International Phenomenological Society

Positivism and Religion

Author(s): Thomas McPherson
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Mar., 1954), pp. 319-331
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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POSITIVISM

AND RELIGION
I

People sometimessay that certain Christianbeliefs are nonsensical.

How, forexample,can God be One Person yet Three Persons?Or Three
Personsin One Person?Is God One Person yet Three Personsin the way
that an actress playingMiss Hardcastle in She Stoops to Conqueris one
person (herself)yet three persons (herself,Miss Hardcastle, and Miss
Hardcastle pretendingto be the barmaid)? Or in the way in whichI may
simultaneouslybe one (affectionate)person to my wife and children,a
"totally different"(bad-tempered)person to my subordinates in the
office,and all the timea thirdpersonas well (the "real me" whomnobody
understands-thepersonI thinkI am whenI am "dramatizingmyself"as
we say, or "beinginscrutable"as JamesThurbersays, or beingExistentialpersonsin sucist)? Or in the way in whicha man may be threedifferent
in late youthreformedand a leader of
cession:in earlyyoutha profligate,
men,in middleage dullyrespectableand unadventurous?And is God Three
Personsin One Personin theway that Pooh Bah was a greatmanypersons
in one, or the editorof a verysmall countrynewspapermay be threepereditorand sub-editor)?Or is he Three Personsin One
sons in one (reporter,
in the way that Siamese tripletswould be threepersonsin one?
God is "whollyother"yet God is "in us." Christdied yet lives. Man is
made in theimageofGod, yetGod has noformthatany mirrorcouldimage.
Christsaid both "I and my fatherare one" and "My fatheris greaterthan
I." Christis the Son of God and God is his Father, and God is also the
Fatherofall ofus, yetnot in the same way. We are commandedto workout
our ownsalvationforit is God whichworkethin us. The serviceof God is
perfectfreedom.These are the kindsofthingsthat are pointedto as hardly
good sense.
Now whatdo suchbeliefsmean?How are we to understandthem?Or is it
wrongto tryto "understand"them?Aretheyabsurdor nonsensical?If they
are not, then why not? If they are, then how exactlyis it that they are
absurd or nonsensical?Is it because theydo not make "literal" sense?But
do theythenhave some "deepermeaning"whichis not theirliteralmean"level" fromthat ofliteralmeaning?
ing; do theymake senseon a different
fromthe level ofliteral
And, if so, what is thislevel,and howis it different
meaning?
All these questionsindicatea worry-a worrythat we may feelnot only
withtheologicalstatementsbut withothersortsof statementsas well,but
we feelit particularlywiththeologicalstatementsbecause theyare (rightly)
319

