We will discuss Revised Forestry Code until small scale mining act next meeting.

Revised Forestry Code - PD. No. 705

A) oriented to progress and development of the country, advancement of science and
public welfare
B) Protection, management and rehabilitation for sustainable development
C) Land classification and survey shall be systematized and hastened
D) Wood-processing plants shall be encouraged
Public Forest vs Permanent Forest or forest reserves
-subject to the present system of classification

1. Protected Areas - locations which receive protection because of their recognised

natural, ecological and/or cultural values
a. RA 7586 National Integrated Protected Areas System = AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM, DEFINING ITS SCOPE AND
COVERAGE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically
important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or
marine, all of which shall be designated as protected areas.
Picop Resources vs. Base Metals, 510 SCRA 400
ALvarez vs PICOP nov 29, 2006
DOCTRINE
Timber licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind theGovernment regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare.
FACTS PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43.TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It
was renewed on 7 October 1977 for another 25 years to "terminate on April 25,2002.On
25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
297,"EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, ANDDECLARING THE
SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATIONu AND AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL
AREA."The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less, which formed part of
PICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its applicationfor IFMA conversion.On 21

January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid
presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order.In said
NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
respondents therein from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary
and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) To
Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss
ISSUE
Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract
HELD: NO PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed
contract entered into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29
July 1969 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary
refutes this claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
the Presidential Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions NonImpairment Clause.The SC disagrees. Such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber
in the countrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare
b. PD 705 Revised Forestry Code as amended by EO 277 and RA 7161
Policies
See top
Sec 3. Definitions - see page 95
Sec of Environment and Natural Resources Vs Yap GR Nos. 167707 and173775 Oct
8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public
Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed
with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines apublic forest as a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay

Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De
Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act,
gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since
then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard
for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in
the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration
case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitutionclassifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by
dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has
not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as

amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does
not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

Lalican Vs Vergara GR 108619, July 31, 1997

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of
illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of
"timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code
of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the
former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1] Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose
Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543,
the information reads:
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City
of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted
species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW."
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of
P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and
asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or
boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the
law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents
required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the
information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the law.[2]
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the
courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature
which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a
"product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to
hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily
cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal
prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more
semantical than a question of law.[3]
On September 24, 1991, the lower court,[4] guided by the principles that penal laws
should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction
between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself
distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest
product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding
that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68
while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the
government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest
lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and
sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by
petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.
[5]

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that
under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources
(DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and
manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or
hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not
criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused
presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had
expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually
came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with
certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were
indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin,
lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation
from one point to another.[6]
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR
primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber"
from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear
legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that
section.[7]
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch
49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was
subsequently assigned to Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court [8] issued the herein questioned Order setting aside
the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident
that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal
documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber
is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal
documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of
forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied
it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his
motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies
nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued
on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings
on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru
Justice Hilario Davide, held:
"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While
the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,'
which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timberwithout the required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is
clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive
Order No. 277, are the following:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the
country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the
vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties,
due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to

make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act
which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat
compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the
law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber
which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would
merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:
"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the
prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof
without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD
705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest
products, viz., x x x
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product
(supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is
not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could
stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal
prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for
the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in
their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the
legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of
timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is
prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other
forest products without lawful authority."
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari
may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of
discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
[11]
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.[12]
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
discretion.[13] Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.[14]As this Court said:
"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,

every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of
justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil
action of certiorari."[15]
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[16]
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case
is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this
case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three
others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a
motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part
to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.[17]
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is
denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the
fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot
be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. [19] An
interlocutory order may be assailed bycertiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that
the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
[20]
However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the
subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also
would unduly burden the courts.[21]
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention
that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case
has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not
being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed,[23] this case may
not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion
to quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner
would have this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on
constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional
matter are present in a case,[25] this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other
grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.[26]
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in
this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling
our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the
lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the

interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare
and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must
arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in
arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform
Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to
petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not
been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Chapter I. Organization and Jurisdiction of the Bureau
DENR vs. Daraman, 377 SCRA 39 Gr 125797, 2002
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others,
the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused
GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged,
with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is
taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3]

