey
with
a
specific
focus
on
rights-based
civil
society
organizations
(CSOs)
active
in
the
fields
of
womens
and
human
rights.
The
CSOs
within
the
scope
of
this
research
comprise
KA-DER
(Association
for
the
Support
and
Training
of
Women
Candidates),
MOR
ATI
(Purple
Roof
Womens
Shelter
Foundation),
MAZLUMDER
(The
Human
Rights
and
Solidarity
Association
for
the
Oppressed),
and
HD
(The
Human
Rights
Association).
(See
Appendix
1
for
a
synthesized
overview
of
these
CSOs).
The
research
sought
to
examine
the
key
features
of
state-civil
society
interface
and
conduct
a
qualitative
analysis
of
the
roles
CSOs
play
in
the
mode
of
governance
in
Turkey
and
the
implications
for
policy
options
to
strengthen
state-civil
society
interactions
toward
good
governance
in
Afghanistan
and
other
developing
or
emerging
democracies.
2.
Objectives
The
objectives
for
this
research
were
as
follows:
Establish
the
formal
role
allocated
to
CSOs
by
the
Government
of
Turkey
Establish
the
actual
role
of
CSOs
in
government
decision/policy
making
process
in
Turkey
with
a
focus
on
the
experiences
of
womens
and
human
rights
CSOs
Define
the
key
features
of
the
mode
of
governance
in
Turkey
regarding
the
interface
between
CSOs
and
government
Identify
gaps
or
inconsistencies
between
the
place
of
CSOs
in
governance
in
law
and
practice
Assess
implications
of
the
findings
for
CSOs
in
Turkey
as
an
overwhelmingly
Muslim-
populated
country
Generate
specific
and
practical
recommendations
for
governments,
international
donors,
and
CSOs
on
how
to
strengthen
existing
links
between
CSOs
and
governmental
authorities
and
develop
additional
links
to
facilitate
good
governance.
3.
Methodology
This
research
focused
on
selected
womens
and
human
rights
CSOs
namely
KA-DER,
MOR
ATI,
HD,
and
MAZLUMDER.
CSOs,
for
the
purposes
of
this
research,
refers
to
entities
defined
according
to
the
Turkish
law
as
associations
and
foundations.
The
rationale
underlying
the
preference
of
these
particular
CSOs
is
twofold.
First,
although
the
rights-based
CSOs
constitute
only
1.28
percent
of
the
associations
and
foundations
in
Turkey,
their
political
visibility
and
interface
with
governmental
authorities
is
much
higher
compared
to
other
CSOs
engaged
in
sports,
development
and
housing,
development
of
religious
services,
promotion
of
professional
solidarity,
work,
health
services,
and
education.1
Second,
the
focus
on
CSOs
engaged
in
the
protection
and
promotion
of
womens
rights
and
human
rights,
as
opposed
to
CSOs
in
general,
is
more
relevant
to
Afghanistan
as
a
Muslim
country
and
thus
likely
to
result
in
practical
1
TSEV, 2011: 18
www.appro.org.af
recommendations
for
Afghanistan,
given
the
currently
alarming
state
of
affairs
of
women
in
Afghanistan.
To
meet
the
above
objectives,
this
research
is
based
on:
Document
review:
a
review
of
Turkeys
legal
and
regulatory
environment
pertaining
to
CSO
activity,
review
of
the
broader
literature
on
state-CSO
interface,
review
of
media
reports
on
state-CSO
relations,
and
documents
and
information
from
the
websites
of
the
four
CSOs
(KA-DER,
MOR
ATI,
MAZLUMDER,
HD)
selected
for
this
research.2
Semi-structured
interviews:
with
key
informants
from
the
four
selected
CSOs
and
selected
relevant
governmental
authorities
as
stakeholders
of
the
selected
CSOs.3
Analysis
of
data
from
secondary
and
primary
sources.
This
report
is
organized
as
follows.
The
next
section
provides
and
overview
of
state-CSO
literature.
Section
5
sets
the
context
for
state-CSO
interface
in
Turkey.
Section
5
provides
a
historical
overview
of
state-CSO
relations
in
Turkey
since
the
founding
of
the
Republic.
Section
6
analyzes
the
data
from
interviews
with
key
informants
to
highlight
the
key
current
(2014-2015)
characteristics
of
state-CSO
relations
in
Turkey.
Section
7
summarizes
the
key
findings
from
the
research.
Section
8
concludes
with
implications
for
Afghanistan,
followed
by
recommendations
for
improving
state-CSO
relations.
4. State-CSO Relations and Good Governance
There is a general consensus among international aid organizations and CSOs, particularly in less
developed countries, that linkages between CSOs and formal governmental bodies including the
legislature are necessary ingredients of good governance and against corruption. Good governance may
be defined as the totality of mechanisms and arrangements that ensure access to information about
service entitlements and standards prescribed by the law, granting voice to beneficiaries regarding
2
The selected CSOs:
KA-DER: An Istanbul-based women's rights association with the major aim of raising awareness on equality
between women and men to counter male domination in social and political life.
MOR ATI: An Istanbul-based women's rights foundation that aims to offer legal and practical support for
victims of violence and to strengthen the struggle against domestic violence.
MAZLUMDER: An Ankara-based association that aims to defend and promote human rights both at the
domestic and international levels.
HD: An Ankara-based association with the mission to struggle against and prevent all kinds of human rights
violations based on race, language, religion, sex and political stance.
3
The selected state stakeholders:
For KA-DER and MOR ATI:
Republic of Turkey, The Ministry of Family and Social Policies (T.C. Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanl) - state
department with a mission of social policy formation and implementation for increasing the welfare of the
individual, family and the society.
The Turkish General Directory on the Status of Women (KSGM, Kadnn Stats Genel Mdrl) a sub-
department of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies with a mission of policy formulation and
implementation for the attainment of gender equality.
For MAZLUMDER and HD:
National Human Rights Institute of Turkey (THK, Trkiye nsan Haklar Kurumu)
For all the four CSOs:
Republic of Turkey, The Ministry of European Union (T.C. Avrupa Birlii Bakanl) state department with a
mission of policy formulation and implementation regarding EU-Turkey relations.
www.appro.org.af
design
and
implementation
of
service
programs,
and
providing
citizens
with
grievance
redress
mechanisms
and
tools
to
demand
accountability
from
service
providers
through
such
means
as
third
party
monitoring,
public
hearing,
and
social
audits,
citizen
report
cards,
public
expenditure
tracking
surveys,
access
to
information
laws
and
tools,
and
community
score
cards.4
Box
1:
Principles
of
Good
Governance
Transparency
implies
openness
and
visibility,
and
should
apply
to
almost
all
aspects
of
the
conduct
of
governmental
affairs.
It
is
the
foundation
upon
which
both
accountability
and
participation
are
built.
Information
in
the
public
domain
is
the
currency
of
transparency
and,
together
with
open
and
visible
decision-making
processes,
signals
that
there
is
really
nothing
to
hide.
Transparency
facilitates
good
governance;
its
absence
provides
cover
for
conflicts-of-interest,
self-serving
deals,
bribery,
and
other
forms
of
corruption.
Accountability
has
both
internal
and
external
dimensions.
Internal
accountability
implies
probity
in
how
and
why
resources
are
mobilized
and
used;
it
involves
issues
of
financial
accountability,
efficiency,
and
effectiveness
in
the
collection
of
taxes
and
other
revenue,
in
the
creation
of
public
goods,
and
in
the
delivery
of
basic
services.
External
accountability
refers
to
political
leaders
responsiveness
to
citizen
needs
and
aspirations,
including
accountability
for
the
overall
performance
of
the
economy
(sustainable
growth
and
job
creation)
and
for
the
level
and
quality
of
basic
services.
Such
accountability
implies
that
the
institutions
including
the
civil
servicehave
the
capacity
to
respond
to
citizen
demands,
and
that
salary
levels
and
other
incentives
are
consistent
with
those
expectations.
Participation,
or
inclusion,
is
important
not
just
on
principle,
but
in
practical
terms
as
well.
It
represents
the
demand
side
of
good
governance,
and
implies
that
people
have
rights
that
need
to
be
recognized;
that
they
should
have
a
voice
in
the
decisions
that
may
affect
them;
that
they
should
be
treated
fairly
and
equally;
and
that
they
should
benefit
from
the
protection
of
the
rule
of
law.
The
benefits
of
participation
are
well
documented.
They
are
particularly
important
in
decisions
on
the
types
of
investment
projects
to
be
done,
their
design
and
implementation,
and
operation
and
maintenance.
The
involvement
of
civil
society
organizations,
consumer
groups,
project
beneficiaries,
and
affected
communities
in
all
stages
of
Bank-financed
projects
can
simultaneously
improve
development
outcomes
and
reduce
the
scope
for
fraud
and
corruption.
Source:
IEG
World
Bank
(2011)
5
Empowering
CSOs
to
demand
good
governance
through
increased
transparency,
a
higher
degree
of
qualitative
participation
and
the
capacity
to
exert
greater
accountability
from
service
providers,
makes
a
difference
in
the
effectiveness
and
impact
of
public
service
delivery
(Box
1).
Fighting
corruption
at
the
grassroots
level
thus
becomes
a
twofold
priority.
First,
the
empowerment
of
civil
society
allows
citizens
to
exercise
their
right
in
making
choices
and
determining
the
direction
of
community,
state
or
national
development
policy
as
a
whole.
Second,
citizen
engagement
and
empowerment
to
demand
good
governance
using
social
accountability
is
likely
to
lower
corruption
and
hold
service
providers
accountable.6
4
This
definition
of
good
governance
is
based
on
Partnership
and
Transparency
Fund
(2012),
PTF
Working
Paper
Series
No.
4
/
2012:
Strategies
for
Empowering
Communities
to
Demand
Good
Governance
and
Seek
Increased
Effectiveness
of
Public
Service
Delivery,
pages
5-7.
5
IEG
Working
Paper
2011/5,
Stefano
Migliorisi
Clay
Wescott,
A
Review
of
World
Bank
Support
for
Accountability
Institutions
in
the
Context
of
Governance
and
Anti-corruption,
page
14,
available
from:
http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/ieg-gac-accountabilityfinal.pdf
6
Ibid.
Page
3.
www.appro.org.af
State-CSO
relations
in
the
context
of
good
governance
consist
of
a
set
of
mutually
beneficial
arrangements
between
CSOs
and
the
state
as
follows:
Building
State
Capacity
Participatory
policy
and
budget
formulation
Delivering
basic
services
Training
for
public
service
providers
in
health,
education,
clean
water
and
sanitation,
social
safety
nets,
and
livelihood
enhancing
programs
as
well
as
access
to
justice.
Delivering
civic
education
and
raising
citizens
awareness
about
national
policies,
and
their
rights
and
responsibilities,
e.g.,
voting
rights,
democratic
freedom,
rights
of
access
to
basic
services
Raising
citizens
awareness
about
rights
and
services
so
that
official
security
and
justice
institutions
are
more
accessible
and
effective.
Building
State
Accountability
Influencing
standard
setting,
e.g.,
lobbying
for
legislation
and
transparency,
adherence
to
international
commitments
on
human
rights.
Carrying
out
investigation
through
monitoring
and
evaluating
government
programs
through
social
audits,
community-based
program
monitoring,
citizen
report
cards,
and
participatory
expenditure
tracking
systems.
Demanding
answers
from
state
authorities
on
its
performance
on
policies
and
plans,
and
the
development
of
future
policies
and
plans,
through
petitioning
and
public
hearings
Applying
democratic
discourse
sanctions,
such
as
protests,
boycotts,
strikes,
or
media
campaigns,
when
state
is
found
to
be
lacking
on
delivering
on
policies
and
plans.
Building
State
Responsiveness
Identifying
and
voicing
needs
of
citizens,
including
the
poor.
Pursuing
social
inclusion
through
strategies
including
advocacy
through
lobbying
reformers
within
the
government
and/or
international
community,
providing
empirically
based
input
for
policy
debates
and
policy
formation,
and
initiating
social
mobilization
on
key
civic
issues.7
One
of
the
many
pre-requisites
of
good
governance
is
the
existence
of
a
system
of
checks
and
balances
among
executive,
legislative,
and
judicial
pillars
of
government.
As
such,
good
governance
requires
democratically
elected
policy
making
bodies
such
as
parliaments
tasked
with
developing
and
protecting
channels
of
communication
with
CSOs
and
spaces
within
which
CSOs
can
make
their
contributions,
based
on
the
evidenced
needs
of
their
constituents,
to
the
policy
making
process.
