THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002]

JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was charged with estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The information reads:
That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the Vice President
and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc.
as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost
of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is
duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and the accused once in possession of the same, far from
complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said
complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the said
amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant, in the aforementioned amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. (Skiva) is a New York-based corporation which imports
clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines) Inc. (Olivier).Aurora
Manufacturing & Development Corporation (Aurora) and Uni-Group Inc. (Uni-Group) are domestic
corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both
Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of UniGroup and a consultant of Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from Aurora and UniGroup. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier, issues to the local supplier,
Aurora/Uni-Group, a Purchase Contract and Olivier issues to Skiva a Sales Contract. In these
transactions, payment is usually made by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is paid only upon
the presentation of the proper shipping documents to the designated bank.[2]
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered sometime in
January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora and
Uni-Group to supply the jeans. [3] Thus, a Purchase Contract dated December 18, 1985 was issued by
Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was to supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of
Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans payable by means of a letter of credit at sight. [4] The
Purchase Contract was confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985 .[5] A Sales Contract was

also issued by Olivier to Skiva containing the same terms and conditions as the Purchase Contract and
was confirmed by Mr. Jack Chehebar of Skiva.[6]
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group the amount of
US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of P20.59 to US$1.00) as
Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw materials to manufacture the jeans.[7] It
was also agreed that the amount advanced by Skiva represents advance payment of its order of 700
dozens of ladies jeans. [8] Skiva then issued a check in the said amount payable to UniGroup. [9] However, due to the length of time needed for the check to be cleared, the parties made
arrangements to remit the funds instead by way of telegraphic transfer. [10] Thus, the check issued by
Skiva was returned by Mr. Lettmayr[11] and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in
New York, the Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and
Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.[12]
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of the said joint
account, withdrew the amount of US$21,675.21[13] and on January 22, 1986, petitioner withdrew the
amount of US$20,000.00.[14] The prosecution also presented evidence that subsequent to said
withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99 were deducted from the joint account as
telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the remittance of the funds to another account. [15]
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the production of the
jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics required for the
order were purchased from Litton Mills by the petitioner.[16] 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics are enough to
produce only 200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva of 700
dozens of ladies twill jeans.[17] Upon inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the
query be directed to petitioner as petitioner is in charge of securing the materials. [18] However, Ms.
Tujan could not locate the petitioner.[19]
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group
through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00.[20]
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the US$41,300.00
despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan, filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and an information was filed against petitioner. [21]
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to pay Uni-Group and Aurora the amount of
P595,259.00. [22] On March 13, 1997, the lower court denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. [23] On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[24]
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files the instant petition for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code: a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and d) there is demand made by the offended party to the offender.[25]

We agree with the trial courts finding that the contract between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was
one of sale.[26] Thus, upon remittance by Skiva of its advance payment in the amount of US$41,300.00,
ownership thereof was transferred to Aurora/Uni-Group and Aurora/Uni-Group had no obligation to
account or deliver the money to Skiva, its only obligation under the contract of sale being to deliver the
700 dozens of ladies jeans. However, petitioner, as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware
of the specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt of the amount, had the obligation to account for
the proceeds thereof to Aurora/Uni-Group.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of US$41,300.00 was remitted by telegraphic transfer to
the joint account of the petitioner and his wife and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr; [27]2) the said
amount was remitted as advance payment by Skiva for the jeans it ordered;[28] and 3) the amount of
US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by petitioner on January 16, 1986 and the amount of US$20,000.00 was
withdrawn by petitioner on January 22, 1986.[29] In fact, petitioner himself admits having withdrawn from
the joint account on two occasions after the remittance was made.[30] Petitioner further admits having
made such withdrawal for the purpose of purchasing materials to be used for the jeans ordered by
Skiva and a portion thereof to be given to Aurora.[31] Thus, upon withdrawal by petitioner of the amounts
advanced by Skiva, petitioner received the same in trust with an obligation to return the funds or
account for the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or misappropriation of the amount received, petitioner
claims that a portion of the amount was used to purchase 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics and the
balance was returned to Aurora.[32] However, upon cross-examination, petitioner was unable to recall
the amount paid for the purchase of the fabrics or the amount given to Aurora nor was petitioner able to
identify whether payment for the purchase of fabric or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash
or in check.[33]
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his defense
that payment for the purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance of the amount received by
petitioner was given to Aurora. The only reason why the Court is inclined to believe that 3,000 meters of
Litton fabrics were purchased for the manufacture of the jeans is because the witness for the
prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified the purchase of the said materials from Litton Mills.[34]
To support petitioners claim that the remainder of the amount withdrawn was returned to Aurora,
petitioner presents a letter dated October 15, 1986 from the Philippine Veterans Investment
Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) addressed to Mr. Werner Lettmayr, President of Aurora,
regarding the financial audit of Aurora, wherein the amount of P850,780.00 is indicated as an amount
due to Uni-Group.[35] Atty. Cesar Singson, witness for the defense, testified that the amount of
P850,780.00 indicated in the said letter represents the peso equivalent of the advance payment of
US$41,300.00 made by Skiva to Uni-Group.[36]
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the said letter is nil. The trial court correctly
ruled:
The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the letter] because the person who testified
thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar Singson, was not the one who prepared the document. He was only one
[of] those who was furnished a copy thereof. Moreover, when said piece of evidence was presented,
there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the [petitioner] as to how he was able to procure said
documents. In a hearing he testified that he personally procured said letter from the records of
PHIVIDEC and the person who certified said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross
examination, he testified that he did not personally obtain said letter and he was not there when the
person who authenticated said letter signed it and that it was only given to him by his former counsel.
This is further muddled when Atty. Singson testified that he was the one who authenticated said
document on December 7, 1987 from his copy upon the request of the accused. Atty. Singson has

already severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the year 1986. This means that Atty.
Singson was no longer connected with PHIVIDEC when he authenticated said document based on his
copy which implies that the document was not obtained from the records of PHIVIDEC.[37]
Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence, we are unable to see any indication
that the amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion thereof (assuming that the said amount represents
the advance payment made by Skiva) has been received by Aurora and/or Uni-Group from
petitioner. At most, what said letter indicates is that Aurora acknowledges liability to Uni-Group in the
said amount or that said amount has been received by Uni-Group from Skiva as advance payment
which Uni-Group may have, in turn, assigned to Aurora. The glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be
seen from the said letter that there was actual receipt by Aurora from petitioner of the amount indicated
therein, or at least a portion thereof, after deduction of the cost of the materials purchased to
manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon withdrawal of the said amounts,
petitioner caused the telegraphic transfer of the amount to another account prior to petitioners receipt of
the amount in pesos.[38] In fact, upon being confronted by the prosecution with Exhibits R and T which
are account debit forms showing that certain amounts were deducted by Citibank N.A. from the joint
account as telegraphic transfer fee for the amounts withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that
upon withdrawal, the dollars was converted by the bank, remitted abroad, and given to me in
pesos.[39] The act committed by petitioner of remitting the funds abroad constitutes an act of conversion
or misappropriation. This Court has previously held that even a temporary disturbance of property rights
constitutes misappropriation.[40] The words convert and misappropriate as used in Article 315 paragraph
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were
ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate a
thing of value for ones own use includes, not only conversion to ones personal advantage but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. [41]Thus, when petitioner caused the
remittance of the amount withdrawn to another account, such act constituted conversion or
misappropriation or unauthorized disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for which the
property was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is not present as the party prejudiced, in
accordance with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is Skiva, when petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent
with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is the owner of the sum remitted as advance payment,
petitioner had the obligation to account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. [42] Thus,
petitioner maintains that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora was alleged in the
information nor did the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co,[43] in estafa, the person
prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods misappropriated.
Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who shall defraud another by
any means mentioned [in Article 315] may be held liable for estafa.The use by the law of the word
another instead of the word owner means that as an element of the offense, loss should have fallen
upon someone other than the perpetrator of the crime.[44] Thus, the finding of the trial court that Skiva,
the party prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the
petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent as no demand was made by Skiva on
petitioner. Petitioner argues that although demand was made by Skiva to Aurora/Uni-Group and/or Mr.
Lettmayr, no demand was shown to have been made on petitioner himself.

We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when demand was made upon Aurora/UniGroup. To require Skiva to make a demand on petitioner himself would be superfluous and would serve
no other additional purpose. We note that at the time when Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery
of the jeans, except for the advice of Mr. Lettmayr to direct her queries to petitioner who was in charge
of procuring the materials for the jeans, Ms. Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be
primarily responsible for the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the
obligation of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not complied
with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the return of the
amount advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner himself to uphold
the conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind application of the law. In the case of United States
v. Ramirez,[45] this Court held:
The consummation of the crime of estafa does not depend on the fact that a request for the return of
the money is first made and refused in order that the author of the crime should comply with the
obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or conversion of money received to the
prejudice of the owner thereof are the sole essential facts which constitute the crime of estafa, and
thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed by the Penal Code.
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals[46] this Court ruled that the law does not
require a demand as a condition precedent to the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds and property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,[47] we also held that in a prosecution for
estafa, demand is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa
was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that the
transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, petitioner argues that
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,[48] the complaint should not have
been instituted by Skiva as it is not the offended party contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account. [49]
The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a
criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an
information which is generally filed by a fiscal. [50] It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense
subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a
complaint for preliminary investigation.[51]
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of
which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended
party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed
with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. [52] Thus, in the case at bar, the
complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of the court a
quo finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The key issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a government official for
grave oral defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit our attention. We thus resolved to give due
course to the petition, consider the private respondent's comment on the petition[1] as the answer
thereto, and decide it on the basis of the pleadings which have sufficiently discussed the issue.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.
On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then officer-in-charge of the Physical
Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of Region VII in Cebu City of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas (hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave oral defamation[2] allegedly
committed on 23 September 1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the
same Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994,[3] Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of the said office,
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of
the necessary information against the petitioner. This resolution was approved by the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
Cebu City an information[4] for grave oral defamation against the petitioner. This was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash[5] the information on the ground that the
"criminal action or liability" has been extinguished. She contended that under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense of grave oral defamation prescribes in months and that since the information
was filed only on 28 March 1994, or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its alleged commission, the
crime had then already prescribed. In support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia[6] vs. Reyes,
Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the filing of an
information at the fiscal's office will not stop the running of the prescriptive period for crimes.
In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases and

which fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of
the complaint directly with the said court or with the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription of
the offense charged. The filing of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's)
office under said Section 1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The private respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is
inapplicable because it involves an offense covered by the rule on summary procedure and it explicitly
stated that Section 1 of Rule 110 excludes cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge Bajarias, denied the motion to quash in the
order of 18 July 1994.[8] It fully agreed with the stand of the private respondent.
Her motion to reconsider[9] the above order having been denied on 29 November 1994,[10] the
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil action forcertiorari,[11] which
was docketed therein as Civil Case No. CEB-16988. The case was assigned to Branch 11.
In its decision of 3 July 1995,[12] the RTC, per public respondent Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed
the challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and 29 November 1994. It ruled that the order
denying the motion to quash is interlocutory and that the petitioner's remedy, per Acharon vs.
Purisima,[13] reiterated in People vs. Bans,[14] was to go to trial without prejudice on her part to reiterate
the special defense she had invoked in her motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Besides, the petitioner has
not satisfactorily and convincingly shown that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the orders considering that the ground invoked by her does not appear to be indubitable. And
even assuming that the MTC erred in venturing an opinion that the filing of the complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman is equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is merely
one of judgment. For, there is no decided case on the matter, and the substantive laws have not clearly
stated as to what bodies or agencies of government should complaints or informations be filed in order
that the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should be considered interrupted. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code simply states that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the "filing of the
complaint or information" and has not specified further where such complaint or information should be
filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to reconsider[15] the decision in the order of 23
August 1995,[16] the petitioner filed this special civil action wherein she reiterates the arguments she
adduced before the two courts below. The private respondent likewise did nothing more in her
responsive pleading than reiterate what she had raised before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special
laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation, which is the
subject of the information in Criminal Case No. 35684-R of the MTC of Cebu, prescribes in 6 months.
Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to
be of 30 days, then grave oral defamation prescribes in 180 days.[17] Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the presence of the
offended party on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense started to run on
that date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint or information
had been the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People vs. Tayco,[18]People vs. Del
Rosario,[19] and People vs. Coquia,[20] this Court held that it is the filing of the complaint or information
with the proper court, viz., the court having jurisdiction over the crime, which interrupts the running of
the period of prescription. On the other hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,[21] a case for libel,
this Court held that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court even for preliminary
investigation purposes only interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the second case of People vs.
Olarte[22] resolved once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with
the municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions
following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted. One line
of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (now municipal judge)
does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases
cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.
Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario,
L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court
has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the
true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the
period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do
on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,"
thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit
or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not
otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima
facie case has been shown.

Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases of
People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated
June 29, 1963.
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[23] this Court not only
reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of the complaint in the
fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or
information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or
accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court,
because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when the
proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the
acquittal or conviction of the accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case,
cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte case, there was diversity of
precedents on the issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of the complaint with the
justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This view is
found-in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People v. Uba, L-13106,
October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to produce
interruption, the complainant or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction
to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960;
People v.Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor
General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar read:
xxx xxx xxx
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, a
proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also of the
doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the
offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the
preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal
prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for
preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal
judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with
respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x.
Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended
party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days

after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. (Italics supplied)
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila.[24]
The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution
of Offenses) of the Rules of Court. We quote the entire Section for a better understanding of the last
paragraph:
SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:
(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or information directly with the said courts,
or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Italics supplied)
The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as amended, whose Section 2 explicitly
provides that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings, i.e.,
the filing of the complaint or information with the court. The said section reads:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.(Italics supplied)
And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,[25] this Court held that the proceedings referred to in said Section 2
are "judicial proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the petitioner, and her invocation thereof is
misplaced. In the first place, it involved a violation of an ordinance, which is covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. By its express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does not apply
to cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in question
partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326 is then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper
court of the complaint or information which suspends the running of the period of prescription.
In Zaldivia, this Court categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure to mean
that "the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that," which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No. 3326.

What is then left to be determined is whether the filing of the private respondent's complaint for
grave oral defamation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is equivalent to filing the complaint in
the prosecutor's office such that it interrupted the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation.
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide:
SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and
shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act
of 1989, which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8[26] of the aforementioned Section 13, Article
XI of the Constitution, provide as follows:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of
the Government, the investigation of such cases.
SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure in office.
Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory provisions vest upon the Ombudsman
and his Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed
against public officers or employees, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Thus,
in Deloso vs. Domingo,[27] this Court held:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate

x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1]) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer
concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x
and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.
It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or
omission of any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a "shared or concurrent authority
in respect of the offense charged."[28]
A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose duties involve
the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government. [29] The petitioner, being an
Education Supervisor II of the Regional Office of Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The
Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent's
complaint against the petitioner for grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the
first Olarte case, reiterated as the controlling doctrine in the second Olarte case, which was broadened
in Francisco and reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman against public officers and employees for purposes of preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against the
petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the period of prescription of the said
offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13 October 1993, or barely twenty days from the commission
of the crime charged, the filing then of the information on 28 March 1994 was very well within the sixmonth prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
G.R. Nos. 116259-60

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
G.R. Nos. 118896-97

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Salvador
P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos.
116259-60, petitioner assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying petitioner's
Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Informations; 1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994
denying the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation;2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994
denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the other hand, in
G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of the Resolution dated December 23,
1994 4 ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period
of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the Solicitor General in G.R. Nos.
116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said
province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was
replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the
EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for
governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized
national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of
Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both dated December 5,
1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with
violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes "A" & "A-1", respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of the Special
Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation (Annex
"C", ibid.).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia Yap-Fernandez,
the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself from handling the preliminary investigation
of the present case considering that petitioner appears to be her co-principal sponsor in a
wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988 (Annex "C-3", ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from Rodriguez, who was
then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about the present status of TBP No. 8601119 (Annex "D",ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement dated February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman
referred the matter of continuing and terminating the investigation of the present case to the

newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (Annex "D-1", ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27,
1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to another Prosecutor
considering that he is a long time close friend and "compadre" of petitioner and that one of the
complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was formerly a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex "D2", ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the lettermanifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be effected
on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes "E" & "E-2", ibid.). No comment having
been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an even date, was again
directed to comment thereon (Annex "E-1", ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his required comment
dated June 2, 1989 (Annex "E-3", ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell
Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21, 1992
rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate
charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992
with the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and
the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes "F" & "F-1",ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an "Urgent Motion for Quashal of
Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts." However, when the said
motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioner's counsel was made to choose which of
the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with respondent Court. Thus, on
January 18, 1993, petitioner filed an "Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Information in the Above-entitled Cases." After an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the
prosecution and petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed Resolution on
February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex "G", ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, which
was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second assailed Resolution issued on May
24, 1992 (Annex "H-1", ibid.). 5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 116259-60,
challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was likewise prayed that
respondent court be enjoined from taking cognizance of and from proceeding with the arraignment of
petitioner and the trial and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before it. Respondents
thereafter filed their Comment to which a Reply was submitted by petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by this Court in G.R. Nos. 11625960, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of herein petitioner on October 5, 1994 wherein a
plea of not guilty was entered for him by the court after he refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial
of petitioner's motion to quash the informations, the prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before
respondent court a Motion to Suspend AccusedPendente Lite 6 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said motion on the ground that the validity of the informations filed
against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein that Section

13 of Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is unconstitutional in that it
constitutes an undue delegation of executive power and is arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed on October 14, 1994 in G.R. Nos.
116259-60 a Supplemental Petition 7 questioning the veracity of and seeking to restrain respondent
court from acting on said motion to suspend pendente lite, the hearing of which was scheduled on
October 17, 1994. However, before respondents could file their comment thereto as required by this
Court, petitioner, who initially sought the holding in abeyance of further action on his supplemental
petition until after respondent court shall have resolved the motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually
decided to withdraw the same purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main petition.
Hence, on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw the
supplemental petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted for resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28, 1994 an amended motion to
include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel in question; and (b) in Criminal
Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation which entered
into a contract with the Province of Palawan. 9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these coprincipals violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the
informations null and void. It appears that the prosecution did not oppose nor object to this amended
motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioner's motion to include co-principals,
issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to suspend pendente lite and ordering the
suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a restraining order was filed by petitioner on February 20, 1995 against the
same respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-97, and which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin
respondent court from enforcing its resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering his
suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the Court resolved to consolidate this second petition with
G.R. Nos. 116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected therein, the following pattern of
contentious issues has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 is being
contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on
the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of his
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of law pursuant to
the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and (3) since the acts charged in
the complaints filed before the Tanodbayan are different from the charges contained in the
informations, another preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which
there is a denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension order in that: (1) he may not
be suspended while the issue on the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review
before the Supreme Court; and (2) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the
order of suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue delegation of the

authority to suspend which is essentially an executive power. Petitioner contends that the
jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent court in upholding the constitutionality of Section 13
are not applicable to the cases at bar which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In
addition, petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject informations for having been filed in violation
of the due process and equal protection clauses by reason of the non-inclusion therein, as coprincipals, of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who approved the purchase of the vessel,
as well as the board of directors of ERA Technology and Resource Corporation which entered into a
contract with the Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason of the unreasonable
delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al. 10 In said case, all the affidavits and counter-affidavits had already been filed with the Tanodbayan
for final disposition as of October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12, 1985, or three (3) years
thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed
before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held there that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the
conduct and termination of the preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights of the
accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case, by reason of which the informations filed
against the accused therein were ordered dismissed. It must be emphasized, however, that in
the Tatad case, no explanation or ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as to the
cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining in Tatad, respondent court found
that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation was caused by petitioner's own
acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in these cases
was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on account
of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates, entitled "Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation" Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as provided in Executive Order
No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then Governor
Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation correcting the complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the Office of the
Ombudsman a reply to complainant's manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary investigation of these cases
was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the accused herein,
were required to submit counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, on
August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:

(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent;
and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within which to
oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after protracted
deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an "Appearance and Motion for Extension of
Time to File Appropriate Pleading." Counsel prayed that "respondents be granted an extension
of twenty (20) days within which to comply with the order of March 11, 1991";
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a motion to
quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the prosecution to resolve the
motion and there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the accused was
invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him. The motion to
quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the Informations in these cases
were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the prosecution on the
motion to quash/dismiss. 11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of respondent court, could only raise
the defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary investigation did not affect the proceedings
therein; that the preliminary investigation really started on February 18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan
issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the motion to dismiss/ quash the complaints was purposely
for the early termination of the preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint was politically
motivated, as may be gleaned from the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the
time the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the factual situation in Tatad because
the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by herein petitioner were not present in the latter case.
Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to
justify the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently
established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof. The situation in Tatad was quite to
the contrary since the accused therein successfully proved that the charges were filed against him only
after it became widely known that he actually had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that "prosecutors should not allow,
and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants
alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Such an exigency apparently does
not obtain in the case at bar. There is nothing in the records from which it can be conclusively inferred,
expressly or impliedly, that the investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even coerced into
filing these criminal charges against petitioner.

