Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
his answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions
SUPREME COURT
raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite
ManilaEN BANC
categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative
order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-delegation, is
DECISION
not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest
involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to
the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the
L-32096
executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this
vs.
sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and
insubstantial.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of
Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner. Teddy C. Galo in his own
other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
behalf.
injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police
G.R.
No.
power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970
, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari
and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of
petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for
certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the
validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in
with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that
respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties
were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970,
respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the
enforcement of such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile,
the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the
injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was
oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the
filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for
to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather
certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.
convincing fashion that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged
constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G.
Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the
enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the
Solicitor General in seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality
of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to
be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July
6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this petition
concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order
No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that
it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing
with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It
for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a
declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof
of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that
there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any
further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the
constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then
where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need
not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public,
both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was
mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying
that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge
being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
was made clear during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this Court.
a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was
a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector
Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the
question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so
we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused
considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
themselves."
Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly
passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding
before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt
need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a
challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the
case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can
very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.
Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of
showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown too
much for respondent Galo.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to
quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed
at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that
are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or
other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back
which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not
powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs."
9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang
v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and
economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater
receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and
unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to
do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the
due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the
hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude
betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there
was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is
reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product
property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian,
could already discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental
activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no
longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights
to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions
were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of
many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American
Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against
an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a
fundamental postulate in American public law, laissez faire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American
court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo
speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do
well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must
obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered
on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract,
based on such a basic assumption.
that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as
1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm
already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past.
The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process
clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty
days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It is
to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the
Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year before, the
American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-
thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not
faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally
only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find
infirm.
declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard
the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have
come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards,
the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and
national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat
in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a
7.2At the very least, whether or not Congress will be able to fasttrack the
enactment of a new oil deregulation law consistent with the Honorable
Court's ruling, would depend on many unforseeable and uncontrollable
factors. Already, several statements from legislators, senators and
congressmen alike, say that the new law can wait because of other
pending legislative matters, etc. Given the "realities" of politics, especially
with the 1998 presidential polls six months away, it is not far-fetched that
the general welfare could be sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus
further unduly delaying the enactment of a new oil deregulation law.
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment
concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the
laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the
changes that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and
its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in
People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21
leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate
issuance of
Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental
functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this
Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29
price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security
or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there
scheme. 34
shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle
parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of
Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissezfaire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to
body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial
glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all
be red. 39
paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it
would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune
from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the
with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse
constitutional test.
registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe
suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided],
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity
of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took
effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set
forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall
either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or
luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean
However, that in the case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8)
Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.
40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector
Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and
regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It
is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its
provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor
not less than P50 could be imposed. 42
at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions
the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors - Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape - At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner."
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry
announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature
non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments,
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice
law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be
by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel.
A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that
is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is
then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is
assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government,
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders
said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to
of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate
the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying
the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the
reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to
law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo,
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of
"sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs.
costs.
FIRST DIVISION
Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the
delegated authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law
and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative
powers ... " 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
D. SACO, respondents.
There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,
far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had
no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of
the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner,
as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but
by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move
for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his
widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but
a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan
in 1985.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an
opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one
of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law.
petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay
the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen"
overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign
employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments
seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he
died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute
implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas
10
of the
it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a
contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas
serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular,
Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on
board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract
effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private
respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas
contract worker Vitaliano Saco."
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the
provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with
Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the
Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees
of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are
not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it
been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and
approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier
observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it.
13
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase
of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the
better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
exception.
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public
interest" in People v. Rosenthal
15
16
"public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and
efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United
States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit
pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral
benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also
received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen
Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working
electrician
class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the
Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum
Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of
administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the
quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply
such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its
own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and
the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be
granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract
approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law
and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the
Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane.
Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159796. July 17, 2007.]
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and
ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN),
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT
GROUP
(PSALM
Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY
ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
The Facts
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. 7
On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group 8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a
petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165. 9
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the
Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of
P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF)
managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group
(PSALM) 10 for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. 11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPCSPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the
same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision 13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165)
modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional
authority granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power
Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is
hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount of P0.0205 per
kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour
provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly,
a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share
from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective
on the following billing cycles:
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the
NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the
Universal Charge. 16
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal
Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
17
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of
the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities.
The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as
such, the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision
clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence
leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where
the funds collected should be used.
benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual
taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable
standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly,
respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with
the requirements of due process. 23
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components
of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC
Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec.
46 24 of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions
or its IRR. 25
The Issues
The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your
property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers. 34 We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. 35
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose
for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
36
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts
and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
forum from which to seek such relief. 28 It has long been established that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 29
This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue
raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not
resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of
this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid
unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State's power of taxation from
the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it. 30 It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of
the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. 31 Thus,
the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without
taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the people. 32
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. 33 It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed 37 and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA
resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a
regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and
economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of
Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and
private sector entities in the process of restructuring the
electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and
services of electric utilities and other providers of electric
power;
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated).
This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 47
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.
48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies
the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation
is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have
to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. 49
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec.
34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the
specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43 (b) (ii) of
the EPIRA provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote
competition, encourage market development, ensure customer
choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured
electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to
issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards
this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the
restructured industry:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate
and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a
Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the
TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the
formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and
function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That
such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry
participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the
public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and
public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity
end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude
of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of the
EPIRA 50 clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective,
have the following powers:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer
limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals,
which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police
power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to
eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of
an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted
"to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of
society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the
governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the
basic end of all government." When police power is delegated to
administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should
be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader
dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State
must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting
interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC,
acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We
should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This
approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of
electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a
traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few
but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging
investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may
come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is
impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power
outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the
ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great
flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.
Energy Regulatory Commission 63 where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator,
should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious
factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that
the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory,
and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed
waived or abandoned per Resolution 64 of August 3, 2004. 65 Moreover, the
determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an
issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
reviewing the same. 66
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in
recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal
EN BANC
violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big
business within reasonable bounds.
The Constitution gave this Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the
Constitution. It did not exempt from the reach of this authority laws with economic
dimension.
A separability clause does not clothe the valid parts with immunity from the invalidating
effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the bad with the good. The
separability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result. In sum, if
the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature, separation will not
take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law. In the case of
Republic Act No. 8180, the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff differential,
minimum inventory and predatory pricing cannot but result in the unconstitutionality of
the entire law despite its separability clause. These provisions cannot be struck down
alone for they were the ones intended to carry out the policy of the law embodied in
Section 2 thereof. The provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and
predatory pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. 8180.
Without these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry.
The Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of the intervenors as
well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique Garcia: are denied
for lack of merit.
Sanidad, Abaya, Cortez, Te, Madrid, Viterbo & Tan Law Firm for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz co-counsel for Caltex Phil., Inc.
SYNOPSIS
Motions for reconsideration and partial motions for reconsideration were filed by the
parties of the decision of the Supreme Court declaring R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional.
The choice and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of delegated power is part
of the lawmaking process and lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The
standard cannot be altered in any way by the Executive for the Executive cannot modify
the will of the Legislature.
The power of Congress to enact laws does not include the right to pass unconstitutional
laws. In fine, the Court did not usurp the power of Congress to enact laws but merely
discharged its bounden duty to check the constitutionality of laws when challenged in
appropriate cases. Our decision annulling R.A. 8180 is justified by the principle of check
and balance. We hold that power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the
constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries
serious economic implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political
and civil rights of our people even if it has to often the other more powerful branches of
government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION BUT EXCLUDE FAIR AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION. Public
respondents try to justify the 4% tariff differential on the ground that there is a
substantial difference between a refiner and an importer just as there is a difference
between raw material and finished product. Obviously, the effort is made to demonstrate
that the unequal tariff does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The effort only proves that the public respondents are still looking at the issue of tariff
differential from the wrong end of the telescope. Our Decision did not hold that the 4%
tariff differential infringed the equal protection clause of the Constitution even as this
was contended by petitioner Tatad. Rather, we held that said tariff differential
substantially occluded the entry point of prospective players in the downstream oil
industry. We further held that its inevitable result is to exclude fair and effective
competition and to enhance the monopolists ability to tamper with the mechanism of a
free market. This consideration is basic in anti-trust suits and cannot be eroded by
belaboring the inapplicable principle in taxation that different things can be taxed
differently.
4.ID.; ID.; .ID.; MINIMUM INVENTORY REQUIREMENT; HIGH COST OF MEETING
REQUIREMENT HAS AN INHIBITING EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. The public
respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory requirement. They
aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during their first year of
operation because they do not have yet annual sales from which the required minimum
inventory may be determined. Compliance with such requirement on their second and
succeeding years of operation will not be difficult because the putting up of storage
facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an ordinary and
necessary business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished-products in
other industries." The contention cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner
Garcia, "the prohibitive cost of the required minimum inventory will not be any less
burdensome on the second, third, fourth, etc. years of operations. Unlike most products
which can be imported and stored with facility, oil imports require ocean receiving,
storage facilities. Ocean receiving terminals are already very expensive, and to require
new players to put up more than they need is to compound and aggravate their costs,
and consequently their great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Big 3." Again, the argument on
whether the minimum inventory requirement seriously hurts the new players is best
settled by hearing the new players themselves In their motion for intervention, they
implicitly confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory requirement has an
inhibiting effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of this Court striking
it down as unconstitutional.
5.ID.; ID.; PREDATORY PRICING; DEFINITION TOO LOOSE TO BE DETERRENT.
As discussed, the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential and minimum
inventory erected high barriers to the entry of prospective players even as they raised
their new rivals' costs, thus creating the clear danger that the deregulated market in the
downstream oil industry will not operate under an atmosphere of free and fair
competition. It is certain that lack of real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists
to dictate prices, and can entice them to engage in predatory pricing to eliminate rivals.
The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing will not dissolve-this clear
danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to be a real deterrent.
Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test, Congressman Tinga has proposed to
redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any
oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying
7.ID., ID., POWER TO PASS UPON CONSTITUTIONALITY LAWS DID NOT EXEMPT
LAWS WITH ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS. We hold that the power and obligation of
this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that
the challenged law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck down
laws abridging-the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other
more powerful branches of government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike
down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to
bridle the liberty of big business within reasonable bounds. The Constitution gave this
Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the Constitution. It did not exempt
from the reach of this authority laws with economic dimension.
8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; R.A. NO. 8180; CHOICE OF
DATE OF FULL DEREGULATION, A JUDGMENT CALL OF CONGRESS WHICH
CANNOT BE IMPUGNED BY THIS COURT. Petitioner has no basis in condemning
as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive
for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to
February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the full
deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already come to pass.
March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date the transition period has ended and it
was expected that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in
shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date
of full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned
by this Court.
politics nor does it delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan
political theology for as an institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse politically
agnostic.
13.ID.; ID.; WITH THE UNYIELDING DUTY TO UPHOLD THE SUPREMACY OF THE
CONSTITUTION. The Constitution mandates the regulation of monopolies and
interdicts unfair competition. Thus, the Constitution provides a shield to the economic
rights of our people, especially the poor. It is the unyielding duty of this Court to uphold
the supremacy of the Constitution not with a mere wishbone but with a backbone that
should neither bend nor break.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER;
STATUTES; SEPARABILITY CLAUSE; CONSTRUED. A separability clause states
that if for any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be
unconstitutional or (invalid), the other section(s) or provision(s) of the law shall not be
affected thereby. It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision
shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however,
controlling and the courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute where what is
left, after the void part, is not complete and workable.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The three provisions declared void are
severable from the main statute and their removal therefrom would not affect the validity
and enforceability of the remaining provisions of the said law R.A. 8180, sans the
constitutionally infirmed portions, remains "complete in itself, sensible, capable of being
executed and wholly independent of (those) which (are) rejected. In other words,
despite the elimination of some of its parts; the law can still stand on its own.
RESOLUTION
11.ID.; AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIVES THE LAWS IT HAS REPEALED. It
is sealed jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws
that it has repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status
quo ante and this return is beyond the power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of
government, however, the remedy to prevent the revival of all unwanted status quo ante
lies with Congress. Congress can block the revival of the status quo ante or stop its
continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial legislation. We emphasize
that in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of deregulation
as unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to the
constitutional provision calling for fair competition. Thus, there is no impediment in reenacting R A. No. 8180 minus its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court
agrees that our return to the regime of regulation has pernicious consequences and it
specially sympathizes with the intervenors. Be that as it may, the Court is powerless to
prevent this return just as it is powerless to repeal the 10% tariff, differential of the Tariff
Code. It is Congress that can a give all these remedies.
12.ID.; SUPREME COURT, WITH NO PARTISAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY. When
the Court reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of
PUNO, J p:
For resolution are: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondents;
and (2) the partial motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and
the intervenors. 1
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the public respondents contend:
I
"Executive Order No. 392 is not a misapplication of Republic Act
No. 8180;
II
public respondents do not cite any authority to support its strange thesis for there is
none in our jurisprudence.
The public respondents next recycle their arguments that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 do not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution. 3 They
reiterate that the 4% tariff differential would encourage the construction of new refineries
which will benefit the country for they use Filipino labor and goods. We have rejected
this submission for a reality check will reveal that this 4% tariff differential gives a
decisive edge to the existing oil companies even as it constitutes a substantial barrier to
the entry of prospective players. We do not agree with the public respondents that there
is no empirical evidence to support this ruling. In the recent hearing of the Senate
Committee on Energy chaired by Senator Freddie Webb, it was established that the 4%
tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum importation gives a 20-centavo per
liter advantage to the three big oil companies over the new players. It was also found
that said tariff differential serves as a protective shield for the big oil companies. 4 Nor
do we approve public respondents' submission that the entry of new players after
deregulation is proof that the 4% tariff differential is not a heavy disincentive. Acting as
the mouthpiece of the new players, public respondents even lament that "unfortunately,
the opportunity to get the answer right from the 'horses' mouth' eluded this Honorable
Court since none of the new players supposedly adversely affected by the assailed
provisions came forward to voice their position." 5 They need not continue their
lamentation. The new players represented by Eastern Petroleum, Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation, Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., TWA Inc., and DubPhil Gas have intervened in
the cases at bar and have spoken for themselves. In their motion for intervention, they
made it crystal clear that it is not their intention ". . . to seek the reversal of the Court's
nullification of the 4% differential in section 5(b) nor of the inventory requirement of
section 6, nor of the prohibition of predatory pricing in section 9(b)." 6 They stressed
that they only protest the restoration of the 10% oil tariff differential under the Tariff
Code. 7 The horse's mouth therefore authoritatively tells us that the new players
themselves consider the 4% tariff differential in R.A. No. 8180 as oppressive and should
be nullified.
To give their argument a new spin, public respondents try to justify the 4% tariff
differential on the ground that there is a substantial difference between a refiner and an
importer just as there is a difference between raw material and finished product.
Obviously, the effort is made to demonstrate that the unequal tariff does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The effort only proves that the public
respondents are still looking at the issue of tariff differential from the wrong end of the
telescope. Our Decision did not hold that the 4% tariff differential infringed the equal
protection clause of the Constitution even as this was contended by petitioner Tatad. 8
Rather, we held that said tariff differential substantially occluded the entry point of
prospective players in the downstream oil industry. We further held that its inevitable
result is to exclude fair and effective competition and to enhance the monopolists' ability
to tamper with the mechanism of a free market. This consideration is basic in anti-trust
suits and cannot be eroded by belaboring the inapplicable principle in taxation that
different things can be taxed differently.
The public respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory
requirement. They aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during
their first year of operation because they do not have yet annual sales from which the
required minimum inventory may be determined. Compliance with such requirement on
their second and succeeding years of operation will not be difficult because the putting
up of storage facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an ordinary
and necessary business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished products
in other industries." 9 The contention is an old one although it is purveyed with a new
lipstick. The contention cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner Garcia, "the
prohibitive cost of the required minimum inventory will not be any less burdensome on
the second, third, fourth, etc. years of operations. Unlike most products which can be
imported and stored with facility, oil imports require ocean receiving, storage facilities.
Ocean receiving terminals are already very expensive, and to require new players to put
up more than they need is to compound and aggravate their costs, and consequently
their great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Big 3." 10 Again, the argument on whether the
minimum inventory requirement seriously hurts the new players is best settled by
hearing the new players themselves. In their motion for intervention, they implicitly
confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory requirement has an inhibiting
effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of this Court striking it down
as unconstitutional.
Public respondents still maintain that the provision on predatory pricing does not offend
the Constitution. Again, their argument is not fresh though embellished with citations of
cases in the United States sustaining the validity of sales-below-costs statutes. 11 A
quick look at these American cases will show that they are inapplicable. R.A. No. 8180
has a different cast. As discussed, its provisions on tariff differential and minimum
inventory erected high barriers to the entry of prospective players even as they raised
their new rivals' costs, thus creating the clear danger that the deregulated market in the
downstream oil industry will not operate under an atmosphere of free and fair
competition. It is certain that lack of real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists
to dictate prices, 12 and can entice them to engage in predatory pricing to eliminate
rivals. The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing will not dissolve this clear
danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to be a real deterrent.
Thus, one of the law's principal authors, Congressman Dante O. Tinga filed H.B. No.
10057 where he acknowledged in its explanatory note that "the definition of predatory
pricing . . . needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark
price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was
taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the
questions." Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test, Congressman Tinga has
proposed to redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or offering
to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of
destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from
entering the market." 13 In light of its loose characterization in R.A. 8180 and the law's
anti-competitive provisions, we held that the provision on predatory pricing is
constitutionally infirmed for it can be wielded more successfully by the oil oligopolists. Its
cumulative effect is to add to the arsenal of power of the dominant oil companies. For as
structured, it has no more than the strength of a spider web it can catch the weak but
cannot catch the strong; it can stop the small oil players but cannot stop the big oil
players from engaging in predatory pricing.
Public respondents insist on their thesis that the cases at bar actually assail the wisdom
of RA. No. 8180 and that this Court should refrain from examining the wisdom of
legislations. They contend that R.A. No. 8180 involves an economic policy which this
Court cannot review for lack of power and competence. To start with, no school of
scholars can claim any infallibility. Historians with undefiled learning have chronicled 14
over the years the disgrace of many economists and the fall of one economic dogma
after another. Be that as it may, the Court is aware that the principle of separation of
powers prohibits the judiciary from interfering with the policy setting function of the
legislature. 15 For this reason we italicized in our Decision that the Court did not review
the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180 but its compatibility with the Constitution; the Court did not
annul the economic policy of deregulation but vitiated its aspects which offended the
constitutional mandate on fair competition. It is beyond debate that the power of
Congress to enact laws does not include the right to pass unconstitutional laws. In fine,
the Court did not usurp the power of Congress to enact laws but merely discharged its
bounden duty to check the constitutionality of laws when challenged in appropriate
cases. Our Decision annulling R.A. No. 8180 is justified by the principle of check and
balance.
We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of
laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic
implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political and civil rights of
our people even if it has to offend the other more powerful branches of the government.
There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the
economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within
reasonable bounds. In Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation 16 the Court, speaking
thru Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held:
"2.Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the
nullification of the challenged provision on the ground of his being
deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of law.
8.4The investments that existing new players have already made would
become idle and unproductive. All their planned additional investments
would be put on hold.
8.5Needless to say, all this would translate into tremendous losses for
them.
8.6And obviously, prospective new players cannot and will not come in.
8.7On top of everything, public interest will suffer. Firstly, the oil
deregulation program will be delayed. Secondly, the prices of petroleum
products will be higher because of price ceilings based on transfer
imported crude.
9.When it passed R.A. No. 8180, Congress provided a safeguard
against the possibility that any of its provisions could be declared
unconstitutional, thus the separability clause thereof, which the
Court noted (Decision, p. 29). We humbly submit that this is
another reason to grant the motion for partial reconsideration.
In his Supplement to Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner Garcia
amplified his contentions.
In a similar refrain, the public respondents contend that the "unmistakable intention of
Congress" is to make each and every provision of RA. No. 8180 "independent and
separable from one another." To bolster this proposition, they cite the separability clause
of the law and the pending bills in Congress proposing to repeal said offensive
provisions but not the entire law itself. They also recite the "inevitable consequences of
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180" as follows:
"1.There will be bigger price adjustments in petroleum products due
to (a) the reimposition of the higher tariff rates for imported
crude oil and imported refined petroleum products [10%20%], (b) the uncertainty regarding R.A. 8184, or the "Oil
Tariff Law," which simplified tax administration by lowering
the tax rates for socially-sensitive products such as LPG,
diesel, fuel oil and kerosene, and increasing tax rates of
gasoline products which are used mostly by consumers
who belong to the upper income group, and (c) the issue
of wiping out the deficit of P2.6 billion and creating a
subsidy fund in the Oil Price Stabilization Fund;
2.Importers, traders, and industrial end-users like the National
Power Corporation will be constrained to source their oil
pricing formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly
price increases in excess of P0.50 per liter."
We held in our Decision that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory
and predatory pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. No.
8180. Without these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry. Consider the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined
petroleum. Before R.A. No. 8180, 22 there was a ten-point difference between the tariff
imposed on crude oil and that on refined petroleum. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
lowered the difference to four by imposing a 3% tariff on crude oil and a 7% tariff on
refined petroleum. We ruled, however, that this reduced tariff differential is
unconstitutional for it still posed a substantial barrier to the entry of new players and
enhanced the monopolistic power of the three existing oil companies. The ruling that the
4% differential is unconstitutional will unfortunately revive the 10% tariff differential of
the Tariff and Customs Code. The high 10% tariff differential will certainly give a bigger
edge to the three existing oil companies, will form an insuperable barrier to prospective
players, and will drive out of business the new players. Thus, there can be no question
that Congress will not allow deregulation if the tariff is 10% on crude oil and 20% on
refined petroleum. To decree the partial unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 will bring
about an absurdity a fully deregulated downstream oil industry where government is
impotent to regulate run away prices, where the oil oligopolists can engage in
cartelization without competition, where prospective players cannot come in, and where
new players will close shop. LLjur
We also reject the argument that the bills pending in Congress merely seek to remedy
the partial defects of R.A. No. 8180, and that this is proof that R.A. No. 8180 can be
declared unconstitutional minus its offensive provisions. We referred to the pending bills
in Congress in our Decision only to show that Congress itself is aware of the various
defects of the law and not to prove the inseparability of the offending provisions from the
body of R.A. No. 8180. To be sure, movants even overlooked the fact that resolutions
have been filed in both Houses of Congress calling for a total review of R.A. No. 8180.
The movants warn that our Decision will throw us back to the undesirable regime of
regulation. They emphasize its pernicious consequences the revival of the 10% tariff
differential which will wipe out the new players, the return of the OPSF which is too
burdensome to government, the unsatisfactory scheme of price regulation by the ERB,
etc. To stress again, it is not the will of the Court to return even temporarily to the regime
of regulation. If we return to the regime of regulation, it is because it is the inevitable
consequence of the enactment by Congress of an unconstitutional law, R.A. No. 8180. It
is settled jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws
that it has repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status
quo ante and this return is beyond the power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of
government, however, the remedy to prevent the revival of an unwanted status quo
ante lies with Congress. Congress can block the revival of the status quo ante or stop
its continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial legislation. We
emphasize that in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of
deregulation as unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to
the constitutional provision calling for fair competition. 23 Thus, there is no impediment
in re-enacting R.A. No. 8180 minus its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court
agrees that our return to the regime of regulation has pernicious consequences and it
specially sympathizes with the intervenors. Be that as it may, the Court is powerless to
prevent this return just as it is powerless to repeal the 10% tariff differential of the Tariff
Code. It is Congress that can give all these remedies. 24
Petitioner Garcia, however, injects a non-legal argument in his motion for partial
reconsideration. He avers that "given the 'realities' of politics, especially with the 1998
presidential polls six months away, it is not far-fetched that the general welfare could be
sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus further unduly delaying the enactment of a new
oil deregulation law." The short answer to petitioner Garcia's argument is that when the
Court reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of politics
nor does it delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan political
theology for as an institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse, politically agnostic. In
any event, it should not take a long time for Congress to enact a new oil deregulation
law given its interest for the welfare of our people. Petitioner Garcia himself has been
quoted as saying that ". . . with the Court's decision, it would now be easy for Congress
to craft a new law, considering that lawmakers will be guided by the Court's points." 25
Even before our Decision, bills amending the offensive provisions of R.A. No. 8180
have already been filed in the Congress and under consideration by its committees.
Speaker Jose de Venecia has assured after a meeting of the Legislative-Executive
Advisory Council (LEDAC) that: "I suppose before Christmas, we should be able to pass
a new oil deregulation law." 26 The Chief Executive himself has urged the immediate
passage of a new and better oil deregulation law. 27
Finally, public respondents raise the scarecrow argument that our Decision will drive
away foreign investors. In response to this official repertoire, suffice to state that our
Decision precisely levels the playing field for foreign investors as against the three
dominant oil oligopolists. No less than the influential Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry whose motive is beyond question, stated thru its Acting President Jaime
Ladao that ". . . this Decision, in fact tells us that we are for honest-to-goodness
competition." Our Decision should be a confidence booster to foreign investors for it
assures them of an effective judicial remedy against an unconstitutional law. There is
need to attract foreign investment but the policy has never been foreign investment at
any cost. We cannot trade-in the Constitution for foreign investment. It is not economic
heresy to hold that trade-in is not a fair exchange.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J ., concurring and dissenting:
Brought before us are the motions for reconsideration of public respondents and the
partial motions for reconsideration of petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and the movants-inintervention. The majority, acting on the motions, resolves to deny the same for lack of
merit. With due respect, I concur in part and dissent in part.
To recapitulate, our Decision declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional for three reasons:
(1) it gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly; (2) it blocked the entry of
effective competitors; and (3) it will sire an even more powerful oligopoly whose
unchecked power will prejudice the interest of the consumers and compromise the
general welfare.
At the outset let me clarify that, although I concurred with the enlightened ponencia of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the decision sought to be reconsidered. I did not go
along with his conclusion declaring the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act (R A.