Numerous
international
aid
organizations
subscribe
to
the
view
that
good
governance
has
to
be
an
integrated
component
of
all
development
aid
interventions.
This
view
holds
that
without
good
governance
there
is
likely
to
be
little
or
no
transparency
and
accountability
by
state
authorities
and
hence
no
possibility
of
establishing
program
impact
or
sustainability.
However,
there
is
also
recognition
that
promoting
and
implementing
good
governance
is
constrained
by
limited
funding.
There
is
insufficient
funding
for
investing
in
human
and
social
capital
of
CSOs,
particularly
in
evidence-based
Adapted
from
DfID
(2007),
CSOs
and
Good
Governance:
A
DfID
Practice
Briefing
Paper,
cited
in
Overseas
Development
Institute
(2008),
Promoting
Good
Governance
through
Civil
SocietyLegislator
Linkages,
available
from:
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.istr.org/resource/resmgr/working_papers_barcelona/jones.tembo.pdf
www.appro.org.af
research
and
advocacy,
dissemination
and
communication
with
policy
actors,
and
pragmatic
engagement
with
state
authorities.8
Lack
of
core
(sufficient
and
sustained)
funding
for
many
CSOs
means
dependence
on,
and
competition
for,
funding
from
external
sources.
The
dependence
on
external
(national
and
international)
funds
often
results
in
a
loss
of
autonomy
and
independence
of
the
CSOs
and
competition
among
CSOs
for
the
same,
limited,
external
funds.
The
net
result
of
fund
scarcity
is
a
weakened
basis
for
collaboration
among
CSOs
and
reduced
effectiveness.9
According
to
OECD
many
donors
are
reviewing
their
development
policies
based
on
their
own
track
records
and
experience
and
in
anticipation
of
a
new
framework
for
Official
Development
Assistance
(ODA)
after
2015,
the
target
date
for
the
Millennium
Development
Goals
(MDGs).
The
key
questions
emerging
from
the
critical
self-assessment
by
key
international
donors
center
on
the
effective
have
CSOs
in
contributing
to
development
outcomes,
the
ability
of
civil
society
to
contribute
to
changes
in
government
policies
and
practices
that
benefit
the
poor
and
marginalized,
and
the
best
way
in
which
the
support
to
CSOs
can
be
most
(cost)
effectively
channelled.10
The
remaining
sections
of
this
paper
draw
on
secondary
sources
and
primary
data
collected
through
interviews
with
key
informants
to
provide
an
overview
of
state-CSO
relations
in
Turkey,
and
the
extent
to
which
Turkeys
experience
may
provide
insights
for
state-CSO
relations
in
relatively
volatile
political
environments.
5. State-CSO Relations in Turkey A Historical Overview
The evolution of state-CSO relations in Turkey can be divided into three distinct but interrelated
periods.11 These three periods are presented in the remainder of this section.
State-CSO Relations: 1923-1980
It is not possible to talk about the existence of civil society in Turkey from 1923 to 1980 since there only
existed an associational life between civil society and the state.12 Due to the strong state tradition,
state-led modernization and national developmentalist approach in economy the dominance and
suppression by the center over the periphery did not make the emergence of a countervailing power to
central authority possible, viewed by some as a prerequisite for the emergence of civil society.13 Under
these conditions there was no space for negotiation between the state and civil society.
8
Some
of
the
key
international
entities
invested
in
good
governance
in
development
are
the
Department
for
International
Development
(DfID)
/
UKAid,
AusAid,
World
Bank,
UNDP,
OECD,
Oxfam,
Christian
Aid,
and
Save
the
Children.
9
Based
on
ODI
(2008),
Ibid.
Page
7.
10
OECD
(2013),
Support
to
Civil
Society
Emerging
Evaluation
Lessons,
page
2,
available
from:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/Evaluation%20Insight%20Civil%20Society%20FINAL%20for%20print%20an
d%20WEB%2020131004.pdf
11
See
Keyman,
F.
(2006)
for
additional
detail
on
these
periods.
12
Keyman
and
Gumuscu
2014:
152
13
Heper
and
Yldrm,
2011:
8
www.appro.org.af
After
transition
to
a
multi-party
system
in
1946,
civil
society
emerged
for
a
short
period
of
time
but
was
suppressed,
in
the
second
half
of
the
1950s
due
to
authoritarian
tendencies
of
the
Democrat
Party.14
The
1960
coup
was
designed
to
limit
the
repressive
role
of
the
state
by
protecting
civil
society
through
the
1961
Constitution.15
Civil
society
activism
and
freedom
of
action
flourished
to
an
unprecedented
degree
in
the
1960s.
However,
civil
society
in
Turkey
in
this
period
was
not
characterized
as
an
arena
for
democratization
debates
or
the
emergence
of
right-based
CSOs.16
The
period
from
1980
to
1983
was
characterized
as
a
reversal
of
the
gains
made
by
civil
society
from
the
1960s
to
the
1980
coup
since
the
coup
aimed
to
empower
state
vis-a-vis
civil
society.
Severe
restrictions
were
imposed
on
CSOs
in
the
aftermath
of
the
1980
coup.17
The
restoration
of
civil
rule
in
1983
resulted
in
a
re-emergence
of
civil
society
as
an
autonomous
sphere
in
Turkey.18
State-CSO Relations: 1980-2002
Since the mid-1980s onwards, political and economic liberalization attempts by the Turkish state and
broader globalization processes have provided a fertile ground for the development of civil society in
Turkey as a vital arena for democratization and emergence of right-based CSOs with CSOs beginning to
challenge the dominance of state-centric model of associational life and advocating a civil society
independent from the state. This period witnessed the emergence of the language of rights and
freedoms, the discourse of individualism, and the idea of participatory democracy in Turkey.19 One
outcome of these developments was the emergence of a politics of identity / difference, exemplified in
expressions of Kurdish nationalism and Islamist tendencies.20
In reaction to these developments, the state began to gradually place limitations on the activities of
some CSOs. Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s the state monitored and curbed CSOs deemed as undermining
the secular and pan-Turkist foundations of the Turkish state. The approach toward other CSOs
continued to remain as indifferent or collaborative.21 The states attitude in this period has been
described as passive-exclusive, passive in the sense that it neither confronted nor promoted civil
society and exclusive in that the state resisted the entry of disadvantaged groups to the official
domain.22 The cases of the Islamist and Kurdish movements and the states approach toward them are
illustrative on this point.
In terms of womens rights CSOs, the state had an exclusive and repressive attitude in the 1980s. Over
time, this relationship has evolved into an inclusive or passive attitude.23 The 1990s were significant for
the institutionalization of womens movement in terms of both the proliferation in the number and
institutionalization of womens right CSOs such as MOR ATI to KA-DER, and the establishment of a
14
Erdoan-Tosun, 2012: 190-1
Toprak, 1995: 94
16
Keyman, 2006: 26-7
17
Toprak, 1995; Erdoan-Tosun, 2012: 191
18
Erdoan-Tosun, 2012: 192; Toprak, 1995: 92; Keyman, 2006
19
Keyman and ni, 280; Keyman and Gumuscu, 2014: 154-155
20
Gumuscu, 2014:155
21
Kalaycolu, 2002: 261
22
Sunar in Kalaycolu, 2002: 261
23
Kalaycolu 2002: 262
15
www.appro.org.af
womens
policy
agency,
the
KSGM,
creating
the
opportunity
for
influencing
gender
policy-making
in
Turkey.
Women's
rights
CSOs
in
Turkey
have
made
contributions
at
the
macro
and
micro
level.
At
the
macro
level,
womens
organizations
have
acted
as
indicators
of
the
collective
capacity
of
women
to
determine
the
politics
of
gender
in
contemporary
Turkey.24
In
terms
of
women's
rights
organizations,
civil
society
has
become
more
organized
and
gained
more
recognition
of
their
identity
claims.
MOR
ATI
and
KA-DER
as
two
such
organizations
are
important
examples
of
CSOs
speaking
and
acting
for
women,
though
channels
created
by
themselves
rather
than
the
state.25
At
the
micro
level,
women's
organizations
are
forces
of
change
working
to
improve
the
wellbeing
of
women
with
programs
on
health,
education,
and
income
generating
activities.26
The
role
of
international
entities
such
as
the
United
Nations
and
the
European
Union,
the
signing
of
Convention
on
the
Elimination
of
All
Types
of
Discriminations
Against
Women
(CEDAW)
by
Turkey,
and
EU-Turkey
accession
negotiations
demanding
more
attention
by
the
Turkish
state
to
gender
equality
have
been
critical
in
this
institutionalization
process.27
During
the
1980s
and
1990s
the
key
challenge
for
CSOs
in
Turkey
was
not
the
number
of
CSOs
but
their
lack
of
collective
capacity
to
influence
the
states
decision-making
processes.28
In
part,
this
was
due
to
a
fragmentation
among
CSOs.
Business,
professional,
and
human
rights
associations
and
CSOs
were
divided
along
political
and
ideological
lines.29
For
example,
there
were
ideological
differences
among
human
rights
associations
ranging
from
the
leftist
HD
to
the
Islamic
MAZLUMDER.30
As
a
result
of
this
fragmentation,
rather
than
[CSO]
forming
horizontal
relations
with
others
and
trying
to
oblige
the
state
to
act
in
a
responsive
manner
to
their
group
interests,
peripheral
groups
have
had
vertical
relations
with
the
state,
expecting
the
latter
to
be
responsive
to
their
specific
interests.31
Some
CSOs
such
as
HD
and
MAZLUMDER
usually
take
oppositional
stances
against
the
state
with
no
evidence
that
their
actions
have
a
serious
influence
on
the
governments
political
decisions:
.civil
society
consists
of
voluntary
associations
that
are
better
at
rivalry
rather
than
mutual
cooperation
[with
other
CSOs
while]
a
mutually
rewarding
relationship
of
symbiosis
seems
to
emerge
only
between
the
state
and
relatively
resourceful
associations.32
At
the
same
time,
local
and
regional
solidarity
associations,
religious
and
commercial
associations,
overtly
political
organizations
such
as
the
right
wing,
peace
and
dialogue
initiatives,
Marmara
Group
Foundation,
and
the
left
wing
human
rights
Taksim
Solidarity
Group
have
succeeded
in
attracting
the
support
of
the
state.
However,
the
states
attitude
is
entirely
negative
toward
CSOs
whose
activities
24
Esim and Cindoglu 1999: 178
Arat, 1997: 106
26
Esim and Cindolu, 1999: 178
27
aha, 2011: 8, Sallan Gl 2013: 111
28
imek, 2004: 48; Keyman, 2006
29
Kalaycolu, 2002; imek, 2004: 61
30
imek 2004: 62
31
Heper and Yldrm 2011: 6
32
Kalaycolu, 2002: 257-8
25
www.appro.org.af
10
tend
to
challenge
the
political
status
quo,
such
as
human
rights
organizations
and
womens
organizations
advocating
for
the
right
to
wear
headscarf.33
Fragmentation,
polarization,
and
lack
of
tolerance
for
different
views,
were
thus
the
defining
characteristics
of
civil
society
organizations
in
Turkey
during
this
period.
With
economic
and
political
liberalization
processes
and
pressures
starting
in
the
1980s,
the
government
allowed
interest
groups
to
freely
articulate
and
express
their
views
and
interests,
perhaps
with
the
intention
of
transferring
some
of
the
load
of
the
states
functions
to
non-state
actors.
However,
it
is
not
clear
whether
and
how
the
government
has
incorporated
views
of
non-state
actors
into
its
policies
since,
by
and
large,
CSOs
have
remained
outsiders
to
the
policy
making
process.34
During
the
1990s
womens
rights
organizations
experienced
numerous
financial
and
organizational
challenges
but
continued
their
work
by
relying
heavily
on
a
volunteer
workforce.
The
only
womens
organizations
with
adequate
funds
were
those
funded
by
religious
foundations
and
organizations.
While
the
widespread
voluntarism
indicates
high
levels
of
commitment
among
the
women,
the
lack
of
funds
was,
in
effect,
a
major
deterrent
to
the
institutionalization
of
womens
rights
CSOs
and
the
continuation
of
their
contributions
to
good
governance.
State-CSO Relations: 2002-Present
Three events between 1999 and 2002 played key roles in shaping state-civil society relations in Turkey.
