PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE T. LEOGARDO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AND VICENTE D. ELLELINA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58494 July 5, 1989
FACTS:
On January 20, 1978, the petitioner PNOC-EDC filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), Regional Office No. VII,
Cebu City, a clearance application to terminate the services of private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.
The application for clearance was premised on Ellelina's alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a Christmas
party on 19 December 1977 at petitioner's camp in Uling, Cebu, when, because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the
prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning
shots fired by the latter.
Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but was subsequently revoked and petitioner was ordered to reinstate Ellelina to his
former position, without loss of seniority rights, and with backwages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the PNOC-EDC is governed by the Labor Code
2. Whether or not Ellelinas dismissal was justified.
RULING:
Article IX-B, Section 2 in 1987 Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. The test in determining
whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that
government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation
Law are not within its coverage. Since the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a governmentowned or controlled corporation without an original charter, its employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
The dismissal ordered by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature of the act which he had committed and that it was his
first offense.
LUZ LUMANTA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FOOD TERMINAL, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 82819 February 8, 1989
FACTS:
On March 20, 1987, petitioner Luz Lumanta, joined by fifty-four (54) other retrenched employees, filed a complaint for unpaid
retrenchment or separation pay against private respondent Food Terminal, Inc. ("FTI") with the Department of Labor and Employment.
The complaint was later amended to include charges of underpayment of wages and non-payment of emergency cost of living
allowances (ECOLA).
The Labor Arbiter held that the case at bar lies outside the jurisdictional competence of the Department of Labor and Employment and
the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a labor law claim against a government-owned and controlled corporation falls within the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor and Employment.
RULING:
It is the 1987 Constitution, which applies in the case at bar, under the principle that jurisdiction is determined as of the time of the filing
of the complaint. Since 1980 FTI is in the category of "government-owned or controlled corporations." It served as the marketing arm
of the National Grains Authority (now known as the National Food Authority). FTI was previously a privately owned enterprise, created
and organized under the general incorporation law, with the corporate name "Greater Manila Food Terminal Market, Inc."
Because respondent FTI is government-owned and controlled corporation without original charter, it is the Department of Labor and
Employment, and not the Civil Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from employment of the petitioners
with private respondent FTI, and that consequently, the terms and conditions of such employment are governed by the Labor Code.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
FACTS:
On June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. When the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work they refused to return and the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike.
The SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential
pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS;
and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees
and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from
continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work
RULING:
Article XIII, Sec. 31 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law". But the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike.
The terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law. Thus the employees of SSS are covered by the Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which prohibits all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.
SSS is a government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters thus employees shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations. This being the case, it is the Civil Service Commission which has the jurisdiction and not the Regional Trial
Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION & THEIR
MEMBERS, respondents.
G.R. No. 87676 December 20, 1989
FACTS:
On June 15, 1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No.
967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.
On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los
Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue
depends the right of its employees to strike.
RULING:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and
Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice- Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the
Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued
pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated
July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President
and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A Perlas, Item No. 2, 3). (Italics ours.)

Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987
Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law
permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No.
180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment,
shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and
the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment.
AGUSTIN CHU, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. respondents.
G.R. No. 106107 June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner retired from the service of private respondent upon reaching the age of sixty under its regular retirement program. He was
granted an extention of service by the Board of Directors of private respondent under a "Special Contract of Employment." The contract
provided, inter alia, that its term was for a period of one year commencing on August 1, 1988; that petitioner was employed as Head of
the Warehousing, Sugar, Shipping and Marine Department; and that he was to receive a basic salary of P6,941.00 per month.
Private respondent issued Memorandum No. 1012-PS dated December 12, 1988 and Memorandum No. 1028-PS dated January 16,
1989, both providing for a rotation of the personnel and other organizational changes. Pursuant to the memoranda, petitioner was
transferred to the Sugar Sales Department.
Petitioner protested his transfer and requested a reconsideration thereof, which was denied. Consequently, on February 27, 1989,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, contending that he was constructively dismissed from his employment (RAB IV Case
No. 06-02-10081-89).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there was a valid exercise of management prerogative when the petitioner was transferred to other department
RULING:
An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in managing his business because it is deemed important to society as
a whole that he should succeed. Our law recognizes certain rights as inherent in the management of business enterprises. These rights
are collectively called management prerogatives or acts by which one directing a business is able to control the variables thereof so as
to enhance the chances of making a profit. It is part of the management prerogative their right to transfer employees in their work
station.
Nothing in the "Special Contract of Employment" wherein private respondent had waived its right to transfer or re-assign petitioner to
any other position in the company. Before such right can be deemed to have been waived or contracted away, the stipulation to that
effect must be clearly stated so as to leave no room to doubt the intentions of the parties. The mere specification in the employment
contract of the position to be held by the employee is not such stipulation.
PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EDILBERTO M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 106370 September 8, 1994
FACTS:
Edilberto M. Alvarez was first employed by petitioner on 2 July 1979. On 31 May 1989, private respondent, who was then occupying the
position of Steam Test Operator II, injured his right wrist when a steam-pressured "chicksan swivel joint assembly" exploded while he
was checking a geothermal well operated by petitioner. As a result, private respondent's right arm was placed in a plaster cast and he
was confined from 31 May 1989 to 3 June 1989.
Petitioner thus gave private respondent a fifty (50) days "work-connected accident" (WCA) leave with pay. Petitioner also referred
private respondent's case to an orthopedic doctor, at petitioner's expense.
On 26 July 1989, the orthopedic doctor certified that private respondent was fit to return to work with the qualification however, that he
could only perform light work. Thus, on 31 July 1989, when respondent Alvarez returned to work, he was assigned to "caliberation of
barton recorders", in accordance with the doctor's recommendations.
On 13 November 1989, when Alvarez was examined again, the orthopedic doctor finds that on the 6th month he can go back to his
previous job. Despite this certification private respondent continued to absent from work. On December 1989, the doctor certified that
the Alvarez injury had healed completely and that he could return to his pre-injury work. However, Alvarez consulted four more
orthopedic doctors with the same certification that he is fit for work.
Notwithstanding the medical findings, Alvarez continued to incur numerous absences. He did not report for work in the months of
January and February 1990.

The petitioner informed Alvarez through its third letter that inline with their company policy his subsequent absences will not be paid and
if he fail to report to work and are unable to present a medical certificate explaining his absence, he will face disciplinary action.
However, Alvarez incurred continued absences. As a consequence, petitioner terminated Alvarez employment on March 9, 1990.
A month after, Alvarez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region IV. The labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint. When he refilled his complaint, the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding private respondent's termination from
employment as valid and justified. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision was reversed and set aside. Petitioner was ordered to reinstate
Alvarez to his former position without loss of seniority rights but without backwages.
ISSUE
Whether or not Edilberto M. Alvarez was validly dismissed
RULING:
Article 282(b) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may validly dismiss an employee for gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties.
An employee who earnestly desires to resume his regular duties after recovering from an injury undoubtedly will not go through the
trouble of getting opinions from five (5) different of getting opinions from five (5) different physicians before going back to work after he
has been certified to be fit to return to his regular duties.
Petitioner has not been shown to be without sympathy or concern for Alvarez. He was given fifty (50) days work-connected accident
(WCA) leave with pay to allow him to recuperate from his injury without loss of earnings. He was allowed to use his leave credits and
was actually given an additional fifteen (15) days WCA leave to allow him to consult his doctors and fully recover from his injuries.
Moreover, petitioner gave Alvarez several warnings to report for work, otherwise, he would face disciplinary sanctions. In spite of these
warnings, Alvarez was absent without official leave (AWOL) for eighteen (18) days. Under company policy, of which Alvarez was made
aware, employees who incur without valid reason six (6) or more absences are subject to dismissal.
Petitioner, in its fourth and last warning letter to Alvarez, was willing to allow him to resume his work in spite of the eighteen (18) days
he went on AWOL. It was made clear, however, that should private respondent still fail to report for work on 5 March 1990, his
employment would be terminated.
Private respondent failed to report for work on 5 March 1990. Petitioner validly dismissed him not only for violation of company policy
but also for violation of Section 282(c) of the Labor Code aforecited.
While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving termination of employment
since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include
compelling an employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in
protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that
when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and
management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases
where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is
an injustice to the employer.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and/or ABELARDO DE LEON, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, and RODOLFO PERONILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 106654 December 16, 1994
FACTS:
In 1971, Peronila was employed as a driver of Pantranco North Express, Inc., a common carrier, and Abelardo de Leon is a manager.
In 1973, Peronila was investigated for his absence from work of more than two and one-half months without leave. According to the
report, Peronila claimed that he went on absence without leave from his work 107 calendar days continuously because "he went to
Cotabato, Mindanao to visit his dead grandfather."
The petitioner finds Peronilas explanation insufficient and consequently dismissed the respondent.
Fifteen years after such termination, Peronila reappeared and implored petitioner to reconsider his dismissal. Due to insistent appeals
by Peronila, petitioner eventually acceded and hired him as a driver, but on a contractual basis for a fixed period of one month. The
terms and conditions of that new employment contained in a letter signed by the general manager of the company and voluntarily
conformed to by Peronila.
Fifteen days from such employment, private respondent was involved in a vehicular mishap. The administrative investigation found
Peronila guilty hence his employment contract was terminated.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the employment contract which stipulates that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and Peronila is valid
(2) Whether or not the dismissal of employment contract of Peronila was illegal

RULING:
In upholding the validity of a contract of employment with fixed or specific period the decisive determinant in term employment should
not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement
and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it
may not be known when.