We likewise do not adhere to petitioner's asseveration that the orders issued by Branches 51 and 52 of
the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing the informations for technical malversation
filed against herein petitioner, on the ground that the inordinate delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to due process and speedy
disposition of his case which thereby ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have become final
and conclusive by reason of the prosecution's' failure to file an appeal therefrom. We have carefully
scrutinized the orders adverted to and we find and so hold that the same cannot effectively deter the
prosecution herein from proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said Regional Trial Court are different
from the charges for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the Sandiganbayan. The former is
covered by a general law while the latter involves a special law, with variant elements of the offenses
being required, hence double jeopardy cannot set in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that
the trial court in the malversation case hastily concluded that there was an inordinate delay of six (6)
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation through the mere expedient of counting the
number of years that had elapsed from the institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the
filing of the informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual considerations
and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself strictly to a mathematical
reckoning of the time involved, instead of undertaking a more substantive appreciation of the
circumstances and particulars which could have possibly caused the delay. On the contrary, herein
respondent court has convincingly shown that the preliminary investigation dragged on for several
years owing, ironically, to petitioner's evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In the cases now
before us, it cannot be successfully and validly contended that petitioner's right to speedy trial has been
violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the application of the
constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably clear that the application of
the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal
concern should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be
deduced from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-year delay was
specifically considered vis-a-vis all the facts and circumstances which obtained therein. Perforce, even
on this ground alone, the instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. 12 In the cases at bar, while there may have been some delay, it was petitioner
himself who brought about the situation of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations in that the same do not
constitute an offense supposedly because (a) in Criminal Case No. 18027, there is no statement that
herein petitioner actually intervened and participated, as a board member of ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation, in the latter's contract with the Province of Palawan, which is allegedly an
element necessary to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (b) in Criminal
Case No. 18028, the information failed to show a causal relation between the act done by the accused
and the undue injury caused to the provincial government of Palawan.

With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027 for violation of
Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Trieste,
Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 13 where it was held that "what is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft
law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order
that liability may attach." In the cited case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein did not,
in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question since he signed
the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the
municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the municipal treasurer without the
knowledge and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were subsequently delivered by the supplier,
and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the knowledge and consent of the mayor. The
only participation of the accused mayor in the transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the
disbursement vouchers for record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the act therein of the
accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h)
for intervening in his official capacity as Governor of Palawan in reviewing and approving the
disbursement voucher dated August 2, 1982 for payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources
Corporation where he was one of the incorporators and members of the board of directors. Such
allegation clearly indicates the nature and extent of petitioner's participation in the questioned
transaction. Without petitioner's approval, payment could not possibly have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for violation of
Section 3(e), which would warrant the dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the
information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. 14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the
information which would prove the causal relation between the act done by the accused and the undue
injury caused to the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to petitioner's contention, a reading of the
information in Criminal Case No. 18028 will readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charged have been sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges right at
the outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller ventilation and
examination. Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unwarranted to cut off the
prosecutory process at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the information. 15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses charged in the complaints are
different from those stated in the informations which were filed before the Sandiganbayan, and that
since there was no preliminary investigation conducted with respect to the latter, such informations
should be declared null and void for lack of due process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the filing of an information in
Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is accused of intervening in
his official capacity as Provincial Governor in the contracts for the installation and construction of
waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, where he was an
incorporator and a member of the board of directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said
transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner was charged with a violation of Section 3(e) as a
result of the complaint filed against him and several others for a violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In
both instances, petitioner is charged with the disbursement of public funds for the purchase of a motor
launch which was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of Palawan
because the same broke down only after its maiden voyage.

It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are based on substantially the same
factual settings, except that the respective designations are different. Axiomatic is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or information. 16 The
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given
by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the crime but the
facts alleged in the body of the information. 17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set forth in the body of
an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the defendant of the
nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or
other parts of the information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls
the erroneous designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the
statement of facts. The erroneous designation may be disregarded as surplusage. 18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law which is involved in the present
case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it defines several modes of committing the
same offense. It is an old and well-settled rule in the appreciation of indictments that where an offense
may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is
alleged to have been committed in two or more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the
offense committed through any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive
offense. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the
record that the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense. 19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary to conduct a new
one, affect the validity of the informations filed against petitioner. It has been consistently held that the
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy. 20 It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or
information. The proper course of action that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in
abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to the office of the
Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation 21 if the accused
actually makes out a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold that the informations filed
against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the petitioner's preventive suspension,
which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering
his suspension despite the fact that the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending
review before the Supreme Court. In support thereof, he invokes the rule laid down in Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation vs.Court of appeals, et al. 22 that even if no temporary restraining order was
issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained from taking any action while
the petition for certiorari was pending with the Supreme Court. Petitioner insists that this is what
respondent court should have done. Under this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review

of the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994, denying his amended and
consolidated motion to quash the information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory
and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only
be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. 23 In other words, it
cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure
to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment. 24 Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed
of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not attendant
in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him. 25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted
for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The
hearing may be treated in the same -manner as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of
a motion to quash. 26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. 27 we have set out the guidelines to be followed
by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension
from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section
13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court
should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the
cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion
for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order or suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold
such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that
the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code
which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he
may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the Act upon determination of the
pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under
a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial
court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be
called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and
setting the same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a proper
determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue
the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate
courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain
whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the
informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the
order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a
preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer
does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that
the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against
him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer
charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the
private interest of the accused. 29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is
said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive
suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate
his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the
accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do
both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is
likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the instant case do not show that the
proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against petitioner were tainted with any irregularity

so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, the informations show that the allegations contained therein
meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by the substantive law. The record is also bereft
of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the grounds provided in
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 31 Finally, a cursory reading of the order dated February 9,
1994 issued by respondent court will show that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his
motion to quash. Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on which the order of suspension
was based, are null and void in view of the non-inclusion of his co-principals which thus constitutes a
violation of petitioner's right to due process and equal protection of the law and, therefore, ousted
respondent court of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the
board of directors of ERA Technology Corporation should have been included as principals by
indispensable cooperation because without them he could not possibly have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who
issued the resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor launch should likewise have
been included as principals by inducement or indispensable cooperation, considering that petitioner
was allegedly merely implementing their resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations
are null and void, the suspension order which is based thereon should necessarily also be declared null
and void. We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines "against all persons who appear
to be responsible for the offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file
the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. This does
not mean, however, that they shall have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether
the evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. What the
rule demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information, which
conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required to be
included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to include the other public
officials who appear to be responsible for the offense charged as co-accused in the information filed
against the accused does not in any way vitiate the validity of the information under the Rules. 33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged is not
one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion to quash the information
against the accused may be filed, most especially in the case at bar where there is prima facie proof
that petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from the fact that there is no allegation of
conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such an infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing
or mitigating petitioner's liability if he is subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No one would
contend that if for lack of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the prosecuting
officer fails to include the names of one or more persons in an information filed by him, who were in fact
guilty participants in the commission of the crime charged therein, such persons will be relieved of
criminal liability; or that those accused who have been charged with the offense, brought to trial, and
found guilty will be permitted to escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of the
trial, or after the trial, that there were other guilty participants in the crime. 34

Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a ground for the quashal of the
informations, the motion to quash must still be denied for having been filed only after petitioner had
been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(t)he
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and
jeopardy." The failure to include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is
deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an information or to include a
person as an accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants such action, the
offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an
action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a new
complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new examination conducted as
required by law; (3) he may institute administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal
complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of
the Civil Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may institute
another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioner's strategy that from the inception of the criminal
complaint before the Ombudsman and during the conduct of the preliminary investigation, until the filing
of the informations before the Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his amended and consolidated
motion to quash, herein petitioner has not been heard to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of
the other supposed offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for petitioner to invoke and exploit this
particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information, from the facts and evidence of
record, we do not deem it necessary to include the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan and the board members of the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation as co-accused in
the informations filed against herein petitioner. Insofar as the board members of said corporation are
concerned, they may be prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides
that "(i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any
of the offenses defined in Section 3 thereof." In the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027,
petitioner stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not contain any allegation to the effect
that the board members knowingly induced or caused herein petitioner to commit the offense defined
therein, which is an essential element of the crime in Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board
members cannot be included as co-principals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot likewise be included in the
information for violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for the simple reason that it is
not the validity of their resolution which is in issue here. While it is true that said sanggunian passed a
resolution authorizing the allocation of funds for the purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner
merely acted on the strength thereof, it is not the fact of such authorization which is the subject of the
charges against petitioner but rather the manner by which that resolution was implemented by the
latter. There is nothing in the averments in the information from which it could be inferentially deduced
that the members of the sanggunian participated, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of the vessel,
and which fact could be the basis for their indictment.

3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground that Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of executive
power to the Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power of suspension, which is an incident of the
power of removal, is basically administrative and executive in nature. He further submits that the power
of removal vested in the court under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 is an incident of conviction,
that is, it can only be exercised after a conviction has been handed down. Hence, according to
petitioner, since the power to suspend is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only
be exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13 authorizes the court to
exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot be considered as an
exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of the court's power of removal. In addition,
petitioner avers that Section 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in
that it does not require a proceeding to determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the
fact that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the court's power of suspension under Section 13 has been
squarely and directly raised and adjudicated in the case of Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the
pronouncements wherein we quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who should exercise the
mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension where a criminal case
has already been filed in court still is with the Provincial Governor, relying on Section 2188 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that, following the ruling in Sarcos vs. Castillo . . .,
because the main respondents are elective municipal officials, that power of suspension must
be held to repose in the Provincial Board, under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967
(Republic Act 5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
solely the court in which the criminal case has been filed shall wield the power of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act grants with
specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an official charged with a
violation thereof. It would seem to us though that suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings
are separate and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate reading of
Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one separate from the other: one criminal before
the courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import of the last sentence of
Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case
"shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him." Our interpretation but preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry between the first
part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all other
acts connected with the discharge of court functions which here include suspension should be
left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any public official committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the law, amongst others, to