First, the Helsinki Summit in 1999 resulted in a deepening of Turkey-EU relations, requiring of Turkey
legal and constitutional changes in terms of democratizing state-society relations. Second, the 2001
economic crisis revealed serious weaknesses in Turkeys political system particularly in terms of
effectiveness, accountability, and respect for democratic values. Third, the national elections in 2002
resulted in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming to power and starting a process of putting
in place a new governing structure for Turkish politics.35 These events provided a fertile ground for civil
society organizations to be regarded as indispensable in the process of democratization, a necessary
factor in creating stability in the relations between Turkey and the European Union; and a key indicator
of the modernization and liberalization project of the Turkish state.36
EU funding to Turkey came with conditionalities, particularly on democratization while at the same time
Turkish CSOs were given the opportunity to apply for EU funds.37 CSOs have tried to stimulate a social
life independent of the state, to criticize Turkeys strong state tradition and its top-down approach to
governing society, and to transform a duty-based notion of citizenship into active citizenship with an
emphasis on principles of rights and freedoms.38
The deepening of the relations between Turkey and the European Union has thus resulted in Turkish
civil society becoming an object of structural change and an agent of change simultaneously.39 The
Turkish governments decision to invite several CSOs for consultations about the EU negotiation process
was a significant step toward accepting civil society as an important actor in the states reform process.
33
ibid. page 260
Heper 1991a:18, Heper and Yldrm 2011: 10
35
Keyman, 2006: 31-33
36
Ibid.
37
Altan-Olcay and duygu, 2012: 169
38
Keyman and ni 2008:2801 in ner, 2014:24
39
duygu 2011:384, ner 2014:29, Kubicek, 2011:910
34
www.appro.org.af
11
Since
2009
the
government
has
shown
a
stronger
commitment
to
consulting
Turkish
CSOs
particularly
during
the
development
of
the
Secretariat
General
for
EU
Affairss
Communication
Strategy.40
However,
CSO
representatives
were
generally
dissatisfied
with
the
outcomes
of
their
engagements
with
the
government
because
many
felt
that
their
views
were
merely
listened
to
but
not
taken
on
board
seriously
by
the
government.41
More
than
1,600
CSOs
were
engaged
by
the
government
in
the
EU-Turkey
Civil
Society
Dialogue
program.
However,
an
assessment
by
the
EU
concluded
that
government-civil
society
and
parliament-
civil
society
relations
in
Turkey
needed
to
improve
through
systematic,
permanent
and
structured
consultation
mechanisms
at
the
policy
level
and
as
part
of
the
legislative
process,
and
with
regard
to
non-legislative
acts
at
all
levels
of
administration.42
During
its
first
term,
the
AKP
government
(2002-2007)
displayed
an
engaging
attitude
toward
civil
society
organizations.
AKPs
relatively
constructive
relationship
with
the
womens
organizations
can
be
attributed
to
pressures
of
remaining
within
the
EU
accession
process.43
In
addition,
womens
rights
CSOs
in
Turkey
were
positively
influenced
by
transnational
womens
movements,
international
development
organizations
focusing
on
the
gender
aspects
of
development,
and
a
number
of
international
treaties
on
womens
rights.
In
its
second
term
of
office,
the
AKP
governments
attitude
toward
womens
organizations
became
more
symbolic
while
the
administration
effected
constitutional
reform
allowing
women
to
wear
the
Islamic
headscarf
in
public
offices.
In
some
ways,
it
could
be
argued
that
the
polarization
along
secular/Islamic
lines,
and
the
governments
overt
support
to
Islamist
CSOs
and
other
actors,
undermined
the
collective
strength
of
CSOs
with
universalist
claims
such
as
human
and
womens
rights
and
decreased
their
effectiveness.44
Additionally,
the
relationship
between
the
AKP
government
and
CSOs
began
to
resemble
that
of
a
patron
serving
the
needs
of
his/her
clients
in
exchange
for
electoral
support
rather
than
a
cooperative
relationship
between
independent
political
actors
with
similar
policy
goals.45
The
net
result
this
situation
was
the
increased
influence
of
Islamist
CSOs
on
AKP
governments
policy
making
and
alienation
and
ineffectiveness
of
all
other
CSOs
not
closely
associated
with
AKP.46
Some
have
observed
that
Turkish
CSOs
have
remained
in
their
infancy
due
to
political
polarization
along
secular-Islamist
lines
and
the
electoral
hegemony
of
AKP,
despite
the
democratization
and
EU
accession
processes.47
6. Current State-CSO Relations in Turkey
The EU accession process has played a transformative role in the evolution of state-CSO relations in
Turkey. Considerable gains have been made by civil society due to a desire by Turkey to join EU.
However, there remain significant structural challenges that hinder the prospects for a constructive
relationship between the state and civil society. There are deficiencies in the legal framework while
40
The Secratariat became the EU Ministry 2011.
Grigoriadis 2009, 634 in ner, 2014: 30
42
EU Progress Report 2013, 11; ner, 2014: 30-31
43
Coar and Onba 2008: 331
44
Keyman and Gumuscu 2014:159; Ozler and Sarkissian, 2011: 378
45
Ozler and Sarkissian2011: 376
46
Keyman and Gumuscu, 2014:160
47
Ibid.
41
www.appro.org.af
12
there
are
gaps
between
the
laws
and
their
implementation.
In
the
political
sphere,
the
mode
of
governance,
best
described
as
one
of
state
hegemony
over
society,
hampers
the
development
of
a
democratic
milieu
in
which
a
fully
functioning,
autonomous
and
independent
civil
society
organizations
can
flourish.
A
closer
examination
of
state-CSO
relations
reveals
that
there
are
considerable
differences
between
CSOs
and
their
relations
with
the
state,
depending
on
the
area
of
specialization
of
the
CSO
concerned.
In
the
cases
of
KA-DER
and
MOR
ATI
the
interaction
by
CSOs
can
be
defined
as
swinging
between
no
meaningful
dialogue
and
dialogue
in
a
superficial
manner.
In
the
cases
of
HD
and
MAZLUMDER
the
interaction
can
be
characterized
shifting
from
consultative
to
collaborative
dialogue.
Two
major
roles
can
be
identified
for
CSOs
in
Turkey.
These
are,
first,
influencing
policy
making
processes
and,
second
monitoring
and
controlling
state
policies
and
activities.
The
four
CSOs
examined
for
this
research
appear
to
be
qualitatively
ineffective
since
they
are
not
taken
seriously
by
public
authorities
in
the
decision
making
process.
As
far
as
the
second
role
of
monitoring
and
controlling,
there
is
variation
between
the
womens
and
human
rights-based
CSOs.
While
the
state
authorities
do
not
consider
the
outputs
and
feedbacks
provided
by
KA-DER
and
MOR
ATI
as
a
part
of
their
follow-up
roles,
as
valuable,
they
are
relatively
more
receptive
toward
the
feedbacks
from
HD
and
MAZLUMDER.
The
distant
position
of
the
state
authorities
toward
KADER
and
MOR
ATI
can
be
attributed
to
the
conservative
/
Islamist
view
within
state
organs
of
the
role
and
status
of
women
in
society:
We
are
in
conflict
with
the
state
because
of
their
perspective
on
violence
against
women.
For
us
domestic
violence
is
a
result
of
patriarchal
structures
and
gender
inequality
whereas
the
state
views
this
as
a
social
and
economic
problem.48
The
state
seems
to
favor
some
womens
rights
organizations
more
than
others.
For
example,
the
state
avowedly
supports
the
newly
established
KADEM
(Kadn
ve
Demokrasi
Dernei/
the
Woman
and
Democracy
Association)
whose
motto
is
justice
rather
than
equality
between
women
and
men.
A
the
Women
and
Justice
Summit,
held
in
November
2014
and
co-hosted
by
KADEM
and
the
Family
and
Social
Policies
Ministry,
President
Recep
Tayyip
Erdoan
criticized
feminists
by
stating
that
he
did
not
believe
in
gender
equality,
which,
he
argued,
was
against
nature.
The
murder
of
a
young
woman,
zgecan
Aslan,
who
was
stabbed
and
then
burnt
in
a
minibus
while
resisting
a
rape
attempt
on
her
way
home
in
February
2015,
added
to
the
tension
between
rights-based
womens
organizations
and
AKP.
Most
of
the
rights-based
womens
organizations
participated
in
protests
against
the
incident
and
criticized
AKPs
policies
and
discourse
about
the
place
and
status
of
women
in
Turkey.
Some
argue
that
the
states
overt
stance
disfavoring
gender
equality
paved
the
way
for
the
increase
in
cases
of
violence
against
women
and
hampered
efforts
by
civil
society
to
address
this
problem:
Erdoan
is
constantly
making
propagandist
statements
such
as
'women
and
men
are
different
by
nature'
or
'motherhood
is
the
sacred
role
of
women'.
We
are
facing
a
political
violence
here.49
48
49
MOR ATI, 21 November 2014
Interview with ex-chairperson of KADER and activist, Hlya Glbahar, on BBC, available from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31538538
www.appro.org.af
13
Thus,
despite
the
legislative
provisions
by
the
state
and
political
achievements
by
CSOs
there
remain
serious
limitations
in
Turkey
for
a
mode
of
governance
that
entails
pragmatic
and
equitable
engagement
between
the
state
and
CSOs.
The
key
deficiency
in
state-CSO
relations
is
the
gap
between
aims
and
objectives
of
formal
legislation
and
policy
on
the
one
hand
and
active
implementation
of
formal
legislation
and
policy
on
the
other.
A
review
of
the
legislation
pertaining
to
CSOs
in
Turkey
reveals
that
there
are
no
major
deficiencies
at
the
formal,
legal
level.
(See
Appendix
2
for
a
synthesis
of
pertinent
legislation).
The
key
challenge
remains
the
full
and
transparent
implementation.
The
four
CSOs
engaged
for
this
research
stated
that
there
was
a
lack
of
systemic
interaction
between
CSOs
and
public
authorities
on
policy
development.
This
lack
was
attributed
to
legal
and
political
structural
factors.
First,
there
is
an
inherent
vagueness
in
the
legal
framework
for
systemic
state-CSO
relations,
the
definitions
for
associations
and
foundations,
and
their
legitimate
place
in
the
policy
formulation
process:
We
are
bound
by
the
Law
for
Foundations,
which
is
very
restrictive.
[For
example,]
we
have
experienced
a
very
difficult
auditing
process
[required
by
the
law]
during
which
a
lot
of
our
human
resources
were
allocated
to
the
process...
and
we
are
not
exempt
from
the
tax.
(MOR
ATI).
Secondly,
there
is
a
gap
between
the
law
and
its
practice.
For
example:
For
us,
what
is
significant
is
not
the
committees
or
institutions,
it
is
the
rules
which
matter.
If
we
establish
institutions
without
defining
the
working
rules
properly,
there
will
not
be
any
use
for
those
institutions.
The
problem
in
Turkey
is
that
the
rules
are
not
set
clearly.
Even
if
the
rules
are
set
clearly,
they
are
not
applied
properly.
(MAZLUMDER).
The
stanbul
Convention
(The
Council
of
Europe
Convention
on
preventing
and
combatting
violence
against
women
and
domestic
violence)
was
ratified
by
the
AKP
government
on
12
March
2012
and
came
into
force
on
1
August
2014.
The
General
Director
of
the
KSGM
stated
that
they
are
very
proud
of
Turkey
being
the
first
country
that
ratified
the
Convention
as
a
sign
of
sincerity,
courage
and
willingness
to
combat
violence
against
women.
The
ratification,
according
to
KSGM,
constituted
a
model
for
even
the
European
countries
in
terms
of
facilitating
close
relations
among
women's
rights
based
CSO's
and
how
they
each
dealt
with
violence
against
women.
However,
there
are
concerns
about
major
discrepancies
between
the
provisions
of
the
Law
(no.
6284)
adopted
on
8
March
2012
to
protect
family
and
prevent
violence
against
women
and
its
implementation
since
the
government
has
not
made
any
serious
attempts
to
involve
womens
rights
CSOs
in
the
process.50
The
stanbul
Convention
Turkey
Monitoring
Platform,
founded
by
85
women's
rights
CSOs
and
LGBT
to
monitor
the
implementation
of
the
Convention,
criticized
the
exclusionary
practice
and
top-down
manner
of
the
Ministry
of
Family
and
Social
Policies
for
excluding
the
Platform
from
the
nominee
process.
Instead,
the
government
has
appointed
six
public
officials
and
nominees
from
three
CSOs
known
to
have
organic
ties
with
the
government,
namely
AKDER
(an
association
established
to
fight
against
discrimination
against
headscarved
women),
KADEM
(Smeyye
Erdoan,
the
daughter
of
the
President
Tayyip
Erdoan,
is
one
of
its
founders
and
member
of
the
Governing
Board),
KASAD-D
(Sare
Davutolu,
the
wife
of
the
prime
minister
Ahmet
Davutolu,
is
member
of
the
Governing
Board).