No. 8180) unconstitutional in its entirety. In the dispositive portion of my separate
opinion, I explicitly stated that only the three anti-competition provisions of the said law
should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of the law, free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect in view of the separability clause
contained therein. 1
A weak and developing country like the Philippines cannot risk a downstream oil
industry controlled by a foreign oligopoly that can run riot. Oil is our most socially
sensitive commodity and for it to be under the control of a foreign oligopoly without
effective competitors is a clear and present danger. A foreign oil oligopoly can
undermine the security of the nation; it can exploit the economy if greed becomes its
creed; it will have the power to drive the Filipino to a prayerful pose. Under a
deregulated regime, the people's only hope to check the overwhelming power of the
foreign oil oligopoly lies on a market where there is fair competition. With prescience,
Let me explain. A separability clause states that if for any reason, any section or
provision of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or (invalid), the other section(s) or
provision(s) of the law shall not be affected thereby. 2 It is a legislative expression of
intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act.
Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts may, in spite of it, invalidate
the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and workable. 3
remains "complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent
of (those) which (are) rejected. 6 In other words, despite the elimination of some of its
parts, the law can still stand on its own.
The crucial test is to determine if expulsion of the assailed provisions cripples the whole
statute, so much so, that it is no longer expressive of the legislative will and could no
longer carry out the legislative purpose.
The principal intent of R.A. No. 8180 is to open the country's oil market to fair and free
competition and the three provisions are assailed precisely because they are anticompetition and they obstruct the entry of new players. Therefore, in order to make the
deregulation law work, it is imperative that the anti-competition provisions found therein
be taken out. In other words, it is only through the "separation" of these provisions that
the deregulation would be able to fully realize its objective.
Take the tariff provision for instance. The repudiation of the tariff differential will not
revive the 10% and 20% tariff rates. What is being discarded is the differential not the
tariff itself, hence, the removal of the 4% differential would result in the imposition of a
single uniform tariff rate on the importation of both crude oil and refined petroleum
products at 3% as distinctly and deliberately set in sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 itself. The
tariff provision which, admittedly, is among the "principal props" of R.A. No. 8180
remains intact in substance and the elimination of the tariff differential would, in effect,
transform it into one of the statute's "vouchsafing provisions," a tool to effectively carry
out the legislative intent of fostering a truly competitive market.
There is no question that the legislature intended a single uniform tariff rate for imported
crude oil and imported petroleum products. This is obvious from the proviso contained
in Sec. 5(b) 7 of R.A. No. 8180 which specifically states that:
Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision maybe amended only
by an Act of Congress.
although said proviso equalizing the tariff rate takes effect on January 1, 2004.
However, the nullification of the tariff differential renders the prospective effectivity
of the rate equalization irrelevant and superfluous. Naturally, there would no longer
be any basis for postponing the leveling of the tariff rate to a later date. The
provision that the tariff rate shall be equalized on January 1, 2004 is premised on
the validity of the tariff differential, without which there is nothing to equalize. Stated
differently, the imposition of a single uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and
imported petroleum products is to take effect immediately. A different way of
interpreting the law would be less than faithful to the legislative intent to enhance
free competition in the oil industry for the purpose of obtaining fair prices for highquality petroleum products.
The provision requiring a minimum inventory was similarly found by the majority to be
anti-competition. Its exclusion, therefore, would not have any deleterious effect on the
oil deregulation law. On the contrary, the essence of R.A. No. 8180, which is free and
fair competition is preserved.
The same rationale applies to the provision concerning predatory pricing and may be
subsumed (at least in the meantime pending the amendment of the law) under Sec.
9(a).
SEC. 9.Prohibited Acts. To ensure fair competition and prevent
cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following
acts are hereby prohibited:
a)Cartelization which means any agreement, combination
or concerted action by refiners and/or importers or their
representatives to fix prices, restrict outputs or divide
markets, either by products or by areas, or allocating
markets, either by products or by areas, in restraint of
trade or free competition; and
These barriers were eradicated by R.A. No. 8180, as expressly mandated in Sec. 5(a)
thereof:
SEC. 5.Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff
Treatment. a) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil and petroleum products either in a generic
name or its own trade name, or use the same for his own
requirement: Provided, That any person or entity who shall engage
in any such activity shall give prior notice thereof to the DOE for
monitoring purposes: Provided, further, That such notice shall not
exempt such person or entity from securing certificates of quality,
health and safety and environmental clearance from the proper
governmental agencies: Provided, furthermore, That such person
or entity shall, for monitoring purposes, report to the DOE his or its
every importation/exportation: Provided, finally, That all oil
importations shall be in accordance with the Basel Convention.
The nullification of the whole law would, therefore, considerably jeopardize the chances
of the new entrants to survive and remain competitive in the market.
As a consequence thereof, Eastern Petroleum Corp., Seaoil Petroleum Corp., Subic
Bay Distribution, Inc., TWA, Inc. and Dubphil Gas, which are some of the oil industry's
new entrants, filed a motion for intervention on 18 November 1997 urging the Court to
reconsider its decision declaring the whole R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional. The
intervenors raise similar apprehensions concerning the power of the existing oil firms
under the regulated industry, to block the importation of petroleum products by the small
oil companies and likewise impede their expansion and growth. 9
Even the public respondents in their motion for reconsideration concede that if R.A. No.
8180 should be declared unconstitutional, the unconstitutionality is partial, that is, only
the three (3) anti-competition provisions should be declared void. Public respondents,
thus, opine:
Thus, even assuming that the assailed provisions are
constitutionally defective, they cannot be that contagious as to
infect or contaminate the other valid parts of the law which are
complete in themselves, or capable of bringing about the full
deregulation of the oil industry. LLphil
To apply the exception to the general rule of separability will require
a clear and overwhelming demonstration which will erase any and
all doubts on the unconstitutionality of R.A. 8180.
The oil deregulation law was not built upon and do not center on the provisions on tariff
differential, minimum inventory requirement and predatory pricing. These are not the
only provisions of R.A. No. 8180 intended to implement the legislative intent as
expressed in sec. 2 thereof. The heart and soul of R.A. No. 8180 is embodied in sec.
5(a) aptly entitled "Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment." It is
this provision which does away with the burdensome requirements and procedures for
the importation of petroleum products (the main impediments to the entry of new players
in the oil market). With this provision the "entry and exit of competitors" is made
relatively easy and from this the competitive market is established.
The other remaining provisions are, likewise, sufficient to serve the legislative will. There
is, among others, sec. 7 mandating the promotion of fair trade practices and sec. 9(a)
on the prevention of cartels and monopolies.
The point is, even without the subject three provisions what remains is a
comprehensible and workable law. The infirmities of some parts of the statute should
not taint the whole when these parts could successfully be incised.
I also take exception to the majority's observation that ". . .a partial declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 will bring about a fully deregulated downstream oil
industry where government will be impotent to regulate run away prices, where the oil
oligopolists can engage in cartelization without competition, where prospective players
cannot come in, and where new players will close shop. As I have earlier discussed,
R.A. No. 8180 has armed the government with adequate measures to deal with the
above problems, should any of these arise. The implementation, therefore, of R.A. No.
8180 (sans the void provisions) is not an absurdity, on the contrary as shown above, it is
the sensible thing to do.
ACCORDINGLY, resolving the pending motion for reconsideration and partial motions
for reconsideration, I CONCUR with the majority insofar as it maintains the opinion to
strike down as unconstitutional the three (3) anti-competition provisions of R.A. No.
8180, but I register my DISSENT to its ruling declaring the entire law as
unconstitutional.
||| (Tatad v. Sec. of Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 127867, December 03,
1997)
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
These consolidated petitions 1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007,
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 2
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City
and eight municipalities. 3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A.
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054). 4 Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989. SDECAI
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, 5 enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
MMA Act 201 provides:
EN BANC
DECISION
further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are
receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new
readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
acSECT
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities 6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao's first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. ICDSca
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite held on
29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act
201. CHIEDS
In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan
in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao". Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted
the recommendation of the COMELEC's Law Department under a Memorandum dated
27 February 2007, 7 provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law
by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied) aScIAC
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on
29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao's first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. 8
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City)." 9
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution 10 and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 11 Thus, Sema asserted that
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No.
7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao's first legislative district despite
the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanao's reapportioned first legislative district. 12 Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress'
power to create or reapportion legislative districts. CHDAaS
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial,
power and (2) Sema's prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became
moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent
Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative
of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City". Respondent Dilangalen added that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao's first legislative district. Respondent
Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao's
first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to
reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that
Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city. 13
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents'
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902. HAaScT
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No.
177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in
Felwa v. Salas 14 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment;" (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160)
"affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province;
and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. 15
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments. 16
On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, the parties
in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: CITcSH
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is constitutional (a) as a
valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under
Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through
their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law
for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an
amendment to Section 6 of R.A. 7160. 17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken
literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly
of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in R.A. 7160 in the
creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. 18 Thus,
Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards . . . that do not comply with the minimum criteria "
under R.A. 7160. 19
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of R.A. 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and EHCcIT
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus
effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the
Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054
is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, 20 Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054
is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent
Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to
submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of R.A.
9054 is unconstitutional. CcTIDH
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the
Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the
House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate
law".
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and TIHDAa
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and cSIADa
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of
ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with
the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court's ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
II. In G.R. No. 177597 and G.R. No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of
such district (excluding Cotabato City). DCaSHI
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The
Writ
of
Prohibition
is
to
Test
the
Constitutionality
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
Appropriate
of
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 21 On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty." 22 True, the
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasijudicial functions. 23 Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City". These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 24 2005jur
Respondent
Does Not Moot the Petition
Dilangalen's
Proclamation
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen's proclamation as winner
in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen's election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
Whether
the
ARMM
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
Regional
Assembly
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
EcSCAD
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, 25 subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or
municipalities. 26 EIaDHS
Under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the
question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.
are
Created
or
Reapportioned
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly. SDECAI
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress' power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress' power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation
of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall
have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not
detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts
belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except
Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province
such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an
act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the
Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a
legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of
only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district
of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires
that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand . . ., shall have
at least one representative." EacHSA
Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19, 33 Article VI of R.A. 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, namely: minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or
minimum population of 250,000. 34 The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the
membership of a superior legislative body, the House of
Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); SHCaDA
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives
based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents
will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not
comply with the requirement in Section 461 (a) (ii) of R.A. 7160 that
every province created must have a population of at least 250,000;
and
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces,
sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the
House of Representatives without a national law[,]
that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative
district[s] and pack Congress with their own
representatives [?] CIaHDc
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy, 37 nor Congress in enacting R.A. 9054, envisioned or intended
these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. ESTcIA
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily
involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply
with the criteria established in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays
does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue
to an appropriate case.
Separate Opinions
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. acCITS
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as
it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
ESTAIH
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED. TCEaDI
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Nachura and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., join the separate opinion of
Justice Tinga.
Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ., join the dissent of Justice Tinga.
Tinga, J., please see dissenting concurring opinion.
Both petitioners challenge the notion of fusing Cotabato City, which is not a part of
ARMM, with the ARMM municipalities which now constitute the new province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, into one legislative district. To resolve that question on the merits, it is
inevitable that the Court examine the validity of the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
first place, and the majority has fully adopted that approach. However, there are
significant impediments that weigh down both petitioners, and supply the cogent reason
for the more prudent approach which is to dismiss the petitions outright. DHcSIT
It is clear that both petitioners rely on constitutional issues in support of their petitions as
they posit that under the Constitution Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its own separate
legislative district. It is cardinal that the Court's power of judicial review may be
exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with,
namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 3
With respect to Sema, it is plainly evident, as argued by private respondent Rep.
Didagen P. Dilangalen, that she is estopped from bringing forth the present petition. On
29 March 2007, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy before the COMELEC, declaring
her candidacy a Member of the House of Representatives representing "the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan w/ Cotabato City." 4 She recognized under oath that she was
seeking election for a legislative district that encompassed both Shariff Kabunsuan and
Cotabato City, and she should be consequently barred from disavowing the very district
which she undertook to serve if elected. Sema appears to have campaigned for election
in this conjoined district, and was accordingly defeated by Dilangalen, her votes from
both Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City included in the tally. SIHCDA
It would indeed be difficult to assess injury for purposes of locus standi on the part of
Sema by reason of the assailed COMELEC Resolution, which after all, reaffirms the
very legislative district whose seat in Congress she had sought to be elected to. Her
standing to raise the present petition is materially affected by her express consent and
active campaign for election from the legislative district which she now seeks to
invalidate. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show
"not only that the law is invalid, but also that he or she has sustained or is in immediate,
or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement", that
party has been or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he or she is
lawfully entitled. 5 Sema's prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie
the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that
very legislative district.
On the part of Marquez, he first raised his present claims through the petition in G.R.
No. 179608, which was filed with this Court in July 2007, or more than two months after
the May 2007 elections. As a result, could no longer ask that the holding of the said
elections in the conjoined district be restrained, and instead seeks that new or special
elections be conducted. AEDcIH
As earlier noted, among the requisites for the Court to be able to exercise judicial review
in constitutional cases is that the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
possible opportunity. 6 Clearly, his petition was not timely filed at the earliest possible
opportunity, which would have been at a point prior to the May 2007 elections. Worse,
he filed his petition after the voters in the affected districts had already elected a
candidate of their choosing, a sovereign act which he seeks to annul. Considering the
grave implications of the step he seeks, as well as the fact that such recourse usually
smacks of opportunism and bad faith, it is but proper for the Court to decline review
unless all the established requisites for judicial review for constitutional cases have
indeed been met. Marquez does not meet this Court's exacting standards.
Moreover, Marquez does not have a valid cause of action before this Court. His prayer
is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new congressional elections for Cotabato
City. The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep. Dilangalen, by virtue of his
electoral victory, lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the COMELEC does not have the requisite
power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power. Only
Congress, which was not impleaded as a party to Marquez's petition, has the power to
set congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if ever. Even assuming that Congress
was impleaded, it would be improper for this Court to compel Congress by judicial fiat to
pass a law or resolution for the holding of such elections. AHaETS
In sum, Marquez's petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed out of
time, for lack of cause of action, and for not impleading a real party-in-interest.
II.
One might argue that it is imperative for the Court to resolve the substantive issues,
since the situation may emerge again. However, the exception in exercising judicial
review if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review applies only if the case is
"moot and academic", 7 and not when the petitioners lack the requisite standing, have
no cause of action, and have failed to join a proper party, which is the case here. In
addition, it is entirely possible that between now and the next elections, either Congress
or the Regional Assembly would pass new legislation concerning the composition or
status of Shariff Kabunsuan, thereby changing the legal complexion and factual milieu
of the situation. If that occurs, the questions that will be facing the Court then should a
challenge be mounted may very well be different from those currently befacing us.
HTCAED
However, it is apparent that the ponente wishes to settle these cases on the merits. In
doing so, he frames two issues whether Congress can delegate to the Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces; and whether the Regional Assembly has the
power to create legislative districts. However, with due respect, the majority's discussion
makes quite an easy leap when it abruptly fuses these two issues. Worse, the majority
fails to take into account certain fundamental constitutional principles which have
immense bearing in these cases. The resulting analysis is incomplete and uninformed
of the full constitutional milieu under which these petitions should be resolved.
My own framework firstly considers two important principles which underlie the issues
presented before us the rule on delegation of powers, and the constitutionallyordained paradigms of local government and local autonomy. Without the influence of
these principles, any resulting analysis of the two issues cast by the majority will be
atomistic in nature. HcSDIE
III.
The laws we are presently impelled to interpret involve multiple instances of Congress
delegating power to the Regional Assembly. Explicity, Rep. Act No. 9054 delegates to
the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and other local government units,
though subject to certain specified limitations. The majority likewise asserts that through
that mechanism, Congress has also delegated to the Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts.
The fundamental principles on delegation of powers bear review.
The Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 8 Traditionally, the delegation
of Congress of its legislative powers had been frowned upon. "A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another." 9
However, the strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has, in recent times, been
relaxed, if not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction
of administrative agencies. In every industrialized nation, administrative agencies, which
are generally part of the executive branch, have been granted considerable lawmaking
power. 10 "Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if
the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly
to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies
the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies." 11
In the context of delegation of legislative powers to local governments, a noted authority
on the subject has this to say:
The state legislative power that is, the exercise of the policymaking judgment and discretion on state matters that state
constitutions vest and recognize in the legislature cannot be
delegated to some other person or body but must rest with the
legislature itself. Thus, the legislature cannot delegate to a
commission the power to determine the form of government,
powers and functions of proposed municipalities since these
matters require legislative judgment. But the details of
Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-delegation, it
bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress
it also specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations
upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such constitutional predicate. These
include the prohibition of political dynasties as may be defined by law, 13 the
reasonable conditions prescribed by law relating to full public disclosure of all the
State's transactions involving public interest; 14 the manner by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired; 15 the date of regular elections for members of
Congress; 16 the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional
vacancies; 17 the authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; 18 the
system for initiative and referendum; 19 the salaries of the President and VicePresident; 20 the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts; 21 and on many
other matters of grave import. cTCADI
May these specified functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These
specific functions are non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the Constitution
to Congress. Perhaps it is possible to segregate these particular functions to those
which would, even absent constitutional definition, anyway fall within the plenary
legislative power, and those which are not plenary in nature but were especially
designated to Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and no
other body, can carry out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall
within the plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize
that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks. With respect to
the non-plenary functions assigned to Congress, it is clear that the assignment implies
the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of specific, wholly original functions.
There shall be further discussion on this point in relation to the questions currently
presented. Before we get there, I wish to emphasize a second constitutional principle,
local governance and autonomy, that should likewise bear on our deliberations. SDTaHc
IV.
The 1987 Constitution ushered in a new era in local government rule for all citizens, and
local autonomy rule for Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera region. This new paradigm
is crystallized under Article X of the Constitution.
Section 2, Article X guarantees that the territorial and political subdivisions in the
Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized
through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers of local
governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government units to
generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the
purpose in the political units affected." 26 Indeed, it could hardly be argued that the
challenged power of the Assembly was animated by nakedly selfish political purposes. It
was, in fact, among the terms negotiated with care by the Philippine Government with
the leading armed insurgency group in Muslim Mindanao towards the higher purpose of
providing a permanent peace agreement in the strife-torn region. It does come with a
measure of surprise and disappointment that the Solicitor General has reached a
position that rejects the Final Peace Agreement negotiated by the Government and the
MNLF. CDHSac
Disomangcop further crystallizes the interplay between regional autonomy and national
sovereignty, to the extent that the former is accommodated under the latter.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by
the local government unit vis- -vis the central government.
TCHcAE
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood
as a right to political separation, but rather as a complex net of legalpolitical relations between a certain people and the state authorities. It
ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would
guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of
priorities by the community's internal decision-making processes and the
management of collective matters by themselves.
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for
homogeneous, independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal
application without massive disruption. However, if self-determination is
viewed as a means to an end that end being a democratic, participatory
political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the
identity of minority communities are protected its continuing validity is
more easily perceived. IaAHCE
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government
powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and
supervision from the central government.
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with
a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop
freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge
of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a
special governance regime for certain member communities who choose
their own authorities from within the community and exercise the
jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal
community affairs. ATcaID
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more
positive means for national integration. It would remove the wariness
among the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the
way for the unhampered implementation of the development programs in
The only constitutional provision that concerns with the creation of provinces is Section
10, Article X, which reads:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
ISAcHD
Nothing in this provision specifically limits the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays to Congress alone. The provision does embody a significant
limitation that the creation of these political subdivisions must be in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code, a law which is enacted by
Congress. It would thus be proper to say that the Constitution limits the ability to set
forth the standards for the creation of a province exclusively to Congress. But to say
that the Constitution confines to Congress alone the power to establish the criteria for
creating provinces is vastly different from saying that the Constitution confines to
Congress alone the power to create provinces. There is nothing in the Constitution that
supports the latter proposition.
Section 10, Article X does not specifically designate Congress as the body with the
power to create provinces. As earlier stated, the power to create these political
subdivisions is part of the plenary legislative power, hence such power can be exercised
by Congress even without need of specific constitutional assignation. At the same time,
the absence of constitutional language committing Congress with the function of
creating political subdivisions ultimately denotes that such legislative function may be
delegated by Congress. CaDATc
In fact, the majority actually concedes that Congress, under its plenary legislative
powers, "can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution." 33 As is pointed out, such delegation is operationalized by the LGC
itself, which confers to provincial boards and city and municipal councils, the general
power to create barangays within their respective jurisdictions. The Constitution does
not confine the exercise of such powers only to the national legislature, and indeed if
that were the case, the power to create barangays as granted by the LGC to local
legislative bodies would be unconstitutional.
Traditionally, it has been the national legislature which has exercised the power to
create provinces. However, the 1987 Constitution ushered in a new era in devolved
local government rule, and particularly, a regime of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras. We recognized in Disomangcop v. Datumanong, thus:
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the
Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious
diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and
wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies
emanating from the legislature are invariably assimilationist in
prescribe standards lower than those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays." That proviso is
squarely inconsistent with Section 10, Article X, which accords to the LGC the sole
criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local
government units. Said proviso thus cannot receive recognition from this Court. ESITcH
It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus this
aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at
bar.
VI.
The majority unfortunately asserts that Congress may not delegate to the Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, despite the absence of any constitutional bar
in that respect. The reasons offered for such conclusion are actually the same reasons it
submits why the Regional Assembly could not create legislative districts, as if the power
to create provinces and the power to create legislative districts were one and the same.
In contrast, I propose to pinpoint a specific constitutional provision that prohibits the
Regional Assembly from creating, directly or indirectly, any legislative district without
affecting that body's delegated authority to create provinces. CIHTac
Let us review this issue as presented before us. Notably, Republic Act No. 9054 does
not empower the Regional Assembly to create legislative districts, and MMA Act No.
201, which created Shariff Kabunsuan, specifically disavows the creation of a new
district for that province and maintains the old legislative district shared with Cotabato
City. It is the thesis though of the petitioners that following Felwa v. Salas, 37 the
creation of the new province ipso facto established as well an exclusive legislative
district for Shariff Kabunsuan, "by operation of the Constitution."
How exactly does a legislative district come into being? In theory, Congress does not
have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except by
reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within three
years following the return of the census, 38 but this Court has likewise recognized that
reapportionment can also be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. 39 Still, even in exercising this limited power through the constitutionally
mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own discretion for the
standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general reapportionment made
by Congress violate the parameters set forth by the Constitution, such act may be
invalidated by the Court, as it did in Macias v. COMELEC. 40
There is another constitutional provision which is of critical importance in considering
limitations in the creation of legislative districts. Section 5 (1), Article VI states that "[t]he
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The provision textually commits that only
through a law may the numerical composition of Congress may be increased or
reduced. SAHIDc
The Court has previously recognized that such law increasing the membership of the
House of Representatives need not be one specifically devoted for that purpose alone,
but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city with a population of more
than 250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 41 the Court pronounced that the law converting
Mandaluyong into a city could likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition
of the House of Representatives:
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit
on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law". The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional. 42
This point was reemphasized by the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC: 43
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v.
Abalos. In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did
not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. 44
From these cases, it is evident that a law creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan
may likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition of the House of
Representatives. In addition, Congress generally has the power to delegate the power
of creating local government units to the appropriate local legislative assemblies. The
critical question now is thus whether Congress may delegate to local legislative
assemblies the power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives?
The answer is no. cDEICH
I have already pointed out that when the Constitution specifically designates a particular
function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such function, as the same is nondelegable. The power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives is
restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate
such law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to rule that Congress may
delegate the power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives, there
would be no impediment for us to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked
by the Constitution to Congress may be delegated as well. To repeat, these include
gravely important functions as the enactment of a law defining political dynasties; the
enactment of reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of all the State's
transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision
for the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the
authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the prescription of a
system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-President;
and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts.
Considering that all these matters, including the composition of the House of
Representatives, are of national interest, it is but constitutionally proper that only a
national legislature has the competence to exercise these powers. And the Constitution
does textually commit to Congress alone the power to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives. cSIACD
Accordingly, the petitioners' position cannot be sustained, as Shariff Kabunsuan cannot
acquire its own legislative district unless Congress itself accedes to the passage of a
law that establishes the same. The contrary position is in denigration of the Constitution,
which limits to Congress alone the non-delegable power to fix or increase the
composition of the House of Representatives. For that, I concur with the result of the
majority.
Felwa cannot apply to these petitions. Its pronouncement that the creation of a province
automatically leads to the creation of a legislative district "by operation of the
Constitution" can only apply when the province is created by Congress itself, since there
is no other constitutional impediment to the emergence of the legislative district.
However, in cases where it is a body other than Congress which has created, although
validly, the legislative district, the Constitution itself bars the emergence of an
accompanying legislative district, as this will result in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representatives which can only be accomplished through a law passed by
Congress. IcaHCS
VII.
Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional
Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of
that body to exercise such power. I had earlier identified as unconstitutional the
discretion of the Regional Assembly to create local government units based on a lower
standard than that prescribed under the LGC. Another clear limitation is that the creation
of provinces cannot be authorized without the ratification through a plebiscite by the
people affected by such act, a requirement imposed by the Organic Act itself and by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
The majority itself had raised an alarmist tone that allowing the Assembly to create
provinces would not lead to the unholy spectacle of whimsical provinces intended as
personal fiefdoms and created irrespective of size, shape and sense. In fact, allowing
the Regional Assembly to create provinces will not lead to hundreds or thousands, or
even tens or dozens of new provinces. Any new province will have to meet the same
criteria set forth by the LGC for the creation of provinces. SacTCA
To stress how implausible the scenario of dozens-hundred-thousands of ARMM
provinces actually is, it bears reviewing what exactly is the criteria set forth under the
LGC for the creation of provinces. An Assembly-created province, just as with any other
putative province, following Section 461 of the LGC, must possess the following
requisites: (a) an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Php20,000,000.00, such income including the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income; (b) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau (excepting when comprised of two (2) or
more islands or when separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province), or a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office; (c) that the creation of the province shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed under the Code. These
standards, which should bear upon the Assembly, would preclude the emergence of
dozens, hundreds or thousands of provinces within the relatively confined spaces of the
present Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
IX.
The concerns raised by the majority on how allowing the Assembly to create provinces
would affect the composition of the national Congress are valid issues, yet the approach
it adopts is to treat autonomy as invisible and inconsequential, instead of the
countervailing constitutional principle that it actually is. It is an approach that will
exacerbate political and regional tensions within Mindanao, especially since it shuns the
terms of the negotiated peace. This decision today, sad to say, is a decisive step
backwards from the previous rulings of this Court that have been supportive of the aims
of regional autonomy. AEIHaS
3.Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat,
and Upi. The second legislative district is composed of 19 municipalities
(Talitay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff
Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah
Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen, S.K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis,
Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan and Paglat). TaEIAS
4.The enactment of the organic acts for the autonomous regions of the Cordilleras
and Muslim Mindanao is mandated under Sections 18 and 19, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution.