"perpetual disqualification from public office." Here, the Makati elective officials heretofore
named have been charged with and found guilty of a violation of Section 3(8) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and were sentenced by the court below, amongst others, to be
"perpetually disqualified to hold office." Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails "(t)he deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election." No
stretch of the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual absolute disqualification which, in
effect, is encompassed in the punishment set forth in Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act covers that. of removal from the office which each of the respondent municipal
official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of judicial
legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is without doubt that
Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court proceedings
for removal and that the congressional grant is not violative of the separation of powers. For, our
Constitution being silent, we are not to say that from Congress is withheld the power to decide
the mode or procedure of suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme, convinces us the more that
the power of suspension should be lodged with the court. While the law may not be a model of
precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition of the power
to suspend that there be a valid information. Validity of information, of course, is determined by
the Court of First Instance where the criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial
function. Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the criminal proceedings before
the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who knows the facts upon which suspension is
based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque, supra, at page 469: "We are certain that no
authority or good reason can be found in support of a proposition that the Chief Executive can
suspend an officer facing criminal charges for the sole purpose of aiding the court in the
administration of justice. Independent of the other branches of the Government, the courts can
well take care of their own administration of the law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should not be artificially
construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to suspend a prime tool designed by
Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from frustrating the purity and certainty
of the administration of justice. Surely, we should not be pedantically exacting in reading its
provisions. We should rather say that if the court's power of suspension incident to the court
proceedings is to be withheld of narrowed by construction, Congress should have spelled it out
in no uncertain terms. . . .
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an encroachment upon the
power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the process that a line should be drawn between
administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating
further on the possible danger which may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a
criminal action under Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than the court, it declared
that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger should the
power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court. Quite apart from the fact that the

court has a better grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights of the
person accused. The court could very well serve as a lever to balance in one equation the
public interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the danger that
partisan politics may creep in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored especially
if the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public local elective officer
are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused. Conversely, if both are of the
same political persuasion, the suspending authority will display reluctance in exercising the
power of suspension. It is thus that the statute should catch up with the realities of political life.
There is indeed the dispiriting lesson that in a clash between political considerations and
conscience it is the latter that quite often gets dented. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one who should
logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness must have been
in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and rule that under Section
13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the provisions
thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend
the public official indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their logical parameters and the
permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time, ironically in fairness to petitioner himself, that the same
be now calcined in the judicial crucible into their ultimate configuration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and 118896-97 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005]

SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of Bulacan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
The zeal to uphold justice, albeit an admirable and desirable trait, must never be allowed to blind
judges to the limits of judicial power or to obscure the boundaries set by the law.

The facts are as follows:

On May 10, 2003, in the municipality of Paombong, Bulacan, a wedding party was being
celebrated behind the house of the newly-married couple. At the party and drinking together at the
same table were SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo (SPO4 Alonzo), Jun Rances (Rances), Zoilo Salamat
(Salamat) and Rey Santos (Santos). While waiting to be seated, Pedrito Alonzo (Pedrito) was
introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4
Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and his companions took their seats and started
drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzos table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the
back of the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise
followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The
wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos.
Pedritos uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and
even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a
certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified. Upon review of the records of the case
by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged with murder
as principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza,
the prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their conspiracy with
Salamat.2 Thereafter, under the direction of the Officer-in-Charge,3 an Information4 was prepared,
charging Salamat as principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories, for the murder of Pedrito. No
bail was recommended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4767-M-2003 with Branch 12 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, under presiding judge Crisanto C. Concepcion. On
December 17, 2003, Judge Concepcion issued an Order,5 where he stated:
The assassination of the victim has all the color of a planned liquidation. Zoilo Salamat, not known in
that place, appears to be a hired killer with Rey Santos as the supplier of the death gun. SPO4 Alonzo
appears to be the brain or mastermind, pointing Pedrito to the assassin as the target of the planned
killing. Jun Rances appears to be the back-up of Salamat in executing and gunslaying. A conspiracy
clearly appears among them with the common design to kill the victim. Their respective actions were
concerted to attest to that. Jun Rances and Rey Santos are not merely accessories-after-the[-] fact, but
as principals themselves who should be charged as such along with gunman Zoilo Salamat and
mastermind SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo. This is very apparent from the facts on record as borned [sic] out
by the statements of witnesses given to the police.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice that should be given the victim in this case and prosecute all
the persons against whom probable cause exists as principals in this case of murder, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby directed to amend the information, so as to include all the
aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as principals, within five (5) days from notice hereof.6
On January 5, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed his Motion for Reconsideration7 to the Order, on the
ground that the court had no authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for the purpose of amending the
Information. SPO4 Alonzo averred that the prosecutors resolution can only be reviewed by the
Department of Justice, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, when a case for certiorari is
filed.
On January 12, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibitation [sic], 8 alleging that by
issuing the aforementioned Order, Judge Concepcion has shown his prejudice against him and bias in
favor of private complainant Jose Alonzo. He prayed that the case be re-raffled to another judge.

On January 13, 2004, Judge Concepcion issued an Order9 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Motion for Inhibition. Judge Concepcion stated that SPO4 Alonzo had no personality to file the
said motions as he was not an accused in that case. Respondent held that only the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor could question the first Order.
On January 16, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed a verified affidavit-complaint10 against Judge Concepcion
for rendering the December 17, 2003 Order. Complainant averred that respondent x x x clearly acted
without any authority of law as the same clearly violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987
constitution [sic] and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which only
authorizes him to determine if probable cause exist [sic] against those accused impleaded in the
information before issuing a warrant of arrest against them. He accused respondent judge of: a) gross
ignorance of the law; b) violation of Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution; 11 c) abuse of authority
under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;12 d) knowingly rendering an unjust order; e) conduct
unbecoming of a judge; and f) oppression and partiality.13
On February 26, 2004, respondent received the First Indorsement14 from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), requiring him to file his comment to the complaint within ten days from receipt
thereof. On March 4, 2004, respondent filed his Comment.15 Respondent attached copies of the sworn
statements of the prosecution witnesses.16 He claimed that while evaluating the records of the case, his
curiosity was piqued as to why no bail was recommended for the three accused. He noticed that the
five witnesses17 who testified during the preliminary investigation had consistent accounts of the
incidents leading to the death of Pedrito. From these accounts, respondent concluded that SPO4
Alonzo and all the accused conspired to kill Pedrito, thus the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor erred
when it merely charged Salamat as principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories, while
complainant was exonerated. Respondent averred that [c]ourts speak thru order
issuances [sic].18 Hence, on December 17, 2003, he issued the Order, directing the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to amend the Information to include complainant, Rances and Santos as principal
participants in the murder of Pedrito. Respondent stressed that he bade the prosecution to amend the
Information xxx without any sanction even hinted, should it fail to do so.19 After respondent issued the
Order, the prosecution stood pat on its position that there was no compelling reason to disturb its
original resolution or to amend the Information.
The OCA recommended that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the Order and the acts
complained of were done by respondent in his judicial capacity and were not actuated by bad faith,
dishonesty or similar motive. In addition, the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and not an administrative complaint.
The Court cannot follow the recommendation of the OCA. Respondent clearly erred when he
rendered the assailed Order. The rules set the proper procedure20 for the investigation of complaints
and designate the prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation.21 The function of a preliminary
investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.22 It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 23 The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.24 However, while prosecuting officers have the authority to
prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime,25 they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute
when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.26 Judges should not unduly interfere with the exercise of the power to prosecute on the part
of fiscals.

It is not a sufficient excuse for respondent to aver that he did not impose any sanction for noncompliance with his Order. In itself, his Order does violence to the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in our Constitution. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the
prosecutor who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the
prosecutor's should normally prevail.27 Thus, we held in People vs. Pineda,28 viz.:
x x x A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof,
or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting
attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should
give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play
may be transgressed. x x x
The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal
charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges
in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to
reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who
did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as
saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity may be
availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.
We understand respondents zeal in trying to uphold the ends of justice. However, respondent
overlooked the fact that there is a remedy where a prosecutor errs in not charging a person in an
Information. The recourse is to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. 29 By ordering the prosecutor to
include complainant, Rances and Santos as principals in the Information, respondent arrogated unto
himself the executive power of supervision and control over public prosecutors. His conduct is not only
unbecoming of a judge; more importantly, it transgresses our Constitution.
Yet, this is not all. Respondent judge also erred when he issued warrants of arrest for Rances and
Santos without bail. As the Information has not yet been amended charging these two accused as
principals to the crime of murder, they are still entitled, as mere accessories, to bail under Rule 114,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.30 The Court notes with approval that respondent
corrected this error by allowing Rances and Santos, with the recommendation of the prosecution, to
post bail.
For lack of evidence, respondent is exonerated of the other charges brought against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion is found liable for conduct
unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED. He is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be entered upon
his record.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR
TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO
GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTIGRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the
local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit
Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the
respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary restraining orders directing
the respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question until
further orders from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to the petitions and accordingly,
required the respondents to answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a
complaint with the respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of
the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents, conspiring and
confabulating together, allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand
for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that it was made to appear that Tabiliran

Trucking Company won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract pursuant to
the said simulated bidding were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking
Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated and the papers
on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the
private secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the
latter; that said awardee was given wholly unwarranted advantage and preference by
means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are hereby also charged with
interest for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly irregular and
grossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and committed by means of
falsification of official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented
by respondent Cesar Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his trucking contract
in the under his trucking contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that
the same was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view of the then subsisting
contract with Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire on November 2, 1969; that
nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was made to appear that it was collected
by Tecson Trucking Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter and the
voucher was never indorsed or signed by the operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in
facilitating and consummating the aforecited collection, respondent officials, hereinabove
cited, conspired and connived to the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City
Fiscal, another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code. The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of the right wing
portion of the Capitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding
Committee composed of respondents cited hereinabove; that the said building was
maliciously manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage and preference in
favor of the, supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and
managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent Bienvenido
Ebarle; that respondent official is interested for personal gain because he is responsible
for the approval of the manifestly irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited;
and that, furthermore, respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee, also
violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making it appear in the very abstract
of bids that another interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when in truth
and in fact, it was not so. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a
prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified falsely under
oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to
Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during the hearing
and reception of evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido
Sanchez and that he is the owner, when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been
previously acquired and is owned by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur,
where the provincial jail building is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of respondent in said
Cadastral case were made knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. 3
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the
respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for violation of Sec. 3,
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles
171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and the rules and regulations of public bidding,
committed as follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the
so-called "bidding" for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents, without any valid or legal
ground, did not include or even open the bid of one Jesus Teoson that
was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registered duly
qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his
compliance with all the rules and requirements on public bidding; that,
instead, aforecited respondents illegally and irregularly awarded said
contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent Governor
Bienvenido Ebarle; and
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and
papers were falsified or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar
Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference
and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that there is a statutory
presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and
award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and
regulations. 4
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same having
been denied, he went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the
same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. The court granted
preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to have the
restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two challenged orders,
granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private
respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City
for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH
EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within
the third degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him
within the third degree by consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously
made untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH
EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him
within the third degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously
made untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher,
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the
latter is related with him within the third degree affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent
Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 and Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son of his brother, his relative by consanguinity
within the third degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latter is
related with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil
Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE
replaced JOHNNY ABABONwho was then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law
TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, in violation
of the Civil Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality against said complaining employee.
Third Count:

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,

Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother,
his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and
said appointment is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR., son of the younger sister of Governor
Ebarle, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as
Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well know that the latter is related with him in the third degree of
consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended
and gave TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE,
his relative by affinity within the third degree, an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher,
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew then that
the latter was not qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service
Law, thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference in
the discharge of his administrative function through manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, taking advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or
influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular and felonious act in violation of
applicable law or constituting an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the
Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case,
failed to establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration law and the Public Land Act, it appearing that the Provincial Government of
Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse possession of Lot 2545
whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then
and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of facts by
accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:

c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool
Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen
knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of affinity and is in violation
of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then
and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have
been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH
EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him
within the third degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil Service Law.
CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8
xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again
charging the petitioner with further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
extend and give unwarranted benefits and privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his
brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity within the second civil
degree, an appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although he
well knew that the latter is related to him in the second degree by affinity and is not
qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend
and give unwarranted benefits and privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said
respondent, an appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian
City, although he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the third civil
degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.

Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously
extend and give unwarranted benefits and privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-inlaw of said respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office of
the Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina Codinera is
related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the
Civil Service Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for immediate
preliminary investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the
Secretary of Justice, and in the paramount interest of good government. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the
Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a restraining order. The
respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the case itself dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the
implementation of dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the
Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE
PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10 preliminary to
their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League
to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the
respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the
restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies as well thereto,
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he
being, as we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce
the Order in toto:

MALACAANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the
procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials
and employees should be presented and prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to
observe the form.91 requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and
particularity the charges or offenses being aired or denounced, and to file the complaint
with the proper office or authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression, the Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be
resolved at the lower levels of government if only the provisions of law and regulations
on the matter are duly observed by the parties concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it
is equally compelling that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded
them by the constitution and law to defend themselves in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and
sworn to by the complainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or
conduct complained of, instead of generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the Office of the
President or the Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official
involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper
department or agency head.

4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in
case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in
case of municipal officials, and with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of
barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local
board of investigators headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of
those appointed by the President which should be filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and
disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws
and regulations so that the erring officials or employees can be soonest removed or
otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to
the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the
interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.)
FERDINAND
MARCOS

E.

President of
the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.)
MELCHOR

ALEJANDRO

Executive
Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not
criminal complaints. The Order itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the
Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself
applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the public "of the procedure provided
by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to pertains to
existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of administrative charges against erring
government officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof. That
presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a
reecho of the long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over his
appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of
Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction

upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to investigate and decide on
matters involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the other
hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city
officials shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official
before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any
elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a
"Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the
Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative
apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no
reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal)
recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to
serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested
parties, " 17 but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not
require a prior administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed
by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests civil
suits subject to previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring
officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted."
While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the
intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's arguments were
accepted. For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which
legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential lawmaking was to
usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would be
forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations
then in effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly
countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
to bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended
party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20 The
"complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case,
the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21

For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are
filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an
information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may
be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628
embraced as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162
refer invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not,
however, make such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the provincial government
itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019; and making
untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his office. On the other
hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of simulating bids for the supply
of gravel and sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;
manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the capitol building; testifying falsely in connection
with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the
owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and
simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major differences. When, therefore, we
restrained further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not
consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S.
Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in question are tainted with a political
color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this
case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin
criminal prosecutions.22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the orderly administration of
justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to
avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (5) because
the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or otherwise void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the
exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the
deluge of complaints commenced by the private respondent below, but whether or not they were filed
for harassment purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we
believe, for the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes blocked
here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837. March 23, 2004

VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants, vs. JUDGE TEOFILO D.

BALUMA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn Estudillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her
mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance
of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose from the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 11627 for Other Acts of Child Abuse[1] entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie Cirilo
Nocos y Urot by respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, a Family Court.
The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the requisite preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart E.
Himalaloan found that there was sufficient ground to hold the herein accused for trial for the offense of
Other Acts of Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.[2] The record of
the case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review by Third
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Macario I. Delusa, he failed an Information dated October 28, 2002[3].
Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order dated November 21, 2002[4] ratiocinating, thus:
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same forming parts of the Records in this case
appearing in pages 28 and 30, the court finds that the same is not subscribed and sworn to by the
prosecutor.
...
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the Information will readily show that the
information had not been subscribed by the prosecutor and this will militate against the validity of the
information and towards nullity and total worthlessness of the same. Since the Information is defective,
the Court is left without any alternative except to dismiss this case. Any other act by the Court will
tantamount to validating the defective information. The Court can act in this case only when a correct
information is filed, which is beyond procedure for the Court to order.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Revival[5] on
December 12, 2002 alleging that there was no necessity for the Information to be under oath since he
merely concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and that he has properly subscribed and
signed the Information with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor.
On January 10, 2003, respondent issued an Order[6] granting the motion for reconsideration,
reinstating and reviving the case but at the same time requiring the public prosecutor to file a new
information incorporating the formalities called for under Rule 112, Section 4 and the circular of its
department implementing the pertinent laws on the matter, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

On January 30, 2003, the prosecution filed an ex parte motion to increase the bail bond of the
accused[7] but respondent refused to act on it because the prosecution had not yet complied with his
order to file a new information.[8]
On January 31, 2003, the prosecution filed a Manifestation[9] stating that it will not file a new
information as ordered, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence and is unprocedural.
Complainant, therefore, seeks the assistance of the Court to investigate this impasse considering
that the bond of the accused had been cancelled earlier.
Complainant also alleges that previously, respondent judge had dismissed Criminal Case No.
11514 against a certain Eduardo Vedra for Unjust Vexation on the same ground. The prosecution, in a
motion for reconsideration, explained that what is required to be under oath is a complaint, not an
information where the Rules merely require that it be subscribed.Respondent granted the motion and
revived the case without requiring the filing of a new information.
Complainant wonders why respondent did not require the filing of a new information in the Vedra
case, but insisted on the filing of such new information in the present case. This, according to the
complainant, is clearly gross ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, respondent avers: The complaint did not comply with Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which required a certification of non-forum shopping.He denies that he
stood pat on his original order because he had already issued an Order dated 27 February 2003 which
found probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos, under custody in order
to stand trial and fixed his bond at P60,000.00. The complainant, including Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat, the
trial prosecutor who instigated the filing of herein administrative complaint and Atty. Esther Gertrude
Biliran, who notarized and obviously prepared the complaint, were mentally dishonest for not
mentioning the fact that before herein complaint was filed on March 8, 2003, he had already issued the
aforecited Order dated February 27, 2003. Prosecutor Ucat and Atty. Biliran had evil motives when they
instigated the filing of the complaint against him even before he had issued the new order and for
continuing with it after he issued the Order of 27 February 2003.
Respondent maintains that he had efficiently discharged his duties as judge although his Branch is
one of the most heavily burdened branches in the Tagbilaran City area and that to cope with this heavy
load, he works even at night and on Sundays and holidays, writing decisions and drafting orders.
Respondent included in his Comment a Counter-complaint against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran an administrative case for disbarment or for disciplinary sanction for
gross violation of the canons under the Code of Professional conduct and for deceit, dishonesty, failure
to exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing falsehood or consenting to its doing and abuse of
procedures.
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat filed a Rejoinder[10] stating that he is in quandary why the respondent
tagged him as the trial prosecutor when in fact the record shows that Prosecutor Helen T. Cabatos was
the one who handled the subject criminal case (Criminal Case No. 11627) and Prosecutor Macario I.
Delusa was the one who filed the Information. He asserts that the only thing he did was to administer
the oath of the complainant in the original letter-complaint subject matter of the herein administrative
case. He points out that it was in another case, Criminal Case No. 11514 for Unjust Vexation entitled
The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Vedra, a.k.a. Eddie that he acted as the prosecutor. That
case was dismissed by respondent in an Order dated November 25, 2002 on the same ground that the
Information was not subscribed by the prosecutor. Upon a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer For
Revival of the Case, respondent granted it in an Order [11] dated January 2, 2003. He likewise answered
point by point all the accusations hurled by respondent in the latters counter-complaint.

Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran also filed a Rejoinder[12] wherein she denied having participated in
the filing of the complaint except to take the oath of the complainant. She avers that at the time herein
administrative case was filed on March 8, 2003, complainants have not yet received the February 27,
2003 Order issued by respondent judge which found probable cause to warrant the placing of the
accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond
at P60,000.00. Likewise, she denied the accusations of the respondent judge and proferred her
defenses against it.
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that: 1) this case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and 2) respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition
of the offense will merit a more drastic action of the Court.
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the rules would have so
provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as a sworn written statement charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated.[13] In a case, we ruled that the information need not be under oath, the
reason therefore being principally that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in
regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. [14] Clearly, respondent
had confused an information from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or signed by Prosecutor Macario
I. Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject Information on the ground that
it was not under oath.
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in the evaluation submitted by him:
It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information filed by Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat on the
ground that it was not sworn to. The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an information as an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the
court (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not require that it be under oath for otherwise, it would have
provided so. On the other hand, a complaint is defined as a sworn statement charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated (Section 5, Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a complaint and an information need
to be under oath. But the oath is not required when it is a public prosecutor who files the information
because he does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his position. The position of the public
prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation had been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge
of Tubigon-Clarin and the latters resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.
It appears from the record that the respondent corrected himself by issuing his Order of 27 February
2003 where he found that the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estudillo, father of the victim, the
affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the victim executed with the assistance of Visitacion Estudillo, her
mother, the medico-legal certificate issued by Isidro Fermites, Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the certification
of the facts of birth of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records of the proceedings during the preliminary
examination at the First Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated

September 19, 2002, this court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed in the
custody of the law to stand trial.
The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however, must be reminded that as judge he must
be conversant with the rules and laws that it is his office of apply. He deserves a reprimand for his
failure to understand an elementary rule of law.[15]
We agree with Court Administrator Velasco.
The records disclose that respondent, in effect, apparently rectified his error when he issued an
Order dated February 27, 2003, portions of which read as follows:
EXAMINING the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estodillo, father of the victim, the affidavit of
Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the victim executed with the assistance of Visitacion-Estodillo her mother, the
medico legal certificate issued by Isidro Permites, Jr., M.D., on Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the certification on
the facts of birth of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the records of the proceedings during the preliminary
examination at the First Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 19, 2002, this Court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed in the
custody of the law to stand trial.[16]
However, it is noted that said Order did not have any reference at all nor did it attempt to reconcile
the previous Orders he issued on which bases the herein administrative complaint was based, namely:
the Order dated November 21, 2002 dismissing the Information, the Order dated January 10, 2003
reinstating and reviving the case but requiring the prosecution to file a new information, and the Order
dated January 30, 2003 refusing to act on the prosecutions ex-parte motion to increase amount of bail
until the filing of a new information, thus resulting in the grievance submitted by complainant which
could have been easily averted had respondent been more meticulous in the performance of his duties
as presiding judge of a regional trial court.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. It is imperative that judges must be conversant with basic legal
principles[17]. Judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws.[18] They are not common men and women, whose errors, men and women forgive and
time forgets[19]. Judges sit as the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice, their last recourse where
all other institutions have failed.[20]
As to the counter-complaint of respondent Judge against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther
Gertrude D. Biliran, the same should be dismissed for failure of respondent to refute their respective
rejoinders, dated June 11, 2003 and June 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Teofilo D. Baluma is found guilty of violation of Canon 3, Rule
3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct and REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The counter-complaint of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty.
Esther Gertrude D. Biliran is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-44723 August 31, 1987

STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner
vs.
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE
of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et. al., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated.
The facts of the case are not disputed. On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted
theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who,
after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an
information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case
which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated
October 14, 1974.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte an
Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents
with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a
review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14,
1974.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "Please
elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all
proceedings pending review."
The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated
November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already
been filed against private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot
question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima
facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the
dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court
denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and
set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.

Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order dated February 13,
1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23,
1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent
Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to
dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal
manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal
or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute
Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First instance of Camarines Norte" (Petition, Rollo, p. 27).
There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addresses to the sound discretion of the
investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in
his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs.
Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of
his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the
case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the
court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings.
The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450;
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra).
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion
by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly
deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there
appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be,
because the case is already in court and, therefore, within its discretion and control
(Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA 12).
This ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down in U.S. vs. Valencia (1 Phil. 642)
where it was held that "after the complaint has been presented, and certainly after the trial has been
commenced, the court and not the fiscal has full control of it. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the
fiscal without the consent of the court." It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending to
grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil.
914).
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the ground that there was
a prima faciecase against private respondents. The question presented for determination now is-after a
case has been filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to
dismiss it has been denied?
This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his personal convictions
or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not
shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private
prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4,

Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings wig be null and void (People vs. Beriales,
70 SCRA 361).
In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since
an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer (Suarez vs. Platon,
69 Phil. 556).
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for
the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to
proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least
what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of
evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs.
Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor
available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability
and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties.
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the
prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said
directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case.
It is the court where the case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Very recently, this Court
in Mario Fl. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul (G.R. No. 53373, promulgated June 30, 1987) ruled:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or any other person who may be
assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal
Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.

G.R. No. 135022. July 11, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ, accusedappellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
A man descends into the depths of human debasement when he inflicts his lechery upon a minor,
and all the more when he imposes such lasciviousness upon a woman whose capacity to give consent
to a sexual union is diminished, if not totally lacking. Such is the case of Jonalyn Yumang (hereafter
JONALYN).
Upon a complaint[1] dated 5 July 1996 signed by JONALYN with the assistance of her aunt
Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz (hereafter BIENVENIDO) with
rape allegedly committed on 3 and 4 July 1996. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 1274-M-96 and 1275-M-96. The accusatory portion of the information docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1275-M-96, which is the subject of this appellate review, reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 1996, in the Municipality of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Bienvenido
dela Cruz @ Jun] did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design have carnal
knowledge of one Jonalyn Yumang y Banag, a mentally deficient female person, against her will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment on 14 October 1996, BIENVENIDO entered a plea of not guilty. [3] The cases
were consolidated, and joint trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the prosecution sought to obtain from the trial
court an order for the conduct of a psychiatric examination on her person to determine her mental and
psychological capability to testify in court. The purpose was that should her mental capacity be found to
be below normal, the prosecution could propound leading questions to JONALYN. The defense,
through Atty. Jesus M. Pamintuan, vigorously opposed the prosecutions manifestation. Nonetheless,
the trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct examination on JONALYN so that if in its
perception she would appear to be suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted
to ask leading questions.JONALYN was then made to identify her signature in her sworn statement and
to identify the accused, and was asked about her personal circumstances. Thereafter, noticing that
JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court decided to suspend the proceedings to give
the prosecution sufficient time to confer with her.[4]
At the next hearing, the trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the witness stand Dr. Cecilia
Tuazon, Medical Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City. Dr. Tuazon
testified that she conducted a psychiatric examination on JONALYN on 12 July 1996. She found that
JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental retardation and that although chronologically

the latter was already 20 years of age (at the time of the examination), she had the mental age of an 8year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Dr. Tuazon also found that JONALYN could
have attained a higher degree of intelligence if not for the fact that she was unschooled and no proper
motivation was employed on her, and that she had the capacity to make her perception known to
others. She, however, observed that she had to prompt JONALYN most of the time to elicit information
on the sexual harassment incident. She then narrated that JONALYN was able to relate to her that she
(JONALYN) was approached by a tall man named Jun-Jun who led her to a house that supposedly
belonged to her cousin, and that Jun-Jun disrobed JONALYN and raped her twice.[5]
After said testimony or on 11 March 1997, the trial court issued an order[6] allowing leading
questions to be propounded to JONALYN in accordance with Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence.[7] Thus, JONALYN took the witness stand. She again identified her signature and that of her
aunt on her Sinumpaang Salaysay. She also identified BIENVENIDO as the person against whom she
filed a complaint for rape. She declared in open court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice inside the
house of a certain Mhel located at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan. She stated that
BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and inserted his private part into her womanhood.[8]
Dr. Edgardo Gueco, Chief and Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, testified that he examined JONALYN on 8 July 1996, and the
results of the examination were indicated in his Medico-Legal Report.[9] He found that she was in a nonvirgin state physically, as her hymen bore deep fresh and healing lacerations at 3, 8 and 11 oclock
positions. He then opined that the hymenal lacerations were sustained a week before the examination
and, therefore, compatible with the time the rapes were allegedly committed.[10]
Carmelita Borja, aunt of JONALYN, testified that on 5 July 1996, she accompanied JONALYN to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Office in Calumpit, Bulacan, to lodge a complaint against
BIENVENIDO. With them were JONALYNs mother Conchita Yuson and Barangay Councilman Roberto
Dungo. Carmelita testified that in instituting this case, their family incurred expenses amounting
to P30,000.[11]
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. Thus, the defense filed on 5
December 1997 a Demurrer to Evidence[12] on the following grounds:
(a) That the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases; and
(b) The presumption of accuseds innocence had not even [sic] been overcome by the prosecution due
to the insufficiency of its evidence.
Expounding its theory, the defense first admitted that it could have moved to quash the information
but it did not because the complaint on which the information was based was on its face valid, it having
been signed by JONALYN as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is that JONALYN had
no capacity to sign the same considering her mental deficiency or abnormality. The assistance
extended to JONALYN by her aunt Carmelita Borja did not cure the defect, as the enumeration in
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code of the persons who could file a complaint for rape is exclusive
and successive and the mother of JONALYN was still very much alive.
The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as a witness. It claimed that
JONALYNs testimony, considering her mental state, was coached and rehearsed. Worse, she was not
only asked leading questions but was fed legal and factual conclusions which she was made to admit
as her own when they were in fact those of the prosecution.

In its Order of 26 January 1998,[13] the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and set the
dates for the presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, BIENVENIDO filed a Motion for
Judgment, stating in part as follows:
[A]fter going over the Records and carefully analyzing the proceedings as well as meticulously
evaluating the evidence presented and offered [by] the private complainant, in consultation with his
parents, and assisted by undersigned counsel, [he] had decided to submit the cases for judgment
without the need of presenting any evidence to explain his terse PLEA OF NOT GUILTY to the charges
upon his arraignment.[14]
Noting this new development, the trial court, in its Order of 17 February 1998, considered the case
submitted for decision.[15]
In its Joint Decision of 3 April 1998, [16] the trial court convicted BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape
in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of
evidence. While conceding that JONALYNs narration of how she was sexually abused by
BIENVENIDO was not detailed, the trial court, nonetheless, concluded that it was candidly related by
one who had the mental age of an 8-year-old child. The trial court was convinced that JONALYN was
able to show in her own peculiar way that she was indeed raped by BIENVENIDO on 3 July
1996. Finally, the trial court ruled that BIENVENIDOs culpability was further bolstered by his choice not
to offer any evidence for his defense despite ample opportunity to do so. Accordingly, it sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay JONALYN the amount of P60,000 by way of civil
indemnity.
In his Appellants Brief,[17] BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court committed the following errors:
1. ... in having taken the fatally defective criminal complaint for a valid conferment upon it of
jurisdiction to try and dispose of said two (2) charges of rape.
2. ... in having accepted as competent the mentally deficient private complainant even without
first requiring any evidence of her capacity as such a witness.
3. ... in having considered the narration read to the complaining witness from prepared
statements and asked of her simply to confirm as true, as her own.
4. ... in having given full credence and weight to complainants conclusions of facts merely put
to her mouth by leading questions of the prosecutor.
5. ... in having convicted the accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitting
in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96, on the basis of private complainants purported sworn
versions supposedly given in both charges.
BIENVENIDO reiterates the issues he raised in his Demurrer to Evidence. He assails the
competency of JONALYN as signatory to the complaint she filed. He adds that the defect in the
complaint was not cured by his failure to interpose a motion to quash nor by the assistance lent by
JONALYNs aunt, which contravened Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently,
BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
BIENVENIDO also stresses the incompetency of JONALYN as a trial witness for the reason that
the prosecution failed to prove her competency. Further, JONALYN was merely asked to affirm the
legal and factual conclusions of the prosecution which evinced quite clearly the girls lack of
comprehension of the court proceedings and the nature of her oath. Besides, her statements
concerning the alleged sexual penetration were elicited a month after her initial offer as a witness,
which reinforces the rehearsed and coached nature of her testimony.