50
MOR ATI
www.appro.org.af
14
The
Platform
including
KA-DER
and
MOR
ATI
questioned
the
legitimacy
of
the
GREVIO
(Group
of
Experts
on
Action
Against
Violence
Against
women
and
Domestic
Violence)
and
declared
that
they
would
not
recognize
it.51
The
response
from
the
Deputy
Minister
of
the
Family
and
Social
Policies,
after
evaluating
the
protest
by
the
Platform,
was
that
the
protest
as
an
ideological
reaction.52
This
approach
by
the
government
is
viewed
by
the
critics
as
evidence
of
a
lack
of
sincere
political
will
to
address
womens
rights
issues:
We
cannot
talk
about
rule
of
law
in
this
country.
The
stanbul
Convention
is
the
first
international
document
and
a
perfect
text
placing
serious
obligations
and
sanctions
on
the
state.
[The
Turkish]
authorities
are
proud
to
be
the
first
to
sign
the
Convention
without
any
reservations.
However,
the
state
has
used
the
Convention
as
a
tool
for
its
PR,
for
cleaning
up
its
bad
reputation
internationally
for
failing
to
protect
women...the
[government]
is
not
sincere...the
government
is
really
authoritarian
[and
wants
to]
organize
every
sphere
of
the
daily
life.
It
presents
a
wonderful
law,
as
if
it
is
a
gift
to
women.
But
at
the
same
time,
the
state
also
creates
an
institutional
environment
that
forces
women
into
family
life.
(MOR
ATI)
All
four
CSOs
engaged
for
this
research
pointed
to
problems
regarding
their
autonomy
vis-a-vis
the
state
at
different
levels.
One
of
the
major
issues,
particularly
with
CSOs
registered
as
foundations,
is
the
auditing
process,
considered
by
the
state
as
a
supervisory
mechanism.
CSOs
with
a
foundation
status
continue
to
be
subject
to
disproportionate
state
attention
and
supervision
affecting
their
operations
and
consuming
the
CSOs
already
scarce
resources.
Affected
CSOs
view
this
degree
of
interference
by
the
state
as
a
disabling
factor
undermining
the
emergence
of
and
autonomous
civil
society
in
Turkey.
Taxation
plays
a
significant
role
in
limiting
the
work
of
CSOs.
CSOs
complain
that
high
taxation
rates
eat
into
their
revenues
from
membership
fees,
and
deprive
employees
of
the
affected
CSOs
from
having
insurance
expenditures
and
other
benefits.53
Lack
of
funding
and
state
restrictions
on
international
funding
for
Turkish
CSOs
are
critical
factors
in
preventing
Turkish
CSOs
from
gaining
autonomy.
For
example,
HD,
a
CSO
that
largely
operates
on
the
basis
of
international
funds,
complains
that
it
is
obligated
to
obtain
permission
from
the
state
authorities
for
receiving
funds
from
abroad.
HD
states
that
the
same
concern
applies
to
raising
funds
from
the
public.
Neither
HD
nor
MAZLUMDER
take
state
funds
as
a
means
of
maintaining
their
distance
from
the
state
since,
they
argue,
the
state
is
responsible
for
most
of
the
human
rights
violations
in
the
country.
Citing
similar
reasoning,
MAZLUMDER
and
some
other
CSOs
rely
exclusively
on
funds
from
the
United
Nations,
despite
the
fact
that
from
time
to
time
operations
are
adversely
affected
by
lack
of
funds
or
delays
in
release
of
funds:
Why
not
take
funds
from
the
states?
Because,
the
states
are
responsible
for
most
human
rights
violations.
If
you
are
funded
by
institutions
that
violate
rights,
you
will
be
faced
with
pressure
to
meet
their
expectations.
They
either
censor
your
words
or
want
you
to
close
your
eyes
[to
rights
violation
by
them]
(MAZLUMDER)
Womens
right
organizations
also
try
to
keep
their
distance
with
the
state
in
terms
funding:
51
www.wwhr.org, 29 December 2014
.A.E, 13 January 2015
53
This complaint was made by HD and MOR ATI
52
www.appro.org.af
15
We
know
what
we
do
and
we
are
very
clear
about
our
position
vis--vis
the
state.
For
example,
one
of
our
project
proposals
was
accepted
by
the
Under
Secretariat
of
Treasury,
which
is
one
of
the
channels
of
EU-
funding
through
the
[Turkish]
state.
Before,
there
was
no
such
thing
but
now,
as
we
are
working
in
the
womens
rights
field,
we
are
attached
to
the
Ministry
of
Family
and
Social
Policies
as
the
benefiting
institution
and
we
realize
that
[the
Ministry]
requires
us
to
put
the
Ministrys
logo
on
the
publications
related
to
our
research.
(MOR
ATI)
Despite
these
reservations,
there
is
broad
agreement
among
CSOs
that
coexistence
with
the
state
is
inevitable:
[CSOs
and
the
state]
need
each
other.
At
MOR
ATI,
we
perceive
[ourselves]
as
the
addressee
of
the
state
in
terms
of
its
relations
with
the
feminist
movement.
Because
neither
stanbul
Feminist
Collective
nor
the
Socialist
Feminist
Collective
go
to
state
meetings.
Thus,
we
have
to
be
at
these
meetings
to
remain
involved
in
the
process
[and]
to
be
sure
that
the
decisions
about
women
are
taken
for
the
improvement
of
womens
situation.
[For
example]
the
state
needs
our
experience
about
the
[womens]
shelters.
(MOR
ATI)
The
attitude
of
the
state
toward
womens
right-based
CSOs
is
viewed
by
some
as
increasingly
adversarial:
Or,
Recently
we
are
in
a
constantly
complaining
situation.
But
it
is
the
state,
which
has
pushed
us
into
a
position
of
grumbling
continuously.
(MOR
ATI)
We
always
have
had
an
adversarial
relationship
with
the
state.
But
now
there
is
no
relationship.
Although
the
state
never
wants
to
hear
us,
we
still
consider
the
state
meetings
and
our
relationship
with
the
state
as
very
important.
However,
we
have
decided
not
to
attend
the
meetings
of
the
state.
We
decided
to
suspend
our
relations
with
the
state
after
the
abortion
law.
(MOR
ATI)
The
government
official
interviewed
after
the
interview
with
MOR
ATI
claimed
that
the
concerns
by
womens
rights
CSOs
about
not
having
constructive
relations
with
the
government
were
untrue
and
that
the
government
maintained
a
collaborative
relationship
with
womens
organizations,
particularly
for
developing
policy.54
The
human
rights
CSOs
interviewed
reported
that
they
had
issue-based
cooperation
with
the
public
authorities,
albeit
sometimes
antagonistically:
The
major
problem
that
we
experience
is
that
we
see
the
glass
as
half
empty.
This
is
the
mission
of
human
rights
advocates...
As
we
show
the
empty
part,
sometimes
we
can
be
seen
to
be
antipathetic....[but]
the
government
has
to
get
used
to
this...
Also,
54
Interview with KSGM
www.appro.org.af
16
At
the
local
level,
our
colleagues
are
always
in
touch
with
governors,
security
directors,
and
public
prosecutors.
However,
sometimes
this
relationship
turns
antagonistic.
Instead
of
recognizing
their
own
defects
and
accepting
criticisms
positively,
the
government
authorities
turn
against
our
colleagues.
Between
2009-2013
fifteen
of
our
colleagues
were
arrested...
(HD
and
MAZLUMDER)
All
CSOs
interviewed
complained
that
communication
between
CSOs
and
public
authorities
was
becoming
less
and
less
structured.
There
is
no
meaningful
dialogue
with
the
state,
particularly
in
the
third
(current)
AKP
term.
This
change
is
said
to
be
due
to
three
interrelated
factors.
First,
the
current
Minister
for
Family
and
Social
Policies
is
not
as
responsive
to
womens
rights
or
as
accessible
as
the
previous
minister.55
Second,
the
increasing
hegemony
of
conservative
ideology
within
the
state
is
less
sympathetic
to
secular
concerns
about
womens
rights
and
issues
than
before.
Third,
the
move
toward
a
more
traditionalist,
conservative
ideology
by
the
state
has
driven
a
wedge
between
CSOs
aligned
with
the
conservative
mind-set
and
the
other
CSOs,
with
the
state
more
responsive
to
the
former.
According
to
one
womens
rights
CSO:
The
state
and
us,
we
each
know
what
we
stand
for
and
what
our
positions
are.
But
there
are
deep
differences
between
us
and
the
state
regarding
the
problem
of
violence
[against
women].
While
we
take
[violence
against
women]
as
a
gender
inequality
problem,
AKPs
approach
is
based
on
a
patriarchal
perspective
which
holds
that
strengthening
the
institution
of
family
is
the
way
to
fight
violence
against
women...
We
cannot
have
effective
communication
with
any
government
that
doesnt
relate
violence
to
gender
inequality
(MOR
ATI)
Also,
As
we
all
know
today,
the
governments
should
recognize
the
power
of
CSOs
in
the
political
system
and
take
their
views
or
invite
them
to
the
meetings.
...
The
government
acts
as
if
it
is
engaging
with
CSOs
and
taking
their
opinions
into
consideration.
But
they
are
not
sincere...
For
instance
they
send
us
an
invitation
with
an
expired
date.
This
is
not
due
to
AKPs
disorganization.
It
is
intentional
(KA-DER,
A)
Human
rights
CSOs
stated
that
their
communication
with
state
authorities
was
mostly
ad
hoc
but
collaborative
and
that
they
felt
no
constraints
in
their
attempts
to
contact
state
authorities.56
All
those
interviewed
stated
that
on
different
occasions,
the
state
authorities
ask
for
opinions
of
CSOs
though
the
state
does
not
necessarily
take
on
board
those
opinions.
Consultative
communication,
albeit
in
a
tokenistic
manner,
appears
to
be
the
most
common
type
of
communication
between
CSOs
and
the
state
in
Turkey.
For
example,
the
establishment
of
THK,
with
a
legally
defined
responsibility
to
organize
regular
consultative
meetings
with
human
rights
CSOs,
is
considered
to
be
a
constructive
attempt
both
by
IHD
and
MAZLUMDER.
However,
there
are
concerns
over
the
composition
and
the
appointment
of
THKs
members
for
being
highly
political.
Monitoring
and
controlling
state
activities
and
policies
are
regarded
as
major
functions
for
CSOs
by
those
interviewed
for
this
research.
CSOs
monitor
and
report
on
womens
and
human
rights
abuses,
investigate
abuse
cases,
prepare
reports
and/or
submit
press
releases
to
raise
public
awareness,
and
55
56
KA-DER
HD
and
MAZLUMDER
www.appro.org.af
17
inform
the
state
authorities.
CSOs
also
formulate
solutions
for
various
rights
abuse
cases
and
propose
policy
options
to
the
relevant
state
authorities,
though
their
proposals
are
seldom
taken
into
on
board
by
the
state.
For
example:
There
was
an
attempted
attack
by
a
mob
on
the
HDP
office
in
Fethiye
[a
town
in
the
South
Aegean
coast]
before
the
local
elections.
We
managed
the
issue
as
follows:
people
complained
to
us
about
the
attack,
we
established
a
committee
with
the
heads
of
the
relevant
state
departments,
informed
the
Ministry
of
Interior
Affairs
and
the
local
authorities,
investigated
the
attack,
communicated
[our
findings]
to
both
the
targets
of
the
attack,
the
witnesses,
and
state
authorities
such
as
the
district
governor,
Mayor,
and
public
prosecutor.
We
prepared
our
report
and
delivered
it
to
the
relevant
state
departments.
We
transmitted
our
demands
concerning
the
attack
to
the
Ministry
of
Interior
Affairs
and
Ministry
of
JusticeBut,
[our
recommendations
were
not
taken
on
board
by
the
authorities].
We
are
not
satisfied
with
only
detecting
problems.
We
also
want
our
suggestions
to
be
used
in
finding
solutions.
Rights-based
CSOs
rely
heavily
on
the
media
in
their
awareness
campaigns
and
thus
insist
on
the
importance
of
independence
among
various
media:
As
far
as
our
sector
is
concerned,
media
is
the
major
means
for
us
to
disseminate
information
regarding
human
right
issues.
We
do
not
have
staff
everywhere
in
the
country.
[Often]
our
information
on
human
rights
abuse
in
far-flung
regions
comes
through
the
media.
When
we
hear
of
violation
cases
through
the
media
we
apply
to
the
state
authorities
for
more
information
on
the
cases.
We
cannot
talk
about
a
civil
society
without
an
independent
media.