Applying Article 280 of the Labor Code that when the activities performed by the employee are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual trade of the employer, the employment is deemed regular notwithstanding a contrary agreement, there are exceptions to this rule.
The aforesaid provision, however, should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive employers of the right and prerogative to
choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an employee a regular status. Management has rights which should
also be protected.
The petitioner had validly dismissed Peronila long before when the latter absented himself without official leave. The re-hiring of private
respondent was out of compassion and not because the petitioner was impressed with the credentials of Peronila. Peronila's previous
violations of company rules explains the reluctant attitude to the petitioner in re-hiring him. When the bus driven by Peronila figured in a
road mishap, that incident finally prompted petitioner to sever any further relationship with said private respondent. Definitely, his rehiring cannot be construed to mean that Peronila reacquired his former permanent status.
PAMPANGA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., and JESUS S. NICDAO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and RAFAEL TIGLAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 107541 November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Tiglao was a bill collector of Pampanga II Electric Coorperative, Inc. (PELCO II). On May 1990, he failed to
account the amount of P75,238.87 during the audit conducted. A memorandum was issued to him directing him to settle immediately
his obligation. In response, he proposed settlement of the alleged obligation under the following schedules: to pay the amount of
P500.00 each payday by way of salary deduction until the total obligation is fully settled and paid; or in the alternative to execute in
favor of PELCO II a Deed of Conveyance over his real property with an area of not less than 11,000 square meters or more than one
(1) hectare with a total assessed market value in the amount of not less than P100,000.00 in satisfaction of the above-stated obligation.
The petitioner did not accept the private respondents proposal and suspended him from work without pay for an indefinite period of
time from September 3, 1990. On November 7, 1990, private respondent was terminated.
The Labor Arbiter found the petitioner PELCO guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter with modifications.
ISSUE:
1. Did the NLRC err in finding that there was no single iota of evidence establishing the fact that private respondent was
involved in any anomaly?
2. Did the petitioner illegally dismiss Rafael Tiglao?
RULING:
The employer has a right to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust or confidence. The condition for the exercise of this right
is that it must be based "on just and lawful causes, duly substantiated, otherwise it could easily be used as a pretext to reduce to a
barren form of words the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure."
In the case at bar, it is not true, as the Labor Arbiter and NLRC held, that there was not "an iota of evidence establishing the fact that
[herein private respondent] was involved in any anomaly, particularly an act which can be the basis of fraud or dishonesty that will lead
[herein petitioners] to lose trust and confidence on him." There was evidence to show that private respondent collected P75,238.87
from member-consumers of the PELCO II, and that evidence was supplied by private respondent himself.
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of private respondent in disregard of the right of petitioners. Social
justice ceases to be an effective instrument for the "equalization of the social and economic forces" by the State when it is used to
shield wrongdoing. For private respondent was no ordinary worker. He was a bill collector whose job depended on the utmost trust and
confidence of his employer. We have affirmed the dismissal of bill collectors found guilty of misappropriation of money in their custody
on precisely this ground. Private respondent admitted a breach of that confidence, but despite that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
insisted "there was not an iota of evidence establishing" culpability on the part of the employee. This calls for reversal where normally
respect for findings of administrative agencies is the rule.
DELIA BANGALISAN, LUCILIN CABALFIN, EMILIA DE GUZMAN, CORAZON GOMEZ, CORAZON GREGORIO, LOURDES
LAREDO, RODOLFO MARIANO, WILFREDO MERCADO, LIGAYA MONTANCES and CORAZON PAGPAGUITAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
G.R. No. 124678 July 31, 1997
FACTS:

Petitioners staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning the alleged failure of the
public authorities to implement certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
On September 17, 1990, the DECS Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they
were charged with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable
office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were
simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a
decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public school teachers have the right to strike.
RULING:
The Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, but they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services.
Suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right
to strike is denied to government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in
staging the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous
indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, series of 1998, which is GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS In this order is a
deployment ban of Filipina domestic overseas workers in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy,
Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. The petitioner, which is a recruitment firm, assails the constitutional validity of the Department Order
that the measure is discriminative against males or females; it is violative of the right to travel and it is an invalid exercise of police
power.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is constitutional
(2) Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:
Though Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," it does not make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. "Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The classification rests on substantial distinctions. The unhappy plight that has befallen to female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action.
The classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. It is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a
ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The deployment ban does not impair the right to travel. The right to travel is subject to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code. Its basic policy is to "afford protection to labor".
Moreover, the right itself is not absolute.
Though police power is the domain of the legislature, such authority may be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the
Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. Thus, Department Order No. 1 is a valid
exercise of police power.