The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last
paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein
respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with]
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted
sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by
Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not
guilty.
Thereafter trial was conducted.
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a
Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he
was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate
No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said
vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber
consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In
his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would
beP729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it
was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle
was owned by his employer,Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services
in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and,
thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took
photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he

signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the
driver GregorioDaraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he
had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy.
Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned
by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the
vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house
inBarangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the
case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The
prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs.
C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to
identify [them].
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would
merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been
established:
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed
him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service
vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya,
Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by
a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22
inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood
shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin.
After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring
his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy
Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted
lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop
where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao,
Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the
assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture
shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans)
house in Barangay Obrero, CalbayogCity. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him
that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the
papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded
the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the
vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his
employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle to Lucenecio.

Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
of Catbalogan,Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized
lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present
documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber
seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional
Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.
[6]
Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with
the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private
respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and
Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII,Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said
vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been
administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9]He further claimed that the DENR had
exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.
The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood
shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house
in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora.
Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC
considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his
disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the
Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral
Parlor owned by accusedNarciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705.
Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused
Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which
would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products.

Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject
lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long
become final and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by
the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in
question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for
reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the
present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a
violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who
committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in
violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy
Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation
of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the
driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation
charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the
return of property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of
mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the
confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3)
whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from
confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the
return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government
property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The
DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by
land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the
provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction
of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of
forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.[15]

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts; equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want,
especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that
are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A
define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether
motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode
of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
[17]

Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has
supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 5493, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides
the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to
private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess
seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The
Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance
of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false,
falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record
only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only
after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to
the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum
on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-incharge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum
recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32)
ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the
confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal

Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it
was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls
outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the
assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of
violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was
based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it.
Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the
confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of
Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed. [24] The genuineness of the Order
and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this
Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the
main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court. [26] Under PD 705, the
actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special
civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A,
PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator
or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of
1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the
conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal
use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of
PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law
or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her
vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have
violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case
is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement
or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the
authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable
of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we
cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it
impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest

products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an
injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry
laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the
remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws. [29] Strong
paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that
frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners
third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to
hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval
does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Chapter II. Classification and Survey
Areas Needed for Forest Purposes - even if they are below eighteen percent in slope,
are needed for forest purposes to wit: see page 109
Chapter III. Utilization and Management
Antonio Vs Factoran GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993 Sec 20, PD 705 = see internet
A. Timber:
Silvicultural and Harvesting System
Silviculture is the establishment, development reproduction and care of forest trees
Page 118
Limitations Page 118
Duration Page 118

B. Wood Processing - page 122

C. Reforestation
Lands to be Reforested
1. Public
2. Private
PD 953 REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF TREES IN CERTAIN PLACES AND
PENALIZING UNAUTHORIZED CUTTING, DESTRUCTION, DAMAGING AND
INJURING OF CERTAIN TREES, PLANTS AND VEGETATION
PD 1153 REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF ONE TREE EVERY MONTH FOR FIVE
CONSECUTIVE YEARS BY EVERY CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES n furtherance
of said policy, every citizen of the Philippines at least ten (10) years of age, actually
residing therein, unless physically disabled to do so, shall plant one tree every month for
five (5) consecutive years.
Utleg Vs Arca GR No. L-25026, August 31, 1971
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/may1989/gr_l67195_1989.html
Kaingin
D. Special Uses
E. Criminal Offenses:
Who are liable
What acts are punishable
Who may arrest
Merida vs. People, 554 SCRA 366
Aquino vs. People, 594 SCRA 50
Taopa Vs People Gr 184098 Nov. 2008
c. RA 9175 Chainsaw Act of 2002
Persons authorized to use chainsaw
Unlawful acts
2. Minerals
a. RA 7076 Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act
SR Metals Inc Vs Angelo T. Reyes GR 179669; June 04, 2014
League of provinces of the Philippines vs. DENR, Gr no. 175368, Leonora Calanza Vs Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines Gr 146662 April
24, 2009