Monitoring
by
CSOs
takes
place
also
through
attending
meetings
organized
by
government
authorities,
particularly
on
such
key
issues
as
violence
against
women:
It
is
important
to
recognize
successes
and
failures
of
the
government.
To
attain
women's
rights,
the
legal
ground
constitutes
the
basis
but
[civil
society]
must
remain
actively
involved
in
the
process
of
deliberation
and
interpretation
of
the
legal
codes
pertaining
to
womens
rights
to
compensate
for
the
deficiencies
in
the
legal
system
and
ensure
that
the
existing
laws
are
properly
implemented.
(MOR
ATI).
There
is,
however,
increasing
frustration
among
womens
rights
CSOs
that
they
cannot
accept
their
role
as
consisting
of
only
making
complaints
and
being
restricted
to
a
position
of
perpetually
criticizing
the
government:
Most
of
our
time
and
labor
are
spent
on
monitoring
what
the
government
does
not
do
and
expressing
our
concerns
to
the
public.
...
For
example,
we
have
been
following
the
implementation
of
Law
No.6284
[on
prevention
of
violence
against
women].
We
sent
a
lot
of
petitions
and
letters
to
the
Ministry
of
Family
and
Social
Policies
requesting
more
information
on
the
number
of
women
applying
to
the
shelters,
those
who
were
given
shelter
and
those
who
were
not
given
any
form
of
support.
[We
needed
this
information]
to
see
what
does
and
does
not
work
in
the
system.
We
managed
to
get
some
information
due
to
our
persistence
but
the
information
is
not
at
all
useful.
(MOR
ATI)
All
of
the
CSOs
within
the
scope
of
this
research
underlined
the
positive
impact
of
the
EU
accession
process
on
CSOs
in
Turkey:
www.appro.org.af
18
Before
the
EU
accession
process,
people
used
the
concepts
such
as
charity
organizations
and
foundations
instead
of
civil
society...
During
the
mid
1990s,
for
example,
the
concept
of
civil
society
was
totally
unknown...The
EU
projects
in
Turkey
have
been
significant
in
terms
promoting
the
concept
of
civil
society
and
the
appreciation
of
the
concept
more
broadly
within
the
society.
(KA-DER).
The
CSOs
interviewed
pointed
to
the
positive
impact
of
the
EU
accession
process
on
both
the
state
and
the
CSOs.
The
process
has
been
a
catalyst
for
the
state
to
recognize
the
significance
of
CSOs
in
governance,
particularly
in
the
human
rights
sphere,
as
stakeholders
in
the
policy
making
process:
...
We,
the
nine
to
ten
human
rights-based
CSOs,
are
regularly
invited
to
the
Ministry
about
progress
reports
every
year.
While
we
are
talking,
they
are
taking
notes
with
and
paying
a
lot
of
attention
to
what
we
say.
That
makes
us
feel
psychologically
satisfied
about
our
interaction
with
the
state
authorities.
[In
our
experience]
most
of
our
opinions
and
insights
are
reflected
in
the
reports
by
the
government.
(MAZLUMDER).
Similarly,
As
you
know,
the
negotiations
for
Turkeys
full
membership
of
the
EU
started
just
after
1999.
During
that
negotiation
process,
IHD
had
a
close
relationship
particularly
with
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs.
We
were
continuously
giving
advice
to
the
ministerial
authorities
on
what
to
do
and
government
authorities
were
taking
our
advice
seriously
because
they
recognized
that
they
would
be
unable
to
manage
the
negotiations
relaying
solely
on
the
state
officials...that
they
needed
a
critical
eye
other
than
the
ones
in
power...(HD)
This
positive
view
of
state-CSO
relations
is
confirmed
by
high
government
officials
who
attach
utmost
importance
to
constructive
state-CSO
relations
as
a
pre-requisite
of
the
negotiations
for
joining
the
EU.57
In
retrospect,
however,
this
positive
sentiment
from
the
state
authorities
and
CSOs
was
short-lived.
With
the
strengthening
of
the
AKP
government
domestically
and
a
relative
cooling
off
in
the
accession
process,
some
CSOs
are
once
again
suspicious
of
the
governments
true
intentions
in
its
engagement
with
CSOs:
The
EU
resolutions/sanctions
set
up
the
parameters
governing
AKPs
policies
regarding
CSOs.
Just
after
forming
the
first
government,
AKP
appointed
a
vice
chairperson
responsible
for
CSO
affairs...
Similarly
when
KSGM
was
established
as
a
directorate,
they
appointed
a
vice
director
responsible
from
CSO
affairs...
At
this
point
I
dont
even
know
the
name
of
this
person
and
whether
this
position
still
exists.
(KA-DER).
As
for
EU
funding,
it
is
mostly
welcomed
by
Turkish
CSOs
with
the
exception
of
MAZLUMDER
in
terms
of
its
positive
effects
both
on
the
scope
of
CSO
activities
and
security
on
financial
issues.
However,
at
the
same
time,
there
are
concerns
that
EU
and
other
funding
are
likely
to
result
in
the
commercialization
of
the
CSOs.
For
instance,
MOR
ATI
was
critical
of
how
the
current
mode
of
funding
for
EU
projects
was
encouraging
some
Turkish
CSOs
to
become
focused
on
making
money.
While
stating
its
concerns
along
similar
lines
with
MOR
ATI,
KA-DER
draws
attention
to
the
transformative
implications
of
EU
funding
and
some
of
the
dilemmas
for
Turkish
CSOs:
57
This
positive
outcome
was
confirmed
by
the
Minister
for
EU
Affairs,
Ambassador
Rauf
Engin
Soysal,
on
December
4,
2014,
for
example.
www.appro.org.af
19
The
idea
of
paid,
salaried
civil
society,
connotes
something
different
than
civil
society...
Actually,
EU
shows
up
to
be
a
sector
in
itself.
In
my
opinion,
it
is
a
sector
of
employment.
Through
the
funds,
the
CSOs
too
have
created
such
a
sector.
In
the
previous
era
CSOs
operated
solely
on
the
basis
of
voluntarism
in
Turkey.
There
were
no
payments...
Without
voluntarism
in
CSOs
the
essence
of
CSO
work
no
longer
exists.
On
the
other
hand,
particularly
in
the
Eastern
societies
like
ours,
it
is
hard
to
be
serious
enough
[about
voluntary
work]
without
professionalization.
It
is
really
very
hard
to
ensure
the
balance...(KA-DER).
7.
Key
Findings
A
key
finding
from
this
research
is
that,
to
date,
state-CSO
relations
have
not
become
fully
institutionalized
and
are
far
from
stable.
It
should
be
noted
that
institutionalization
in
this
context
does
not
refer
to
the
level
of
professionalization
of
the
CSOs.
Rather,
it
refers
to
the
rules
and
regulations
which
have
set
the
official
parameters
for
the
state-civil
society
interaction
and
the
difference
in
rules
in
writing
and
rules
in
practice.
Another
finding
is
that
the
interface
between
the
state
and
CSOs
is
mostly
vertical
with
some
CSOs
having
direct
and
ongoing
communication
with
state
authorities
while
others
have
little
or
no
relations
with
the
state.
In
addition,
there
are
ideological
rifts
between
rights-based
CSOs
with
some
having
adopted
an
Islamist
approach,
and
rewarded
for
this
by
the
state,
while
others
have
maintained
a
secular
approach
resulting,
in
some
cases,
in
exclusion
from
state-CSO
interactions.
Also,
some
secular
CSOs
want
to
keep
their
distance
from
to
the
state
for
the
sake
of
preserving
their
autonomy.
They
consider
this
distance
as
necessary
for
being
qualitatively
effective
in
the
decision
and
policy
making
processes
as
well
as
in
terms
of
performing
their
monitoring
roles.
Lack
of
state
funds
for
non-conformist,
autonomous
CSOs
limits
the
effectiveness
these
CSOs
due
to
cash
flow
and
fund
shortage
issues
and,
therefore,
lessened
ability
for
systematic
intervention
in
policy
making
processes.
The
laws
and
the
legal
framework
governing
CSOs,
particularly
those
with
a
foundation
status,
are
serious
impediments
to
the
autonomous-functioning
of
CSOs.
The
laws
and
regulations
thus
often
serve
as
tools
for
the
government
to
control
rather
than
regulate
the
CSOs.
Despite
these
weaknesses
in
state-CSO
relations,
there
is
an
inevitability
for
both
the
state
and
CSOs
to
co-exist
and
interact
constructively
in
the
making
of
policy.
Despite
this
need
for
co-existence,
the
relations
between
state
authorities
and
CSOs
are
by
and
large
of
an
adversarial
nature,
oscillating
between
project-based
cooperation
and
outright
antagonism,
depending
on
the
issue
in
question.
The
adversarial
nature
of
relations
is
also,
in
part,
a
product
of
the
centralized
tradition
of
governance
in
Turkey
since
the
founding
of
the
republic
and
a
perhaps
over
exaggerated
concern
about
national
security
particularly
in
relation
to
human-rights
as
they
pertain
to
Turkeys
significant
ethnic
minorities.
Of
late,
the
move
by
the
state
toward
an
Islamist
identity
and
ideology
has
additionally
constrained
the
work
and
spheres
of
influence
of
womens
and
human
rights-based
CSOs.
The
state
authorities
have
maintained
their
approach
of
engaging
with
CSOs
in
matter
of
policy,
particularly
in
light
of
the
pre-requisites
set
as
part
of
the
EU
accession
process.
There
is
some
collaboration
between
the
state
and
CSOs
on
specific
policies
though
there
are
concerns
by
CSOs
that
their
contributions
are
often
not
taken
on
board
by
state
authorities.
www.appro.org.af
20
In
the
case
of
human
rights-based
CSOs,
relations
with
state
authorities
may
go
beyond
consultation
and
turn
into
full
collaboration.
The
common
concern
for
right-based
CSOs
is
to
have
participative
communication
with
the
state
and
thus
to
be
recognized
as
full
stakeholders
in
the
decision
and
policy
making
process.
In
current
circumstances,
the
common
contention
of
the
CSOs,
in
contrast
to
the
statements
of
the
state
authorities,
is
the
indifferent
attitude
of
the
state
toward
CSOs.
This
discrepancy
of
views
on
state-CSO
relations
raises
serious
questions
about
mutual
trust
and
willingness
by
either
party
to
engage
constructively.
The
EU
accession
process
has
been
a
milestone
for
state-CSO
relations
in
Turkey,
notably
in
terms
of
the
improvements
in
the
legal
framework.
The
EU
accession
process
has
created
a
political
impetus
for
taking
substantial
steps
toward
democratization
and
promotion
of
rights,
particularly
in
the
previous
terms
of
AKP.
However,
due
to
the
increasing
repressive
practices
of
the
government
particularly
in
the
aftermath
of
the
Gezi
incident
in
May
2013,
the
EU
Turkey
relations
have
deteriorated.
The
deterioration
witnessed
in
the
relations
between
the
state
authorities
and
CSOs
on
the
one
hand
and
between
Turkey
and
EU
on
the
other
is
likely
to
have
serious
negative
implications
for
the
collective
role
of
CSOs
to
be
played
in
Turkeys
attempts
to
move
toward
good
governance.
8.
Conclusion
Civil
society
organizations
in
Turkey
have
gone
through
distinct
but
related
periods
of
evolution,
the
most
significant
one
of
which
started
with
the
EU
accession
process
in
1999
and
gaining
impetus
in
the
2000s.
To
satisfy
the
requirement
of
accession,
the
Turkish
government
took
a
number
of
significant
steps
to
allow
CSOs
to
thrive
and
play
an
active
role
in
governance.
Since
the
early
2000s
until
the
2011
General
Elections
the
state-CSO
relations
improved
qualitatively.
However,
since
2011
there
has
emerged
a
tendency
by
the
government
toward
authoritarianism,
an
outcome
of
which
has
been
a
deterioration
state-CSO
relations.
The
current
political
climate
in
Turkey
can
be
described
as
ideologically
polarized
with
the
government
favoring
and
establishing
Islamist
CSOs
while
neglecting
or
excluding
secular
CSOs.
The
result
has
been
a
fragmentation
of
CSOs
as
an
interdependent
group
of
actors.
This
research
shows
that
state-CSO
relations
in
Turkey
have
not
yet
become
institutionalized,
i.e.,
stable,
based
on
mutual
dependencies,
and
predictable.
There
is
consultation
and
communication
between
CSOs
and
the
state
but
CSOs
complain
that
their
contributions
to
the
policy
process
are
usually
overlooked
by
the
government.