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

thoughtto be assertingsomethingvery important.Not everyonehas

thisworryovertheologicalstatements,but some do. Of thosewho have it,
some are not Christiansmainlybecause they have it. Otherswho have it
and who are Christians,are not altogethersure whethertheirworryneeds
to be reconciledwith their Christianity,and if it does how they are to
accomplish this. There is a differencebetween "direct" statementsof
religiousbelief(somequotationsfromthe Bible are clearlyofthiskind) and
propositionsof a more sophisticatedsort constructedby theologians.
Sometimesthelatterare not so muchexpressionsoftheworryas themselves
attemptsto settleit. But forour purposeswe can ignorethisdistinction.
Christiantheologianstoday who themselveshave this worry,or can see
that othershave it and considerthat theyoughtto say somethingto help
them,react to the worryin varyingways.
There are those who gloryin the fact that thereare absurditiesamong
Christianbeliefs.They are pleased that Christianityis full of nonsense,
only do not say "nonsense;" theysay "paradox." (Commonlythey say it
in English witha Scottish,or-I writeas an Englishman-an American,
accent,or in Germanwitha Swissaccent.) Language is just not designedto
are too
deal withcertainthings,theywouldsay. The truthsof Christianity
to be expressedin simplelanguage. Some thingsare easy to say,
difficult
and ordinarypeople succeedin sayingthemeasily.Otherthingsare hardto
say, and theologianssay these with an effort.Theologiansuse language,
which is the only tool they have, but a poor one for theirpurposes,to
expressthingswhichlook "on the surface"absurd (paradoxes) but which
have a "deeper" meaning.
Othertheologiansdislikethe appearance of absurdityof some Christian
doctrines,and would ignoreit if they could. They say that the doctrines
may appear to be absurd,but that we oughtnot to let that worryus. We
are all sensible men together-believersand non-believers.Let us put
firstthingsfirst.What is importantis to live a Christianlife.Let us not be
too narrowly"logical" about Christiandoctrines.Let us be as littlechildren; let us catch the "spirit" of doctrineas we catch the "spirit" of
Christ'sparables. This is said in all sortsof accents.
Again, some deny that Christiandoctrinecontainsabsurdityor nonbut not nonsense.They ask us
sense.Difficulties,
yes; plentyof difficulties;
to be rationalabout it. It is sensebecause sensecan be made ofit in termsof
Aristotle'slogic. (Not quite as Aristotleleftit, but refinedand improved;
in particular,witha developedsectionlabelled "Analogy.") This is said in
English or French and supportedby quotationsin Latin.
There is a fourthway out of the worry.It is this: There are some things
thatjust cannotbe said. As longas no one triesto say themthereis no trouble. But if anyone does try to say them he must take the consequences.

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POSITIVISM AND RELIGION

321

We ought not to try to expressthe inexpressible.Now the thingsthat

theologianstryto say (or some of them) belongto the class of thingsthat
cannotbesaid. The way out ofthe worryis retreatinto silence.This is said
not usuallyby theologians(thoughit is, of course,said by some important
religious persons who are not theologians) but by philosophers-and
philosophersof a kind that theologianscommonlyregardas theirenemies.
The situation,then, is this. We have a certainset of statementsthat
look absurd or nonsensical.What are we to do about them?Well, we can
inventa special kind of logic wherewords mean what we want them to
mean; where,forexample,God can properlybe called a "person" yet can
be describedas havingattributesthat no personhas, or whereGod can be
one and many at the same time (or neitherone nor many);' and we can
justifyourselvesin this by sayingthat the "ordinary"use of words will
That is the firstway out ofthe worry.Or we
not do forthissubject-matter.
That is the secondway. Or we can
can shutour eyesto the wholedifficulty.
account forit all by a theoryof analogical predication.That is the third
way.
Or we can go to thesourceoftheworry;admitit to be a reasonableworry;
and draw this conclusionfromit: We can agreethat some thingscannotbe
said, and thatifwe tryto say themwe are boundto talk nonsense.Christian
theologianshave triedto say some thingsthat cannotbe said. They have
succeeded,as mighthave been expected,only in saying nonsense.They
oughtnot to have triedto say thesethings.This is the fourthway.
There is muchthat needs to be made clearerin this account.But before
I go on thereis thisto be said. It may be feltthat the worryI am writing
about is one that no sensiblepersonoughtto have. In particular,persons
who have had a trainingin theologymay feelthat the worryarises from
altogethertoo naive a way of lookingat things.Of course,it will be said,
there are Christianbeliefswhich,when writtendown in cold ink, look
nonsensicalif judged by ordinarytests of sense and nonsense.But that is
just wherewe can easily go wrong.The tests by whichthese statements
look nonsensicalare all verywell when applied to some otherstatements,
but such testsare out ofplace here.The statementsofChristiantheologians
are not intendedto be statementslike theseothers.So we cannottrythem
by such tests.
kinds of nonsense.To see this we
Now it is truethat thereare different
need onlycompare," 'Twas brillig,and the slithytoves Did gyreand gim1 See R. Otto, The Idea oftheHoly,p. 205,and ReligiousEssays, pp. 85-6 and 97.
The Christianuse of "person" in "God is Three Persons in One" is not to be
dismissedas easily as I have dismissedit above in takingit as an exampleof "nonsense." If thiswerea seriousdiscussionof that propositionwe shouldneed to considerit as "God is threepersonaein one substantia."