5.The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities or
Barangay. The Regional Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish,
or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or
barangay in accordance with the criteria laid down by Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The
Regional Assembly may prescribe standards lower than those
mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay. Provinces,
cities, municipalities, or barangay created, divided, merged, or whose
boundaries are altered without observing the standards prescribed by
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall not be
entitled to any share of the taxes that are allotted to the local governments
units under the provisions of the Code. CHTAIc
The financial requirements of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay so
created, divided, or merged shall be provided by the Regional Assembly out
of the general funds of the Regional Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the voters of the
areas affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries are
being altered as required by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, shall, however, be observed.
The Regional Assembly may also change the names of local government units, public
places and institutions, and declare regional holidays. (Emphasis supplied)
aDcETC
Before the enactment of R.A. 9054, the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays was vested in Congress (for provinces, cities
and municipalities) and in the sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang
panlungsod (for barangays). (See Sections 384, 448, and 460 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991).
6.Sultan Mastura (created from Sultan Kudarat), Northern Kabuntulan (created from
Kabuntulan) and Datu Blah Sinsuat (created from Upi).
The record shows the former province of Maguindanao was divided into two new
provinces (Shariff Kabunsuan and Maguindanao), in view of Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act (MMAA) No. 201, which authority was conferred to
under Section 17, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 giving the ARMM, thru
its Regional Legislative Assembly, the power to legislate laws including the
enactment of the Local Government Code of ARMM. IaDcTC
WHEREAS, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 provided for the creation of the
new Province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprising the municipalities of Barira,
Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat,
Sultan Mastura and Upi, all of the first legislative district of the mother
Province of Maguindanao, except Cotabato City which is not part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; while the remaining municipalities
of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang,
Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu
Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa
Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat, all of the
second legislative district of the mother Province of Maguindanao, shall
remain with said province;
It must be emphasized that Cotabato City is not included as part of ARMM although
geographically located within the first district of the former Maguindanao
province. Cotabato City is not voting for provincial officials. This is the reason
why Cotabato City was not specifically mentioned as part of the newly
created province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
WHEREAS, by reason of said provision of MMA Act No. 201, the first legislative
district of the Province of Maguindanao is now made up of Cotabato
City only, and its second legislative district, the municipalities of
Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang,
Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu
Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa
Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
Geographically speaking since [sic] Cotabato City is located within the newly created
province of Shariff Kabunsuan having been bounded by municipalities of
Sultan Kudarat, Datu Odin Sinsuat and Kabuntalan as its nearest neighbors.
Following the rule in establishing legislative district, it shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
However, legally speaking, it may arise question of legality [sic] if Cotabato City will
be appended as part of the newly created Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Under our Constitution [it is] only Congress that shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided for
under Section 5 (1) of Article VI.
In the earlier Resolution No. 7801, dated 11 January 2007, the COMELEC allocated
one legislative seat each for the provinces of Maguindanao and Shariff
Kabunsuan for the 14 May 2007 elections.
9.Resolution No. 7902 reads in full:
This pertains to the amendment of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6,
2007, entitled, "IN THE MATTER OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ATTY.
WYNNE B. ASDALA, ACTING DIRECTOR III, LAW DEPARTMENT,
RELATIVE TO THE STUDY/RECOMMENDATION OF SAID DEPARTMENT
RE: CONVERSION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF MAGUINDANAO INTO A
REGULAR PROVINCE PER MINUTE RESOLUTION NO. 07-0297 DATED
FEBRUARY 20, 2007". The dispositive portion of which reads:
EN BANC
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The
remainder
of
the
former
legislative
district
of
San
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of
the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1)
and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
(emphasis supplied).
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act
the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same
does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in
Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not
qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No.
SO ORDERED.
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted
in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995.]
JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI,
HON.
JEJOMAR
BINAY,
THE
MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 118627. March 7, 1995.]
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MAKATI, respondents.
Villamor Legarda & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 118627.
Acosta & Corvera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 118577.
Emmanuel P.J . Tamase for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
SYLLABUS
the
assailed
law, is
the
incumbent
representative
of
the
former
San
law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
"SEC. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes
or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the
City of Makati and the adjoining local government units." (Emphasis
supplied)
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
can be brought about by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, Section 2
stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over
Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a
co-equal department of government, the legislations felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present
an unsurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress form defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City
of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by
the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold
that Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz:
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code,
it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz: 'the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be
described by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions' was
made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities
may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on
metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment
of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as
the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained,
i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require
such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code
is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful
due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the
law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to
do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them. In particular,
petitioners point that Section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further
argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in
the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said
Section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of
respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will
run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality
of Section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
"SEC. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district." (Emphasis supplied)
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law; (2) the
addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill; 7 and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.
8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 That intolerable
situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of
an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the
title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit. we reiterated the policy
of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as
not to impede legislation. To be sure, the Constitution does not command that the
title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details.
Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
||| (Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, 118627, March 07, 1995)
EN BANC
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC's
motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the
propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the
Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
RESOLUTION
i. Timeliness of COMELEC's Motion for Reconsideration
PUNO, C.J p:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movantsintervenors' motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court's December 1,
2009 Decision (Decision). 1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar
P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, 2 Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code 3 and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, 4
mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of
their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and
movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the
constitutional proscription against the participation of
public appointive officials and members of the military in
partisan political activity;
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, 5 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 52 of the same rules, 6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of
notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC
received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until
December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December
14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally
submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still
within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be
entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor
shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or
interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. 7 SCIacA
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within
which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, 8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, 9 and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory. 10 In Lim v. Pacquing, 11 the motion for intervention filed
by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and
injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court 12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. 13 We
stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to
make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. 14 Its purpose is
not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, all the movantsintervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or
interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the
December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a
right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer,
he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its
system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are
candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of
the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not
likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed
Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if
this Court's Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.
With regard to the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that
"this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National
Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene . . . so that the voice
of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal
as it resolves issues of transcendental importance." 16 SDHacT
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter
has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with
standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too
indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and
employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46
(b) (26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities by one holding a non-political office. TCacIE
MS. QUESADA.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in
Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee
in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in
any partisan political activity." This is almost the same
provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the
government service have actually experienced how this
provision has been violated by the direct or indirect
partisan political activities of many government officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would
make this provision more strict, and which would deter its
violation?
MR. FOZ.
Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the
implementing rules on the matter are more than
exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and
employees in the public service from engaging in any form
of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in
implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and
even the superior officers of offices and agencies of
government will themselves violate the constitutional
injunction against partisan political activity, then no string
of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft
will really implement the constitutional intent against
partisan political activity. . . . 20 (italics supplied)
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken.
But Section 2 (4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the
constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that
"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." 21 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office,
engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. 22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office,
elective positions included. 23
MR. FOZ:
There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand
that there was no intention on the part of the Committee to
disenfranchise any government official or employee. The
elimination of the last clause of this provision was
precisely intended to protect the members of the civil
service in the sense that they are not being deprived of
the freedom of expression in a political contest. The last
phrase or clause might have given the impression that a
government employee or worker has no right whatsoever
in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the
case. They are still free to express their views although
the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively
in a political campaign. 24
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to
vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain
candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO:
Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2,
Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13,
between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase
ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete
the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word
CAMPAIGN. AaITCS
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas):
Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
MS. AQUINO:
The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase
"except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not
intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a
qualification of the general prohibition against taking part
in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided
for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. DcTSHa
i. Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. 25
In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the
Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast,
since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section
14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to
both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy
created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and
significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention
that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates
the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who
do not. ADTEaI
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other
ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.
31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.: 32
. . . A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded
as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can
an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case
has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So,
also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative
precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can
be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should
not be denied authority merely because another point was more
dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding
other propositions dicta. 33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if
reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. 34 What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 35 The test developed
by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 36 which has four
requisites:
. . . [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that
the statute's distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the
best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find
that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing
treatment. 48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding
elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the
purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 49 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote. 50 Considering that elected officials are put in office
by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny
the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold,
nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso,
since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set
of facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service
Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch
Act's prohibition against "active participation in political
management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to
campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get
federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as
delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague
and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahoma's Merit System of
Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the
State's classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the
Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal
employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the
appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of
their superior, and were administratively charged for asking other
Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to
give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for
soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing
campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic
resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer
and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed
as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode
Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the
process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home
Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of
laws and were decided based on a different set of facts, Letter
Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso. . . . (italics in the original)
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary
to his claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the
constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a
candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode
Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality
of 14.09 (c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which
prohibits "continuing in the classified service of the city
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city
office in 1975. Pawtucket's "Little Hatch Act" prohibits city
employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities.
Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed,
66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate
dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on
the ground that that the provision of the city charter was
unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter
Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had
since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that
political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be
infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not
available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the
Supreme Court (finding that the government's interest in
regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees
differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the
citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument
that prohibitions against the coercion of government
employees were a less drastic means to the same end,
deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a
"balancing" test to determine whether limits on political
activity by public employees substantially served government
interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the
employees' First Amendment rights. 67 aIcCTA
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even
though the election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-torun provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or
particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions were found valid
precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found that a
regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the
claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to
the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme
Court:
Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of
certain offices automatically resign their positions if they become
candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the
current term is one year or less. The burdens that 65 imposes on
candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by 19. The two
provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The
District Court found 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature or
extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the
manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court,
the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because
Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are
subject to 65 and why others are not. As with the case of 19, we
conclude that 65 survives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to the
classification scheme. TcSICH
The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the
"one step at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to
state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned
by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a
transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65
extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to
four years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices so that at
least some county and local offices would be contested at each election.
The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until 1958. In that
year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in Art. XI, 11,
which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer
than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending
the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the
State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did not go further in
applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose
terms were not extended by 11 or 65, absent an invidious purpose, is
not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected
officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places
similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language and its
history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying
8678,
the
Section 13 of RA
Omnibus
Election
9369,
Code
Apart from nullifying Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed
Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants
holding appointive posts without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee seeking an elective
ii. Limitation
on
Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil
servants holding appointive positions without due regard
for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan
or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or
barangay level.
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Regardless
of
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without
due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office
and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant
only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential
post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat
to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy:
the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has
amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its
incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." 80 As elucidated in
our prior exposition: 81 EHTSCD
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to
make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote their own
candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when
viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government
employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if
not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly
disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the
part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda
through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective]
officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.
. . . [T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which
could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the
reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to
the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of
influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)
Candidacy
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly
partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved
in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,"
82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions
can validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in
character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even
candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be
considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will
show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this
issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and
guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy
and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in
connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. 83
Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section
4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are
decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in
Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive
officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against
Section 4 (a) is clearly unsustainable. aIcDCH
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the
matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply
to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this
country which involve nonpartisan public offices. 84
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of
the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these
nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a
separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:
Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. 103 The Judiciary has not been
spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political
arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.
political activity a citizen can do. All other political activities are deemed partisan. Thus,
Commissioner Christian Monsod declared that, "As a matter of fact, the only non
partisan political activity one can engage in as a citizen is voting." 1
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678 and
Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Indisputably, any political activity except to vote is a partisan political activity. Section 79
(b) of the Omnibus Election Code implements this by declaring that any act designed
to elect or promote the election of a candidate is an electioneering or partisan
political activity, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent's and the
intervenors' Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2)
the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and
(3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. IDCHTE
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
The filing of a Certificate of Candidacy for an elective position is, by the very nature of
the act, an electioneering or partisan political activity.
Two provisions of the Constitution, taken together, mandate that civil service
employees cannot engage in any electioneering or partisan political activity
except to vote. Thus, the Constitution provides:
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the Constitution
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political activity.
Section 5(3), Article XVI of the Constitution
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
partisan political activity, except to vote.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on these provisions of the
Constitution, it was clear that the exercise of the right to vote is the only non-partisan
Second, only a candidate for a political office files a Certificate of Candidacy. A person
merely exercising his or her right to vote does not. A candidate for a political office is
necessarily a partisan political candidate because he or she is contesting an elective
office against other political candidates. The candidate and the electorate know that
there are, more often than not, other candidates vying for the same elective office,
making the contest politically partisan.
Third, a candidate filing his or her Certificate of Candidacy almost always states in the
Certificate of Candidacy the name of the political party to which he or she belongs. The
candidate will even attach to his or her Certificate of Candidacy the certification of his or
her political party that he or she is the official candidate of the political party. Such
certification by a political party is obviously designed to promote the election of the
candidate.
Fourth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political
activities is intended, among others, to keep the civil service non-partisan. This
constitutional ban is violated when a civil servant files his or her Certificate of Candidacy
as a candidate of a political party. From the moment the civil servant files his or her
Certificate of Candidacy, he or she is immediately identified as a political partisan
because everyone knows he or she will prepare, and work, for the victory of his or her
political party in the elections.
Fifth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political
activities is also intended to prevent civil servants from using their office, and the
resources of their office, to promote their candidacies or the candidacies of other
persons. We have seen the spectacle of civil servants who, after filing their certificates
of candidacies, still cling to their public office while campaigning during office hours.
Sixth, the constitutional ban prohibiting civil servants from engaging in partisan political
activities is further intended to prevent conflict of interest. We have seen Comelec
officials who, after filing their certificates of candidacies, still hold on to their public office.
Finally, filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is a partisan political act that ipso facto
operates to consider the candidate deemed resigned from public office pursuant to
paragraph 3, Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369, as well as
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
In its January 12, 2010 Resolution, 9 the Court required petitioners to comment on the
aforesaid motions.
Parenthetically, petitioner Quinto admitted that he did not pursue his plan to run for an
elective office. 10 Petitioner Tolentino, on the other hand, disclosed that he filed his
certificate of candidacy but that he had recently resigned from his post in the executive
department. These developments could very well be viewed by the Court as having
rendered this case moot and academic. However, I refuse to proceed to such a
conclusion, considering that the issues, viewed in relation to other appointive civil
servants running for elective office, remain ubiquitously present. Thus, the issues in the
instant case could fall within the classification of controversies that are capable of
repetition yet evading review. cAaETS
Let it be recalled that, on December 1, 2009, the Court rendered its Decision granting
the petition and declaring as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and Section 4 (a) of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8678.
1
Claiming to have legal interest in the matter in litigation, Senator Manuel A. Roxas filed,
on December 14, 2009, his Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to: (a) Intervene in the
Instant Case; (b) Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) If Necessary, Set
the Instant Case for Oral Arguments. 2
On the same date, respondent COMELEC, through its Law Department, moved for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid December 1, 2009 Decision. 3
Expressing a similar desire, Franklin M. Drilon, a former senator and a senatorial
candidate in the 2010 elections, filed, on December 17, 2009, his Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit the Attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention. 4
On December 28, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Cebu City Chapter,
also filed its Motion for Leave to Intervene 5 and Motion for Reconsideration in
Intervention. 6
In a related development, on January 8, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
which initially represented the COMELEC in the proceedings herein, this time disagreed
with the latter, and, instead of moving for the reconsideration of the December 1, 2009
Decision, moved for clarification of the effect of our declaration of unconstitutionality. 7
The motions for intervention should be denied. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court
explicitly states that motions to intervene may be filed at any time "before the rendition
of judgment." 11 Obviously, as this Court already rendered judgment on December 1,
2009, intervention may no longer be allowed. 12 The movants, Roxas, Drilon, IBP-Cebu
City Chapter, and Apacible, cannot claim to have been unaware of the pendency of this
much publicized case. They should have intervened prior to the rendition of this Court's
Decision on December 1, 2009. To allow their intervention at this juncture is
unwarranted and highly irregular. 13
While the Court has the power to suspend the application of procedural rules, I find no
compelling reason to excuse movants' procedural lapse and allow their much belated
intervention. Further, a perusal of their pleadings-in-intervention reveals that they merely
restated the points and arguments in the earlier dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Puno and Senior Associate Justices Carpio and Carpio Morales. These very same
points, incidentally, also constitute the gravamen of the motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent COMELEC. Thus, even as the Court should deny the motions for
intervention, it is necessary to, pass upon the issues raised therein, because they were
the same issues raised in respondent COMELEC's motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC's motion for reconsideration
Interestingly, in its motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC does not raise a matter
other than those already considered and discussed by the Court in the assailed
decision. As aforesaid, the COMELEC merely echoed the arguments of the dissenters.
I remain unpersuaded.
I wish to reiterate the Court's earlier declaration that the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Section 66 of the OEC and Section 4 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (CoCs), but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between the two classes does not justify such disparate treatment. Constitutional law
jurisprudence requires that the classification must and should be germane to the
purposes of the law. As clearly explained in the assailed decision, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. Indeed, a candidate, whether holding an appointive or an elective office, may
use his position to promote his candidacy or to wield a dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. Under the same scenario, he may also, in the discharge of his official
duties, be swayed by political considerations. Likewise, he may neglect his or her official
duties, as he will predictably prioritize his campaign. Chief Justice Puno, in his dissent
to the assailed decision, even acknowledges that the "danger of systemic abuse"
remains present whether the involved candidate holds an appointive or an elective
office, thus CDHaET
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others
or to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote
their own candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous
particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by
other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy
to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous
possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken
together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of a reigning political
party to advance its own agenda through a "carefully orchestrated
use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various
levels of the bureaucracy. 14
To repeat for emphasis, classifying candidates, whether they hold appointive or elective
positions, and treating them differently by considering the first as ipso facto resigned
while the second as not, is not germane to the purposes of the law, because, as clearly
shown, the measure is not reasonably necessary to, nor does it necessarily promote,
the fulfillment of the state interest sought to be served by the statute.
not only downright ineffectual, but is also, as shown in the assailed decision, offensive
to the equal protection clause.
Furthermore, as the Court explained in the assailed decision, this ipso facto resignation
rule is overbroad. It covers all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction,
regardless of whether they occupy positions of influence in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker, a messenger, a chauffeur, or an industrial worker in the
government service cannot exert the same influence as that of a Cabinet member, an
undersecretary or a bureau head. Parenthetically, it is also unimaginable how an
appointive utility worker, compared to a governor or a mayor, can form his own "private
army" to wield undue influence on the electorate. It is unreasonable and excessive,
therefore, to impose a blanket prohibition one intended to discourage civil servants
from using their positions to influence the votes on all civil servants without
considering the nature of their positions. Let it be noted, that, despite their employment
in the government, civil servants remain citizens of the country, entitled to enjoy the civil
and political rights granted to them in a democracy, including the right to aspire for
elective public office.
In addition, this general provision on automatic resignation is directed to the activity of
seeking any and all public elective offices, whether partisan or nonpartisan in character,
whether in the national, municipal or barangay level. No compelling state interest has
been shown to justify such a broad, encompassing and sweeping application of the law.
It may also be pointed out that this automatic resignation rule has no pretense to be
the exclusive and only available remedy to curb the uncontrolled exercise of
undue influence and the feared "danger of systemic abuse." As we have explained
in the assailed decision, our Constitution and our body of laws are replete with
provisions that directly address these evils. We reiterate our earlier pronouncement that
specific evils require specific remedies, not overly broad measures that unduly
restrict guaranteed freedoms. HIaSDc
It should be stressed that when the Court struck down (in the earlier decision) the
assailed provisions, the Court did not act in a manner inconsistent with Section 2 (4) of
Article IX-B of the Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 2. . . . .
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly
or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political activity.
or with Section 5 (3), Article XVI of the Constitution, which reads:
In fact, it may not be amiss to state that, more often than not, the elective officials, not
the appointive ones, exert more coercive influence on the electorate, with the greater
tendency to misuse the powers of their office. This is illustrated by, among others, the
proliferation of "private armies" especially in the provinces. It is common knowledge that
"private armies" are backed or even formed by elective officials precisely for the latter to
ensure that the electorate will not oppose them, be cowed to submit to their dictates and
vote for them. To impose a prohibitive measure intended to curb this evil of wielding
undue influence on the electorate and apply the prohibition only on appointive officials is
Sec. 5. . . . .
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration
and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State.
The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
which are specifically involved herein, have been stricken down in the United States for
unduly burdening First Amendment rights of employees and voting rights of citizens,
and for being overbroad. Verily, in our jurisdiction, foreign jurisprudence only enjoys a
persuasive influence on the Court. Thus, the contention that Mancuso has been
effectively overturned by subsequent American cases, such as United States Civil
Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers 19 and Broadrick v. State
of Oklahoma, 20 is not controlling.
Be that as it may, a closer reading of these latter US cases reveals that Mancuso is still
applicable. IAcDET
On one hand, Letter Carriers and Broadrick, which are based on United Public Workers
of America v. Mitchell, 21 involve provisions prohibiting Federal employees from
engaging in partisan political activities or political campaigns.
In Mitchell, the appellants sought exemption from the implementation of a sentence in
the Hatch Act, which reads: "No officer or employee in the executive branch of the
Federal Government . . . shall take any active part in political management or in political
campaigns." 22 Among the appellants, only George P. Poole violated the provision 23
by being a ward executive committeeman of a political party and by being politically
active on election day as a worker at the polls and a paymaster for the services of other
party workers. 24
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing,
or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act's prohibition against "active participation in
political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for
candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and
local offices, to participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a
political club. 25
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a
provision in the Oklahoma's Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the
political activities of the State's classified civil servants, in much the same manner as
the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal employees. 26 Prior to the
commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection
campaign of their superior, and were administratively charged for asking other
Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to give referrals to persons
who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving
and distributing campaign posters in bulk. 27
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision.
Kenneth Mancuso, a full-time police officer and classified civil service employee of the
City of Cranston, filed his candidacy for nomination as representative to the Rhode
Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing
the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter. 28
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided
based on a different set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to
mean a reversal of Mancuso. Thus, in Magill v. Lynch, 29 the same collegial court which
decided Mancuso was so careful in its analysis that it even remanded the case for
consideration on the overbreadth claim. The Magill court stated thus
Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but
they should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the
charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the
candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the
possible threats to government efficiency and integrity which Letter
Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly,
we remand for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. 30
As observed by the Court (citing Clements v. Fashing 31 ) in the December 1, 2009
Decision, U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-torun rules when applied to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all
others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law . These
resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and sweeping provision,
and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law , the
second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials,
they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. In fact, Morial v. Judiciary
Commission of the State of Louisiana, 32 where the resign-to-run provision pertaining to
judges running for political offices was upheld, declares that "there is no blanket
approval of restriction on the right of public employees to become candidates for public
office." 33 The Morial court instructed thus HTDcCE
Because the judicial office is different in key respects from other offices, the
state may regulate its judges with the differences in mind. For example the
contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind of
particularized pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of
campaigns for most non-judicial offices. A candidate for the mayoralty can
and often should announce his determination to effect some program, to
reach a particular result on some question of city policy, or to advance the
interests of a particular group. It is expected that his decisions in office may
be predetermined by campaign commitment. Not so the candidate for
judicial office. He cannot, consistent with the proper exercise of his judicial
powers, bind himself to decide particular cases in order to achieve a given
programmatic result. Moreover, the judge acts on individual cases and not
broad programs. The judge legislates but interstitially; the progress through
the law of a particular judge's social and political preferences is, in Mr.
Justice Holmes' words, "confined from molar to molecular motions."
As one safeguard of the special character of the judicial function,
Louisiana's Code of Judicial Conduct bars candidates for judicial office from
making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office." Candidates for nonjudicial office are not subject to such a ban; in the conduct of his campaign
for the mayoralty, an erstwhile judge is more free to make promises of postcampaign conduct with respect both to issues and personnel, whether
publicly or privately, than he would be were he a candidate for re-election to
his judgeship. The state may reasonably conclude that such pledges and
promises, though made in the course of a campaign for non-judicial office,
might affect or, even more plausibly, appear to affect the post-election
conduct of a judge who had returned to the bench following an electoral
defeat. By requiring resignation of any judge who seeks a non-judicial office
and leaving campaign conduct unfettered by the restrictions which would
be applicable to a sitting judge, Louisiana has drawn a line which protects
the state's interests in judicial integrity without sacrificing the equally
important interests in robust campaigns for elective office in the executive
or legislative branches of government.
This analysis applies equally to the differential treatment of judges and
other office holders. A judge who fails in his bid for a post in the state
legislature must not use his judgeship to advance the cause of those who
supported him in his unsuccessful campaign in the legislature. In contrast,
a member of the state legislature who runs for some other office is not
expected upon his return to the legislature to abandon his advocacy of the
interests which supported him during the course of his unsuccessful
campaign. Here, too, Louisiana has drawn a line which rests on the
different functions of the judicial and non-judicial office holder. 34
Indeed, for an ipso facto resignation rule to be valid, it must be shown that the
classification is reasonably necessary to attain the objectives of the law. Here, as
already explained in the assailed decision, the differential treatment in the
application of this resign-to-run rule is not germane to the purposes of the law,
because whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented are not effectively addressed by the measure. Thus, the
ineluctable conclusion that the concerned provisions are invalid for being
unconstitutional.
Without unnecessarily preempting the resolution of any subsequent actual case or
unwittingly giving an advisory opinion, the Court, in the December 1, 2009 Decision, in
effect, states that what should be implemented are the other provisions of
Philippine laws (not the concerned unconstitutional provisions) that specifically
and directly address the evils sought to be prevented by the measure. It is highly
speculative then to contend that members of the police force or the armed forces, if they
will not be considered as resigned when they file their COCs, is a "disaster waiting to
happen." There are, after all, appropriate laws in place to curb abuses in the
government service. DCISAE
The invalidation of the ipso facto resignation provisions does not mean the
cessation in operation of other provisions of the Constitution and of existing
laws. Section 2 (4) of Article IX-B and Section 5 (3), Article XVI of the Constitution, and
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 still apply. So
do other statutes, such as the Civil Service Laws, OEC, the Anti-Graft Law, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and related laws.
Covered civil servants running for political offices who later on engage in "partisan
political activity" run the risk of being administratively charged. 35 Civil servants who
use government funds and property for campaign purposes, likewise, run the risk of
being prosecuted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or under the OEC on
election offenses. Those who abuse their authority to promote their candidacy shall be
made liable under the appropriate laws. Let it be stressed at this point that the said
laws provide for specific remedies for specific evils, unlike the automatic
resignation provisions that are sweeping in application and not germane to the
purposes of the law.
To illustrate, we hypothetically assume that a municipal election officer, who is an
employee of the COMELEC, files his CoC. Given the invalidation of the automatic
resignation provisions, the said election officer is not considered as ipso facto resigned
from his post at the precise moment of the filing of the CoC. Thus, he remains in his
post, and his filing of a CoC cannot be taken to be a violation of any provision of the
Constitution or any statute. At the start of the campaign period, however, if he is still in
the government service, that is, if he has not voluntarily resigned, and he, at the same
time, engages in a "partisan political activity," then, he becomes vulnerable to
prosecution under the Administrative Code, under civil service laws, under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act or under the OEC. Upon the proper action being filed, he
could, thus, be disqualified from running for office, or if elected, prevented from
assuming, or if he had already assumed office, be removed from, office.