Implications for Afghanistan
A crosscutting goal for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan has been to establish an economically
sustainable, socially vibrant, and stable society. The development of a civil society and active roles by
civil society organizations has thus been an important aspect of the reconstruction process. The findings
from the research on state-CSO relations in Turkey have thus particular significance for womens and
human rights-based CSOs in Afghanistan.
One of the projections from the Turkish case for Afghanistan is the involvement of the international
donor community as an external impetus to create a civil society in Afghanistan. The findings from the
Turkish case suggest strongly that external funding and assistance to domestic CSOs is a knife-edge
www.appro.org.af
21
process
unless
the
process
is
internalized
by
the
state
authorities
and
the
society
at
large.
That
is,
while
international
donor
funds
have
been
crucial
to
the
emergence
and
sustenance
of
the
bulk
of
the
CSOs
in
Afghanistan
since
2001,
continued
blanket
funding
for
choice
CSOs,
e.g.,
womens
rights
organizations,
is
likely
to
effectively
transform
civil
society-oriented
non-state
entities
to
funding-oriented
enterprises
whose
main
goal
is
to
remain
financially
liquid
by
securing
project,
core,
or
other
types
of
funding
from
international
donors.
The
Turkish
case
also
underlines
the
risks
associated
with
Islamic
conservatism,
whose
practical
interpretation
and
implications
in
Turkey
have
been
to
drive
a
wedge
between
secular
and
religious
CSOs
while
nurturing
an
autocratic
political
structure
for
the
state.
Within
the
context
of
reconstruction
and
support
for
civil
society
in
Afghanistan,
particularly
in
the
fields
of
womens
and
human
rights,
caution
will
need
to
be
taken
to
address
attempts
to
marginalize
CSOs
based
on
the
degree
of
their
belief
in
fundamentalisms
including
strict
or
inaccurate
interpretations
of
Islamic
values.
The
findings
from
this
research
point
to
the
need
for
much
better
coherence
between
formal
rules,
e.g.,
laws
and
regulations,
and
rules
in
practice
as
a
pre-requisite
for
upholding
the
rule
of
law
and
moving,
ultimately,
toward
good
governance.
This
research
has
also
highlighted
the
key
role
to
be
played
an
independent
media
and
respect
for
religious,
cultural,
and
political
differences.
Recommendations
For
Governments
State
authorities
should
provide
an
enabling
legal
and
political
environment
based
on
the
rule
of
law,
adherence
to
fundamental
democratic
principles,
clear
procedures,
and
shared
spaces
for
dialogue
and
cooperation
for
a
sustainable
civil
society.
State
authorities
should
not
discriminate
against
CSOs
that
do
not
share
state-dominant
ideology.
Medias
independence
must
be
safeguarded
through
legislation,
applied
without
prejudice
and
irrespective
of
ideology.
CSOs
should
be
engaged
from
across
the
full
spectrum
of
civil
society
without
exception
and
without
preferential
treatment
Womens
and
human
rights
CSOs
should
be
protected
and
nurtured
based
on
universal
values
rather
than
the
arbitrarily
defined
traditional
or
other
values.
Respect
for
and
defense
of
womens
and
human
rights
should
become
institutionalized
through
early
and
later
education
curricula
changes
and
provisions.
Respect
for
and
defense
of
CSOs
more
generally
should
also
become
institutionalized
through
changes
in
education
curricula.
Protected
spaces
should
be
created
by
state
authorities
for
CSOs
to
encourage
free
expression
by
CSOs
and
opportunities
for
state
and
non-state
actors
to
engage
with
civil
society.
For CSOs
The
complicated
relationship
between
state
and
civil
society
in
terms
of
mutual
dependency
should
not
prevent
CSOs
from
preserving
their
autonomy
from
the
state.
CSOs
should
remain
guarded
against
attempts
at
coercion
by
national
and
international
funding
sources.
www.appro.org.af
22
CSOs
must
continually
explore
opportunities
for
establishing
cooperative
networks
and
associations
as
a
means
to
share
knowledge
and
increase
capacity
for
advocacy
and
other
forms
of
engagement
with
government
policy
making
authorities.
As
much
as
possible,
CSOs
should
link
up
with
international
and
transnational
CSOs
working
in
the
same
sectors.
CSOs
should
find
a
balance
professionalism
and
voluntarism,
and
fund-dependency
and
autonomy.
CSOs
should
make
every
attempt
to
prevent
a
weakening
of
pluralism
and
ideological
tolerance
which
can
result
in
fragmentation,
polarization,
and
ineffectiveness.
CSOs
should
seek
alliances
and
common
causes
with
the
media,
traditional
civil
society
entities
including
cultural
or
religious
organizations,
research
organizations
and
think-tanks,
and
private
sector
on
the
condition
that
the
common
cause
is
subscribed
to
by
all
parties,
regardless
of
their
value
systems
or
beliefs.
For International Donors
The
international
donors
should
keep
the
balance
between
the
political
and
cultural
specificities
and
universal
values
as
a
means
to
avoid
orientalist
or
ethnocentricist
approaches
to
intervention
and
funding.
The
international
donors
should
ensure
the
security
of
CSOs
by
practicing
do
no
harm
in
their
funding
and
intervention
approaches.
The
international
donors
should
support
mechanisms
that
enhance
new
legislature-CSO
relations
and
collaboration.
The
international
donors
should
prioritize
funding
CSOs
and
CSO-related
projects
that
are
most
likely
to
contribute
to
the
institutionalization
CSOs
in
(good)
governance.
The
international
donors
should,
selectively
and
rotationally,
provide
core
funding
for
CSOs
to
increase
the
potential
for
autonomy
and
creativity
by
the
funded
CSOs.
The
international
donors
should
continue
to
support
service
delivery
functions
of
CSOs,
particularly
of
womens
and
human
rights
CSOs,
in
health
and
education
programming
and
such
initiatives
as
womens
and
childrens
shelters
operated
by
rights-based
CSOs.
The
international
donors
must
lead
in
knowledge
accumulation,
knowledge
sharing,
and
research
on
state-CSO
relations,
working
closely
with
local,
recipient
country
CSOs.
www.appro.org.af
23
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Websies:
- www.ihd.org.tr
- www.ka-der.org.tr
- www.mazlumder.org.tr
- www.morcati.org.tr
CSO
Interviews
- Interviews
with
current
and
former
chairperson
of
KA-DER,
Gnl
Kahramanolu
and
idem
Aydn,
21
November
2014,
stanbul.
- Interview
with
a
volunteer
from
MOR
ATI,
Esen
zdemir,
21
November
2014,
stanbul.
- Interview
with
chairperson
of
MAZLUMDER,
Ahmet
Faruk
nsal,
26
November
2014,
Ankara.
- Interview
with
chairperson
of
HD,
ztrk
Trkdoan,
01
December
2014,
Ankara.
Expert
Interviews
- Interview
with
the
Director
of
KSGM,
Glser
Ustaolu,
Ministry
of
Family,
KSGM,
20
November
2014,
Ankara.
- Interview
with
the
Deputy
Minister
Consultant
of
Family
and
Social
Policies,
20
November
2014,
Ankara.
- Interview
with
Undersecretary
of
the
Ministry
for
EU
Affairs
Ambassador
Rauf
Engin
Soysal,
05
December
2014,
Ankara.
- Interview
with
chairperson
of
THK,
Dr.
Hikmet
Tlen,
23
December
2014,
Ankara
- Interview
with
Deputy
Minister
of
Family
and
Social
Policies,
13
January
2015,
Ankara.
www.appro.org.af
26
Appendix 1: Profiles of CSOs Used as Case Examples
This section provides a synthesized overview of the four rights-based CSOs used as case examples in this
research. These are: KA-DER, MOR ATI, MAZLUMDER and HD
KA-DER
(The
Association
for
the
Support
and
Training
of
Women
Candidates)
KA-DER
was
founded
in
March
1997
in
stanbul
by
a
group
of
feminist
women
with
the
goal
of
achieving
an
increase
in
womens
representation
at
least
from
around
%
4-4,5
to
%
10
(Arat,
2008:
409)
in
the
parliament.
The
principles
of
the
Association
is
stated
as
to
be
against
any
kind
of
discrimination,
keep
equal
distance
to
all
parties,
to
work
with
all
of
women
branches
of
the
parties
and
female
parliamentarians
to
achieve
gender
equality
(www.ka-der.org.tr).
For
this
reason,
they
have
been
supported
by
women
professionals
ranging
from
academics
to
journalists
with
different
ideological
backgrounds.
KA-DER
is
significant
for
being
the
sole
women's
association
targeting
to
increase
the
number
of
women
in
politics
and
in
decision
making
positions
so
as
to
the
achieve
equal
representation
of
women
and
men.
To
emphasize
its
significance,
Yeim
Arat,
an
academic
specialized
on
womens
studies
in
Turkey
stated
that
it
was
the
only
women's
organization
that
Bill
Clinton
met
during
his
visit
in
Turkey
in
1999
(Arat,
2008:
409).
Moving
from
the
belief
that
different
experience
and
capabilities
of
women
should
also
be
reflected
in
social
and
political
issues,
KA-DER
works
to
eliminate
social,
economic
and
cultural
obstacles
women
politicians
face
and
encourage
women
to
become
candidates
for
national
and
local
elections,
forces
the
government
and
political
parties
to
enact
positive
discrimination
in
laws
and
by-laws
to
secure
equal
representation
for
women,
organizes
training
programs
for
women
candidates
and
campaigns
to
attract
attention
to
women
candidates
during
the
election
periods,
strengthen
cooperation
and
collaboration
among
women
in
political
parties,
to
have
them
and
the
womens
movement
act
in
cooperation
on
issues
concerning
women
(www.kader.org.tr)
KA-DERs
relations
with
the
state
in
terms
of
struggling
for
womens
equal
representation
in
politics
is
questioned
by
some
feminists
who
challenged
the
Associations
achievements
realized
by
cooperating
with
the
state.
As
Tokta
and
Diner
claim,
in
fact,
working
with
the
state
and
denying
its
support
in
the
name
of
the
feminist
cause
(2011:50)
lead
to
cliques
within
the
womens
movement
and
KA-DER
is
not
an
exception.
KA-DER
declared
that,
on
the
basis
of
certain
criteria
stated
in
their
principles,
they
would
support
women
candidates.
These
criteria
are:
being
conscious
of
womanhood
and
sensitive
to
womens
problems,
attaching
importance
to
womens
solidarity,
working
to
alleviate
all
kinds
of
discrimination
against
women,
having
innovative
projects
that
will
lead
the
society
further,
defending
human
rights,
democracy
and
the
constitutional
state,
attaching
importance
to
the
strengthening
of
the
civil
society,
going
against
all
kinds
of
fanaticism
and
racism,
and
behaving
honestly
(www.ka-der.org).
KA-DER
promoted
30%
quota
for
women
in
2003.
One
of
the
most
attractive
campaigns
of
KA-DER
was
organized
before
2007
elections
by
publicising
the
photographs
of
women
artists
and
businesswomen
with
moustaches
and
ties
and
asking
"is
it
mandatory
to
be
male
to
enter
the
parliament?"
In
2011,
In
terms
its
organizational
structure,
KA-DER
is
stanbul-based
association
with
8
branches
in
cities
and
8
www.appro.org.af
27
representatives
in
2010
(www.ka-der.org.tr).
Its
funding
is
based
on
EU
grants
and
donations.
It
does
not
accept
state
funding.
MOR
ATI
KADIN
SIINMA
VAKFI
(Purple
Roof
Womens
Shelter
Foundation)
MOR
ATI,
one
of
the
oldest
and
established
CSO
aiming
to
end
violence
against
women,
was
founded
in
1990
in
stanbul
by
a
group
of
feminist
following
the
Campaign
against
Domestic
Violence
in
1987
and
purple
needle
campaign
against
sexual
harassment
in
1989.
Its
significance
lies
in
its
being
the
first
autonomous
shelter
for
victims
of
domestic
violence
in
Turkey
(www.morcati.org.tr).
On
average,
2,000
women
apply
to
MOR
ATI
for
shelter
each
year
(https://zenodo.org/record/13026/files/Turkey_WP5_FinalReport.pdf).
Due
to
its
prominent
principle
of
establishing
solidarity
between
women,
the
main
purpose
of
MOR
ATI
is
to
spread
struggle
against
and
end
domestic
violence
against
women
and
children
by
questioning
gender
inequality
and
by
building
womens
self-esteem
and
confidence.
They
stated
this
as:
We
support
a
womans
process
in
decision-
making
without
judging
her
or
putting
pressure
on
her
(www.morcati.org.tr).