Finally, he wonders why he was convicted in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 but acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 when it was a joint trial and the evidence was the same. He insists that
he should also be acquitted in the case at bar.
In the Appellees Brief,[18] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the case, since the complaint and information filed were valid.JONALYNs mental
retardation does not render her incompetent for initiating the prosecution of the crime committed
against her and for testifying in court. If minors are allowed not only to initiate the prosecution of
offenses under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but also to testify under the Rules on Evidence, JONALYN, who had the mentality
of an 8-year-old child, was competent to sign the criminal complaint and to be a witness in
court. JONALYNs competency as a court witness was aptly proved when she was able to answer the
leading questions asked of her as allowed by Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence.
Moreover, the OSG asseverates that JONALYNs testimony on the fact of rape is corroborated by
medical and physical evidence. As to BIENVENIDOs quandary that he should be acquitted also in this
case, it is convinced that he should have been convicted for two counts of rape, as JONALYN
expressly testified that she was raped twice by BIENVENIDO. Finally, the OSG seeks an award of
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 for JONALYN, as well as a reduction of the award of civil
indemnity to P50,000 in conformity with current jurisprudence.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

I. Validity of the Complaint for Rape

We agree with the disputation of the OSG that the trial court validly took cognizance of the
complaint filed by JONALYN. The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed were
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353[19] otherwise known as
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on 22 October 1997[20]) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. -The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.However, in Municipal
Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when there is no fiscal available, the offended party, any
peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the
case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the
Regional Trial Court.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may

be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and
has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her
behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above
offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor
fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. The right to file the
action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of all other persons and
shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the immediately
preceding paragraph.
A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the
aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in
court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family.[21]
It has been held that [w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there shall be a
complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint
that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to
try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.[22]
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal
Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right
to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory
proceeding. The assistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYNs
signature alone suffices to validate the complaint.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape
independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of
an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be
rightfully considered filed by a minor.
The overriding intention of BIENVENIDO is to challenge the validity of the complaint by assailing
the competency of JONALYN to file the complaint. But even he admits in his Demurrer to Evidence that
the complaint is proper and valid on its face for which reason he did not move to quash the
information. Thus, even he admits and recognizes the futility of his argument.

II. Competence of JONALYN to Testify

The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who
sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence,
as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath.[23]
The prosecution has proved JONALYNs competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding
of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of
an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her
testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness.[24] JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with

the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20 of Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence.[25]
JONALYNs competency is also better established in the answers she gave under direct
examination relative to the harrowing defilement she suffered in the hands of BIENVENIDO, thus:
Q And the nature of your complaint was that you were abused or you were raped by the herein
accused Bienvenido de la Cruz y Santiago, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
...
Q And do you know in what place where you raped by the accused, Bienvenido dela Cruz y
Santiago?
A Inside the house, sir.
Q Whose house?
A In the house of Mhel, sir.[26]
Q How many times were you raped by the herein accused Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias
Jun Jun?
A Twice, sir.
Court: Where?
Fiscal: Where?
Witness: On top of the wooden bed, sir.[27]
Q You said you were raped twice by the herein accused, Bienvenido dela Cruz alias Jun-Jun on
a papag inside the house of Mhel at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan, how did Jun Jun
the herein accused rape[] you?
Court: On the first time?
A He layed [sic] me to bed, sir.
Q After you were layed [sic] on the bed what happened next?
A He went on top of me, sir.[28]
Q Last time, you stated that the herein accused whom you called Jun laid you on top of a bed and
after that, he went on top of you. My question is, when he went on top of you, what did he do to
you, if any?
A: Pumaloob sa akin.[29]
Q Now, when the accused, which you called Jun, pumaloob sa iyo, what did you feel at that time?
A I felt a hard object, sir.
Q Now since you said it [was] a hard object, you could now tell the Court, what that hard object
[was]?
A I cannot remember.[30]
Public Prosecutor:

Q When you said the last time around, you were asked about, what you mean by pumaloob siya sa
akin and then you said that there was a hard object inserted and after that, the follow-up
question was asked on you, you said you cannot remember, what is that hard object, what do
you mean when you say I cannot remember?
Atty. Pamintuan:
Leading.
Court:
Witness may answer, subject to your objection.
Witness:
His private part was inserted in my private part, sir.[31]
Court: But there was an answer a while ago. Witness may answer.
Witness:
A Yes, sir.
Public Pros.:
Q And, when you say he did the same to you, he inserted his penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Public Pros.:
No further question, Your Honor.[32]

III. Credibility of JONALYN as a Witness

The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYNs competency but also her
credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her
charge against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was
shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A
rape victims testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to
incriminate and testify against the accused.[33] It has been held that no woman, especially one of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished.[34]
We, therefore, affirm the trial courts decision to lend full credence to the testimony of JONALYN on
the circumstances of the rape, thus:
In so few a word, complainant has made herself clear about the sexual molestation she suffered in the
hands of the accused. Plain and simple her testimony may have been, unembellished, as it is, with
details, yet, it is in its simplicity that its credence is enhanced. Certainly, we cannot expect complainant,
in her present state of mind, to come out with a full account of her misfortune with all its lurid
details. That, to this Court, is simply beyond the reach of her enfeebled mind. She came to talk on her
sad plight from the viewpoint of an 8-year-old child, and she must, by all means, be understood in that
light.[35]

Absent any cogent reason warranting a disturbance of the findings of the trial court on the
credibility and competency of JONALYN, this Court has to give these findings utmost respect, if not
complete affirmation. Settled is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is
accorded the highest respect, for it has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor
of witnesses on the stand and, thus, to determine whether they are telling the truth. [36]

IV. Propriety of Propounding Leading Questions to JONALYN

We likewise agree with the trial courts conclusion that JONALYNs testimony should be taken and
understood from the point of view of an 8-year-old child. JONALYNs testimony is consistent with the
straightforward and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecutions persistent, repetitious and
painstaking effort in asking leading questions was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice
to draw out from JONALYNs lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her by
BIENVENIDO.
The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. It is usual
and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is
immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to,
court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment;
confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of
questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English
language or only imperfectly familiar therewith.[37]
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN
nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully
phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import
of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecutions referral to JONALYNs Sinumpaang Salaysay to
refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to
enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the
court.[38]
Thus, JONALYNs behavior merely conformed to Dr. Tuazons clinical and expert observation that
JONALYN had to be continuously and repetitiously prompted so that she could answer and recount a
terrible experience. JONALYNs constant eyeball fixature towards her aunt and mother does not by itself
indicate coaching, in the face of a dearth of other evidentiary bases that the latter did coach her. There
was nothing in the behavior of JONALYN which was indicative of her failure to understand the import of
the trial proceedings. Her identification of BIENVENIDO as her assailant is quite telling on how simple,
yet unassuming, her grasp of the situation was. Thus:
Stenographer:
Reading back the question.
Q Because you understand that this was explained to you, I would like to read to you particularly
question number 3.
Tanong: Sino naman ang ibig mong idemanda?
Answer: Si Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun po.
Was this explain[ed] to you?
Atty. Pamintuan:

I stand correct[sic].
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Fiscal:
(to the witness)
Q Now, this Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun, which was the person whom you are
filing the complaint of [sic], will you kindly look around to this Court and tell us whether or not he
is inside.
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you mind to point him?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing orange T-shirt and when asked his name answered
Bienvenido dela Cruz.[39]

V. Sufficiency of Prosecutions Evidence

It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYNs lone testimony, which was found to be credible by
the trial court, is enough to sustain a conviction.[40] At any rate, medical and physical evidence
adequately corroborated JONALYNs testimony. Time and again we have held that the laceration of the
hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of forcible defloration.[41]
On the basis of the foregoing, we agree with the trial courts conviction of BIENVENIDO under
Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96. His acquittal under Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 is, at this point,
beyond the review powers of this Court.
Since the information charges BIENVENIDO with simple rape only and no other modifying
circumstances has been proved, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the lesser of the penalties
prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was correctly
imposed by the trial court.
We rectify the error of the trial court in granting JONALYN the amount of P60,000 as civil
indemnity. In conformity with current jurisprudence, we hereby reduce it to P50,000.[42] An award of
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also just under the circumstances.[43]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal
Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in
the reduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27923 November 18, 1991

MARCELA N. GONZALES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, City Judge of Davao City (Branch III), ALFREDO M. CELI, First
Assistant City Fiscal of Davao City, representing the People of the Philippines, and FILIPINAS
ORDOEZ, respondents-appellants.
Jose M. Ilagan for petitioner-appellee.
Caneta, Tolentino, Arcangel & Guyo for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

This is an appeal from the Decision dated 7 June 1967 Branch III of the then Court of First Instance
(now Region Trial Court) of Davao in a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Special Civil Case No.
5270) which granted the petition and enjoined permanently both the City Judge and City Fiscal from
taking further cognizance of a criminal case for slander (Criminal Case No. 2273-B) in the City Court of
Davao City because said case was not brought at the instance and upon complaint of the offended
party, respondent City Fiscal had no authority to file the information, and the City Judge had no
jurisdiction over the case. 1
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On 17 February 1966, an information for slander against accused Marcela N. Gonzales (hereinafter
referred to as the appellee) was filed before the City Court of Davao by Assistant City Fiscal Alfredo
Celi. The information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1965, in the City of Davao, Philippine, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused with intent to cast
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon one Filipinas Ordoez, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and in the heat of anger uttered publicly in the presence and within the
hearing of several persons the following defamatory words, to wit: "MANG-AAGAW NG
ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA! TIBIHON! PUTANG INA MO! WALANG HIYA! PATAY
GUTOM", which when translated to English runs (sic) as follows: "Seducer of wives of
other husbands or adulteress. Consumptive. Your mother is a prostitute. You do not
have a sense of shame. You are a glutton", to the dishonor, discredit and contempt of
said Filipinos Ordoez.
On 5 August 1966, the appellee moved to quash the information asserting that the City Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so. She claims therein that the alleged defamation imputes the crime of adultery and thus cannot be
prosecuted de oficio. The other remarks, however, do not charge a crime, The complaint must,
therefore, be brought at the instance of the offended party, which was not done in this case. Hence, the
fiscal did not have the authority to file the information and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.

