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FACTS:
Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and
Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments
with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging
that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco
rates.
In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is
not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment
tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with
their lease contracts.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents
against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations
with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged
in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity
for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their
respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board
which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring
her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common
areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year
arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must
be set aside as null and void.
rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose
A.Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
theElectoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
ofthe protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of
saidpetitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district
ofthe Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
ElectoralCommission.Issue :
WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdictionin assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of theherein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election byresolution of the
National Assembly?
Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate reithe
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protestsintrusted to its
cognizance should be filed.It is a settled rule of construction thatwhere a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular powernecessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is alsoconferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). Inthe absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to befollowed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, theincidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive powers to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed bynecessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise thepower to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power isinherently judicial in
nature. The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer alllaws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear anddecide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
theelections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be
classifiedas a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30,
ArticleVIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise
quasi- judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law
comeunder its jurisdiction.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence isessential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to theenforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, inthe, administration
of justice.The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident andattribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariablylimited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise
of thatpower by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative
functionhas been held invalid
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757
Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the
defunctCourt of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared
null andvoid its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private
respondent SimplicioC. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto.
Domingo of San Juan,Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as
policeman of the samemunicipality with back salaries from the date of his
suspension up to the date of his actualreinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio
C.Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission
decidedAdministrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the
proceedings of the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the
legalrequirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative
case withoutstenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of
Investigators) of theproceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does
not provide that the Boardof Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such
it does not provide for officepersonnel such as clerks and stenographers who may
be employed to take note of theproceedings of the board. The proceeding provided
for is merely administrative andsummary in character, in line with the principle that
"administrative rules of procedureshould be construed liberally in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties inobtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims anddefenses." The formalities usually
attendant in court hearings need not be present in anadministrative investigation,
provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunityto adduce their
respective evidence.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, CIR)
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the
layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is
not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
motion.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR
is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between,
and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
(Administrative Law, Contempt Power, Quasi-Judicial Power)
Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then
NLRC charging petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the
Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of
officers. NLRC issued an order directing the BLU to hold its election of officers within
20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for prohibition with a writ of
preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the Sec. Of
Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it.
Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime delos Angeles afterwards
reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions
raised therein. Private and judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued
by respondent Inciong requiring them to appear at the NLRC to explain why they
should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a
union election duly ordered by the commission.
Issue: WON a labor officials power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to
comply with its order can be extended to trial court judges.
Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law,
which is the essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies,
must observe the limits of its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in
view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised after hearing the arguments on
the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case
before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the
domain of the powers conferred on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to
reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules.
have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case
that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be
governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the
appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partesproceedings in the Philippine Patent
Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing
officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing
of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo
Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their
cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under
the law the Director must personally hear and decideinter partes cases. Said
objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition
formandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents
under the general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the
contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is
"empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified
officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or
operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any
matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said
Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the
approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent
Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the
administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the
administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may
be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions
maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by
express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no
provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such
authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the
makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies
them." 17
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the
myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on
the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.
Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not
jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been
prejudiced by the proceedings.
Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this Court
has correctly pointed out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing
officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963 to 1968 18 not only confirms the
departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the
act of the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the
administration of the law. 19
Petition dismissed.
SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Padilla, J. | June 29, 1957
FACTS:
-
In 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubal, father of Alicia Nubal (16 year old minor), filed
a complaint against Emilio Suntay. The complained alleged that Suntay
took Alicia from her school in St. Paul Pasig, and took her to UP Diliman,
and there had carnal knowledge of her.
The private prosecutor filed a motion praying that the Court issue and
order directing the concerned government agencies (i.e. DFA, NBI) to,
essentially, bring the accused back to the Philippines so that he can be
made to answer for the charges against him. This motion was granted.
However, this order was not carried out in view of the present petition
filed by Suntay. Suntays complain alleged that:
While the court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the
Secretarys discretion is abused, the court cannot take the
discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a
passport to be cancelled.
Suntay in this case is charged with seduction. The order of the court
directing the DFA to take proper steps in order that Suntay may be
brought back to the Philippines is not beyond or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
RATIO:
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.
But where the holder of a passport is facing criminal charges in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport
already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically in cancelling
such passport.