For
MOR
ATI,
violence
against
women
is
among
worlds
most
widespread
of
human
rights
violations
(Mor
at,
2014).
MOR
ATI
provides
shelter
and
legal
and
psychological
support
for
women
who
are
subjected
to
violence,
organize
workshops
to
train
municipalities
and
other
womens
organizations
about
violence
against
women,
publish
brochures
to
inform
women
about
violence
and
watch
reports
on
the
practice
and
law-making
process
of
the
government
concerning
violence
against
women.
Based
on
the
experiences
of
women
subjected
to
violence,
the
feminist
volunteers
are
working
to
develop
policies
to
combat
violence
against
women
and
share
them
with
the
state
agencies
such
as
KSGM.
MOR
ATI
is
organized
on
local
basis
centered
in
stanbul.
Since
2009,
it
operated
three
shelters
in
stanbul
by
the
support
of
local
government.
MOR
ATI
organizes
activities
in
other
cities
with
other
womens
organizations
and
municipalities.
As
aha
states,
it
operates
in
line
with
generally
accepted
principles
in
the
feminist
movement
such
as
not
creating
and
producing
hierarchy,
working
on
a
voluntary
basis,
sharing
authority
and
responsibilities
alternately,
making
decisions
collectively
and
working
for
solidarity
among
women
(2011:7).
MOR
ATIs
administrative
board
is
known
as
the
Collective
MOR
ATI
because
all
decisions
are
taken
collectively.
The
foundation
does
not
have
a
determined
head;
leadership
is
rotating.
In
terms
of
funding,
the
Foundation
operated
its
activities
by
the
support
of
ili
Municipality,
European
Commission
Delegation
of
Turkey,
and
volunteers.
To
keep
its
independent
status,
MOR
ATI
does
not
prefer
to
cooperate
with
the
state.
It
also
establishes
links
with
the
European
Union
for
EU-based
grants
(https://zenodo.org/record/13026/files/Turkey_WP5_FinalReport.pdf).
Besides
the
achievements,
the
Foundation
experiences
financial
problems
and
organisational
problems
due
to
the
frequent
turnover
of
existing
volunteers.
Additionally,
being
in
NGO
status
sometimes
prohibits
MOR
ATI
from
acting
independently,
making
it
subject
to
certain
restrictions
once
in
a
while
when
it
is
forced
to
follow
certain
regulations
and
official
procedures,
as
with
any
other
NGO
(https://zenodo.org/record/13026/files/Turkey_WP5_FinalReport.pdf).
www.appro.org.af
28
HD (Human Rights Association)
HD was founded in 1986 by the initiative of intellectuals, members of various professions including
doctors, journalists, lawyers and the relatives of political prisoners, the missing and the arrested people
in the aftermath of the 12 September 1980 military coup detat (Kuruluundan Bugne HD, 2001: 1-2)
Attempting to rectify the consequences of the coup, the association took immediate action against
capital punishment, torture, unhealthy conditions in the prisons and prosecution processes as well as
campaigned for amnesty. Moreover, HD took active role in the establishment of Human Rights
Foundation of Turkey (1990), an organization that specifically focused on the physical and psychological
treatment and rehabilitation of torture survivors (nen, 1996: 732, 734). While mainly engaged with
defending the rights of the oppressed socialists and worked within the dominant paradigm of the left
during its early years of establishment (Kanar, 2006: 142), HD focused on the Kurdish problem and
took action to support the rights of the Kurds in the region starting with the 1990s (Beiki, 2006: 122;
Arslanel & Hamdemir, 2011: 29-31).
Currently, HD is one of the most powerful CSOs working in the field of human rights in Turkey with its
wide spectrum of issues ranging from all kinds of discriminatory acts, racism, lost people, unidentified
murders, womens issue, prisoners rights, torture, living conditions in prisons, and particularly the
human rights violations against the Kurds and refugees (www.ihd.org.tr)
As stated in the regulation of the association, the major aim of HD is to work for human rights and
freedoms. Departing from the principle of the universality and indivisibility of human rights, it defends
the rights of the oppressed individuals, sex, class, and people/nation and fights against any
discrimination based on ethnicity, language, religion, gender and political stance. The association is
against torture; considers the right to self determination of nations as a human right; defends fair
adjudication, right of defence, freedom of speech and freedom of belief (HD Tz, m. 2/b)
Alongside the general managerial board and district managers, the commissions that operate both in
the branches and headquarters play a significant role within the organizational structure of HD. The
major activities of the association consist of following up the human rights violations; informing the
public, political and state authorities regarding the violations through reports and press statements;
organizing conferences, congresses, panels; publishing books and reports; organizing meetings,
demonstrations and campaigns; cooperating with other national and international human rights
associations; and organizing training sessions on human rights. HD publishes yearly reports on human
rights violations (www.ihd.org.tr; 17. HD Olaan Merkez Genel Kurulu alma Raporu, Kasm 2012-
Kasm 2014)
HDs main sources of funding are membership fees, donations of members and supporters. The
association also receives international funding mostly on the bases of projects (Interview with HD, 01
December 2014, Ankara; IHD Tz, m. 40)
HD is a founding member of Human Rights Joint Platform (nsan Haklar Ortak Platformu), established in
2005, a national umbrella organization for Turkish human rights organizations and works in cooperation
with EU as well as many associations at the world scale (HD 20 Yanda, 2006: 32).
www.appro.org.af
29
MAZLUMDER (Human Rights and Solidarity Association for the Oppressed)
MAZLUMDER, established in 1991, is the second largest human rights association active in Turkey. Based
in Ankara, the association has 27 branches in various regions throughout Turkey
(http://www.mazlumder.org/main/pages/hakkimizda-biz-kimiz/65).
The association was founded by lawyers, writers, publishers and businessmen most of whom were
known with their Islamic and nationalist political identity. The major motive underlying the
establishment of MAZLUMDER was the inspiration of its founders to form an alternative association that
would engage with the violation of human rights of the Islamic social segments as well. Since HD was
primarily watching and working on the violations of rights of the leftist segments. Hence, during its early
years of establishment, MAZLUMDER mainly engaged with the religious rights of the Muslim
community, with a particular focus on the rights of the women discriminated for wearing head scarf
(aylak, 2008: 131; see also Arslaner & Hamdemir, 2011: 35-37). However, the founders of the
association were also sensitive to the oppression of the other segments such as Kurds and the leftists, as
made explicit in the first campaign of the association held for supporting the mistreatment of a leftist
prisoner. Throughout the years, the focus of the association intensified as to comprise such issues
ranging from human rights violations of non-muslim communities, Armenians, and particularly, Kurds,
womens issue, lost people, unidentified murders, prisoners rights to violations against refugees. The
motto is declared as On the side of all the oppressed (mazlum); against all the oppressors (zalim)
(www.mazlumder.org.tr; Tarihe Tanklmz 2011-2013)
The major goal of MAZLUMDER is to fight with the all kinds of political, economic, social, legal,
psychological, cultural obstructions not in conformity with human dignity and justice and thus limit
human rights. Though prioritizing the human, the association, targets to struggle for the protection of
the nature of all the creatures. In this context, MAZLUMDER aims to struggle against all kinds of torture,
denigration and rape without taking into account the religious, ethnic, cultural, and gender backgrounds
of neither the oppressors nor the oppressed and provides all kinds of financial and legal assistance to
the oppressed and victimized for enhancing cooperation (Mazlumder Tz, article 3).
Alongside the central and local managerial bodies, MAZLUMDER carries out its activities through various
commissions and committees specialized in particular areas of human rights violations. The major
activities of the association consist of watching human rights violations in Turkey and in the world;
informing the public, political parties, international organizations, states and the other related bodies
regarding the violations through reports, press statements and the web; publishing books and reports;
organizing meetings, demonstrations and campaigns; cooperating with other national and international
human rights associations; and giving legal, financial and moral support to the oppressed individuals and
their families (www.mazlumder.org.tr).
The funding of MAZLUMDER comes from membership fees and donations of the members and
supporters (Mazlumder Tz, article 47). The association prefers not to take any donations/funds
from states, EU, or international organizations (ner, 2014: 35).
www.appro.org.af
30
Appendix 2: Legal Framework Governing CSOs In Turkey
Turkey has a dynamic civil society with CSOs working in a variety of sectors. The legal context is a very
significant dimension for the operation and effectiveness of the CSOs as well as their relationship with
the state alongside the cultural, political and economic dynamics. The legislation governing the CSOs has
been improved within the wider context of the reforms aimed to promote democratization carried out
in the afterwards of Turkeys EU candidacy in 2003. However, there are still problems both regarding the
implementation, interpretation as well as limitations of the legislation. In this report, CSOs are limited
to associations and foundations. The legal framework concerning civil society in Turkey is provided on
the basis of freedom of association and freedom of assembly.
The major laws governing the sector are schematized in the below table developed on the basis of
TSEV Civil Society Monitoring Report 2012. (Sivil Toplum zleme Raporu, 2012: 11; TSEV, Vakf ve
Dernekleri lgilendiren Yasal Mevzuat ve Dier Konular)
Table 1- National Legislation Governing the CSOs
Context
Constitution 1982
Articles 33-Freedom Association;
Article 34- Right to Hold Meetings
and Demonstration Marches
General provisions governing CSOs Articles 101-
117
Specific provisions governing
associations
Specific provisions governing
foundations
Provisions for collection of aid
activities other than donations and
membership fees
Provisions of conditions for
holding of meetings and
demonstrations
Provisions regulating CSO-public
institutions relationship
Civil Code (No: 4721; Date: 2001)
Associations Law (No: 5253: Date:
2004
Foundations Law (No: 5737; Date:
2008)
Law on Collection of Aid (No: 2860;
Date:1983
Law on Meetings and
Demonstrations (No: 2911;
Date:1983)
Law on Relations of Associations and
Foundations with Public Institutions
(No: 5072; Date: 2004)
Penal Code (No: 5237; Date: 2004)
Law on Misdemeanors (No: 9337;
Date: 2005)
Press Law (No: 5187; Date: 2004)
Tax Laws
Law on Tax Exemption for
Foundations (No: 4962; Date: 2003)
Income Tax Law (No:193; Date: 1961)
Corporate Tax Law (No: 5520; Date:
2006)
Property Tax Law (No. 1319; Date:
1970)
VAT Law (No: 3065; Date: 1984)
www.appro.org.af
Foundations
Legislation
Associations
Articles
56-100
Penalty
provisions
Penalty
provisions
Provisions regarding printed
materials
Tax Provisions
31
The
freedom
of
association
is
guaranteed
in
the
Article
33
of
the
Constitution,
promulgated
in
1982
following
the
military
coup
dtat.
The
article
stating
that
Everyone
has
the
right
to
form
associations,
or
become
a
member
of
an
association,
or
withdraw
from
membership
without
prior
permission
is
broadly
in
line
with
the
international
standards.
Yet
there
still
exist
many
issues
particularly
due
to
the
limitations
provided
in
the
relevant
laws
as
well
as
the
regulations
and
mandates
regarding
the
CSOs.
In
the
Article
56
of
the
Civil
Code
an
association
is
defined
as
a
society
formed
by
the
unity
of
at
least
seven
real
persons
or
legal
entities
for
realization
of
a
common
object
other
than
sharing
of
profit
by
collecting
information
and
performing
studies
for
such
purpose.
Foundations
on
the
other
hand,
as
defined
within
the
frame
of
the
Article
101,
are
charity
groups
in
the
status
of
a
legal
entity
formed
by
real
persons
or
legal
entities
dedicating
their
private
property
and
rights
for
the
public
use.
Under
the
relevant
legislation
the
associations
are
required
to
register
to
the
Department
of
Associations
at
Ministry
of
Interior
Affairs.
The
Foundations
on
the
other
hand
are
registered
by
the
courts
based
on
the
initial
review
of
the
General
Directorate
of
Foundations
affiliated
to
the
Turkish
Prime
Ministry.
Although
the
registration
process
of
the
associations
was
simplified
under
the
new
law
of
Associations
(2004)
and
being
implemented
consistently,
still
the
process
is
considered
to
be
complicated
and
slow
working.
As
for
the
foundations,
the
registration
process
is
burdensome
and
expensive.
The
minimum
capital
requirement
for
establishing
a
foundation
is
set
up
as
55,000
Turkish
Liras/
22,000
$
for
2015.
Although,
under
the
Article
33
of
the
Constitution,
the
right
of
freedom
of
association
is
guaranteed
for
everyone,
certain
discriminatory
restrictions
are
stipulated
which
are
further
specified
through
the
relevant
laws
and
regulations.