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

ble in thewabe,"and "Thisbookis redand greenall over,"and "Allonly

everybut," and "Socratesis numerous."(And thereare morekindsof
thanthese.)
nonsense
It is alsotruethatthetestsforonekindofnonsense
willnotbe thetests
for another.A singletest fornonsenseappliedindiscriminately
to all

propositionswill result in some propositionsbeing classed as nonsense-

propositions
wherewithout
suchsingle-mindedness
we mightprefer
to call
them,forexample,"strikingly-expressed."
But sometimes
peopledo want
to say: "God is bothOnePersonand ThreePersons,and thisis notjusta
way of speaking;I meanthathe reallyis bothOne Personand Three
Persons."Thenwe haveto ask,Whatexactlydoesthismean?,and we are
to beginbytakingit perfectly
surelyentitled
literally.
To makethesameobjectionagain.The worryis thought
to be sillyin
thatit arisesfromoverliteralness.
Of course,it willbe said, "God is One
butonlybecauseyouareassumPersonyetThreePersons"looksnonsense;
ingas yourmodelforsenseandnonsense
something
like"The catsat onthe
mat."But whataboutpoetry?"Tyger,tyger,
burning
bright."Whatdoes
inflames?
thatmean?How cana tigerburn?Is thetiger"literally"
Yet you
wellwhatit means,and youdo notcall it nonsense.
knowperfectly
thatthewholepointof
But,wemustpointoutin answerto theobjection
theworryliesin this:How,ifat all, are theological
different
propositions
Aretheological
statements
to be interfromotherkindsofpropositions?
in poems?-like"Tyger,tyger,burningbright"?
pretedlike statements
notcompletely
likethem.)
(Likethesein someways,thatis; butnaturally
That is just whattheworryis about.Aretheological
statements
senseor
are theynonsense:and whatkindof sense,and whatkindof nonsense?
If theyarenonsense
aretheyto be classedwithsomeothercommon
kindof
oraretheytheirownkindofnonsense?
nonsense,
herehas a question-begging
The word"nonsense"
look,and,fora reason
toputoneoff.Butifoneis to findoutwhat
weshallnotelater,tendsrather
statements
thesetheological
reallyamountto it is bestto beginby being
to themodel
naiveand literal-minded.
Perhapstheyare to be assimilated
in poems,ortothemodelofsentences
inbooksofmetaphysics,
ofsentences
likeit) cannotbe
butthisis whathas to be foundout.This (orsomething
simplyassumedso as to disposeoftheworry;fortheworryitselfis about
thesepropositions
are.
whatsortofsenseornonsense
thatI cannotdiscussfullyhere.WhatI have to
Now thisis something
to anysuchdiscussion.
But I canat leastindicate
sayis reallypreliminary
thatI thinkthe bestanswerto the question"Whatsortofmeaningdo
have?"is thattheyhavetheirownkindofmeaning.
theological
propositions
as thepoet's,themetaphysician's,
Theyhavenotthesamesortofmeaning
that they
statements.
or thescientist's
Indeed,whyshouldit be thought
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POSITIVISM AND RELIGION