At this juncture, it may even be said that Mitchell, Letter Carriers and Broadrick, the
cases earlier cited by Chief Justice Puno and Associate Justices Carpio and CarpioMorales, support the proposition advanced by the majority in the December 1, 2009
Decision. While the provisions on the ipso facto resignation of appointive civil servants
are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being
overbroad, the general provisions prohibiting civil servants from engaging in "partisan
political activity" remain valid and operational, and should be strictly applied.
The COMELEC's motion for reconsideration should, therefore, be denied.
The OSG's motion for clarification
In its motion, the OSG pleads that this Court clarify whether, by declaring as
unconstitutional the concerned ipso facto resignation provisions, the December 1, 2009
Decision intended to allow appointive officials to stay in office during the entire election
period. 36 The OSG points out that the official spokesperson of the Court explained
before the media that "the decision would in effect allow appointive officials to stay on in
their posts even during the campaign period, or until they win or lose or are removed
from office." 37
I pose the following response to the motion for clarification. The language of the
December 1, 2009 Decision is too plain to be mistaken. The Court only declared
as unconstitutional Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Section 66 of the OEC and
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678. The Court never stated in the
decision that appointive civil servants running for elective posts are allowed to
stay in office during the entire election period. ETaHCD
The only logical and legal effect, therefore, of the Court's earlier declaration of
unconstitutionality of the ipso facto resignation provisions is that appointive government
employees or officials who intend to run for elective positions are not considered
automatically resigned from their posts at the moment of filing of their CoCs. Again, as
2nd District
EN BANC
3rd District
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
4th District
Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
Population
417,304
474,899
372,548
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table 3
illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: AIaSTE
District
1st District
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and2nd District
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the3rd District
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and(formerly 2nd
from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
District)
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by4th District
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October(formerly 3rd
2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaperDistrict)
of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
5th District
(formerly 4th
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have aDistrict)
population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
Municipalities/Cities
Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Population
176,383
San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
276,777
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
439,043
372,548
429,070
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of
the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No.
4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new
congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before
us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least
250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill
by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part
of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two;
neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision reads:
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the
creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national
population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to
roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently
from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population
threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1.Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly
apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet
the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
Article VI
Section 5.(1) . . .
(2). . .
(3)Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. DIcSHE
(4). . . (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is
the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The
petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative
district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be
reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will
represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement.
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality. 24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by
this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain. 25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. TaCDIc
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. 27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that
the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less
than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit: DTEScI
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative. 28 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of
a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and
the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be
less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not
interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be
included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the
period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff
study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
In reply to Mr. Monsod's query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the
proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District,
the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while
the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no
substantial changes.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF
PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there
being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the
province of Palawan was approved by the Body. 34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by
the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado
made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Brion, J., I join opinion of J. CC Morales.
Abad, J., is on official leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join Justice Morales' concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic
and republican State" 1 that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion
introduces the Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The
majority opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a
legislative district created by Congress to send one representative to Congress even if
the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative
districts created by Congress send one representative each because they all meet the
minimum population requirement of 250,000. aHSTID
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly
repugnant to the clear and precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5 (4) 2 of Article VI
mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as
population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum
population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase
of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area." The assailed RA 9716 grossly violates these constitutional standards.
Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
There was never any debate 3 in the design of our government that the members of the
House of Representatives, just like the members of the Senate, represent people
not provinces, cities, or any other political unit. 4 The only difference is that the
members of the Senate represent the people at large while the members of the House
represent the people in legislative districts. Thus, population or the number of
inhabitants in a district is the essential measure of representation in the House
of Representatives. 5 Section 5 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the
previous Constitutions, 6 could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of . . .
members, . . ., who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the
principle of "one person, one vote," 7 is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours,
claiming to be a "democratic and republican State." 8 A democracy in its pure state is
one where the majority of the people, under the principle of "one person, one vote,"
directly run the government. 9 A republic is one which has no monarch, royalty or
nobility, 10 ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the people
under the principle of "one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to
the laws. 11 A republic is also known as a representative democracy. The democratic
and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of
equality equality in voting power, and equality under the law. cCaEDA
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting
power that each vote is worth the same as any other vote, not more or less.
Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy,
voters have an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means
equal representation for equal numbers of people 12 or equal voting weight per
legislative district. In constitutional parlance, this means representation for every
legislative district "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 13 or proportional
representation. Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting
power is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court
unanimously struck down an apportionment law which:
(a) . . . gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger
number of inhabitants got four only; (b) . . . gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only;
(c) [gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and
Cotabato . . . more than both, five members having been assigned
to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao
with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 . . .
two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and
for
Reapportionment:
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws
like RA 9716 will be tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section," 17 referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards relate to first,
population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other standards. TCaEIc
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the
rule on proportional representation, which is the universal standard in direct
representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000
per legislative district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the
rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of legislative districts shall
increase as the number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on
proportional representation. Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which requires that the
first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area.
The Constitution 18 and the Ordinance 19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the
minimum population of a legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to
cities, this minimum population requirement applies equally to legislative districts
apportioned in provinces and the Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional
command that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To reiterate, the
RA
9716
Flouts
Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200% compared to votes in the
First District while those in the Second District suffer more than 60% undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population,
to the last digit, for every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the
variances swing from negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting
yardstick, such variances are grossly anomalous and destructive of the concept of
proportional representation. In the United States, the Supreme Court there ruled that a
variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of proof of a good
faith effort to achieve a mathematically exact apportionment. 23
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquino's attempt to redraw districting lines to make all
five proposed districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus
lessen the wide variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for
political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in
Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a Congressman] is king [in his district]." 24
This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to achieve a more precise proportional
representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers
with vote valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of proportional
representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent Congressmen, an invalid
standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in
creating the proposed First District, which will have a population of only 176,383.
The minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and
must be complied with to the last digit. The Constitution mandates a population of "at
least two hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative district in a city, and under the
principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in provinces
and in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
Representative"
The directive in Section 5 (3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one
representative" means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must
also be created with it. 25 Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer
in the affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be
apportioned "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude
provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening
provision of Section 5 (1), which states: CDHacE
The House of Representatives shall be composed of . . .
members, . . ., who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio . . . ." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional
representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. 26
Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution or Mariano v. COMELEC 27 and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC 28 as normative
props to shore up the hollow proposition that reapportionment in provinces can
dispense with the minimum population of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article
VI. In the first place, the Constitutional Commission, exercising constituent powers,
enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it textualized in Section 5, Article VI,
in the interest of creating legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate concerns.
29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification, possessed the greater
sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly
ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the people in the exercise of their sovereign power
sanctioned the Constitutional Commission's discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers
under the 1987 Constitution and subject to the reapportionment standards in
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the
reapportionment standards in Section 5, unlike the Constitutional Commission
which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratification by the sovereign
people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum
population requirement of 250,000 in creating a legislative district. Thus, in
Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati
City, the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the National
Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the population of
Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives. 30 Footnote 13 in
Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator
Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of
Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on
House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city) . . . ."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts
in Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts created complied with the minimum
population of 250,000 (254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC. 31 Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, neither
Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports the claim that Congress
can create a legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the contrary,
these cases confirm that every legislative district must have a minimum population of
250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC 32 struck down a law
creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of
the 250,000 minimum requirement. DHTCaI
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section." 33 Instead, Congress has contented itself with
enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws for individual areas, either for this sole
purpose 34 or ancillary to the conversion 35 or creation 36 of a local government unit, at
the behest of legislators representing the area. As movements of district lines spell
doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects Congress to
intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with
constitutional imperatives. RA 9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor
of entrenched interests, sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of
representative democracy, at the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like
RA 9716 will fill the House of Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one,
representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored districts,
elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small,
favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more
valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this
constitutionally abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the first time under the 1987
Constitution creates a new politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed
to be a "democratic and republican State." 37 To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the
blatant violation of the constitutional standards requiring proportional representation and
a minimum population in the creation of legislative districts. This will derail our one
person, one vote representative democracy from the tracks clearly and precisely laid
down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a
new political elite exercising more legislative power than their votes command? Such a
grant of privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility
title, which is banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who
embark on a grotesquely anomalous constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals
of a "democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one
person, one vote" that insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is
no vote more equal than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our
democracy. This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly,
here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more equal than others, has failed in
its primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our democracy. cHATSI
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Republic Act No. 9716 for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation
and minimum population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi.
Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the
initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of
public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. 1 Republic Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the
creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the expenditure of public
funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencia's conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a
population of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencia's assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section
5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article. 2 Both provisions must be read
together in light of the constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with
respect to existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly
created provinces under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and
territory requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec. 3 The actual population of the City of
Makati during the Senate deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was
to be enacted into R.A. No. 7854 was 508,174. 4 That is why the Court in Mariano
declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative. 5 (emphasis in the original)
cIECaS
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population
requirement as it merely stated that Makati's legislative district may still be increased as
long as the minimum population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that
time presupposes that Makati must still meet the constitutional requirements before it
can have another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles
the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on
increasing population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an
alternative addition to the income requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec. 6 Notably, the ponencia
spliced that portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus
the ponencia quotes:
. . . Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation. . . . To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. (emphasis and underscoring in the original by the ponente)
It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts
as above 250,000. Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the
actual population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take
judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de
Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644 while the
second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures
show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. . .
. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum
population requirement at the time of reappportionment. The ponencia's construal of the
disparity in population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the
disparity of population in the present case. CADSHI
The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000
benchmark was used in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The
sponsorship speech of Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr. 7 reflects so.
. . . .Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. EACH CITY OR EACH
PROVINCE WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 250,000 SHALL
HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE. This is Section 5 of
the Article on the Legislative. . . . The ordinance fixes at 200 the
number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among
the provinces and cities with a population of at least 250,000
The ponencia harps on petitioners' admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to
SIX legislative districts, given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that
there is nothing wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This
is a wrong premise. It bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to
underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A.
9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts.
It did not, however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly
reapportioned, can easily form another district. No reasons were offered except Senator
Joker Arroyo's during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz.: "When it
comes to their district, congressmen are kings. We cannot touch them. He [referring to
Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep. Villafuerte]
touched . . . even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it
touched." 14
The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and
progressive ratio prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in
Camarines Sur based on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A.
9716: TaDCEc
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A.
No. 9716, it suffered a very significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors 15 cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting,
particularly the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic
DECLARE
||| (Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010.]
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO
G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
The Case
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for
violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city.
Antecedents
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos 1 and
the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, 2 by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were
filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill
No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995 to 2000." 3
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
Congress' use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination
on the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with
[a constitutional requirement]." 4 DECSIT
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." 5 The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time
for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the
City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the
population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification
states that the population of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The
Certification further states that it was "issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A.
Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City
as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan." 6
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because
based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be
made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election" 7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on
demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states
that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the
requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every
year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been
designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections
in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the
NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of
May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of
Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%
per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
DcICEa
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August
2007. 9 Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only
248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the
population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as
of 1 August 2010. 10
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be
254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the Certification's own growth rate assumption,
the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual
municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces. 11
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment,
thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This
projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is
recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on
the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which
states:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Certification of population size based on projections
may specify the range within which the true count is
deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the
official low and high population projections.
xxx xxx xxx
that the law failed to comply with the requirement of Section 5 (4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that a city must have a population of at least 250,000; (2) that the creation
of a separate district amounts to a conversion and requires the conduct of a plebiscite;
and (3) that the law violates Section 5 (3), Article VI which provides that each district
shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
The Dissenting View
SO ORDERED.
First. Section 5, paragraphs (3) and (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.
Corona, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Abad.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relationship.
Abad, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ABAD, J., dissenting:
This case is about a law that establishes a new legislative district based on a projected
population of the National Statistics Office (NSO) to meet the population requirement of
the Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.
On May 1, 2009 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9591, to amend Section 57 of
R.A. 8754, the charter of the City of Malolos, making the city a separate district from the
existing first legislative district of Bulacan.
The Challenge
On June 16, 2009 petitioners Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S. Fajardo, Julio G.
Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada, all claiming to be taxpayers from Malolos City,
filed the present action, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9591. They point out a)
of
(Sgd.) ALBERTO
MIRANDA
the
N.
Regional Director 1
I cannot agree with petitioners' claim that the Congress gravely abused its discretion in
relying on the 2010 projected population of Malolos City as basis for its reapportionment
law. The Court has always been reluctant to act like a third chamber of Congress and
second guess its work. Only when the lawmakers commit grave abuse of discretion in
their passage of the law can the Court step in. But the lawmakers must not only abuse
this discretion, they must do so with grave consequences. 2
Here, nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or
population projections in the creation of legislative districts. As argued by the Solicitor
General, the standard to be adopted in determining compliance with the population
requirement involves a political question. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into the
wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature. ESHAcI
In fact, in Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 the Court upheld the validity of a
reapportionment law based on the NSO's "preliminary count of population" which may
be subject to revision. The Court held there that "although not final, and still subject to
correction, a census enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that
Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters of apportionment of
legislative districts."
Majority opinion ably written by Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out, however, that "no
legal effect" can be accorded to the certification of demographic projection for Malolos
City issued by the NSO Region III Director because it violates the provisions of
Executive Order 135 dated November 6, 1993 of President Fidel V. Ramos, which
requires that such demographic projection be declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board and that the certification be issued by the NSO administrator or a
designated officer. In addition, the intercensal population estimates must, according to
the Executive Order, "be as of middle of every year."
But Executive Order 135 cannot apply to this case for the following reasons:
a. The President issued Executive Order 135 specifically to provide guidelines on the
issuance of Certification of Population sizes pursuant to the following provisions of the
Local Government Code: Section 7 (the creation and conversion of local government
units); Section 386 (the creation of a barangay), Section 442 (the creation of a
municipality); Section 450 (the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangay into
a component city); Section 452 (the creation of highly urbanized cities); and Section 461
(the creation of urbanized cities).
Since R.A. 9591 is not concerned with the creation or conversion of a local government
unit but with the establishment of a new legislative district, which is by no means a local
government unit, the same is not governed by the requirements of Executive Order 135.
b. R.A. 9591 is based on a "legislative" finding of fact that Malolos will have a population
of over 250,000 by the year 2010. The rules of legislative inquiry or investigation are
unique to each house of Congress. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Executive
Department can dictate on Congress the kind of evidence that will satisfy its law-making
requirement. It would be foolhardy for the Court to suggest that the legislature consider
only evidence admissible in a court of law or under the rules passed by the Office of the
President. Obviously, the Judicial Department will resist a mandate from Congress on
what evidence its courts may receive to support its decisions.
c. At any rate, the certification issued by the NSO Region III Director, whose office has
jurisdiction over Malolos City, partakes of official information based on official data. That
Malolos had a population of 175,291 as of May 1, 2000 is, as the certification states,
based on the 2000 census of population conducted by the NSO. The President of the
Philippines proclaimed and declared that census official under Proclamation 28 dated
April 18, 2001. On the other hand, the population growth rate of 3.78% used in the 2010
population projection for Malolos derived from the difference between the results of the
official population census taken in 1995 and that taken in 2000. The Regional Director
did not make the projection by counting the trees from the mountaintops. The data are
based on evidence that is admissible even in a court of law. EDATSI
The majority opinion claims that the NSO Regional Director's projection of the
population of Malolos by 2010 is erroneous. Given that the total population of Malolos
as of May 1, 2000 was 175,291 and its growth rate was 3.78% per year, its population
will grow, according to the dissenting opinion, to only 241,550 in 2010.
But the majority opinion uses the following formula: 175,291 x 37.80% (arrived at by
multiplying the 3.78 annual growth rate by 10 for the 10 years between 2000 and 2010)
= 241,550. It uses a growth rate of 37.80% per 10 years to substitute for the stated
official growth rate of 3.78% per year. It ignores logic and the natural cumulative growth
of population.
In contrast, the NSO Regional Director's computation applies the growth rate of 3.78%
per year, which is more logical in that the base is adjusted annually to reflect the year to
year growth. Thus:
Base Rate Growth Year
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others
may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we
may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However,
choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right
to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least,
civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang
Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the
Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad
as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in
2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition 5
for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of
an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nation's only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that.
II.No substantial differentiation
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which
motion was granted on February 2, 2010. 19
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection
of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines' international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC's
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner's freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had
been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance
with
the
Constitution
7941
the
and
Requirements
Republic
Act
of
No.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 20 "the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was
shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country." 21 EaISTD
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner's
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a
change in respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's right to procedural
due process.
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
as
the
Ang
Basis
Ladlad's
for
Refusal
Petition
to
for
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we
held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
. . . The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence
the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only
on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
Ground
to
Deny
to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. 29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing immoral acts."
30 The OSG argues:
. . . A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full
of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality,
sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality
on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value.
Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle,
"consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. 34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges . . . have followed the 'rational
basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad
cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers
no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it
is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom
Association
of
Expression
and
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It
is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be
distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral
ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every
opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people
deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of
opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief,
and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining
which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle
in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies
including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small not only for a majority, however large but for
each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also
to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. aAcDSC
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not
illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality
and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming
public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and United Nations judicial decisions
have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing
general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To
the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the
law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking
or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view.
On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal
fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,
reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
and
International
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to
bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms
are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems
so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege
ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case
are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner's
application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,
Perezand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., Pls. see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Abad.
Brion, J., joins dissent of J. Corona.
Abad, J., I certify that J. Abad wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion to
underscore some points that I deem significant. EScIAa
FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul
of the non-establishment clause 1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the
part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal much less constitutional
terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on
the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian 2 and
its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a
morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement" 8 with
religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether
Christian or Muslim" 9 since the "moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have
slipped into society and . . . are now publicly accepted moral norms." 10 However, as
correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen fit to
disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State
has legislated to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy
grounds. 11 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality,
crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.
Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and offensive.
Nevertheless, private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be attributed or
ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas, 12 opined:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was
making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The
condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and
deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which
they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of
the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the . . . law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code." 13
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad's definition of the term "sexual
orientation," 14 as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with
men, 15 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual
individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise
of personal liberty. For, the "ability to [independently] define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend
on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 16 As Mr. Justice Blackmun
so eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 17 (overturned by the
United States Supreme Court seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas): 18
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence,
central to family life, community welfare, and the development of
human personality[.]"19 The fact that individuals define themselves
in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be
many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much
and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs
were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the
class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was
enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs,
from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent
charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a
blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the
SSL, expressly or impliedly . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute
significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates
to the constitutionality of the classification albeit made indirectly
as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws between
the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The
classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply
equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the
following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other
GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the
exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not
exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal
and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity
manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of
Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in
time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a
classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a
discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several
other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the
validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the
inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any
all
i.Fair
wages
and
equal
remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work
not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay
for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. 36 Noteworthy, and of
special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications
based on gender or illegitimacy. 37
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for
mere rationality. 38 This is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an
unavoidable one. 39 The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the
reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if
any such grounds exist, on which the State acted. 40
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative
classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has looked to four factors, 41 thus:
(1)The history of invidious discrimination against the class
burdened by the legislation; 42
(2)Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a
typical class member's ability to contribute to society; 43
(3)Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or
beyond the class members' control; 44 and
(4)The political power of the subject class. 45
These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain weight. 46 The U.S.
Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither required,
nor even discussed, every factor in every case. 47 Indeed, no single talisman can
define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the equal
protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; experience, not
abstract logic, must be the primary guide. 48
In any event, the first two factors history of intentional discrimination and relationship
of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute have always been
present when heightened scrutiny has been applied. 49 They have been critical to the
analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. 50 However, the last two factors immutability of the
characteristic and political powerlessness of the group are considered simply to
supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny
exists. 51
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex or
gender albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis have been previously held to
trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classification on the basis of sexual
orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect classification that
prompts intermediate review.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping. 77
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the
intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and
intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected 78 (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and
trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based classification
undertaken for its own sake cannot survive. 79
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the
party-list system because it is not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector"
enumerated either in the Constitution 80 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. 81 However,
this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 82 where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT
community as marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history (and
indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my humble
view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation encompasses
social marginalization as well. To hold otherwise is tantamount to trivializing socially
marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the State's benevolence" and
denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of representative
democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them." 83 The party-list system
could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
CORONA, J., dissenting:
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I believe the
basic issue here is simple: does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify, under the
terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and underrepresented sector
in the party-list system? IaHCAD
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks accreditation
by the respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization of a marginalized
and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding that petitioner is not a
marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on Elections denied its petition.
A
SYSTEM
AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS
FOR
MARGINALIZED
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for
the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public
policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the
fundamental law be consulted. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the
course of our present inquiry. It provides:
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
SEC. 5.. . .
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of Representatives including those under the
party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as
"marginalized" to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA
7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2.Declaration of policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5.Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before
election.
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization; AcSHCD
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with
established rules of statutory construction and the Court's pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the
party list system is limited and qualified. Hence, other sectors that may qualify as
marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to the sectors
mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system refer only to the
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other
related or similar sectors.
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the fundamental
law and of its implementing statute. It is coherent with the mandate of the Constitution
that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be provided by
law" duly enacted by Congress. It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory
construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that follows
an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases,
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 21
Moreover, it reins in the subjective elements of passion and prejudice that accompany
discussions of issues with moral or religious implications as it avoids the need for
complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors under the party-list system? What are the family resemblances that would
characterize them? 22
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the
pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT, the
following factors are significant:
(a)they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b)they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and
historically regarded as vital to the national interest but
they have long been relegated to the fringes of society and
deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation
of national policy;
(c)the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or
similarity of sectors to those expressly mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941 is a constitutional provision
specifically recognizing the special significance of the said
sectors (other than people's organizations, unless such
people's organizations represent sectors mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941) 23 to the advancement of the
national interest; and
SYSTEM,
and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for
the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature
and history, also the nation's but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to
public attention because of these sectors' underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may
qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court's task is to respect that
legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand
such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of
political will and not of judicial judgment. TAaCED
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.
ABAD, J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the same conclusion following a different
path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more about
what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the party-list
system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming overnight
proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct
part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 1 the Court laid down guidelines for
accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass
for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for
sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has never
applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to
apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this
point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC's claim in its comment on the petition
that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not marginalized and underrepresented since it
is not among, or even associated with, the sectors specified in the Constitution and in
R.A. 7941. 2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and
underrepresented group of people like those representing labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. This is effectively the COMELEC's
frame of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term "marginalized and
underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong
Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting
such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term marginalized and underrepresented
from its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution itself gives of
groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant,
the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors.
Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they are, which
was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract
description of them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an
elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a gathering of "animals." Here, it looked
at the samples of qualified groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
minorities, women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them
all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The
examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and
youth) should be the starting point in any search for definition. Congress has added six
others to this list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas
workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941
provides: HcTSDa
Sec. 5.Registration. . . . Provided, that the sector shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified parties, it
should be evident that they represent the working class (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically deprived
(urban poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the vulnerable
(women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans). This analysis
provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are marginalized and
underrepresented.
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just lobby or
interest groups. They must have an authentic identity that goes beyond mere similarities
in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their members belong to the same
industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or wish to promote
public support for their mutual interests. The group should be characterized by a shared
advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to their
groups. This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing with them seats in the
House of Representatives so they can take part in enacting beneficial legislation.
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 merely
provide by examples a sense of what the qualified organizations should look like. As the
Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not exclusive. For
instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they advocate an
extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the extreme left of the political
divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as qualified sectors.
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather than
a specific definition of the class of people they seek to represent. For example, the
Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower definition than the broad and more
abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more specific and concrete
definition like "carpenters," "security guards," "microchips factory workers," "barbers,"
"tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See the other
illustrations below.
Broad*NarrowSpecifically
DefinitionDefinition
Defined
Working
ClassLaborCarpenters,
security
factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers
EconomicallyUrbanInformal
settlers,
DeprivedPoordisplaced by domestic wars
the
Groups
guards,
jobless,
microchip
persons
and
dumb,
the
blind,
people
on
*The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their
examples.
the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, . . .
.
This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors
provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-list
applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural minorities) or
a national presence (all the rest).
The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces,
cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group representing the sugar plantation workers of
Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not represent the
inherently national character of the labor sector.
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim that
it represents the marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must present to
the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity, advocacy, and
magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject those who put up building props
overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so they can get
through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular legislative district.
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 for
the party-list system is the second, the narrow definition of the sector that the law
regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is that, if any of
the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory workers,
the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within the sector desires to apply for
accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat
allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of Representatives. This is the apparent intent
of the Constitution and the law.
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and
underrepresented," exemplified by the working class, the service class, the
economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or some
such similar class of persons.
An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election
as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of
sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether
the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may
have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an
irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as
shown above. If such party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with other
sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in the
party-list system must state if they are to be considered as national, regional, or sectoral
parties. Thus: ESCDHA
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying
for accreditation must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine
issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or
national presence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally
accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, 5 the
Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by
and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against,
and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's petition on religious and
moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have
been documented. At home, effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical abuse
by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior,
while lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived affliction. LGBTs are
refused admission from certain schools, or are suspended and put on probation.
Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or benefits which are
otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry for
their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party
accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.
Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete
and specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are our
brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who have suffered in silence all these years.
True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or
acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized
and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement in crafting
legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and
effective representation which is the very essence of our party-list system. cIETHa
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Office for Chamber of
Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW).
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the present
petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded the case
to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary hearings
on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the submissions of
the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It
would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the
establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to
assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants.
SYLLABUS
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTYLIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably,
therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list
elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the partylist provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their
votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not
win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
and objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the
law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED.
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers
to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. "Lack of
well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS
SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."
The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I
do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST
NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or
unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It
has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature
of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to
enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. Not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can
those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to
betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do
district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide
Development Fund (CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORAL
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE
STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE
AGENTS. A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups
and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and
their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies,
becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization
he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another
person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in
succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration.
Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term
forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months
before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative
under his new party or organization. EcTDCI
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty
objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the
Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in
the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered
parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the
premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized
and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements
of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration,
pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated
November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution
3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose
of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)
and
Underrepresented
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
System
Desecrated
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in
the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in
the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich
and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these
two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly
defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their
economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized
and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor,
even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent
of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in
order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.
45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who
therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical
to open the system to those who have long been within it those privileged sectors
that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized
or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.
The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not
have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by
those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation
Separate Opinions
of
the
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis
still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on
and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote
shows:
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May
14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting
official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers . . . ."
We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but,
inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of
whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved
groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the
party-list system.
Guidelines
Party-List Participants
for
Screening
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in
order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its
own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through
the legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA.
When
REV. RIGOS.
Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia
ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et
cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering
as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a
political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of
or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of
RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . .
to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced,
and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for
them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all.
Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of
noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of
RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec
is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after
the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, 147613, June 26, 2001)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and
Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION
OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG
LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must
be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is
mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1[1] of the
2
3
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this
law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously
with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties,
organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes
cast in their favor were as follows:6[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of
Percentage of
Nominees
Coalition
Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC
503,487
5.5%
Rene M. Silos
Melvyn
Eballe
2. ABA
321,646
3. ALAGAD
312,500
4. VETERANS
304,802
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
255,184
6. AKO
239,042
7. NCSCFO
238,303
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
10. BUTIL
215,643
11. SANLAKAS 194,617
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
3.51%
3.41%
3.33%
Leonardo Q. Montemayor
Diogenes S. Osabel
Eduardo P. Pilapil
2.79%
2.61%
2.60%
2.57%
2.54%
2.36%
2.13%
2.07%
D.
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998,
the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes,
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as
the 14th party-list representative.7[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8[8] filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power,
Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
7
8
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional9[9] seats
must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine
"how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in
the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x
x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
18. FEJODAP
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
11
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party,
12
10
13
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following
issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2.Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3.
If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of
a qualified party be determined?
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
"twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80
representatives
This formulation16[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives,
as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list
seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional
seats.
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
14
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together
with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties,
organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such
15
16
allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise
of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that
the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list
complement.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and
obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys
the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:
(b)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. 17[17] Our task now,
as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes
cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will
actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by
the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will
be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system, Mr. President."18[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned
after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the
Bundestag of Germany.19[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a
seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-
18
17
19
half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000
votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent,
we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we
are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be
able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying
to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job
to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat.
We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats
within that system.20[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. 21[21] But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 22[22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise
and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.23[23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. x x x.24[24]
22
23
20
24
21
25
will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence,
the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by
that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of
additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated
--------------------------- x
Total no. of votes of
qualified parties
No. of additional
No. of votes of
= seats of party
party concerned concerned
(Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be
as follows:
Party
Number of
Guaranteed
Votes
Seats
1. APEC
503,487
1
2. ABA
321,646
1
3. ALAGAD
312,500
1
4. VETERANS
304,802
1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
255,184
1
6. AKO 239,042
1
2.72
7. NCSCFO
238,303
1
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548
4
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
1
10. BUTIL
215,643
1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617
1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
3
13. COCOFED
186,388
1
Total
3,429,338
Additional
Seats
5.73
3.66
3.55
3.47
Extra
Seats
1
1
Total
2.90
7
5
4
4
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our
party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of
the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have
threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked
differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,26[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members.
More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the
Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in
the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer
formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two
party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution
to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need
to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
1
2.71
1
4
1
2.68
2.64
2.45
2.21
1
2.16
2.12
13
32
4
1
4
3
3
3
52
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
26
27
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:
Additional seats
for concerned
party
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
No. of additional
= ----------------------x seats allocated to
No. of votes of
the first party
first party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of additional
------------------ x seats allocated to
No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
Additional seats
for concerned
=
party (ABA)
No. of votes of
ABA
No. of additional
-------------------- x seats allocated to
No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
235,548 2.57%
232,376 2.54% 1
232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46
1
215,643 2.36% 1
215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43
194,617 2.13% 1
194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39
1
189,802 2.07% 1
189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38
186,388 2.04%
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an
exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions
are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To
repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that
provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled
to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set
the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC)
and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the
incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and
methodology.
255,184 2.79% 1
255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51
1
239,042 2.61% 1
239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
1
238,303 2.60% 1
238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end
result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
Additional seats
for concerned
party
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
1
8. ABANSE!
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10. BUTIL
1
11. SANLAKAS
12. COOP1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say,
however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify
RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the
changes willed by the lawmakers.
Organization
Votes
Epilogue
1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
503,487
321,646
312,500
304,802
2
1
1
1
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirtyeight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a
party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
percent threshold and proportional representation.
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in
adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties,
we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed
with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will
fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the partylist system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14)
sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve
(12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
28
29
30
31
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to
nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BARA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the
various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P.
Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release
or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating
party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales' previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, 1 the
petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply
with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2 ]"
and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections. aTEHCc
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public
and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven
(7) private respondents 3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group 4 mentioned in
G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate
comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the
plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the
May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of
names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the
May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1)
BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6)
AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG
KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to
be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the
Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. EACIcH
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor
and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5
dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec's Law Department
requesting a list of that groups' nominees. Another letter 6 of the same tenor dated
March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the
particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales' requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the
front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7
with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the
Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales' earlier plea for
information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the
same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for
the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming
or denying . . . the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin
Abalos, Sr. . . ." Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 9 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees' names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales' basic
disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED,
moreover,
that
the
Commission
will
disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection
with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election
day. DaACIH
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all
letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list
nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007
Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last
part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to 'implement this resolution and
reply to all letters . . . inquiring on the party-list nominees' is apparently a fool-proof
bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 . . . is the final answer to the two formal requests .
. . of Petitioners". 10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their
petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the
accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in
their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec
. . . committed grave abuse of discretion . . . when it granted the
assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining
whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or
not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such
course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral
groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.
13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal's evaluation of
the evidence. 14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No.
07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the
nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941's and UP-LR's posture that the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No.
7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by
private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec
"not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8
requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list
of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314
formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these
consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to
the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to costs. HcaATE
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cinco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, 177314, May 04, 2007)
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to
be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be
achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of
the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has
consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22
So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the
herein petitions. cIECaS
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.]
assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made
a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced
that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before
the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is
duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". 7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens'
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela), Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We
quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for PartyList, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and
public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty
three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under
the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation
Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than
sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical
data:
15,283,659
1,337,032
102,430
16,723,121
PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION
VOTES
RECEIVED
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
BATAS
ANAK PAWIS
ARC
ABONO
1,163,218
972,730
760,260
610,451
538,971
476,036
470,872
423,076
405,052
390,029
386,361
376,036
338,194
337,046
Bayan Muna
Citizens Battle Against Corruption
Gabriela Women's Party
Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives
Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party
Alagad
Luzon Farmers Party
Cooperative-Natco Network Party
Anak Pawis
Alliance of Rural Concerns
Abono
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
BUHAY
=
party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system
party-list system
Party-List
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
1,178,747
977,476
755,964
621,718
622,489
492,369
462,674
423,190
409,298
412,920
370,165
375,846
340,151
Additional seats
Equal to or at least 6%
Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6%
s for
rty
BAYAN MUNA
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the
GABRIELA
following percentage:
A TEACHER
1,178,747
16,261,369
COOP-NATCO
ANAKPAWIS
0.07248 or 7.2%
Percentage
Additional Seat
1.65
1.28
1.05
1.05
0.83
0.78
0.71
0.69
0.69
0.62
0.63
0.57
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of votes of
first party
No. of additional
seats allocated to
first party
Additional Seats
BAYAN MUNA
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
2
1
1
1
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
SO ORDERED. 10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 13 and An Waray. 14 Per the
certification 15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List
No. of Seat(s)
Buhay
Bayan Muna
CIBAC
Gabriela
APEC
A Teacher
Akbayan
Alagad
Butil
Coop-Natco [sic]
Anak Pawis
ARC
Abono
AGAP
AMIN
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1.Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2.Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3.Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by
the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4.How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in
their petition:
I.Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified partylist organizations as said rule:
A.Violates the constitutional principle of proportional
representation.
B.Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1.The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule
in allocating additional seats for the
"First Party" violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA
7941.
2.The use of two formulas in the allocation of
additional seats, one for the "First Party"
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference,
these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
1.Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or
merely a ceiling?
2.Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3.Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4.How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5.Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections? 18
The Ruling of the Court
Representatives:
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available
to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation
of
Seats
for
The Statutory Limits Presented by
and the Three-Seat Cap
er of seats available to
ative districts
x .20
Party-List
the Two
Representatives:
Percent Threshold
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved
under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the
allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the
First Party Rule, 20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented
Germany's Niemeyer formula 21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats
for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11.Number of Party-List Representatives. . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220
.80
x .20
55
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats".
25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's second
interpretation.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as
follows: ASEIDH
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the
party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
total number of seats allotted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and
A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a
qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat
allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are
ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.
27
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement
is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by
following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a)shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions
on a nationwide basis;
(b)rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c)allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. 24
Rank
Party
Votes
Garnered
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
COOP-NATCCO
BUTIL
BATAS
ARC
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
ANAKPAWIS
ABONO
AMIN
AGAP
AN WARAY
YACAP
FPJPM
UNI-MAD
ABS
KAKUSA
KABATAAN
ABA-AKO
ALIF
SENIOR CITIZENS
AT
VFP
ANAD
BANAT
ANG KASANGGA
BANTAY
ABAKADA
1-UTAK
TUCP
COCOFED
AGHAM
ANAK
ABANSE! PINAY
PM
AVE
SUARA
ASSALAM
DIWA
ANC
SANLAKAS
ABC
KALAHI
APOI
BP
AHONBAYAN
BIGKIS
PMAP
AKAPIN
PBA
GRECON
BTM
A SMILE
NELFFI
AKSA
BAGO
BANDILA
AHON
ASAHAN MO
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
310,889
300,923
245,382
235,086
228,999
228,637
218,818
217,822
213,058
197,872
196,266
188,521
177,028
170,531
169,801
166,747
164,980
162,647
155,920
146,032
141,817
130,356
119,054
110,769
110,732
110,440
107,021
99,636
97,375
90,058
88,868
79,386
78,541
78,424
77,327
75,200
74,686
71,544
62,220
60,993
58,717
57,872
57,012
55,846
54,751
54,522
51,722
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
AGBIAG!
SPI
BAHANDI
ADD
AMANG SCIAaT
ABAY PARAK
BABAE KA
SB
ASAP
PEP
ABA ILONGGO
VENDORS
ADD-TRIBAL
ALMANA
AANGAT KA PILIPINO
AAPS
HAPI
AAWAS
SM
AG
AGING PINOY
APO
BIYAYANG BUKID
ATS
UMDJ
BUKLOD FILIPINA
LYPAD
AA-KASOSYO
KASAPI
TOTAL
50,837
50,478
46,612
45,624
43,062
42,282
36,512
34,835
34,098
33,938
33,903
33,691
32,896
32,255
29,130
26,271
25,781
22,946
20,744
16,916
16,729
16,421
16,241
14,161
9,445
8,915
8,471
8,406
6,221
15,950,900
=========
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
GABRIELA
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
COOP-NATCCO
BATAS 29
ANAKPAWIS
ABONO
IDTHcA
AN WARAY
YACAP
FPJPM
The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations,
UNI-MAD
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the twopercenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for all party-list candidates.
Votes
Garnered
Votes
Garnered over
Total Votes
for Party-List,
in %
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
7.33%
6.14%
4.74%
3.89%
3.88%
3.07%
2.92%
2.65%
2.57%
2.57%
2.42%
2.35%
2.32%
2.13%
2.12%
2.06%
2.02%
310,889
300,923
245,382
1.95%
1.89%
1.54%
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one
seat each", or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed
17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes". This is where petitioners' and intervenors'
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion
to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability
of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives". 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1.The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2.The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Votes
Garnered
Votes
Garnered
over
Total
Votes for
Party List,
in %
(A)
Guaranteed
Seat
Additional
Seats
(First
Round)
(B)
(Second
Round)
(C)
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
310,889
300,923
245,382
235,086
228,999
228,637
218,818
217,822
213,058
197,872
196,266
188,521
177,028
170,531
169,801
166,747
164,980
162,647
155,920
7.33%
6.14%
4.74%
3.89%
3.88%
3.07%
2.92%
2.65%
2.57%
2.57%
2.42%
2.35%
2.32%
2.13%
2.12%
2.06%
2.02%
1.95%
1.89%
1.54%
1.47%
1.44%
1.43%
1.37%
1.37%
1.34%
1.24%
1.23%
1.18%
1.11%
1.07%
1.06%
1.05%
1.03%
1.02%
0.98%
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
====
2.79
2.33
1.80
1.48
1.48
1.17
1.11
1.01
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55
party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available
party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient
number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each
party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. TADEO.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
MR. TADEO.
MR. VILLACORTA.
The same.
MR. OPLE.
. . . In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground.
For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I
see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of
the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no
question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of
such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both
the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that
the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated
with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute
themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very
presence there has a transforming effect upon the
philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFLCIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the
Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all
why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other
so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution
for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I
support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty
of being elected representatives later on through a party
list system; and even beyond that, to become actual
political parties capable of contesting political power in the
wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided
the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region. cDaEAS
(d)A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage
in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for partylist representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate,
the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang
Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the partylist elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, 35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan
Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
vs.
petitioner,
vs.
DRUGS FOUNDATION
vs. COMMISSION ON
SOCIAL
MOVEMENT
FOR
ACTIVE
REFORM
AND
TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman,
Carlito B. Cubelo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC, respondent.
ALLIANCE
OF
ORGANIZATIONS,
NETWORKS
AND
A.Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's resolutions approving registr
ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent. groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8
[G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.]
204379
12-099
Alagad ng
(PLM)
Sining (ASIN)
Bayani.
Association, Inc.
(Manila Teachers)
and
-
CARPIO, J p:
The Cases
204426
12-011
Association of
(PLM)
Local Athletics
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition 1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
Entrepreneurs
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
and Hobbyists,
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
Inc. (ALA-EH)
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 10
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13
204435
12-057
1 Alliance
November 2012, 2 20 November 2012, 3 27 November 2012, 4 4 December 2012, 5 11
(PLM)
Advocating
December 2012, 6 and 19 February 2013. 7
The Facts
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R. No.
SPP No.
Group
204367
12-104
Akbay
Inc. (ALONA)
(PL)
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.
sector.
204370
12-011
Ako An Bisaya
(PP)
(AAB)
204139
12-127
Alab ng
(PL)
Mamamahayag
organization;
12-009
Abyan Ilonggo
(PP),
Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204402
represent.
12-061
Kalikasan Party-
(PP)
List
(KALIKASAN)
12-175
Alliance of
(PL)
Organizations,
Associations of
the Philippines,
and underrepresented;
204485
representatives;
peasants.
204436
(ALAM)
204394
Failure to prove membership base continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified
and track record;
the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections:
Philippines, Inc.
to represent.
12-145
Association of
(PL)
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
(GUARDJAN)
12-154
AKO Bicol
(PLM)
Political Party
12-177
(AKB)
(PLM)
elections
204490
12-073
Pilipinas Para sa
(PLM)
Pinoy (PPP)
12-161
Atong Paglaum,
(PLM)
Inc. (Atong
accreditation
Paglaum)
12-187
Association for
(PLM)
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)
and
-
204002
12-188
Alliance for
(PLM)
Rural Concerns
accreditation
(ARC)
204318
12-220
United
(PLM)
Movement
accreditation
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)
204100
12-196
1-Bro Philippine
(PLM)
Guardians
Cancelled registration
-
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1 BROPGBI)
204122
12-223
1 Guardians
(PLM)
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
Cancelled registration
-
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)
Cooperatives
(APEC)
represent.
12-257
Blessed
(PLM)
Federation of
Cancelled registration
-
204174
12-232
Aangat Tayo
(PLM)
Party-List Party
accreditation
(AT)
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
to be represented; and
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)
and
-
sought to be represented.
seeks to represent.
203960
12-260
1st Consumers
(PLM)
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)
underrepresented;
-
203976
12-288
Alliance for
(PLM)
Rural and
accreditation
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)
represents differ;
represent;
12-201
Association of
(PLM)
Philippine
accreditation
members; and
Electric
204240
12-279
Agri-Agra na
(PLM)
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
(AGRI)
204364
12-248
Aksyon
(PLM)
Magsasaka-
Adhikain at
(PLM)
Kilusan ng
Cancelled registration
-
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204141
Cancelled registration
-
12-180
12-229
The True
(PLM)
Marcos Loyalist
Cancelled registration
-
(for God,
Partido Tinig ng
Country and
Masa (AKMA-
underrepresented;
People)
PTM)
Association of
-
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)
12-217
Pilipino
Cancelled registration
(PLM)
Association for
204126
Cancelled registration
Movement
203936
204408
Country Urban
Poor Youth
a new application;
Cancelled registration
Advancement
and Welfare
Agilang
(PACYAW)
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
the party;
12-263
Kaagapay ng
(PLM)
Nagkakaisang
(KAP)
12-277
Pasang Masda
(PLM)
Nationwide
Cancelled registration
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 33
-
Party (PASANG
12-185
Alliance for
MASDA)
interests; and
(PLM)
Nationalism and
accreditation
203958
12-015
Kapatiran ng
(PLM)
mga Nakulong
Democracy
former operators.
(ANAD)
Cancelled registration
-
Inc. (KAKUSA)
sector;
na Walang Sala,
and
beyond reasonable
Resolution
doubt); dated 7 November 2012 34
-
12-060
and
(PLM)
the Environment
accreditation
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
and underrepresented;
(GREENFORCE)
204428
12-256
Ang Galing
(PLM)
Pinoy (AG)
accreditation
-
hearing;
-
12-254
Firm 24-K
(PLM)
Association, Inc.
accreditation
and
-
(FIRM 24-K)
204341
12-269
Action League
(PLM)
of Indigenous
accreditation
Masses (ALIM)
204358
12-204
Alliance of
(PLM)
Advocates in
Cancelled registration
-
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)
204359
12-272
Social
(PLM)
Movement for
Cancelled registration
-
Active Reform
12-252
Ang Agrikultura
and Transparency
(PLM)
Natin Isulong
accreditation
(SMART)
(AANI)
-
and
underrepresented.
204238
12-173
Alliance of
Cancelled registration
Resolution
and dated 7 November 2012 40
(PLM)
Bicolnon Party
accreditation
(ABP)
204125
12-292
Agapay ng
(PLM)
Indigenous
accreditation
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)
people sector;
represent.
204323
12-210
Bayani Party
(PLM)
List (BAYANI)
accreditation
-
12-202
Philippine
underrepresented sector of
(PLM)
Coconut
accreditation
professionals; and
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)
not marginalized;
of professionals.
(PLM)
Para sa mga
204220
12-238
Abang Lingkod
(PLM)
Party-List
mga Magsasaka
(BINHI)
continuously representing
Resolution
thedated 28 November 2012 45
LINGKOD)
12-136
Butil Farmers
(PLM)
Party (BUTIL)
accreditation
sector; and
-
(ABANG
Magsasaka
Cancelled registration
-
accreditation
underrepresented; and
204158
12-158
Action
(PLM)
Brotherhood for
accreditation
Active
the party.
Dreamers, Inc.
12-194
1st Kabalikat ng
(ABROAD)
(PLM)
Bayan
accreditation
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
registration; and
(1st KABAGIS)
and
-
204374
12-228
Binhi-Partido ng
Cancelled registration
Resolution
and dated 4 December 2012 47
204410
12-198
1-United
Cancelled accreditation
(PLM)
Transport
Koalisyon (1-
203960
The party represents drivers
and
operators, who may have conflicting
203936
interests; and
UTAK)
-
12-260 (PLM)
12-248 (PLM)
12-015 (PLM)
underrepresented sector.
203976
12-288 (PLM)
12-157
Coalition of
204425
(PLM),
Senior Citizens
Cancelled registration
-
204094
12-185 (PLM)
12-191
in the
204125
because its nominees had
a term-
(PLM)
Philippines, Inc.
sharing agreement.
(ANAD)
12-292 (PLM)
12-196 (PLM)
204141
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, AIPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK,
204240
SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of
204216
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. CSAaDE
12-229 (PLM)
Group
03818-19
12-154 (PLM)
12-177 (PLM)
204122
12-202 (PLM)
12-223 (PLM)
203766
12-161 (PLM)
204318
12-220 (PLM)
12-257 (PLM)
03981
12-187 (PLM)
04002
12-188 (PLM)
03922
12-201 (PLM)
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
204158
12-158 (PLM)
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This
Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status
Quo Ante Orders, namely:
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
SPP No.
CITIZENS)
G.R. No.
204100
(SENIOR
Foundation (UNIMAD)
Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc.
(A BLESSED Party-List)
204174
12-232 (PLM)
204126
12-263 (PLM)
04364
04139
12-127 (PL)
04220
12-238 (PLM)
04236
12-254 (PLM)
04238
12-173 (PLM)
04239
12-060 (PLM)
LINGKOD)
04321
12-252 (PLM)
04323
12-210 (PLM)
04341
12-269 (PLM)
04358
04359
04356
(ALIM)
12-204 (PLM)
12-272 (PLM)
12-136 (PLM)
04402
12-061 (PL)
04394
12-145 (PL)
04408
04428
12-256 (PLM)
04490
12-073 (PLM)
04379
12-099 (PLM)
04367
12-104 (PL)
04426
12-011 (PLM)
12-041 (PLM)
204374
12-228 (PLM)
204370
12-011 (PP)
204435
12-057 (PLM)
204486
12-194 (PLM)
204410
12-198 (PLM)
204421,
12-157 (PLM)
204425
12-191 (PLM)
204436
12-009 (PP),
12-165 (PLM)
204485
12-175 (PL)
204484
11-002
12-277 (PLM)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the
criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by
the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the
new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in
the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her partylist group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa
Section 5, Article VI
(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7.No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8.Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." 51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be
read in light of the following discussion among its framers: SEDaAH
MR. MONSOD:
....
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the
proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the
party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In
making the proposal on the party list system, we were
made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved
seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly
would mean that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; that they will choose among themselves who would
sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem
of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation
No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission.
The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at
these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be
included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know,
the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the
law become because when we make an enumeration we
exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second,
we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us
just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there
are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A
doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer.
And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am
a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system
of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in
effect, giving some people two votes and other people one
vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and
farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. . . . . CcAHEI
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. TADEO.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. TADEO.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system? CDHaET
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa,
abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:
Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent
problem of sectoral representation. My question is:
Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific
sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are
actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations
belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the
said sector or to question the claims of the existence
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the
first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
"one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea
that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the
end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements
the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the party-list system.
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." 56 The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
"professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the
elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves
into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law
does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No.
7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly
refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the
specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the
sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized
and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions
of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors
in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or
infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in
the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House
of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the partylist system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even
as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the partylist system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This
automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to
have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be
elected to the House of Representatives.'" However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party . . . must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the
party-list system, even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However,
major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as
members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate
in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must
belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed
by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide
party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have
a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those
who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. . . .
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads
as follows: TCcIaA
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal
to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1.Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2.National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3.Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition. cdtai
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in
the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that
"[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted
in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "welldefined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6.National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do
not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may
have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover,
a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances
is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what
the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been
granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
SERENO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
The
party-list
tool for social justice.
system
is
primarily
I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and
underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and
regional parties or organizations to invade what is and should be constitutionally and
statutorily protected space. What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list
system under the 1987 Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere
political plurality, but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged. DSEaHT
The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was not
done in a vacuum. It comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still
is struggling to come to terms with much social injustice that has been perpetrated over
centuries against a majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its own
governments.
This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled
during the Martial Law years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment
that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987 Constitution must be
appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear
in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers
of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe
the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is appropos
since it is a document that not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To
harken to the words of Cecilia Muoz-Palma, n President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
THE PRESIDENT:My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:
xxx xxx xxx
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good." 3 As explained by this Court: cSHIaA
The reasons I will give have been given by most of the Members
of this Constitutional Commission this evening. But permit me to
restate them just to stress the reasons why I am voting in favor.
EDSAac
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the
use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality"
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
direction of greater equality. . . . [T]here is thus in the
through urban land reform and housing; (4) the health of the
people, through an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development; (5) the women, by ensuring the fundamental
equality of women and men before the law, and (6) people's
organizations, by facilitating the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms. caIEAD
xxx xxx xxx
These are some of the provisions which we have
constitutionalized. These are some of the innovations that we
have introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions
which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national
transformation and development, the driving force for what we
pray would be our irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is
what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
have drafted under the able, firm and dedicated leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument
suited to the circumstances of our time. It is also a Constitution
that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in
the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall,
and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs."
As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our
efforts would pave the way towards the establishment of a
renewed constitutional government which we were deprived of
since 1972, that these efforts would ensure that the triumph at
EDSA so deservingly won by the people shall continue to be
enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts
would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution a
Constitution which is the repository of the people's inalienable
rights; a Constitution that enshrines people's power and the rule
of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair
land a community characterized by moral regeneration, social
progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and
concern for one another; a Constitution that embodies vital living
principles that seek to secure for the people a better life founded
on liberty and welfare for all. TAIaHE
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commission's Sponsorship
Committee, I have the honor to move for the approval of the draft
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second
Reading. 5
It is within this historical and textual milieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all
the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made clear. 6
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for
the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena. 7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:
First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic
theorists is that representatives should be selected to 'mirror' the
characteristics of those being represented in terms of gender,
ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to be socially
relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some
recent democratic debates focused on the need for special
representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social
groups within democratic assemblies. The applicability of this
idea of 'mirror' representation is not confined to debates about
representing marginalized minorities within nation-states; Iris Young
further applies this model of representation to global politics,
arguing that global representation should be based on
representation of the various 'peoples' of the world, each of which
embodies its own distinctive identity and 'perspective'. In practice,
special representation for certain social groups within a 'mirror'
framework can be combined with election mechanisms in various
ways such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the
selection of these 'social groups' for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of
selecting legitimate representatives, occurring prior to the
electoral process, such 'mirror' representation is still
recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting
representative agents. 8 (Emphasis supplied) AEcIaH
Two months after their initial debates on the form and structure of government that
would best promote equality, the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political
equality and provided for sectoral representation in the party-list system of the
legislature. Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list system. 9
MR. VILLACORTA:. . . On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our national history by giving
genuine power to our people in the legislature . . .
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system sought to
address: 10
MR. TADEO:. . . Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people's
power. Kaya kami naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil sa people's
and
of
and
RA
underrepresented"
7941
qualifies
sectoral
parties
Under the second parameter, "[n]ational parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector." In a nutshell, the ponencia interprets
"marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral
parties or organizations, and not national and regional parties or organizations.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of
"marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to
divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of
attaining social justice, which objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies
the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941. TcDIEH
Second, Section 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives." On its face, it is
apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations"
and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the
import of "social justice" that has developed in various decisions is that when the law is
clear and valid, it simply must be applied; but when the law can be interpreted in more
ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be favored. 12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is
a countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties.
To quote:
MR. OPLE:
So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a
party list system is that it is a countervailing means
for the weaker segments of our society, if they want to
seek seats in the legislature, to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and
well-established political parties, but he is concerned
that the mechanics might be inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD:
Not only that; talking about labor, for example I think
Commissioner Tadeo said there are 10 to 12 million
laborers and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8
million or 4.5 million if the laborers get together, they
can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would have 10
seats under the party list system.
MR. OPLE:
So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open
to all and would not agree to a party list system which
seeks to accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral
groups that are predominantly workers and peasants?
prcd
MR. MONSOD:
If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within
the 50, and I am assuming that maybe there are just two
major parties or three at the most, then it is already a form
However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented," primarily because it already constitutes sufficient legislative
standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of its
discretion to determine the qualification of a party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC
must be upheld. This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that,
"the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized
and underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these regulations are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then the standard may be deemed
sufficient. 14 TAaIDH
We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those who
are marginalized and underrepresented today may no longer be one later on.
Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever evolving concept, created to
address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our
Constitution. 15 Confining its definition to the present context may unduly restrict the
COMELEC of its quasi-legislative powers which enables it to issue rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. 16
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution,
because the legislature is certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. 17 The growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only
execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest. 18 This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in
People v. Rosenthal 19 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service
Commission. 20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the
COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized and
underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the
party "violates or fails to comply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it
must be first established that "marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a
requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of "marginalization
and underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry
sufficient legal significance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of
a legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative
powers. This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters
of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard
does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. 21 Consequently, we have held that "public welfare" 22
and "public interest" 23 are examples of such sufficient standards. Therefore, that it
appears only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could even be
an implied one. TaCIDS
National,
regional
and
parties
or
organizations
must
represent
the
"marginalized
underrepresented"
and
lack
defined political constituencies".
sectoral
both
and
"well-
The
disqualification
of
a
nominee
should
not
disqualify
the
party-list
group
provided
that:
(1)
it
meets
Guideline
Nos.
1-5
of
Ang
Bagong
Bayani
(alternately,
on
the
basis
of
the
new
parameters
set
in
the
ponencia,
that
they
validly
qualify
as
national,
regional
or
sectoral
party-list
group);
and
(2)
one
of
its
top
three
(3)
nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I
would like to explain my position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the
ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6.National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification
of its nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the
nominee's qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should not
disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of
Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the
ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list
group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons
explained below. IaESCH
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House
of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature." 24 Because of this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot
interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasilegislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the
disqualification of a single nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a
disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation
of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or
public policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification
of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee's
qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers
declaring "untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should have at
least one qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to
participate in the elections. This is because if all of its top three nominees are
disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in
the elections, and should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it would
still have no one to represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its
disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying
Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on "the list of names submitted by the respective parties . . .
according to their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a party-list group's nominees is
determined by the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of
which reads: cHDAIS
. . . No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list.
It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system introduced in
BANAT v. COMELEC, 27 will allow more party-list groups to be represented in
Congress.
Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.
The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes the
following facts: (1) 35 party-list groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million votes
were cast for the party-list system; and (3) there are 50 seats in Congress reserved for
the party-list representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to
distribute the 50 seats reserved in the House of Representatives given the foregoing
facts and the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 party-list groups.
Party-list
Votes
group
Garnered
AAA
1,466,000
BBB
1,228,000
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list CCC
group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking DDD
of the nominees is changed through substitution, which according to Section 8 is done
by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names EEE
that come after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect, FFF
the new list with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among
the nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the first to the last, in GGG
accordance with Section 13.
HHH
2nd Round
(additional
seats)
2
Total #
7.33%
1st Round
(guaranteed
seats)
1
6.14%
1,040,000
4.74%
1,020,000
3.89%
998,000
3.88%
960,000
3.07%
942,000
2.92%
926,000
2.65%
III
If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus,
their ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in JJJ
determining the one/s that will represent the winning party-list group in Congress. This KKK
means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the
elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first LLL
nominee's place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets MMM
enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can represent it.
NNN
910,000
2.57%
796,000
2.57%
750,000
2.42%
738,000
2.35%
718,000
2.32%
698,000
2.13%
Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang OOO
Bagong Bayani 25 (alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it PPP
qualifies as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization) and has established
QQQ
the qualification of at least one (1) of its top three (3) nominees, to participate in the
elections is a better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with the policy of RRR
developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve SSS
proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list
groups' "chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature" 26 while providing TTT
sufficient disincentives for party-list groups to flood the COMELEC with nominees as UUU
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires that they submit not less than five (5). cEaCTS
VVV
678,000
2.12%
658,000
2.06%
598,000
2.02%
482,000
1.95%
378,000
1.89%
318,000
1.54%
294,000
1.47%
292,000
1.44%
of seats
3
WWW
290,000
1.43%
XXX
280,000
1.37%
YYY
274,000
1.37%
ZZZ
268,000
1.34%
1-A
256,000
1.24%
1-B
248,000
1.23%
1-C
238,000
1.18%
1-D
222,000
1.11%
1-E
214,000
1.07%
1-F
212,000
1.06%
1-G
210,000
1.05%
1-H
206,000
1.03%
1-I
194,000
1.02%
20,000,000
17
33
=========
====
====
We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a
seat to the party-list groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system." In our hypothetical scenario, the party-list groups ranked 1st to
17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes cast for the party-list system. In effect,
all 17 of them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of these so-called
guaranteed seats to the "two percenters" is what BANAT calls the "first round of seat
allocation."
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats allocated to
the two percenters will be subtracted from "20% of the members of the House of
Representatives" reserved by the Constitution for party-list representatives, which in this
hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to
establish the qualification of their first nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in
what BANAT termed as the "second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the
distribution/allocation of these seats are fairly simple. If a party-list group's percentage is
multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is no less than 2, then
that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with the 3-seat
limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top two
party-list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming, again, that
the 2nd and 3rd nominees of both AAA and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left
for distribution. TAIDHa
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of votes
cast in favor of the remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the
only thing that matters is the group's ranking. The party-list group that comes after BBB
will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party-list group, per
rank, continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat allocation
stops at this point. In the table above, the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list
group that ranked 31st in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified. What
happens if one or some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the proposed
method, if one or two of the party-list groups with guaranteed seats have a disqualified
first nominee, their second nominee, if qualified, can still represent them in Congress
based on the second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groups whether or not entitled to
guaranteed seats are disqualified, then those party-list groups, which without the
disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled to a seat, would now have a
higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed
seat and the additional seats for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1.
With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a seat in its favor, assuming
50
that its first nominee is qualified. If I-E's first nominee is disqualified, then we will
=== proceed to the party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. This method is followed down the line
until all 50 seats are allocated. TSHcIa
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list groups
represented in Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time
using a "non-two percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at
least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of seat allocation, it was
granted 1 seat. To be able to send a representative in Congress, RRR's first nominee
should be qualified to sit. Assuming that its first nominee was disqualified, its second or
third nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will
now go to I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are
allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the
elections despite the disqualification of some of its nominees, provided that there
remains a qualified nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not only is this the
better policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by law.
Only
nine
remanded.
of
the
petitions
should
be
COMELEC
3,
did
Article
not
IX-C
of
violate
the
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC can decide election cases en banc. To recall, the Resolution allows the
COMELEC en banc, without a motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic
review of a decision of a COMELEC division granting a petition for registration of a
party-list group or organization; and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for those already
accredited and which have manifested their intent to participate in the 2013 national and
local elections for the purpose of determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani 29 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers which
can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of COMELEC's
administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for reconsideration in
Section 3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2 (5) is
not quasi-judicial but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true distinction
between the two. In a number of cases, this Court has had the opportunity to distinguish
quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 30 we
held that: EDaHAT
The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing
or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things." It does not entail an opportunity to be
heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. This is to be distinguished from
"quasi-judicial function", a term which applies, among others, to
the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. [emphasis supplied]
While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the exercise of the former has for its
purpose the adjudication of rights with finality. 32 This makes it akin to judicial power
which has for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 33
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for
reconsideration is to look at it through the lens of an election case. The phrase "all such
election cases" in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C,
viz.:
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be
seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which
states:
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal of officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 34
As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the penumbra of
election as follows: SDHAEC
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to
a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office.
xxx xxx xxx
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the
In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 36 it was also held that the primary purpose of
an election case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate.
Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an election case. Since the
national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513
cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under
Section 3 is not required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-IPRA,
AT, A BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitions of all the
other Petitioners should be dismissed.
BRION, J., concurring:
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views on the various questions
submitted to the Court through consolidated petitions before us.
For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out under the
following structure: IHaSED
I.The Case and the Issues
II.Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions
A.On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
1.Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani
2.Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
B.Nominees
C.On the observation of the Chief Justice
D.Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III.Preliminary Matters
Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court's consideration may be
condensed as follows:
respect
to
the
cancellation
of
previous
registration/accreditation
of
party-list
groups
or
organizations, the denial of due process and the violation
of the principle of res adjudicata; further, the COMELEC's
cancellation of their existing registration/accreditation is
claimed to be an exercise of its quasi-judicial powers that
the COMELEC Division, not the COMELEC En Banc, can
exercise at the first instance;
reliance
on
Bayani and its Guidelines.
POSITIONS
Ang
Bagong
It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Reflections, that this
Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987
Constitution] arose." I recognize the social justice content of the party-list provisions in
the Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these provisions the primacy that
both the framers of the Constitution and Congress did not see fit to accord.
B.On Nominees
the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and Congress (through RA
No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of the
Constitution and the law, and through the intents the framers; both were considered and
cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The whole
Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these policies in the course of their
assigned task of adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the
words only in case of ambiguity. HSEcTC
Third. Considering the Constitution's solicitous concern for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors as understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941's
requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the party-list group, a
nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented
status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of
the interest and concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social
justice or for any ideology for that matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned to
us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or to formulate policies that fall
within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of our
sworn duty.
As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court
suspended the Rules of Court in considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of
the clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the Majority unanimously found.
Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona
fide membership, in accordance with the political party's constitution and by-laws,
would suffice.
In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most tangible link
of the nominees to their respective parties and to the party-list system.
Subject to the above, the disqualification of the nominee does not necessarily mean
the disqualification of the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the qualification that the law's 3 requirement of the submission of a list
containing at least five (qualified) nominees is mandatory, and a party's inexcusable
failure to comply with this requirement warrants the refusal or cancellation of its
registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C.On
the
the Chief Justice
Observations
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I vote to
VACATE the ruling of the COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our
finding of patent violation of the Constitution after revisiting and overturning the Ang
Bagong Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my view that a grave abuse of
discretion exists.
Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases namely, the petitioners and
the COMELEC relied upon and were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its standards, in light of what
the text and intents of the Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a result different
from what Ang Bagong Bayani reached. HIEASa
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong considerations were
used in ruling on the consolidated petitions, resulting in gross misinterpretation and
misapplication of the Constitution. This is grave abuse of discretion that taints a
decision maker's action, 4 infinitely made worse in this case because the Constitution
itself is involved.
of
As my fourth and final point, the "textualist" approach that the Chief Justice objects to,
has been driven, and is fully justified, by the above reading of the Constitution and the
law.
An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion pertains specifically to the
COMELEC's refusal or cancellation of registration of the party-list group based, solely or
partly, on the disqualification of the nominee. As discussed below, this action and any
refusal or cancellation of registration is completely devoid of basis in fact and in
law and in this sense constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and
of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC in
accordance with the terms of this Separate Opinion. AcHaTE
existence
error
that
COMELEC's action
of
warrants
jurisdictional
reviewing
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or quasijudicial powers, on the other hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved party is
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65. Court action under this
rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law, the COMELEC en banc decision is
final and executory and should stand unless nullified by this Court through a writ of
certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal
must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of discretion is in
keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within
the bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition, generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. 5
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC
merely complied with the prevailing jurisprudence (in particular. with the Court's
pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and Banat v. COMELEC), then it
could not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with grave abuse
of discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when the respondent is exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the present case. CITDES
This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound as the gross misinterpretation
and misapplication of the Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in its role and
duty as guardian of the Constitution. Where a misinterpretation or misapplication of the
Constitution occurs, the result is a constitutional violation that this Court cannot be
prevented from addressing through the exercise of its powers through the available
medium of review under the Rules of Court. To hold otherwise is to countenance a
violation of the Constitution a lapse that cannot and should not happen under our
legal system.
Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application of a
prevailing rule or doctrine negates a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a
glaring error in the doctrine's interpretation of the Constitution, then the Court
would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying down a new doctrine that
would operate prospectively but at the same time dismissing the petition for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this is a course of action the Court cannot
take if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn duty to hold the Constitution inviolate.
For the Court, action under these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed
to be heard about its right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional
dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The
Court's previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the resolution of a similar matter
in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future actions. As
the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past
actions, particularly when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate
authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution.
6 cDIaAS
Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in stone and
do not remain un-erased and applicable for all times under all circumstances. The
Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a sense a continuing one as these are made
and refined in the cases before the Court, taking into account what it has said on the
similar points in the past. This is the principle of stare decisis that fosters the stability of
rulings and decisions. This principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies even
if an incisive examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a faithful
interpretation of the Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation. In this
excluded circumstance, both the rule of reason and the commands of the Constitution
itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need be, overturned. 7 Indeed, if the
act done is contrary to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of discretion
cannot be doubted. 8
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
does not rest on firm constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of the text of
the constitution and its myopic view of constitutional intent led it to a grave error never
envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in
accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court i.e., allowing political parties
to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are
"marginalized and under-represented" (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong
Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization
may be validly included in the list of nominees the Court would not be violating the
principle of prospectivity. 9
The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity both in the application of law and of
judicial decisions enunciating new doctrines is the protection of vested rights and the
obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior ruling, the prospective
application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in good faith on
the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. CTHDcE
Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application in this case, for, a ruling
overturning Ang Bagong Bayani broadens the base of participation in the partylist system of election based on the text and intent of the Constitution. Thus, no one
can claim that the application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election would operate
to the prejudice of parties who relied on the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized
and under-represented sectors (as the term in understood in Ang Bagong Bayani)
continue to be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, subject to the
determination of parties' individual circumstances by the COMELEC.
B.COMELEC
power
and
to
cancel
party-list
group
is
its administrative powers
to
register
registration
of
a
an
exercise
of
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 i.e., to
conduct summary hearings for the purpose of determining the registered parties'
continuing compliance with the law and the regulations and to review the COMELEC
Division's ruling granting a petition for registration is appropriately an exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative power rather than its quasi-judicial power. In the exercise
of this authority, the COMELEC may automatically review the decision of its Divisions,
without need for a motion to reconsider the grant of a petition for registration; it may also
conduct summary hearings when previously registered party-list groups file their
manifestation of intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al. 10 already provides us ample guidance
and insights into what distinguishes administrative and quasi-judicial powers from one
another. On the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari (which can only be invoked
when the respondent exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions) would lie against a
public school committee whose function was to determine the ranking of selected honor
students for its graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and said: ScHADI
From the [foregoing], it will be gleaned that before a tribunal,
board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As
pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record
about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down
to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination
of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. 11 (citation
omitted; emphases ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for registration
or the determination of a registered party's continuing compliance with existing laws,
rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a right or the presence of a conflict of
Constitutional
on the Party-list System
Provisions
The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list system
in terms of its purpose, as follows: 15
major political parties from party-list elections, in patent violation of the Constitution and
the law. TIEHSA
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
[contains the qualifications of party-list nominees, with special agerelated terms for youth sector candidates].
Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. The other major
political parties can thus organize or affiliate with their chosen sector or sectors,
provided that their nominees belong to their respective sectors. Nor is it necessary that
the party-list organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution, and infirmity," as
there is no financial status or educational requirement in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he must be a fisherfolk, if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.
sector groups that have no chance to win in legislative district elections, the party-list
system was not established primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution itself
which do not provide for exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral groups in
the party-list system. If at all, the constitutional text only provided a guarantee of 50%
participation for specified sectoral groups, but the guarantee was only for the first
three (3) elections after the ratification of the Constitution. 25
The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted confirm
the primacy of electoral reform as against social justice objectives. The electoral reform
view was espoused by the author of the provision, Commissioner Monsod, and his
proposed amendment 26 met vigorous objections from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum
and Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have guaranteed or reserved
seats for the "marginalized" sectors in order to prevent their "political massacre" should
the Monsod amendment be allowed. 27 TAESDH
When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized sector won.
Eventually, what was conceded to the latter was what the Constitution, as worded now,
provides i.e., "For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from" the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of "marginalized" would be applied to the party-list system, the
term should apply to the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
that cannot win in the traditional legislative district elections (following the
explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming
marginalization in the social justice context or because of their special interests or
characteristics. The term, of course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they
indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional legislative district elections. These
aspects of the case are further discussed and explained below.
a.2.From the Statutory Perspective.
Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system
innovation does not vary or depart from the basic constitutional intents. The objective
continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the promotion of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives. 28
It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words "marginalized and
underrepresented" made their formal appearance in the party-list system. It was used in
the context of defining one of the aims of the system, i.e., to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. ECSaAc
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory recognition
that accommodates the sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social justice
senses) character into the party-list system (i.e., in addition to the primary electoral
reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution), but nevertheless does not render
sectoral groups the exclusive participants in party-list elections. As already mentioned,
this conclusion is not justified by the wording, aims and intents of the party-list system
as established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term "marginalized and underrepresented" (understood in the
narrow sectoral context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a party, group or
organization for participation in the party-list election, except for those in the sectoral
groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or organizations necessarily are
subject to this requirement. For all parties, sectors, organizations or coalition, however,
the absolute overriding requirement as justified by the principal aim of the system
remains to be a party, group or organization's inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning. To clearly express the logical
implication of this statement, a party, group or organization already participating in the
legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed for itself a fair chance of
winning and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections.
CSDcTH
b.Party Participation under the Party-list System
The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are
those who would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics
of the system to future legislation. They are likewise constitutionally identified as the
registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and are the partylist groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free and open party
system that should be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people
within the limits of the Constitution. 29
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster
proportional representation that would lead to the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-defined
constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this
policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" has been partly discussed above and
would merit further discussion below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 30 on the other hand, defined the term "proportional representation" in this
manner: CIDTcH
[I]t refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section
5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 31
As well, the case defined the phrase "who lack well-defined political constituency" to
mean:
refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group,
like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented.
32
Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term "marginalized and
underrepresented," clearly showing how, in its view, the party-list system is bound to this
descriptive term. As discussed above, Ang Bagong Bayani's use of the term is not
exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of the party-list system. This error
becomes more glaring as the case applies it to the phrases "proportional
representation" and "lack of political constituency."
For clarity, Section 2 the only provision where the term "marginalized and
underrepresented" appears reads in full: HaAISC
Section 2.Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a sectoral party,
or a coalition of parties (Section 3 [b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from sectoral
parties or organizations which generally advocate "interests or concerns" a
political party is one which advocates "an ideology or platform, principles and
policies" of the government. In short, its identification is with or through its program of
governance.
Under the verba legisor plain terms rule of statutory interpretation 33 and the maxim ut
magis valeat quam pereat, 34 a combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3 shows
that the status of being "marginalized and underrepresented" is not limited merely to
sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. The law itself
recognizes that the same status can apply as well to "political parties."
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the partylist system comes to mind as it provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with
the relationship and inter-action between sectoral representation and the party-list
system as a whole: cACEaI
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list
system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved
seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a
sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and
present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that
same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or
coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And
here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a
regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the
day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been
garnered by each party or each organization one does not
have to be a political party and register in order to participate as
a party and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of,
say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district
that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a
group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral
This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the concerns of the
marginalized sector (in the narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those
"underrepresented" (in the legislative district) as a result of the winner-take-all system
prevailing in district elections a system that ineluctably "disenfranchises" those
groups or mass of people who voted for the second, third or fourth placer in the district
elections and even those who are passive holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of "underrepresented" when it used a broad
qualitative requirement in defining "political parties" as ideology or policy-based groups
and, "sectoral parties" as those whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that contrary once again to
what Ang Bagong Bayani holds proportional representation refers to the
representation of different political parties, sectoral parties and organizations in
the House of Representatives in proportion to the number of their national
constituency or voters, consistent with the constitutional policy to allow an "open
and free party system" to evolve.
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself notably
anchored on the "open and free party system" mandated by Article IX-C of the
Constitution. For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never noted this part of Section 2
and its significance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor provided by
Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It appears to have simply and conveniently
focused on the first sentence of the Section and its constricted view of the term
"marginalized and underrepresented," while wholly fixated on a social justice
orientation. Thus, it opened its ruling, as follows:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to
give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in
life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. 38 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood statement
that offers little opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely and exclusively
can be misleading. To begin with, the creation of an avenue by which "sectoral parties
or organizations" can meaningfully join an electoral exercise is, in and by itself, a social
justice mechanism but it served other purposes that the framers of the Constitution were
addressing. Looking back, the appeal to the social justice concept to make the party-list
elections an exclusive affair of the "marginalized and underrepresented sector" (as
defined in Ang Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-system is
antithetical to sectoral representation. This was effectively the argument of the
proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in the constitutional party-list
debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-determination of
the sectors' political massacre. This issue, however, has been laid to rest in the
constitutional debates and should not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it
through the Judiciary. TEAaDC
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a
multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral
representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are concepts that
comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system. Thus, both the text
and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral
representation under the party-list system; what was provided was an avenue for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the electoral system it is
an invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance on what democracy and
republicanism can offer.
Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and
exchange of ideas, philosophies and interests within a broader context. By allowing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the numbers, to participate
together with other political parties and interest groups that we have characterized,
under the simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-list we have today, the
framers clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse among the greater portion of the
society and hoped to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1.Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political parties are
not only "not excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by
law to participate. This participation is not impaired by any "marginalized and
underrepresented" limitation understood in the Ang Bagong Bayani sense. DaHISE
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral sense,
i.e., they are parties espousing their unique and "marginalized" principles of governance
and who must operate in the party-list system because they only have a "marginal"
chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This definition assumes that the
political party is not also a participant in the legislative district elections as the
basic concept and purpose of the party-list innovation negate the possibility of
playing in both legislative district and party-list arenas.
Thus, parties whether national, regional or sectoral with legislative district election
presence anywhere in the country can no longer participate as the party-list system is
national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral systems can be allowed
anywhere.
c.The Parties and Their Nominees
c.1.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party Registration
Due
to Nominee Problems
The COMELEC's refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of parties
based on Section 6 of RA No. 7941 is a sore point when applied to parties based on the
defects or deficiencies attributable to the nominees. On this point, I maintain the view
that essential distinctions exist between the parties and their nominees that
cannot be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of Positions, however, the need to
make a distinction between the two types of nominees is relevant only to sectoral
parties and organizations. DAaIEc
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners on the
ground that their nominees are not qualified implies that the COMELEC viewed the
nominees and their party-list groups as one and the same entity; hence, the
disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the disqualification of his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal reality that the party-list group,
not the nominee, is the candidate in the party-list election, and at the same time blurs
the distinction between a party-list representative and a district representative. DEICTS
c.2.The Party-Nominee Relationship
That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is not a
disputed point. Our essential holding, however, is that a party-list group, in order to be
entitled to participate in the elections, must satisfy the following express statutory
requirements:
1.must
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the infirmities of the nominee that do
not go into the qualifications of the party itself should prejudice the party. In fact, the law
does not expressly provide that the disqualification of the nominee results in the
disqualification of a party-list group from participating in the elections. In this regard,
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 6.Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes; IacHAE
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be
correctly applied, the law, rules and regulations that the party violated under Section 6
(5) of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant refusal or cancellation of
registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a party's failure to
submit its list of five qualified candidates, after being notified of its nominees'
disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of registration may be warranted. Indeed, if
the party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this simple requirement of the law
(Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration deserves to be denied or an existing
one cancelled as this omission, by itself, demonstrates that it cannot then be
Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its nominees
cannot be wholly considered as one identifiable entity, with the fault attributable and
affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on the otherwise qualified
collective merit of the party. If their identification with one another can be considered at
all, it is in the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a reflection of the other
i.e., the party-list group acts in Congress through its nominee/s and the nominee in so
acting represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it is there for. TCAScE
E.Observations on Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections.
Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not need to be
further discussed at this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One point,
however, that needs to be answered squarely is the statement that this Separate
Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987
Constitution] arose." The Reflections asserted that the heart of the 1987 Constitution is
the Article on Social Justice," citing, in justification, the statements endorsing the
approval of the 1987 Constitution, particularly those of Commissioner Cecilia Muoz
Palma, the President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission; President Munoz Palma
described the Constitution as reaching out to the social justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a whole
and did not focus solely on the electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in the
discussions above, I have no problem in accepting the social justice thrust of the
1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole, shows special concern for social
justice compared with the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The Reflections,
however, apparently misunderstood the thrust of my Separate Opinion as already
fully explained above.
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in the
present case are the Constitution's electoral provisions, specifically the elections for the
House of Representatives and the nation's basic electoral policies (expressed in the
Article on the Commission on Elections) that the constitutional framers wanted to
reform.
What the 1987 Constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to
"open up" the electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not
otherwise participate under the then existing system those who were marginalized in
the legislative district elections because they could not be elected in the past for lack of
the required votes and specific constituency in the winner-take-all legislative district
contest, and who, by the number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the
district elections, showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in
the legislative district would garner. This was the concept of "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the "lack of political constituency" that came out in the
constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the Constitution. RA No.
7941 subsequently faithfully reflected these intents. DIEcHa
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those belonging to
specifically-named sectors (i.e., the marginalized and underrepresented in the social
justice sense) should be given a head-start a "push" so to speak in the first three
For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona fide
member of the group they represent.