In
this
context,
the
freedom
association
of
some
groups
such
as
security
forces,
public
officials,
children,
and
individuals
with
mental
disability
or
disorders
are
either
limited
or
restricted.
In
addition,
for
foreigners,
residence
permit
is
required
for
founding
or
joining
an
association
in
Turkey
(TACSO58,
February
2014:
6).
The
associations
may
form
federations
(minimum
5
associations)
or
confederations
(minimum
3
associations).
Yet,
it
is
required
that
the
member
associations
should
be
working
in
the
same
field
of
activity
which
limits
the
possibility
of
the
establishment
of
a
wide
scale
cooperation
among
the
CSOs.
(Trkiyede
Derneklerin
rgtlenme
zgrl
nndeki
Engeller,
April
2010:
33-34).
Another
limitation
regarding
the
freedom
of
association
comes
to
the
agenda
due
to
the
ambiguity
of
some
principles
employed
in
the
legal
framework,
such
as
general
morality,
Turkish
family
structure,
national
security,
and
public
order.
Although
these
terms
are
widely
used
in
the
relevant
laws,
including
the
Constitution,
they
are
not
concretely
defined.
This
leads
to
arbitrary
and
inconsistent
interpretation
of
laws
by
the
state
authorities
and
discriminative
practices
particularly
with
respect
to
rights-based
associations.
For
instance,
on
the
basis
of
the
Turkish
family
structure,
two
LGBTI
(International
Lesbian,
Gay,
Bisexual,
Trans
and
Intersex
Association)
associations
faced
closure
requests.
In
addition,
court
cases
concerning
the
closure
five
human
rights
associations,
particularly
engaged
with
the
Kurdish
issue
are
pending
(EU
Turkey
2014
Progress
Report,
October
2014:
54).
58
TACSO
is
a
project
funded
by
the
EU
to
"increase
and
improve
the
capacity
and
actions
of
CSOs
as
well
as
their
democratic
role"
(www.tacso.org).
www.appro.org.af
32
The
freedom
of
assembly
is
guaranteed
in
the
Article
34
of
the
Constitution
and
Law
on
Meetings
and
Demonstration.
As
it
is
the
case
for
freedom
of
association,
the
relevant
article
of
the
Constitution
stating
that
Everyone
has
the
right
to
hold
unarmed
and
peaceful
meetings
and
demonstration
marches
without
prior
permission
is
compatible
with
the
International
legislation.
However,
certain
obstacles
remain
which
do
not
comply
with
the
requirements
of
the
European
Convention
of
Human
Rights
(ECHR).
For
instance,
the
legislation
provides
the
state
officials
almost
unlimited
authority
for
intervention.
The
notification
of
the
authorities
before
the
meetings/demonstrations
is
mostly
implemented
in
such
a
way
that
it
de-facto
turns
into
a
permission.
Both
the
time
frame
as
well
as
the
places
allowed
for
demonstrations
and
meetings
are
very
limited
(TACSO,
February
2014:
7).
In
addition,
the
meetings
can
be
postponed,
banned
or
intervened
if
they
are
regarded
as
posing
threat
to
the
principles
of
national
security,
public
order,
public
health,
and
public
morals.
The
ambiguity
regarding
these
principles
open
the
way
for
the
authorities
to
restrict
the
practice
of
freedom
of
assembly.
Finally,
although
Law
on
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Acts
and
Law
on
Misdemeanors
do
not
directly
govern
CSOs,
they
pose
limitations
for
freedom
of
assembly
as
well
as
freedom
of
association.
The
human
rights
activists
as
well
as
CSO
activists
holding
meetings
and
demonstrations
that
the
state
authorities
considered
as
related
to
the
terrorist
organizations/activities
are
usually
targeted
and
prosecuted
by
the
laws
in
question
(ICLN,
NGO
Law
Monitor:
Turkey,
July
2014:
6).
The
funds
granted
to
CSOs
that
the
activists
are
associated
with
could
also
become
the
targets
of
the
accusations
under
the
Law
on
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Acts.
At
certain
instances,
the
EU
Funds
and
project-based
funds
provided
by
EU
member
states
are
investigated
within
the
context
of
the
criminal
charges
(TSEV,
Civil
Society
in
Turkey:
An
Era
of
Transition,
2006:
11).
In
addition,
in
numerous
demonstrations
opposing
the
government
policies,
the
security
forces
are
inclined
to
use
excessive
force
on
the
bases
of
Anti-Terror
Law.
Protests
relating
to
Gezi
events
as
well
as
numerous
Kurdish
issue
related
gatherings
are
exemplary
in
this
context
(Turkey
2014
Progress
Report,
October
2014:
54).
As
for
the
financial
aspect,
the
taxation
system
signifies
a
demanding
process
both
for
the
associations
and
foundations.
In
principle,
the
CSOs
are
exempt
from
corporate
tax
but
are
required
to
pay
other
taxes.
In
order
to
get
additional
tax
benefits,
the
associations
are
required
to
obtain
public
benefit
status
and
the
foundations
need
to
acquire
tax-exempt
status.
(TACSO,
February
2014:
17).
.
Yet,
since
the
public
benefit
associations
and
tax-exempt
foundations
are
defined
within
the
context
of
different
regulations,
the
criteria,
conditions
and
application
procedures
differ
for
each
organizational
form.
While
hinting
at
the
lack
of
a
comprehensive
policy,
such
a
consideration
set
the
grounds
for
unjust
taxation
conditions
(ECNL,
Assessment
of
The
Legal
Framework
for
Cooperation
between
the
CSOs
and
the
Government
in
Turkey,
1
March
2006:
12).
In
addition,
the
process
is
highly
difficult
and
considered
as
politicized,
as
the
Council
of
Ministers
is
the
sole
authority
granting
the
statuses.
The
number
of
foundations
(as
of
August
2013)
and
associations
(as
of
January
2014)
that
had
tax-exempt
statuses,
were
only
%5.09
(241)
and
only
0.41%
(404)
respectively
(TACSO,
February
2014:
17).
Finally,
there
is
no
overarching
legal
framework
defining
principles,
mechanisms
and
obligations
regarding
the
relationship
between
the
CSOs
and
the
public
institutions.
The
lack
of
legally
structured
cooperation/participation
mechanisms
result
in
the
use
of
personal
connections,
which
in
fact
leads
to
an
unequal
set
up
among
the
CSOs
concerning
their
access
to
public
institutions.
This
process
confines
the
initiative
of
cooperation
to
the
public
authority
and
hinders
the
formation
of
consistent
policies
among
the
public
institutions
concerning
their
relationship
with
the
CSOs
(TSEV,
Sivil
Toplum
Kurulular
ile
Kamu
Sektr
likileri
Sorunlar-Beklentiler,
December
2013:
4).
www.appro.org.af
33
There
are
certainly
some
piecemeal
initiatives
taken
during
the
EU
accession
process
for
the
improvement
of
cooperation
between
CSOs
and
public
institutions,
yet
at
a
very
limited
scale.
As
for
the
participation
of
the
CSOs
to
the
decision
making
process
at
the
central
level,
the
Regulation
on
the
Procedures
and
Principles
of
Drafting
Legislation
adopted
in
2006
foresees
the
draft
legislation
to
be
sent
to
the
related
ministries,
public
institutions
and
organizations.
However,
as
specified
under
the
regulation,
the
participation
of
the
relevant
CSOs
is
limited
with
consultation,
acting
as
discretionary
bodies.
The
CSOs
are
required
to
evaluate
the
drafts
within
30
days;
a
lack
of
feedback
on
the
other
hand
is
considered
as
an
affirmative
opinion.
At
the
local
level,
some
provisions
are
introduced
to
provincial
administration
and
municipality
laws
for
promoting
the
participation
of
CSOs
to
the
processes
of
decision
making
decision
making,
strategic
planning
and
service
delivery.
Yet
the
initiatives
are
far
from
enabling
the
CSOs
participation
as
obligatory
partners
(TSEV,
Active
Participation
in
Civil
Society:
International
Standards,
Obstacles
in
National
Legislation,
Recommendations,
February
2014:
122-23).
Another
step
regarding
the
improvement
of
the
relationship
between
the
CSOs
and
the
state
has
been
the
establishment
of
THK
in
2014.
As
stated
in
the
Article
3
of
Law
on
National
Human
Rights
Institution
of
Turkey,
No:
6332,
THK
has
a
public
legal
personality,
administrative
and
financial
autonomy
as
well
as
a
special
budget.
Article
4
states
that
the
institution
is
authorized
to
carry
out
activities
for
protection
and
development
of
human
rights
as
well
as
for
prevention
of
violations;
to
fight
against
torture
and
ill-treatment;
to
review
the
complaints
and
applications
and
to
follow
up
the
results
thereof;
to
take
initiatives
with
a
view
to
solving
issues;
and
to
conduct
researches
and
studies
for
monitoring
and
evaluation
of
the
developments
in
the
field
of
human
rights.
The
Human
Rights
Board,
the
decision
making
body
of
the
institution,
is
composed
of
the
representatives
of
the
CSOs
working
in
the
field
of
human
rights
and
human
rights
experts.
However,
although
THK
is
designed
as
an
autonomous
body,
the
election
process
of
the
Board
members
is
a
focal
point
of
criticism;
particularly
on
the
part
of
the
CSOs
since
7
out
of
11
members
are
elected
by
Council
Ministers
among
the
eligible
candidates
submitted
by
the
Institution.
www.appro.org.af
34
Appendix 3: CSO Interview Questions
1. What are your views regarding the legal framework governing the CSOs in Turkey?
2. Do you think that your relationship with the government/public authorities is an
institutionalized relationship?
3. Could you describe the channels of your communication with the government/public
authorities? Do you experience any problems during the communication process? For example:
lack of communication/blockage/favoritism...etc.
4. Could you evaluate the governments approach towards the civil society in Turkey? How would
you elaborate on the position of the CSOs in Turkey; are they considered as threats or
democratic elements that should be supported, particularly in your sphere of interest/activity?
5. Considering your sphere of interest/activity, on which topics do you think the
government/public authorities are in a collaborative relationship (or conflictual relationship)
with the CSOs in Turkey?
6. Do you observe/experience any disparities between the CSOS legally defined status and their
practical position in terms of their relationship with the state? Could you provide some
examples?
7. What are the roles of CSOs in the decision and policy making processes in Turkey? What is the
significance of the participation of CSOs to these processes particularly in your area of
specialization?
8. How do you evaluate the relationship between the government/public authorities and CSOs
particularly in the field of women/human rights? Would you consider the relationship as
cooperative?
9. Could you tell us about the practical implications of the participation of CSOs working in the field
of women/human rights to the decision and policy making processes in Turkey?
10. Do you think that your organization can make a change in the political/administrative
processes?
11. Do you think that the European Union accession process caused a shift in your relationship with
the government/public authorities?
12. What would be your suggestions concerning the regulation of the State-CSO relationship in
Turkey?
13. What could be your recommendations for the Afghanistan case taking into consideration the
experiences of CSOs during their interface with the government/public authorities?
www.appro.org.af
35
Appendix 4: Expert Interview Questions
1. What are your views regarding the legal framework governing the CSOs in Turkey?
2. As a public institution, how would you consider your relationship with the CSOs? Could we talk
about an institutionalized relationship?
3. Could you describe the channels of your communication with the CSOs? Do you experience any
problems during the communication process? For example: lack of communication / blockage /
favoritism...etc.
4. How would you evaluate the relationship between the government/public authorities and CSO
in Turkey, particularly in your field of expertise?
5. Considering your institutions sphere of interest/activity, on which topics you have a
collaborative relationship (or conflictual relationship) with the CSOs?
6. Do you observe/experience any disparities between the CSOS legally defined status and their
practical position in terms of their relationship with the state/your institution? Could you
provide some examples?
7. What are the roles of CSOs in the decision and policy making process, particularly in your
institutions field of expertise?
8. How do you evaluate the relationship between the government/public authorities and CSOs
particularly in the field of women/human rights? Would you consider the relationship as
cooperative?
9. Could you tell us about the practical implications of the participation of CSOs working in the field
of women/human rights to the decision and policy making processes in Turkey?
10. Do you think that the CSOs can make a change in the political/administrative processes in your
particular area of your expertise?
11. Do you think that the European Union accession process had an impact on your relationship
with the CSOs?
12. What would be your suggestions concerning the regulation of the State-CSO relationship in
Turkey?
13. What could be your recommendations for the Afghanistan case taking into consideration the
experiences of CSOs during their interface with the government/public authorities?
www.appro.org.af
36
Photo:
Murat
Erkman
www.appro.org.af
37
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