The records do not show that the offended party filed a complaint in the fiscal's office and that the
Information was signed by her.
The motion to quash was denied by respondent Judge, prompting appellee to move for its
reconsideration. This second motion was likewise denied. Thus, appellee filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Davao a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 5270.
Appellee reiterated in her petition the grounds in her motion to quash and elaborated on her arguments
in support thereto. On the other hand, respondents maintained that the slanderous words alleged in the
"information contain imputations no only to (sic) one crime but to (sic) other offenses like vice, defect
and condition which are distinct from and independent of each other; one, admitted to be of adultery
and others are public crimes which can be prosecuted de oficio."
In deciding Civil Case No. 5270 against respondents, then Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales opined that "the
entire context of the Information should be read together as a whole and not to pick up (sic) particular
words and phrases and then detach or isolate them from the rest so as to give them different meaning
(sic) that is desired by the one who may use it for his own convenience" and that "the entire defamation
in question should be given an ordinary and peculiar significance in order to render it effectual in the
sense that is most likely understood by the parties and which is in keeping with the purpose and intent
of the party who uttered them." He then concluded and ruled that:
The first part of the defamation complained of, quoted: "mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may
asawa" may literally mean: "one who grabs another's husband," thereby imputing the
commission of the crime of adultery wherein the accused maintained an immoral or illicit
relations (sic) with another man who is not her husband.
The prosecuting Fiscal has correctly construed in English the significance of the first
portion of the defamation in question by imputing the commission of the crime of
adultery, in which case, it becomes undisputed that the offended party has the exclusive
right to sign and file the complaint and not the Fiscal.
However, the City Fiscal did not interpret the correct meaning of the succeeding group of
clauses quoted: "Putang ina mo, tibi-hon, walang hiya, patay gutom" for he just gave
them a strict, literal construction which does not portray the real intent of the accused
and does not conform to the sense as it is ordinarily understood by an average person.
Expressions of this kind and tenor are commonly used by many people according to
their custom specially those who are unschooled and coming from the lower social
strata. They are usually uttered by the slip of the tongue and are intended to describe,
intensify, explain or emphasize the other parts of the utterances which accompany them
or to which they cling or are attached. They may be defamatory or not depending upon
the tenor and import conveyed by the accompanying statements.
In the instant case, the above quoted combined utterances expressed in the native
dialect are mere accompanying and supporting phrases and terms and used to give
more vivid color and importance to the first portion, depicting the temper, emotion,
demeanor and the hatred of the petitioner (accused in the lower Court) owing perhaps to
a fit of jealousy arising from her suspicion that the offended party is having immoral
relations with her husband.

It become (sic) clear and logical then to conclude that the next group of words
mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not impute the commission of any public
offense that may be considered distinct and independent from that conveyed in the first
sentence, but they are simply intended to give more spicy flavor to the main thought
expressed in the whole statements. No other reasonable and logical conclusion can be
drawn from the premises except that the correct imputation to the crime probably
committed in this case is that of adultery or a similar offense, private in nature and that
there is but one, single and indivisible crime that is described by the whole slanderous
statements alleged in the information.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced and is of the opinion that only the
crime of adultery or a kindred offense is imputed to the accused (petitioner herein) for
uttering the alleged defamation in question taken as a whole and no imputation to (sic)
any other public offense could be logically inferred from the tenor and spirit conveyed
therein.
Respondents-appellants challenge the above decision in their four (4) assigned errors, to wit:
FIRST The lower court erred in holding that the information alleges only one
defamatory remark imputing a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
SECOND The lower court erred in holding that the other utterances alleged in the
information are not defamatory as to constitute the crime of slander which can be
prosecuted de oficio.
THIRD The lower court erred in holding that the fiscal lacks authority to file the
information and, therefore, the City Court fails (sic) to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
FOURTH The lower court erred in permanently enjoining the respondents from taking
further cognizance of the information. 2
In support thereof, they contend that:
(a) It is clear that the information alleges "many remarks or utterances which are all defamatory" and
not just one as ruled by the court. Each may constitute a separate offense. However, since they were
made on one occasion, and the product of a single criminal intent, there is only one offense of slander.
(b) One slanderous remark should not be given more emphasis than the other. Neither should a single
remark be considered to suit the purpose of the accused. Rather, the rule is that all the slanderous
statements should be treated as one and taken as a single offense of slander.
(c) The one remark held by the court to be slanderous as it imputed the crime of adultery is "mangaagaw ng asawa ng may asawa." Standing by itself, it does not, contrary to the court's ruling, impute
the crime of adultery. At most, it implies that the one to whom it is addressed is a flirt, a temptress, or
one who indulges in enticing other husbands. It imputes a vice, condition or act which equally casts
dishonor and contempt upon the person alluded to. Flirtation is not adultery.
(d) All the defamatory statements alleged in the information likewise only impute a vice, defect, act or
condition not constituting a crime. The fiscal, therefore, has the authority to file the information and the
City Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

(e) Assuming for the sake of argument that the defamatory statements alleged in the information
include one imputing an offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, still the case at bar is one which
can be instituted upon the instance of the fiscal on the ground that what then is involved is a compound
or complex crime, one of the components of which is a public crime, in which case it can be prosecuted
de oficio under the theory that public interest is paramount to private interest. 3
In her Brief, 4 appellee maintains that:
(a) when the slanderous remarks, uttered on one occasion with one criminal intent, also imputes the
commission of adultery, regardless of the other imputations, the charge can only be brought at the
instance of and upon complaint subscribed and filed by the offended party. Thus, in People vs.
Padilla, 5 it was held:
... while said Article 364 penalizes any intrigue which has for its purpose to blemish the
honor or reputation of a person, the information avers facts which do not merely
constitute an incriminatory machination or a defamatory intrigue but go as far as
accusing a married woman of having illicit relations with a man not her husband which in
effect constitutes the crime of adultery.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that under Article 360, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, no criminal
action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio can be brought except upon the complaint filed by the offended
party, and the crime of adultery is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio (Article
344, idem.), it is obvious that the information filed in this case is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court of origin. The trial court was therefore correct in quashing the
information.
(b) People vs. Yu, cited by appellants, is not applicable in this case because it refers to a complex
crime defined under the Revised Penal Code which imposes only one (1) penalty. Appellants admit that
in this case there is only one offense, although it involves many slanderous remarks.
Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing. 6 In both, there is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredict, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 7
In determining whether the offense has been committed, the defamatory words are to be construed in
their entirety, and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense. 8 In short, the language used must be understood "in its plain and
popular sense to read the sentences as would the man on the street." 9 The intent or purpose then
of the speaker or writer is not relevant.
The issues in this case revolve on the correct appreciation of the statements uttered by appellee and
alleged in the information to be slanderous. They read as follows:
Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa! Tibihon! Putang Ina Mo! Walang Hiya! Patay
Gutom!

The fiscal translated them as follows:

Seducer of wives of other husbands or adulteress. Consumptive. Your mother is a
prostitute. You do not have a sense of shame. You are a glutton.
Judge Gonzales, after postulating the major premises that the entire defamation in question should be
given an ordinary and peculiar significance in order to render it effectual in the sense most likely
understood by the parties and which is in keeping with the purpose and intent of the party who uttered
them, held that the controlling slanderous utterance is the first part which literally means: "one who
grabs another's husband," thereby "imputing the commission of the crime of adultery," while the rest
are mere accompanying and supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and
importance to the first portion.
In the light of the above rule of determining whether the offense of oral defamation or libel has been
committed, it is evident that the last part of Judge Gonzales' major premise focusing on the purpose
and intent of the speaker is erroneous.
Equally erroneous is his literal translation of the first portion of the alleged defamatory utterance. We
agree with appellants that "mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa," even if translated as "one who
grabs another's husband," does not necessarily mean an adulteress. At most, it may imply that the
person whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a temptress, or one who is in enticing other husbands;" hence, it
is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act not constituting a crime.
If indeed it were the intention of the appellee to impute upon the offended party the crime of adultery,
then in the light of charge that the remarks were made "in the heat of anger" that, as Judge Gonzales
described it, they were uttered in manner "depicting the temper, emotion, demeanor and hatred of the
petitioner (accused in the lower court) owing perhaps to a fit of jealousy arising from her suspicion that
offended party is having immoral relations with her husband," appellee should have used more dialect,
pointed and descriptive terms to convey the accusation that the offended party is a adulteress. Under
such circumstances, she would not have luxury of time to choose less offensive or even harmless
words to camouflage a clear intent to defame the other and thus avoid criminal or civil liability for the
utterance. On its face, her statement is merely suggestive of a doubt as to the kind relationship the
offended party would have with married men. It is thus an imputation of some kind of moral depravity,
immoral conduct or a vice, but certainly not of a crime.
Neither do We agree with Judge Gonzalez' conclusion the other portions of the alleged slanderous
remarks "are me accompanying and supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and
importance to the first portion." The other remarks are by themselves defamatory and are not at all
related to the first portion. They were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice intended to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended party. "Tibihon" means a suffering from
tuberculosis, and not "consumptive" as translated by the fiscal. "Putang Ina Mo,"although referring to a
mother, was meant to suggest that the offended party is not a legitimate daughter of her
mother. "Walang-Hiya," which means "shameless," could relate to the offended party's being a flirt,
seducer, or a daughter of a prostitute. "Patay-Gutom" is derogatory remark connoting abject poverty
entirely unrelated to the first portion. In short, the other imputations did not give color and importance to
the first portion; they were uttered merely to expose all the possible vices, defects, real or imaginary,
status, or condition of the offended party. None of these, however, imputed any crime.
Accordingly, the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:

No criminal action for defamation which consist in the imputation of a crime which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint
expressly filed by offended party.
which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, 10 and the second paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides:
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. ...
are not applicable in this case since, as above discussed, alleged slanderous utterances subject of the
assailed information do not impute any crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The foregoing considered, neither People vs. Yu, cited by appellant, nor People vs. Padilla, cited by
appellee, is applicable in this case. The first refers to a prosecution "for rape murder" (included in the
generic term homicide) under 335 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. A single act
resulted in two (2) grave felonies. Appellants admit that the instant case, the remarks were made in one
occasion that even granting for the sake of argument that one portion imputes a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the rest, however, can be, hence the applicability of People vs. Yu. The argument
is flawed by the wrong assumption that Article 48 the Revised Penal Code applies in this case. Under
said Article, there is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two (2) more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense necessary means for committing another. Appellants apparently forgot that
it is their thesis that the rest of the utterances did not impute any crime but merely a "vice, defect, act,
and condition not constituting a crime;" otherwise stated, regardless of the number of defamatory
utterances, the appellee can only be prosecuted for a single offense.
Neither is People vs. Padilla applicable. In that case, the special counsel of Pasay City accused Lydia
Padilla of the offense of intriguing against honor 11 in an information which alleges that "with the
principal purpose of blemishing the honor and reputation of one Fausta Bravo, a married woman, (the
accused did) circulate and spread gossips, rumors or stories highly offensive and defamatory to her
honor, virtue and reputation,by then and there telling some people in the neighborhood that said Fausta
Bravo was a paramour of one Sangalang , a man not her husband." 12 The lower court dismissed the
case on the ground that it was not initiated by a complaint filed by the offended party pursuant to
paragraph 4 of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that it involves an imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio. This Court sustained the dismissal for the reason that the
import of the allegation in the information cannot be mistaken "[I]t charges Fausta Bravo with
committing adultery pure and simple." Contrary then to the pretension of appellee, only one (1) crime
was imputed adultery.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from in SP Civil Case No. 5270 of the court below dated 7 June
1967 is hereby REVERSED. The Order of the City Court of Davao City of 27 July 1966 in Criminal
Case No. 2273-B denying the motion to quash is hereby REINSTATED and said court is directed to
proceed with the arraignment, if one has not yet been had, and the trial of the case on its merits.
Costs against petitioner-appellee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur