CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of

Labor Relations, MANILA CCBPI SALES FORCE UNION, and COCA-COLA G.R. No. 85333 February
26, 1990
BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.
FACTS: On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union (hereinafter referred to as the
Union), as the collective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the
Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the Company) concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter.
Among the compensation benefits granted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given in
lump sum including recomputation of actual commissions earned based on the new rates of increase.
On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the ratification by the union
members of the new CBA and authorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00
every payday or P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA
lump-sum pay granted to the union members.
As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September 29, 1987, the purpose of the special
assessment sought to be levied is "to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and other
items needed for the benefit of the officers and the general membership; and for the payment for services
rendered by union officers, consultants and others."
This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union through a secret referendum held in
separate local membership meetings on various dates. 3 The total membership of the Union was about 800.
Of this number, 672 members originally authorized the 10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the
same. 4
Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union submitted documents to the
Company stating that although they have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the
deduction of any amount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted similar
documents expressing the same intent. These members, numbering 355 in all (170 + 185), added to the
original oppositors of 173, turned the tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a total
of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters.
Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241in relation to Article 222(b) of the
Labor Code. The Union however contended that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and
approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Article 241.
ISSUE: Whether or not a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union from the lump-sum pay of
its members, granted under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent
disauthorization of the same by a majority of the union members.
The deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not made in accordance with the
requirements provided by law.
Under Article 241, the Union must submit to the Company a written resolution of a majority of all the
members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of the
organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must include, among others, the list of

all the members present as well as the votes cast.

The Union, however, failed to comply with the requirements of Article 241 of the Labor Code. It held local
membership meetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to the
express requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of the Union that
"the local membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings required by law" is untenable
because the law would not have specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent been to
allow local meetings in lieu of the latter.
It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when what is required is a written resolution
adopted at the general meeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded
by a union director and not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list
of the members present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did not
comply with the law at every turn, the only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no valid
levy of the special assessment
Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied, and granting that individual written
authorizations were obtained by the Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the
majority of the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal of
individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all. This is so even if the withdrawal of
authorization was done in collective form. There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization
must be in individual form.

Soriano vs. Offshore Shipping and Marketing Corp.

G.R. No. 78409, Sept. 14, 1989
Facts: In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed
Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen
O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning
Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine
Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a
period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months
by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to
Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985
he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill
its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to
reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his
return airfare to Manila.
In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
short), a complaint against private respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid
salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount of
P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by
reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation
to the Philippines.
In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration or POEA found that petitioner-complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00
inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the Accreditation
Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the
version of complainant that there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because
although the Employment Contract seems to have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are
in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the withholding of a certain
amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was
found to have been requested by petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and
that petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond.

Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA to the National Labor
Relations Commission. Complainant-petitioner's appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while
respondents' appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not POEA acted in excess of its jurisdiction?

Decision: As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the
salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled under the contract. It was a mere
breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay.
Otherwise stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive

under the agreement as approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or
overtime pay included.
Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility
that petitioner could have misunderstood the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the
contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or inconsistent with
what appears in the records. The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the
protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment served to clarify what was
agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go
beyond the bounds of reason and justice.

Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the National Labor
Relations Commission which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Pampanga Bus Company, INC., vs. PAMBUSCO Employees' Union, Inc.

G.R. No. 46739
September 23, 1939
EN BANC: MORAN, J.:
Facts:
On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein,
Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.,
new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from
the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing
the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in
substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service,
the members of the union.
Issue:
Whether or not the said order issued by the CIR valid and not violative of the right of the employer to
select employees.
Held:
We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order.
The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of
the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his
labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to
purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an
equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective
bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages,
and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral wellbeing of their members." This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective
bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with
them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental
curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a
manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not
be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co.
vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62 Law. ed., 260, 276):

Decision:
Thus considered, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against the respondent
Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA G.R. No. 76633, Oct. 18, 1988
Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after

considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Is Saco an overseas worker or a domestic employee?

Decision: We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined
as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen"
or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local
employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen." These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while
under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V
Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country.
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its
submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. The
second is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Songco vs. NLRC [G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990]

Post under case digests, labor law at Monday, April 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance
to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel
due to alleged financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company is not
suffering any losses and the real reason for their termination was their membership in the
union. At the last hearing of the case, the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting
their dismissal, however, they argued that they should be granted a separation pay. Each of
the petitioners was receiving a monthly salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every
sale they made. Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc. and the petitioners, in Article XIV,
Section 1(a), Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness,
death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the

company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one months salary per year of
service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the
salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service
credits, a fraction of at least six months being considered one year, including probationary
employment. Other basis for petitioners contention are Article 284 of the Labor Code with
regards to reduction of personnel and Sections 9(b) and 10 of Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company
to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of
commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with the
company. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres
filed a Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had
received, to his full and complete satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
Held: The petition is granted. Petitioners contention that in arriving at the correct and legal
amount of separation pay due to them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic
salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together. Insofar as
whether the allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the
purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the
case of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and separation pay,
account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation
and emergency living allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included in
the computation of their separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Blacks Law
Dictionary defined commission as the recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent,
salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated
as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature
of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered
demonstrate clearly that the commission are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some
salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or
commissions alone, are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesman do not received
any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, although
an employer-employee relationship exist. In Soriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the
commissions also claimed by petitioner (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are
not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual
market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying this by analogy, since the commissions
in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners,

these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be
taken into account is the average commissions earned during their last year of employment.

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA
446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word
shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their

publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

NASECO vs NLRC
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include
Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of
GOCC under the general corporation law.F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National
Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled orderingher
reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement.
NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which
is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms andconditions
of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National
Housing v Juco.
ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the
Civil Service Law.
HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to
cases that arose before its promulgation of

Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be

oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973
Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor
jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions of employment in GOCC's, among
them NASECO.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti
starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. It provides that the "civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government,including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter."
Therefore by clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized
as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. For more case digests and
lawschool notes visit lizajamarga.com
TUPAS VS NHC
Tupas v. NHC
Facts: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under Executive Order No. 399 of the
Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the
government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that
own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National Investment and Development Corporation and
the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the
conduct of a certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the
employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist
any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the medarbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed in the MR.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON a certification election may be conducted among the NHC employees
Held: Yes. Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service now covers only government owned or
controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by
special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC
without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. Anyway,
whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to unionize
or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and
the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged. This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice
and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is
recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX-B


which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale
for this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also
an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation

JUCO VS NLRC

G.R. No. 98107August 18, 1997BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and NATIONAL HOUSINGCORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:

Juco was hired as project engineer of NHC from Nov16, 1970 to May 14, 75. On May 14, he wasseparated
from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.On
March25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NHC with the Department of Labor.Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing complaint on the ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction over
thecase.Juco then elevated the case to NLRC which rendered a decision reversing decision of Labor
Arbiter.NHC appealed before this SC. On Jan6, 1989, Juco filed with CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal,
withprelim mandatory injunction. NHC moved for dismissal of complaint on the ground that CSC has no
jurisdiction over case. So, having no jurisdiction, CSC dismissed the case. Subsequently Juco also filed
withNLRC complaint for illegal dismissal with prelim mandatory injunction. Labor Arbiter Caday rendered
adecision declaring that Jucos dismissal was illegal. NHC appealed before NLRC and later on, NLRCreversed
the decision of Labor Arbiter Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
: Whether NLRC or CSC has jurisdiction over Jucos case.
HELD:
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides: The civil service embraces allbranches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
In NASECO v NLRC SC had occasion to apply the present Constitution in decidingwhether or not the
employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case
arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still ineffect. It was ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction

over the employees of NASECO on the groundthat it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, the new phrase "with original charter" means
that government-ownedand controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as
distinguished fromcorporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been
organizedunder the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
DevelopmentCorporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from
thepurview of the Civil Service Commission.The National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform
Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been
onehundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, theformer
corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the GovernmentService Insurance
System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines,the National Investment and
Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and HousingCorporation. 13 Considering the fact that
the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, theformer corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a
government-owned or controlledcorporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor
Code. This observation isreiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v.National Housing Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of
theDepartment of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlledcorporation
without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employeesof the NHC (now NHA)
undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization andthat there is no impediment to the
holding of a certification election among them as they arecovered by the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred
in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now
covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 15 Having been
incorporated under the CorporationLaw, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and
come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Villuga v. National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioner Villuga was employed by Private Respondent Zapanta (of Broad St. Tailoring) as a cutter.
He was also tasked to distribute work to other tailors and sewers when the shop manager or assistant
is not around and makes sure that the work conform to the pattern given. The other petitioners were
ironers, repairmen and sewers who were paid on piecerate basis. The petitioners did not fill in any
time record since they did not work on fixed hours, they also work at home when job orders
increased. Villuga got ill and was not able to report to work for a few days but has notified the
employer. Subsequently, he was considered to have abandoned his job. This prompted Villuga to file
a complaint on the ground that he was refused back to work due to an alleged participation to a union
organized by the tailors. The other petitioners claimed that they were dismissed due to union
participation. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint, the NLRC affirmed the dismissal.
Issue: W/N petitioner Villuga is a managerial employee
RULING: No. Villuga's primary work is to cut or prepare patterns and not to lay down management
policies since there is already a manager/assistant in-charge of this exact responsibility. Note that he
only distributes or assigns work occasionally and does not take part in policy-making activities. The
test of 'supervisory' or managerial status depends on whether a person possesses the authority that is
not merely routinary/clerical in nature but one that requires the use of independent judgement. Note
that your functions are not managerial if you only execute approved and established policies.
Requirements to be considered one to be part of the managerial staff is laid down in Rule 1, Sec. 2(c)
Book III), as follows: 1) Performance of work directly related to management policies. 2)
Customarily/regularly exercise discretion and independent judgement in the performance of his
functions. 3) Regularly/directly assists in managing the establishment. 4) Does not devote 20% of his
time to work other than those described above. Finally, there was no abandonment of work by

Villuga, 1) to be considered as such, his act must be deliberate and an unjustified refusal and
accompanied by overt acts, mere absence is not a sufficient ground. - See more at:
http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2014/09/villuga-v-nlrc-digest.html#sthash.pEsqWpGX.dpuf