11.Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The disqualification of
a nominee (on the ground that he is not a bona fide
member of the political party; or that he does not possess
the actual status or characteristic or that he is not a
genuine advocate of the sector represented) does not
automatically result in the disqualification of the party
since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the
finding of disqualification of its nominee or to fill in a
qualified nominee before cancellation or refusal of
registration is ordered. Consistent with Section 6 (5) and
Section 8 of RA 7941, the party-list group must submit a
list containing at least five nominees to the COMELEC. If a
party-list group endeavors to participate in the party-list
elections on the theoretical assumption that it has a
national constituency (as against district constituency),
then compliance with the clear requirement of the law on
the number of nominees must all the more be strictly
complied with by the party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured a Status
Quo Ante Order (instead of mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion in the
ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the remand of their petitions is only for the
academic purpose of determining their entitlement to registration under the party-list
system but not anymore for the purpose of participating in the 2013 elections. IDSaTE
Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40 petitions 49 that
obtain the number of votes required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives
would still be subject to the determination by the COMELEC of their qualifications based
on the parameters and rationale expressed in this Separate Opinion.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past
the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. 1
The Court is tasked to resolve the fifty-three (53) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari
and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations. The petitions assail
the resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that
either cancelled their existing registration and accreditation, or denied their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system. 2 TEDHaA
Of the fifty-three (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are instituted by new applicants to the
party-list system, whose respective applications for registration and/or accreditation filed
under Republic Act No. 7941 3 (RA 7941) and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 4 dated
February 21, 2012 were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the
resolutions of a division of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by party-list groups or organizations that
have been previously registered and accredited by the COMELEC, with most of them
having been allowed to participate under the party-list system in the past elections.
These 40 petitions involve the COMELEC's recent cancellation of their groups'
registration and accreditation, which effectively denied them of the chance to participate
under the party-list system in the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners' desire and intent to participate as candidates in
the party-list system of representation, which takes its core from Section 5, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5.1.The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2.The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. aAHISE
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters that shall govern the party-list
system, including the registration of party-list groups, the qualifications of party-list
nominees, and the election of party-list representatives. In 1998, the country's first
party-list election was held. Since then, the Court has been called upon on several
instances to resolve controversies on the system, oftentimes on questions involving the
qualifications of party-list groups and their nominees. Among the landmark cases on
these issues is Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 5 decided by the
Court in 2001, wherein the Court laid down the eight-point guidelines 6 in the
determination of the qualifications of party-list participants.
Pursuant to its specific mandate under Section 18 of RA 7941 to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the]
Act," the COMELEC issued on February 21, 2012 Resolution No. 9366. About 280 7
groups, comprised of new applicants and previously-registered party-list groups,
formally signified their intent to join the party-list system in the May 13, 2013 elections.
ESCDHA
As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the registration of organized groups that
are not yet registered under the party-list system, among the groups that filed with the
COMELEC their respective petitions for registration were: (1) Alab ng Mamamahayag
(ALAM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204139; (2) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204367; (3) Ako An Bisaya (AAB), petitioner in G.R. 204370; (4) Alagad ng Sining
(ASIN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204379; (5) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204394; (6) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204402; (7) Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and
Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH), petitioner in G.R. No. 204426; (8) 1 Alliance Advocating
Autonomy Party (1AAAP), herein petitioner in G.R. No. 204435; (9) Manila Teachers
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), petitioner in G.R. No. 204455;
(10) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALONA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204485; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204490. The political parties Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), petitioner
in G.R. No. 204436, and Partido ng Bida (PBB), petitioner in G.R. No. 204484, also
sought to participate for the first time in the party-list elections, although their petitions
for registration were not filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.
Party-list groups that were previously registered and accredited merely filed their
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366. Among these
parties were: (1) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), petitioner in G.R. No. 203766;
(2) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203818-19; (3) Association
of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), petitioner in G.R. No. 203922; (4) Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), petitioner in G.R. No. 203936; (5)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), petitioner in G.R. No.
203958; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), petitioner in G.R.
No. 203960; (7) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO),
petitioner in G.R. No. 203976; (8) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
Leadership (ARAL), petitioner in G.R. No. 203981; (9) Alliance for Rural Concerns
(ARC), petitioner in G.R. No. 204002; (10) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204094; (11) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204100; (12) 1 Guardians Nationalist
With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the COMELEC'S determination of the
continuing compliance of registered/accredited parties that have filed their
manifestations of intent, the Commission En Banc scheduled summary hearings on
various dates, and allowed the party-list groups to present their witnesses and submit
their evidence. 8 After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc issued the following
resolutions: DACaTI
1.Resolution 9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12-154 (PLM)
and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and accreditation of AKB
10 as a political party, but denied its participation in the
May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC's ruling is
founded on several grounds. First, the party does not
represent or seek to uplift any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. From its constitution and bylaws, the party seeks to represent and uplift the lives of
Bicolanos, who, for the COMELEC, cannot be considered
or even associated with persons who are marginalized
and underrepresented. Second, the provinces in the Bicol
Region already have their respective representatives in
Congress. To allow more representatives for the Bicolanos
and the Bicol Region would violate the rule on proportional
representation of "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila in accordance with the number of their inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 11
Third, AKB's nominees, a businessman, three lawyers
and an ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and
underrepresented; thus, they fail to satisfy the seventh
guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2.Omnibus Resolution 12 dated October 11, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-161 (PLM), SPP No. 12-187 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-220 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and UNIMAD.
5.Resolution 36 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12201 (PLM)
be; (3) the party failed to show that three of its nominees
43 are among its bona fide members; (4) Its nominee
Quirino De La Torre (De La Torre) appeared to be a
farmland owner, rather than an actual farmer; and (5) It
failed to present any document to show that its Board had
resolved to participate in the May 2013 elections, and that
De La Torre was authorized to sign and file with the
COMELEC the documents that are required for the said
purpose. CASTDI
8.Omnibus Resolution 44 dated October 24, 2012, which
covers SPP Case No. 12-279 (PLM), SPP No. 12-248
(PLM), SPP No. 12-263 (PLM), SPP No. 12-180 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-229 (PLM), SPP No. 12-217 (PLM), SPP No.
12-277 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG
MASDA and KAKUSA.
In AGRI's 45 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for more than a
year immediately after the May 2010 elections, AGRI
stopped existing as an organization, and this constitutes
as a ground to cancel registration under Section 6 of RA
7941; (2) its nominees did not appear to actually belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
peasants and farmers, which the party seeks to represent;
(3) it submitted a list of only four nominees, instead of five
as mandated by Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no
showing that it undertook meaningful activities for the
upliftment of its constituency.
AKMA-PTM's 46 registration as a party to represent the farmers
sector was cancelled for its failure to show that majority of
its members and officers belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented. There was also no proof that its first to
fourth nominees, 47 who were an educator and persons
engaged in business, actually belonged to a marginalized
and underrepresented sector. Its fifth to ninth nominees,
although all farmers, had not been shown to work on
uplifting the lives of the members of their sector. CAIHTE
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP 48 (formerly Ako
Agila ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka, Inc. Ako Agila) on
the following grounds: (1) its Manifestation of Intent and
Certificate of Nomination were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the party, as required by Section 3,
Rule 2 of Resolution No. 9366; (2) it failed to show that it
has continued to work for the betterment of the lives of the
members of the sectors it represents, i.e., farmers and
from those areas. Finally, the party had nominees who did
not appear to belong to a "marginalized class," being a
businessman, lawyer and real estate developer.
First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing party-list groups' or organizations'
compliance with the requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by
jurisprudence on the party-list system. The OSG cites Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution which enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC, giving
emphasis on paragraph 1 thereof that gives the Commission the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, and paragraph
5 that cites the Commission's power to register political parties, organizations or
coalitions.
Second, the COMELEC's review of the parties' qualifications was a valid exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc could have,
even at the first instance, ruled on it.
Third, the requirements of due process were satisfied because the petitioners were
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC's resolve to
suspend its own rules was sanctioned by law, as it was aimed for a speedy disposition
of matters before the Commission. Furthermore, no petitioner had previously
questioned the procedure that was adopted by the COMELEC on the review of the
parties' registration; instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the Commission's
jurisdiction and actively participated in its proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds for denial and cancellation of a
group's registration, as provided by statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG
specifically cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and the eight-point guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani. TADCSE
Fifth, the COMELEC's findings of fact in each petitioner's case are supported by
substantial evidence; thus, are final and non-reviewable as provided in Section 5, Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In prcis, the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions concern two main issues: the
procedural issue as to the COMELEC En Banc's power to automatically review a
decision of its division without the requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration, and the
substantive issue as to the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in denying or
cancelling the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system of the
petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencia's rulings on the procedural issue; however,
consistent with afore-quoted pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, 143 I
signify my strong dissent on major points in the ponencia's resolution of the substantive
issue, including its discussions on the nature of the party-list system and its disposition
on the qualifications of political parties which seek to participate under the party-list
system of representation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the new standards that the
ponencia now provides for party-list groups, the remand of all 53 petitions to the
COMELEC is unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect
The
COMELEC
Powers
and
Functions
of
the
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the
enforcement and administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history
in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of the COMELEC had
continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times. In Mendoza
v. Commission on Elections, 144 the Court briefly noted:
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative
agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935
Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country's awareness
of the need to provide greater regulation and protection to our
electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935
Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMELEC were
defined as follows: HSaIDc
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon
it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors
and of other election officials. All law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when
so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies
for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest
election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court. . . .
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the
1973 Constitution:
(1)Enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of elections.
(2)Be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and
elective provincial and city officials.
(3)Decide, save those involving the right to
vote,
administrative
questions
affecting
elections, including the determination of the
number and location of polling places, the
appointment
of
election
officials
and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
cCAaHD
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the
1987 Constitution, . . . 145
Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the authority of the COMELEC is
evident in the grant of several other powers upon the Commission, specifically under
Section 2, Article IX-C thereof which reads:
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1.Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
2.Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
3.Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
aTCAcI
4.Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5.Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
intention in providing this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide
latitude in dealing with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the
performance of its functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 146 The
rest of the enumeration in the mentioned provision constitutes the COMELEC's specific
powers.
Financial
contributions
from
foreign
governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be
an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELEC's powers can further be
classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and, in limited instances,
judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the Commission embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. 147 cTSDAH
In Baytan v. COMELEC, 148 the Court had the occasion to pass upon the classification
of the powers being exercised by the COMELEC, thus:
The distinction on the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is crucial
to the procedure which has to be observed so as to stamp an official action with validity.
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates
the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc. 150 Section 3 of Article IX-C states:
DAaIEc
Section 3.The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may
be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through any of
its divisions. 151
The Issuance of Resolution No. 9513
as an Implement of the Power to
Register Political Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions
One of the specific powers granted to the COMELEC is the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions articulated in Section 2 (5) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, thus:
(5)Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
xxx xxx xxx
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized. Registration and the formal
recognition that accompanies it are required because of the Constitution's concern
about the character of the organizations officially participating in the elections. 152
Specifically, the process of registration serves to filter the applicants for electoral seats
and segregate the qualified from the ineligible. The purity of this exercise is crucial to
the achievement of orderly, honest and peaceful elections which the Constitution
envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The
COMELEC does not simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes to
its office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the
possession of qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its
qualifications before registration will follow as a matter of course. TAacIE
Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its
general power to enforce and administer election laws is being realized. The exercise of
this power must thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its
duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who possess the
qualifications set by the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it imperative to promulgate
Resolution No. 9513. The said Resolution seeks to manage the registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions that are aspiring to participate in the 2013 National
and Local Elections, with the objective of ensuring that only those parties, groups or
organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system are registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of
representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En Banc to automatically review all
pending registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions and to set for
summary evidentiary hearings all those that were previously registered to determine
continuing compliance. To effectively carry out the purpose of the Resolution, the
COMELEC suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically
the requirement for a motion for reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number of applicants for registration as
party-list group, organization or coalition were denied registration by the COMELEC En
Banc, while several others that were previously registered and/or accredited were
stripped of their status as registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations or
coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that the action of the COMELEC En
Banc was well-within its authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble understanding of the nature of
the powers being exercised by the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed
depends. Indeed, in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the COMELEC En Banc does not have
the authority to assume jurisdiction without the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The
filing of a motion for reconsideration presupposes that the case had been heard, passed
upon and disposed by the COMELEC Division before the same is subjected to review of
the COMELEC En Banc. cITaCS
In Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, 153 the Court defined quasi-judicial power, to wit:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
With respect to the second group, the COMELEC En Banc may directly order the
conduct of summary evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance
considering that there is no specific procedure on this matter. The petitioners cannot
invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure since this provision
relates only to new petitions for registration. Absent a special rule or procedure, the
COMELEC En Banc may directly act or perform an otherwise administrative function,
consistent with our pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject previously-registered and/or
accredited party-list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary
hearing emanates from its general power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election 163 and duty to ensure "free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections." 164 Part and parcel of this duty is the
maintenance of a list of qualified candidates. Correlative to this duty of the COMELEC is
the duty of the candidate or, in this case, the registered party-list groups, organizations
or coalitions to maintain their qualifications. TEDaAc
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is
incumbent upon aspiring participants in the party-list system of representation to
satisfactorily show that they have the required qualifications stated in the law and
prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or organization applying for
registration in the first instance must present sufficient evidence to establish its
qualifications. It is only upon proof of possession of qualifications that registration
follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration. Party-list groups and
organizations that are previously allowed registration and/or accreditation are dutybound to maintain their qualifications.
In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 165 the Court emphasized:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. 166
It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a candidate who was allowed to
participate in the elections and hold office does not give him a vested right to retain his
position notwithstanding loss of qualification. The elective official must maintain his
qualifications lest he loses the right to the office he is holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public office
does not exempt him from establishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for
reelection. He must maintain and attest to his qualifications every time he is minded to
join the electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of candidacy even if he is
an incumbent elective official or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding
elections.
of
the
Doctrine
of
Res
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and
existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. 167
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four
(4) elements, viz.: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action. 168
Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division, allowing the registration of the
applicant party-list groups and organizations do not partake of a final judgment or order.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on
the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is right. Once rendered, the task of
the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. 169 ETHCDS
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be considered an adjudication on the
merits since they do not involve a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the ultimate facts disclosed in the pleadings or in the issues presented during
the trial. 170 They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that the applicant party-list
or organization possesses the qualifications for registration. They do not involve the
settlement of conflicting claims; it is merely an initiatory procedure for the conduct of
elections. On the other hand, previous registration and/or accreditation only attests to
the fact that the concerned party-list group, organization or coalition satisfactorily proved
its qualifications to run as party-list representative in the immediately preceding
elections. It does not, however, create a vested right in favor of the registered party-list
group, organization or coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also become final as to exempt the
party-list group or organization from proving his qualifications in the succeeding
elections. As in individual candidate, a party-list group, organization or coalition desiring
to participate in the elections must possess the required qualifications every time it
manifests its intent to participate in the elections. It must prove and attest to its
possession of the required qualifications every time it bids for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even made more apparent by the fact
that the group, organization or coalition which was denied registration may still apply for
registration in succeeding elections and even be allowed registration provided that the
qualifications are met. The same holds true with previously registered and/or accredited
party-list group, organization or coalition which was stripped of its registration and/or
accreditation.
Procedural
observed.
due
process
was
properly
There is even no merit in the petitioners' claim that their right to procedural due process
was violated by the COMELEC's automatic review and conduct of summary evidentiary
hearings under Resolution No. 9513. ASCTac
As regards the first group, I have explained why I deem the COMELEC's suspension of
its own rules on motions for reconsideration justified, given its duty to ensure that votes
cast by the electorate in the party-list elections will only count for qualified party-list
groups, in the end that the system's ideals will be realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative proceedings is that a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side satisfies the requirements of due process.
Its essence is embodied in the basic requirements of notice and the real opportunity to
be heard. 171
Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the minimum
requirements of due notice and hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal
and/or cancellation of a party, organization or coalition's registration under the party-list
system. It reads:
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were denied of their right to
procedural process. We shall not disregard the proceedings that ensued before the
COMELEC's divisions, before whom the groups were given due notice and the ample
opportunity to present and substantiate their plea for registration. The COMELEC En
Banc's resolution to later review the resolutions of its divisions did not render
insignificant such due process already accorded to the groups, especially as we
consider that the En Banc decided on the basis of the evidence submitted by the groups
before the divisions, only that it arrived at factual findings and conclusions that differed
from those of the latter.
The second group's right to procedural process was also unimpaired, notwithstanding
the COMELEC's conduct of the summary evidentiary hearings for the purpose of
determining the parties' continuing compliance with rules on party-list groups. The
notice requirement was satisfied by the COMELEC through its issuance of the Order
dated August 2, 2012, 172 which notified the party-list groups of the Commission's
resolve to conduct summary evidentiary hearings, the dates thereof, and the purpose
for which the hearings shall be conducted. The specific matters that are expected from
them by the Commission are also identified in the Order, as it provides:
To simplify the proceedings[,] the party-list groups or organizations
thru counsel/s shall submit the following:
1.The names of witness/es who shall be the
Chairperson, President or Secretary General of
the party-list groups, organization or coalition;
ICTaEH
2.Judicial Affidavit/s of the witness/es to be
submitted at prior to the scheduled hearing;
and
3.Other documents to prove their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang
Bagong Bayani case. 173 (Emphasis
supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners' claim that they were not informed of the
grounds for which their existing registration and/or accreditation shall be tested,
considering that the parameters by which the parties' qualifications were to be assessed
by the COMELEC were explained in the Order.
That the parties were duly notified is further supported by their actual participation in the
scheduled hearings and their submission of evidence they deemed sufficient which, in
turn, satisfied the requirement on the opportunity to be heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated petitions is that the COMELEC erred
in assessing their qualifications which eventually led to the denial of their petitions for
registration and cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence is imperative.
The
Representation
Party-List
System
of
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch position that the party-list system,
being a complement of the social justice provisions in the Constitution, is primarily
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; the ideals of social justice
permeates every provision in the Constitution, including Section 5 (2), Article VI on the
party-list system. cCaDSA
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. 174 It is not simply a mechanism for electoral
reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and
existing electoral system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from
which the law breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the
underprivileged and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to become
partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.
The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically underscored in the 1987
Constitution. The strong desire to incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the
pillars of the present Constitution was brought forth by the intent to perpetually
safeguard democracy against social injustices, desecration of human rights and
disrespect of the laws which characterized the dark pages of our history. It is
reminiscent of the unified and selfless movement of the people in EDSA who, minuscule
in power and resources, braved the streets and reclaimed their freedom from the leash
of dictatorship. The gallantry and patriotism of the masses and their non-negotiable
demand to reclaim democracy are the inspirations in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a state which recognizes social
justice at the forefront of its policies brought them to propose a separate article on social
justice and human rights. Initially, the proposed provision defined social justice as
follows:
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic, political,
moral imperative, shall be the primary consideration of the
State in the pursuit of national development. To this end,
Congress shall give the highest priority to the formulation and
implementation of measures designed to reduce economic
and political inequalities found among citizens, and to promote
The objective to hold the party-list system for the benefit of the marginalized and
underrepresented is expressed in clear language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It reads:
Section 2.Declaration of policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis ours) AHECcT
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions in the party-list elections are qualified by
three (3) limiting characteristics: (1) they must consist of Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations or coalitions; (2) who
lack well-defined political constituencies, (3) but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The
term "marginalized and underrepresented" effectively limits the party-list system
to sectors which directly need support and representation. The law could not have
deemed to benefit even those who are already represented in the House of
Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the powerful and the
underprivileged. In empowering the powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality
in favor of the marginalized and underrepresented if genuine social justice must be
achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and underrepresented, which was first
articulated by former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani, was
later affirmed and reiterated by no less than another former Chief Justice of this Court,
Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite separate opinion in BANAT v. COMELEC. 179 He
forcefully articulated:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to
find their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as
genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is
by reason of this underlying premise that the party-list system
was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is
within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of major
political parties to the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on
solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give
utmost deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and
aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of
the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the
intent of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the
Constitution. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is
to harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause.
We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law
operative and avoid rendering some words idle and nugatory. The
harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related
constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the
people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7
of the Transitory Provisions, the President was permitted to fill by
appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral
reform. It could not have been that too simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral
reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the primacy of social justice
in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only implementing the
specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged
from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned provision was not
simply to reform the electoral system but to initiate the equitable distribution of political
power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the populace who sulk in poverty and
injustice by giving them a chance to participate in legislation and advance their causes.
DCSETa
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further elaborated by the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani, which outlined the eight-point guidelines for screening party-list
participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to the qualifications of the (1) sector, (2)
party-list group, organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These key considerations
determine the eligibility of the party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in
the party-list system of representation. Thus, for purposes of registration and continuing
compliance, three (3) basic questions must be addressed:
(1)Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized and
underrepresented?
(2)Is the party, organization or coalition qualified to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sector?
(3)Are the nominees qualified to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented party, organization or coalition?
In seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be the key considerations for
qualifying as a party-list group, organization or coalition. TEDAHI
The
sector
underrepresented.
must
be
marginalized
and
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State in enacting the law. Tersely,
the state aims to promote proportional representation by means of a Filipino-style partylist system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1)who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition
must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized and
underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or condition,
are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of institutional
power, their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the
government's priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and social services and
are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are subsumed under the term
"marginalized and underrepresented" and may register as a party-list group,
organization or coalition. It states:
SEC. 5.Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours) CDaSAE
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12) sectors that are considered
marginalized and underrepresented: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. The enumeration is, however, not exclusive. During the drafting of
our Constitution, the members of the Commission expressed reluctance to provide an
enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors because of their
apprehension that the longer the enumeration, the more limiting the law becomes. 181
Instead of an enumeration, then Commissioner Jaime Tadeo suggested the criteria by
which the determination of which sectors are marginalized can be based, viz.:
1.The number of people belonging to the sector;
2.The extent of marginalization, exploitation and deprivation of
social and economic rights suffered by the sector;
3.The absence of representation in the government, particularly in
the legislature, through the years;
the
Party-List
Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines for screening party-list
participants inAng Bagong Bayani, five (5) pertain to the qualifications of the party-list
group, organization or coalition. The first point in the enumeration reads:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of
its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors. 183
Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented to qualify as a party-list group. There must be proof, credible and
convincing, to demonstrate the group's advocacy to alleviate the condition of the sector.
ECTIcS
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence showing the party's relation to the
causes of the sector goes to the uniqueness of the party-list system of representation.
In the party-list system of representation, the candidates are parties, organizations and
coalitions and not individuals. And while an individual candidate seeks to represent a
district or particular constituency, a party-list group vying for seats in the House of
Representatives must aim to represent a sector. It is thus important to ascertain that the
party-list group, organization or coalition reflects the ideals of the sector in its
constitution and by-laws. It must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to
undertake in its platform of government. Moreover, its track record must speak of its firm
advocacy towards uplifting the marginalized and underrepresented by undertaking
activities or projects directly addressing the concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the
marginalized and underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent
various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to address the multifarious
interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-sectoral party-list
group undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the
sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and
that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system? aEACcS
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. 189 (Emphasis
supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
expressed his approval of keeping the party-list system of representation exclusive to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To further safeguard the sanctity of the
purpose of the law, he conveyed his vehement objection to the participation of major
political parties in the party-list system of representation because of the likelihood that
they will easily trump the organizations of the marginalized. He opined:
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and
excluding the major political parties from participating in the election
of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to
"reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of
women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the
right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the
formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable
role of the private sector in the national economy.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no
match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is
borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major
political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for.
The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners
in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties
which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the
top 50. 190 (Citations omitted)
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided in BANAT to revert to its ruling in the 2000 case
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 191 that major political parties are barred from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. ATHCac
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I maintain that major political parties
have advantages over minority political parties and sectoral parties in the party-list
elections. By their broad constituency and full resources, it is easier for these major
political parties to obtain the required percentage of votes for party-list seats, a
circumstance which, in turn, only weakens the minority parties' chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely
disqualify from the party-list system the major political parties solely by reason of their
classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not be
On the other hand, the disqualification mentioned in the fifth guideline connotes that the
party-list group must maintain its independence from the government so that it may be
able to pursue its causes without undue interference or any other extraneous
considerations. Verily, the group is expected to organize and operate on its own. It must
derive its life from its own resources and must not owe any part of its creation to the
government or any of its instrumentalities. By maintaining its independence, the group
creates a shield that no influence or semblance of influence can penetrate and obstruct
the group from achieving its purposes. In the end, the party-list group is able to
effectively represent the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented, particularly
in the formulation of legislation intended for the benefit of the sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani bear on the
qualifications of the nominees, viz.:
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads
as follows:
SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees
must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are practically the same as
those required of individual candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He
must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; (d) able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days before the day of
election; (f) at least twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a
nominee for the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list
system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be a resident or a
registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted for and
not the appointed nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list
group at least ninety (90) days before the elections.
The
nominee
member
of
underrepresented sector
must
be
the
a
bona
marginalized
fide
and
In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied registration to the party, organization or
coalition on the ground that the nominee does not belong to the sector he wishes to
represent. The quandary stems from the interpretation of who are considered as one
"belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented." The COMELEC supposed that
before a person may be considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector," he must actually share with the rest of the membership that
common characteristic or attribute which makes the sector marginalized and
underrepresented. SHAcID
The construction seemed logical but to be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be
harmonized with Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the
qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from the qualifications
similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts, the
nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when
he enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety (90) days before
the election. From the point in time when the person acquires the status of being a bona
fide member, he becomes one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector."
It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees:
The first type of nominee is one who shares a common physical attribute or status with
the rest of the membership. That he possesses this common characteristic of
marginalization is what entitles him to nomination as representative of the group. This is
because of the reasonable presumption that those who have experienced the
inadequacies in the sector are the ones who can truly represent the same. However,
there are instances when this strict construction becomes impracticable, if not
altogether impossible. For instance, a representation from the organization of skilled
workers working abroad is difficult to comply with without the nominee being excluded
from the literal definition of who belongs to the sector. The strict interpretation also
discourages growth, as in the nominee from the urban sector, since the moment he
rises from his status as such, he becomes disqualified to represent the party. HTSaEC
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An advocate or one who is publicly
known to be pursuing the causes of the sector is equally capable of fulfilling the
objective of providing a genuine and effective representation for the marginalized and
underrepresented. He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has always shown
genuine concern for those who have less in life. Unlike the first type of nominee who
shares a common characteristic with the members of the group, the advocate shares
with them a common aspiration and leads them towards achieving that end. He serves
as a catalyst that stirs movement so that the members of the sector may be encouraged
to pursue their welfare. And though not bound with the group by something physical, he
is one with them in spirit and heart. He is known for his genuine commitment and
selfless dedication to the causes of the sector and his track record boldly speaks of his
advocacy.
At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing ratiocination translates to a more lenient
entry for those aspiring to become a nominee. However, the standard of scrutiny should
not change and nominees shall still be subject to the evaluation by the COMELEC of
their qualifications. They bear the burden of proof to establish by concrete and credible
evidence that they are truly representative of the causes of the sector. They must
present proof of the history of their advocacy and the activities they undertook for the
promotion of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to demonstrate, through their
track record, their vigorous involvement to the causes of the sector.
The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove his advocacy through his track
record. To be clear, the track record is not a mere recital of his visions for the
organization and the trivial activities he conducted under the guise of promoting the
causes of the sector. He must actually and actively be espousing the interests of the
sector by undertaking activities directly addressing its concerns. DSATCI
In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, 197 the Court enumerated the list of evidence which the
party-list group and its nominees may present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
names of at least five (5) nominees who must all be qualified. In the instances when
some of the nominees were found to be suffering from any disqualification, the
COMELEC deemed the party to have committed a violation of election laws, rules and
regulations and denied its petition for registration.
It is the COMELEC's supposition that when the party-list group included a disqualified
nominee in the list of names submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have
committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5) 199 of RA 7941. This feeble deduction,
however, is not within the contemplation of the law. The mentioned provision does not
suggest that all kinds of violations can be subsumed under Section 6 (5) and justify the
disqualification of the group. To warrant such a serious penalty, the violation must be
demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. It must be taken
to refer to election offenses enumerated under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code or any other acts or omissions that are inconsistent with the
ideals of fair and orderly elections. It does not intend to cover even innocuous mistakes
or incomplete compliance with procedural requirements. AHSEaD
I agree with the majority that the construction made by the COMELEC is misplaced.
Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the first or second type, proof of his
track record is required. The requirement is even more stringent for the second type of
nominee as he must convincingly show, through past activities and undertakings, his
sincere regard for the causes of the sector. The history of his advocacy and the
reputation he earned for the same will be considered in the determination of his
qualification. aEcHCD
Admittedly, the foregoing clarification partakes of a new guideline which the COMELEC
failed to take into consideration when it conducted automatic review of the petitions for
registration and summary evidentiary hearings pursuant to Resolution No. 9513.
Disqualification
its effects
of
the
nominee
and
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it must be given its plain and literal
meaning. A reading of the provision will show that it is simply a procedural requirement
relating to the registration of groups, organizations and coalitions under the party-list
system of representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant under the party-list system to
submit a list of nominees, not less than five, at least forty-five (45) days before the
election. The group's compliance with this requirement is determinative of the action of
the COMELEC. In case of failure to comply, the COMELEC may refuse to act on the
petition for registration. If the applicant, on the other hand, tendered an incomplete
compliance, as in submitting a list of less than five (5) nominees, the COMELEC may
ask it to comply or simply regard the same as a waiver. In no way can the mere
submission of the list be construed as a guarantee or attestation on the part of the
group that all of the nominees shall be qualified especially that the assessment of
qualifications is a duty pertaining solely to the COMELEC. In the same way, the
provision did not intend to hold the group liable for violation of election laws for such a
shortcoming and to mete out the same with the penalty of disqualification. Such an
absurd conclusion could not have been the intention of the law. DHSEcI
Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to
represent the group but this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the
latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same significance which the law
holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to
emphasize that the formation of party-list groups organized by the marginalized and
underrepresented and their participation in the process of legislation is the essence of
the party-list system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still
the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to
consider. That one or some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for
the position should not unreasonably upset the existence of an otherwise legitimate
party-list group. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure
to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of
the party-list group itself with defect.
The point is that the party-list group must thus be treated separate and distinct from its
nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of
the qualifications of the former. The features of the party-list system of representation
are reflective of the intention of the law to treat them severally.
To begin with, the electorate votes for the party-list group or organization itself, not for
the individual nominees. 200 The nominees do not file a certificate of candidacy nor do
they launch a personal campaign for themselves. 201 It is the party-list group that runs
as candidate and it is the name of the group that is indicated in the ballot. The list of
nominees submitted to the COMELEC becomes relevant only when the party-list group
garners the required percentage of votes that will entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any
rate, the party-list group does not cease in existence even when it loses the electoral
race. And, should it decide to make another electoral bid, it is not required to keep its
previous list of nominees and can submit an entirely new set of names. aCTcDS
Further, there are separate principles and provisions of law pertaining to the
qualifications and disqualifications of the party-list group and the nominees. The
qualifications of the party-list group are outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while the
grounds for the removal/cancellation of registration are enumerated in Section 6 of RA
7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the qualifications of the nominees. As
to their disqualification, it can be premised on the ground that they are not considered
as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector" or that they lack
one or some of the qualifications. They may also be disqualified under Section 15 202
and Section 8 203 of RA 7941, particularly under the second paragraph thereof. Even
after the COMELEC's determination, interested parties may still question the
qualifications of the nominees through a petition to cancel or deny due course to the
nomination or petition for disqualification under Sections 1 204 and 2, 205 Rule 5 of the
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the
members of the party-list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely
dependent upon the will of the party. 206 More often than not, the choice of nominees is
grounded on trust and confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of
qualifications under the law. The method or process by which the members of the party-
list group choose their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or
guidelines can be imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their
representatives lest we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the party-list groups' freedom to choose their
nominees when it disqualified some of them on the ground that their nominees are
disqualified. While the COMELEC has the authority to determine the qualifications of the
nominees, the disqualification of the group itself due to the failure to qualify of one or
some of the nominees is too harsh a penalty. The nexus between the COMELEC's
outright disqualification of the group due to the disqualification of the nominees and the
avowed objective of RA 7941 of encouraging the development of a "full, free and open
party-list system" is extremely hard to decipher. AHDaET
In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action of the COMELEC in
disqualifying the party-list group due to the disqualification of one or some of the
nominees. There is simply no justifiable ground to support this action. It is unthinkable
how the COMELEC could have conceived the thought that the fate of the party-list
group depends on the qualifications of the nominees, who are mere agents of the
group, especially that the agency between them is still subject to the condition that the
group obtains the required percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Until this condition is realized, what the nominees have is a mere
expectancy. ScEaAD
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on
Elections, 207 the Court emphasized the three-seat limit rule, which holds that each
qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled only to
a maximum of three (3) seats. 208 The rule is a reiteration of Section 11 (b) 209 of RA
7941. Relating the principle to Section 8, it becomes more apparent that the action of
the COMELEC was made with grave abuse of discretion. It bears noting that while
Section 8 requires the submission of the names of at least five (5) nominees, Section 11
states that only three (3) of them can actually occupy seats in the House of
Representatives should the votes they gather suffice to meet the required percentage.
The two (2) other nominees in the list are not really expecting to get a seat in Congress
even when the party-list group of which they are members prevailed in the elections. If
at all, they can only substitute incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate
the office. Therefore, if the right to office of three (3) of the nominees is based on a mere
expectancy while with the other two (2) the nomination is dependent on the occurrence
of at least two (2) future and uncertain events, it is with more reason that the
disqualification of one or some of the nominees should not affect the qualifications of
the party-list group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated petitions, the party-list group
submitted a list of nominees, with less than five (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA
7941. In some other petitions, only some out of the number of nominees submitted by
the party-list group qualified. Again, Section 8 must be construed as a procedural
requirement relative to registration of groups aspiring to participate in the party-list
system of representation. In case of failure to comply, as in non-submission of a list of
nominees, the COMELEC may deny due course to the petition. In case of incomplete
compliance, as when the party-list group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view that
the COMELEC must ask the group to comply with the admonition that failure to do so
will amount to the waiver to submit 5 names. The implication is that if the party-list group
submitted only one qualified nominee and it garners a number of votes sufficient to give
it two (2) seats, it forfeits the right to have a second representative in Congress.
Therefore, for as long as the party-list group has one (1) qualified nominee, it must be
allowed registration and participation in the election. The situation is different when the
party-list group submitted a list of nominees but none qualified and, upon being asked to
submit a new list of names, still failed to appoint at least one (1) qualified nominee. In
this case, the party can now reasonably be denied registration as it cannot, without at
least one qualified nominee, fulfill the objective of the law for genuine and effective
representation for the marginalized and underrepresented, a task which the law
imposes on the qualified nominee by participating in the "formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole." 210 More importantly, the
party-list group's inability to field in qualified nominees casts doubt on whether the group
is truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. Considering that the
majority of the group must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented, it should
not have any trouble appointing a qualified nominee. ADaSET
Ruling on each of the petitions
As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL the
petitions to the COMELEC, completely disregarding the ground/s for the cancellation
or denial of the party-list groups' registration, and even on the supposition that the
ponencia had substantially modified the guidelines that are set forth in the Ang Bagong
Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of the party-list groups whose
remaining ground for denial or cancellation of registration involves the new
guideline on the qualifications of a party's nominees. While I agree on modifying the
qualifications of major political parties, no remand is justified on this ground since none
of the 52 211 petitioners is a major political party. On all other issues, the standard of
grave abuse of discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or administrative body
must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of
discretion. 212 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 213 the Court recognized that
along with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion. 214
Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS the petitions for failure to
substantiate grave abuse of discretion, and to AFFIRM THE COMELEC's DENIAL OR
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION, of the following party-list groups:
GREENFORCE, KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1-CARE, ALA-EH, 1BROPGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN, Manila Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY,
GUARDJAN, PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD, AKMA-PTM,
BAYANI, FIRM 24-K, KAP, COCOFED, AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST
KABAGIS, ARAL, BINHI, SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong Paglaum, ANAD, PBB, PPP,
1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and AI.
The COMELEC's conclusion on the said groups' failure to qualify, insofar as the
grounds pertained to the sectors which they seek to represent and/or their capacity to
represent their intended sector finds support in established facts, law and jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in ruling on the disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO on the supposed failure of these parties to substantiate their eligibility as
a group, specifically on questions pertaining to their track record and the sectors
which they seek to represent. IHSTDE
Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in a certiorari case the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence presented to it, in exceptional
cases, as when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is
not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgment to one of jurisdiction. 215 To this exception falls the COMELEC's
disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO.
1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1-UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various transport drivers and operators
associations nationwide with a common goal of promoting the interest and welfare of
public utility drivers and operators. 216 On the other hand, PASANG MASDA is a
sectoral political party that mainly represents the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of jeepney and tricycle drivers and operators across the National Capital
Region. 217 Contrary to the conclusion that was inferred by the COMELEC from the
common circumstance that 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA represent the sectors of
both public utility drivers and operators, it is not a sufficient ground to cancel their
respective registration as party-list group.
To a great extent, the supposed conflict in the respective interests of public utility drivers
and operators is more apparent than real. It is true that there is a variance in the
economic interests of public utility drivers and operators; the former is concerned with
wages while the latter is concerned with profits. However, what the COMELEC failed to
consider is that the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and operators are aligned with each
other in several instances. To name a few: first, the effects of fluctuation in the prices of
petroleum products; second, their benefit from petitions for fare increase/reduction; and
third, the implications of government policies affecting the transportation sector such as
traffic rules and public transport regulation. In these instances, it is mutually beneficial
for drivers and operators of public utility vehicles to work together in order to effectively
lobby their interests. Certainly, the interrelated concerns and interests of public utility
drivers and operators far outweigh the supposed variance in their respective economic
interests. HIcTDE
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the registration of 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA as party-list groups on the
ground of the sectors which they aim to represent.
Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Pati maliliit na mangingisda?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa
karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong maliliit na
mangingisda na nag-aalaga ng maliliit na . . . 219 aTIAES
BUTIL
Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled the registration
of BUTIL on the alleged ground that the party failed to prove that the "agriculture and
cooperative sectors," which the party represents, are marginalized and
underrepresented. 218
In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted that the Secretary-General of
BUTIL, Wilfredo A. Antimano affirmed in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL is an
organization "representing members of the agriculture and cooperative sectors." From
this declaration, the COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture and cooperative sectors
are not enumerated in RA 7941, it is incumbent upon BUTIL to establish the fact that
the sectors it is representing are marginalized and underrepresented. Since the party
failed to discharge this burden, the COMELEC cancelled the party's registration.
I stress, however, that in determining whether the group represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, all of the evidence submitted by the party should be duly
considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimano's statement in his judicial affidavit that
BUTIL represents the "agriculture and cooperative sectors" should be read in
conjunction with the other documents submitted by the party, including the oral
testimony that was given by the party's witness. Significantly, during the clarificatory
hearing conducted by the Commission En Banc on August 23, 2012, Antimano
explained: ScCEIA
It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that Antimano's reference to the
"agriculture and cooperative sector" pertains to small farmers and fishermen. Likewise,
on the basis of the evidence on record, the term "cooperative" in Antimano's affidavit
should be taken to refer to agricultural cooperatives which, by their nature, are still
comprised of agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small agricultural workers as marginalized
and underrepresented. Based on the records, BUTIL appears to fully adhere to and
work towards their cause. I also give due consideration to the fact that since the partylist system was first implemented in 1998, the party had been able to obtain the
necessary votes for at least one seat in the House of Representatives. This affirms the
party's constituency that may deserve a continued representation in Congress.
AT
AT is an incumbent party-list group that claims to represent six (6) marginalized sectors
labor, urban poor, elderly, women, youth and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 220
In disqualifying AT, the COMELEC found that its incumbent representative,
Congresswoman Daryl Grace J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that will uplift
the welfare of all the sectors it claims to represent. 221
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit na
magsasaka at maliliit na mangingisda sa kanayunan.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang
inyong nire-represent?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?
MR. ANTIMANO:
urban poor, as the term connotes, are those in the urban areas. While they may have
different interests and concerns, these are not necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELEC's conclusion that ARARO's alliances with other
sectoral organizations "muddle" the sectors it represents. 224 These are mere alliances,
i.e., ties. It does not necessarily follow that ARARO, because of these ties, will also
represent the interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO's platform continually
focuses on the enhancement of the welfare of the peasants and the urban poor, there
can be an effective representation in their behalf.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to nullify the COMELEC's
cancellation of the registration of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO
on the ground of these parties' supposed failure to prove their eligibility to represent
their intended sectors.
The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the outright
cancellation of the five parties' registration on the ground of the supposed failure of their
nominees to qualify. I have fully explained that the qualification of a party-list group shall
be treated separate and distinct, and shall not necessarily result from the qualification of
its nominees. ADScCE
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned actions of the COMELEC shall not be
construed to automatically restore the five parties' registration and accreditation, which
would otherwise allow their participation in the May 2013 elections. As has been
discussed, each party must still be able to field in qualified nominees, as it is only
through them that the party may perform its legislative function in the event that it
garners the required percentage of votes for a seat in the House of Representatives.
With this circumstance, and considering a new guideline on nominees' qualifications, I
then find the necessity of remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM,
BLESSED
AKO-BAHAY
A-IPRA,
AKIN,
Party-List
A
and
The denial of the registration of AKIN, and the cancellation of the registration of ALIM,
A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY were based solely on the alleged
failure of their respective nominees to prove that they factually belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector that their parties seek to represent. I
reiterate that a party-list group must be treated separate and distinct from its nominees;
the outright disqualification of the groups on the said ground is not warranted. The
COMELEC's ruling to the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the COMELEC's resolve to deny AKIN's
registration and cancel the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY. Nonetheless, as in the case of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO, this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration under the
party-list system. CITcSH
Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencia's ratiocination, it does not follow
that a remand of all the cases is justified; as we have pointed out the ponencia has
been able to explain the necessity of a remand of only eleven petitions for further
proceedings in the COMELEC, in addition to the ten petitions that I have recommended
for remand.
We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article VI section 5 (1) and (2) in the
light of article II section 1 of the Constitution. We now benefit from hindsight as we are
all witness to the aftermath of the doctrines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC 2 as qualified by Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 3
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC. 4
TAEDcS
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always created space for "national,
regional and sectoral parties and organizations" to join the party list system. It is
textually clear that national political parties or regional organizations do not need to be
organized on sectoral lines. Sectoral parties or organizations belong to a different
category of participants in the party list system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the
party list system "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups" as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. 5 This law is unconstitutional in so far as it makes
a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support those
who are candidates for legislative districts and those that participate in the party list
system. It is inconsistent for national political parties who have candidates for legislative
districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear implication from the text of article
VI, section 5 (1) of the Constitution.
The insistence on the criteria of "marginalized and underrepresented" 6 has caused so
much chaos to the point of absurdity in our party list system. It is too ambiguous so as
to invite invidious intervention on the part of COMELEC, endangering the fundamental
rights to suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with the text of the Constitution
makes more sense under the present circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi relevant to our
present cases in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC 7 and BANAT v.
COMELEC. 8
I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No.
9513, s. August 2, 2012. This will have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty
nine (39) existing party list groups that have already registered for the 2010 elections
especially those that have won seats in the current Congress. This will also
automatically remand the thirteen (13) cases of new party list registrants for proper
processing and evaluation by the Commission on Elections. cHCSDa
Textual
of the relevant provisions
analysis
representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must
be given full consideration. 10 We must always be sensitive in our crafting of doctrines
lest the guardians of our electoral system be empowered to silence those who wish to
offer their representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our people to
mature as citizens in our electorate.
affiliation may change in subsequent elections for various reasons, without any effect on
the qualification of the elected representative.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the light of these overarching
consideration.
The political party that affiliates those who participate in elections in legislative districts
organize primarily to have their candidates win. These political parties have avowed
principles and platforms of government. 11 But, they will be known more through the
personalities and popularity of their candidates. 12 Often, compromises occur in the
political party's philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate. TIaCcD
This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.
The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country,
one where voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees
secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party list system's intentions are
broader than simply to "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented
become lawmakers themselves". 13
Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed
individual candidate over platforms and political programs. 14 Political parties were
convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the national to the local level that
gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement
the electoral campaigns of their members. 15 Most elections were choices between
competing personalities often with very little discernible differences in their interpretation
and solutions for contemporary issues. 16 The electorate chose on the bases of
personality and popularity; only after the candidates were elected to public offices will
they later find out the concrete political programs that the candidate will execute. Our
history is replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked
cohesion on the basis of principle. 17 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and
marginalized large parts of our population.
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been
intended to enhance and further entrench the same system. It is the party or the
organization that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a
democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can
delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve.
Genuine political parties enable true representation, and hence, provide the potential for
us to realize a "democratic and republican state". ISDCHA
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party list groups that have maintained
organizational integrity to pose candidates for higher offices, i.e. the Senate. We can
take judicial notice that two of the candidates for the 2013 senatorial elections who
used to represent party list groups in the House of Representatives do not have the
resources nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the same mould as many of the
usual politicians who view for that position. It is no accident that the party list system is
only confined to the House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to mature
genuine political parties and give them the experience and the ability to build
constituencies for other elective public offices.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are marginalized and
underrepresented, but they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic class.
Just a glance at the history of strong political parties in different jurisdictions will show
that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will provide their rationale
and continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform
their movement forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may care
for the marginalized and underrepresented, but they are not themselves nor for their
effectivity in the House of Representatives should we require that they can only come
from that class. DCESaI
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement of
their platforms. Rather, it should be seen as clear examples where interests and
advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative
districts, cry out for representation. Surely, it should be the electorate, not the
COMELEC, which should decide whether their groups should participate in our
legislative deliberations. That these groups could be excluded even before the vote is
not what the party list system is all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly
show why the text of article VI, section 5 (2) provides:
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from his fundamental principle that:
". . . The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the purpose of the party list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941." 24
The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation of a statute at par with the
text of article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) the Constitution, thus:
"The foregoing provision on the party list system is not selfexecutory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like 'in
accordance with law' or 'as may be provided by law'; it was thus
up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution." 25
The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in the
context of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made
clear. 26 To claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete the
very framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of our
constitution. The phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by law" is
not an invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent
assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from the
text of the constitution in the light of its context in the document and considering the
contemporary impact of relevant precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the workings of the policy through law.
The Constitution remains the fundamental and basic law with a more dominant
interpretative position vis-a-vis statute. It has no equal within our normative system.
DCScaT
Article VI, sections 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete Constitutional framework for
the party list system.
Congress cannot add the concept of "proportional representation". Congress cannot
pass a law so that we read in the text of the Constitution the requirement that even
national and regional parties or organizations should likewise be sectoral.
Certainly Congress cannot pass a law so that even the one-half that was not
reserved for sectoral representatives even during the first three consecutive
terms after the ratification of the Constitution should now only be composed of
sectoral representatives.
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming from Justices Mendoza and Vitug
when Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC was decided in 2001. 27 Only six (6) justices
concurred with the reasoning of the ponencia. Two justices voted only in the result. Five
(5) justices dissented. Four (4) of them joining the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente
Mendoza. There was no majority therefore in upholding the reasoning and ratio
decidendi proposed by the ponencia in that case. It was a divided court, one where
there was a majority to sustain the result but not enough to establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues were tackled in the case of
BANAT v. COMELEC in 2009. 28
Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was to prevent major political parties
from dominating organizations of the marginalized. Citing the concurring and dissenting
opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:
". . . . There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are
no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena.
This is borne out in the party list elections held in 2001 where
major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be
voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major
political parties made it to the top 50." 29 cDHCAE
The premise of course was the argument that major political parties that support
candidates for legislative districts were to be allowed to participate in the party-list
system. This is not the reading proposed today of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
opinion failed to foresee that even parties and organizations that claim to represent the
"marginalized" could crowd out each other further weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a clear vote, we also do so with
the benefit of hindsight.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe to the concept of "marginalized
and underrepresented". It is too ambiguous. There can be no consistent judicially
discernible standard for the COMELEC to apply. It thus invites invidious intervention
from COMELEC to undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to vie for
representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of the electorate.
COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and
beyond its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a definition of what it is to
be socially marginalized. No empirical studies have informed COMELEC's
determination as to which groups are "underrepresented" in government. In fact, there
is no indication as to what the characteristics of an individual's or group's identity would
lead the COMELEC en banc to consider that they were a "sector".
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following are not marginalized or
underrepresented sectors: "Bicolanos", 30 "young professionals like drug counselors
and lecturers", 31 rural energy consumers, 32 "peasants, urban poor, workers and
nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting security of the country against
insurgency criminality and their roots in economic poverty", 33 "persons imprisoned
without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt", 34 those who advocate "to publicly
oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society"; 35
"environmental enthusiasts intending to take are of, protect and save Mother Earth", 36
"agricultural and cooperative sectors"; 37 "businessmen, civil society groups, politicians
and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social justice, and
environmental protection and utilization for sustainable development"; 38 "artists"; 39
"Bisayans"; 40 Ilonggos. 41 SCEDaT
What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex cathedra sans any standard what were
the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors." This, in my opinion, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. We are now asked to confirm their
actions. We are asked to affirm that COMELEC knew what a "marginalized and
underrepresented sector" was when they saw one.
COMELEC's process was a modern day inquisition reminiscent of the medieval hunt for
heretics and witches, a spectacle which may in a few cases weed out the sham
organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless fraught with too many vulnerabilities
that cannot be constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our Constitution, we should not lend
our imprimatur to both the basis and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this case.
After all, we have a due process clause still in place. 42 Regardless of the nature of the
power that COMELEC deployed whether it was administrative or quasi-judicial the
parties were entitled to have a standard that they could apply in their situation so that
they could properly discern whether their factual situation deserved registration or
disqualification. ACIDSc
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a standard. Even Rep. Act No.
7941 was ambiguously worded. 43 There was no workable definition of "marginalized",
"underrepresented" and "sector." 44
Neither would it have been possible for Congress to define these concepts. In the first
place, our decisions have not given them guidance. In the second place, we could not
give guidance because it is not in the Constitution and could not be derived from its
provisions. This is also apart from the reality that "identity", "sector", "marginalized" and
"underrepresented" are heavily contested concepts in the fields of social science and
philosophy. 45
This sham produces the failure in representation. It undermines the spirit of the party list
system, violates the principle of representation inherent in a democratic and republican
state, and weakens rather than strengthen the abilities of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" to become lawmakers themselves. Constitutional construction
cannot lose sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will undermine the very spirit
of the text of our Constitution. 48
Allowing the existence of strong national and regional parties or organizations in the
party list system have better chances of representing the voices of the "marginalized
and underrepresented. It will also allow views, standpoints and ideologies sidelined by
the pragmatic politics required for political parties participating in legislative districts to
be represented in the House of Representatives. It will also encourage the concept of
being multi-sectoral and therefore the strengthening of political platforms. EDcIAC
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain full fealty to the textual content of
our Constitution. It is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." 49 Nothing more, nothing less.
Requirements for Party List Groups
Preferably, party list groups should represent the marginalized and underrepresented in
our society. Preferably, they may not be marginalized themselves but that they may also
subscribe to political platforms that have the improvement of those who are politically
marginalized and economically destitute as their catapulting passion. But, this cannot be
the constitutional requirements that will guide legislation and actions on the part of the
Commission on Election.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:
First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented". However, they will have to clearly show how their plans will impact
on the "marginalized and underrepresented". Should the party list group prefer to
represent a sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani 50 and BANAT 51 will apply
to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list system must not also
be a participant in the election of representatives for the legislative districts. In other
words, political parties that field candidates for legislative districts cannot also
participate in the party list system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms guided by a vision of
society, an understanding of history, a statement of their philosophies and how this
translates into realistic political platforms; aICcHA
Fifth, the parties or organizations not only the nominees must have concrete and
verifiable track record of political participation showing their translation of their political
platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must be organized solely for
the purpose of participating in electoral exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as three (3) years,
prior to their registration. Within that period they should be able to show concrete
activities that are in line with their political platforms;
Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active membership roster so as to
be able to mount a credible campaign for purpose of enticing their audience (national,
regional or sectoral) for their election;
Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have participated in the political
activities of the organization;
Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is not only
democratically elected but also one which is not dominated by the nominees
themselves;
registered
party
list
groups
With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly
reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution
in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
"Sec. 17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members . . ."
A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered
political party list groups should prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC
to enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the "sole judge"
clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest. 52
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote to:
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected through a transparent and
democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the party or organization
must be clear and should not point to a few dominant contributors specifically of
individuals with families that are or have participated in the elections for representatives
of legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be able to win within the two
elections subsequent to their registration;
(1)GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC Resolution No. 9135 and all the
COMELEC Resolutions raised in these consolidated cases; and
(2)REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper proceedings in line with our decision.
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 203818-19, 203922, 203936,
203958, 203960, 203976, 203981, 204002, 204094, 204100, 204122, 204125, 204126,
204139, 204141, 204153, 204158, 204174, 204216, 204220, 204236, 204238, 204239,
204240, 204263, 204318, 204321, 204323, 204341, 204, April 02, 2013)