323

have? Of course,theyare similarto each of these in some ways, but they

are not the same. It is the likingof philosophersfor neatness-a liking
sharedwithothersortsof people-that makes themwant to put all statements into a very small numberof boxes (significantand meaningless,
analyticand synthetic,a prioriand empirical).
It is thelast ofthe fourways out ofthe worrythat I wishto discuss:and
we can call it thepositivisticway. I have expressedit above in a verygeneral
we need not take into account.
manner.Variationsand refinements
enough.The fourth
The otherthreeways have been discussedfrequently
is oftenrejected withoutexamination.Theologians do not see it as an
admissibleanswerto the worry.(Occasionallythe philosophicalview from
which it springsis picked upon by some theologianwith philosophical
trainingbut developedin an unwiseand mistakenmanner.I shall return
to thisat the end.) I am not arguingforanything.All I wantto do is to clear
the groundand show what is involved in the fourthway. I am neither
adoptingnor rejectingit: I want to see what it is. What to the Jewswas a
stumblingblock and to the Greeksfoolishnessis to logical positivistsnonsense. There is moreto be learntfromthis than has yet been realized by
mosttheologians.
II
of the
RudolfOtto can take us some distancetowardsan understanding
fourthway. Otto holds2that what is most distinctivein religioncannotbe
put into words.This is the "non-rational"part of religion;"non-rational"
he equates with "not capable of being conceptualized."The distinctive
(non-rational)thingin religionis a certainsortofexperience-thenuminous
or creaexperience;and this is partlya feeling-a feelingof creatureliness
turehood-and partlyconsciousnessof "somethingoutside" us, consciousness of the Numen (or the Numinous),the WhollyOther.
Christianityis a highlyconceptualizedreligion,Otto says. He means by
this that Christianityis fullof words: hymns,sermons,theologicalbooks,
the Bible itself.The conceptualizedpart of religion-the part that is put
into words-is very important.But we, with our highlyconceptualized
religion,must not forgetthat thereis somethingelse whichcannotbe put
into words; there is a non-rationalelementin religion,and this is the
experienceof the numinous.
of what Otto means,and on the wholeI think
This is one interpretation
milder,
it is the rightone, but thereare passages whichsuggesta different,
view.
Otto shiftsbetweentwo uses of "concept" and "conceptualize."Some2 R.

Otto, The Idea of theHoli.

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PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

timeshe seemsto mean by "concept" somethinglike the conceptsof spirit,

reason,purpose, and by "conceptualize"somethinglike "expressin terms
of such concepts." So to say that Christianityis a conceptualized(or a
highlyconceptualized)religionis like sayingthat Christianityis expressed
in ratheran "abstract"way; it uses too manyhard words,is not expressed
in "concrete"terms,is too "philosophical."But Otto at othertimesseems
to mean somethingmuch wider than this by "concept." He says: "All
language, in so far as it consistsof words,purportsto convey ideas or
concepts;-that is what language means;-and the more clearlyand unequivocallyit does so, the betterthe language. And hence expositionsof
tend to stressthe 'rational'attributes
religioustruthin languageinevitably
of God."4
religionis conceptualizedmerely
Accordingto this widerinterpretation,
by beingput intowords-any words.It is not conceptualizedonlybecause
it is put intohard wordsor "abstract"words.And it is thiswiderview that
I thinkOtto on the wholewantsto hold.
Now, Otto is writingabout the non-rationalelementin religion,but he
writesabout it veryrationally.His approach is thoroughlymatter-of-fact
and reasoned.He is writingabout a special sort of feelingwhichhe says
cannotbe clearlyand accuratelydescribed,yet it is obviousthat the aim of
his book is clarityand accuracy.His Englishtranslator-ProfessorHarvey
-renders Otto's titleDas Heilige as The Idea of theHoly. It is indeed the
idea-or concept-of"the holy" (whoseessenceis the numinous)that Otto
is writingabout; eventhoughthepointthathe mostwantsto make about it
is that the essenceofthe holyis not capable ofbeingconceptualized.Otto is
writingabout that part of religionthat cannot,he thinks,be reducedto
language,but naturallyhe has to use languagein orderto writeabout it,
it is
and it is noticeablehow well he uses language; and, furthermore,
In writingof emotionshe
noticeablethat he uses language descriptively.
does notuse languagein theway thatitselfarousesemotion:he writesin an
objective, "scientific"way.
Indeed, Otto's rationalityis such that he seems hardlyaware that language can be used for expressingfeelingsand not just for talkingabout
feelings.He commonlyinterpretsthe quotationsthat he himselfgives to
illustrate"expression"of the numinousas if theywere dispassionatescientificaccountsof what it is liketo have a numinousexperience,and not (as
some of them are) themselvesreally expressionsof that experience.Language, as has oftenbeen pointedout recently,is not used onlyforconveyit is used also forexpressingemotionsand attitudesand
ing information;
3 Op. cit., p. 1.
4Ibid., p. 2. My italics.

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POSITIVISM AND RELIGION

325

for evokingthem in others:Otto seems not clearlyto realize this, or at

least he does not stressit. He says that somethingcan be "asserted" of
but, if we are to judge by his
"the object of the religiousconsciousness,"5
generalargumentin the book,6he can hardlymean "asserted";I interpret
him as meaningsomethinglike "shown" (in Wittgenstein'ssense7).Otto
was not clear about the uses of language,but he is not to be expectedto
that philosophershave seen fitto draw. What
be familiarwithdistinctions
is importantto see is that Otto can be interpretedin termsof modern
discussionsabout the uses of language, and that such an interpretation
gives his work an interestingnew significance.
Otto, then, uses language in orderto explain what cannot be said in
language.You cannotdefinethe conceptof the holy in a completelysatistell othersin wordswhat it is: but
factoryway: you cannotsatisfactorily
what you can do in wordsis tell themabout, or remindthem of,feelings
fromit, too, for the
which are like the numinousfeeling(but different
numinousfeelingis a unique feeling,and not to be confusedwith any
otherno matterhow similarto it it may be). You can talk roundand round
the subject,neverquite hittingit exactly(forit is impossibleto hit it with
words),untilyou bringyourheareror readerto the pointwherehe seesfor
himselfwhat the numinousexperienceis.
Otto, in fact,is writingabout the non-rationalin a supremelyrational
way. But he thinksthat rationalityis notgoodenoughforreligion;and it
takes a veryrationalman to see that. He does not want to say that it is
wrongfora religionto be highlyrational(highlyconceptualized).What he
wants to say is that we must not be bewitchedinto overlookingthe fact
that at the core of religionis a non-rationalelement-a part that eludes
conceptualization.
Now what would Otto say about our worry?Otto, I imagine,would not
be at all attractedto thefirstway out. He would not say, "Ah! these are
greatmysteries,"and happilygo on talkingnonsense,interlardingit with
EIbid., p. 2.
6 See, e.g. p. 7.
7Something like,indeed,but not,I think,quite the same. WhatexactlyWittgenstein did mean by "show" is not clear. He uses "zeigen", so did he mean somethinglike "point at" or "indicate"? However, Tractatusexegesis aside, we may
put the matterthus: Justas a statementdoes not say what the logical formof reality is but neverthelesssomehowshowsit, so whenwe make "statements"about
that is) but for
God we may not succeed in sayinganything(anythingsignificant,
all that we may show something,even if it is only the "senselessness"of what we
of the Tractatussee D. A. T. Gasking,"Anderare saying. On the interpretation
son and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,"AustralasianJournalof Philosophy,
fromGasking's
adopted in the presentpaper differs
May, 1949.The interpretation
in certainrespects.

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criesof,"This is a paradox." And Otto is too rationalto be satisfiedto turn

his back on the wholeproblem:so the secondway is not forhim. He is too
sturdilya Kantian and a Protestantto take the thirdway.
I thinkhe would take thefourthway. Otto's reactionto the worrymight
be expressed,forhim,like this: "I agree withyou that thereis muchnonsensein Christiandoctrine."And he would not contenthimselfwithagreeof his own' to show just howmuchnoning; he would produceillustrations
sense thereis in Christiandoctrine.Then he would say: "There are some
thingsthat cannotbe said; so let us not tryto say them.If we wouldunderstand religionwe must not forgetthis."
Some of what I have just put into Otto's mouth is inventionor embroidery.What Otto explicitlysays cannotbe conceptualizedis the numihimI have made himsay more
nous experience.'As I have just interpreted
than this. But fromwhat he says about "concept" and "conceptualize"
(Perhaps if
(on the widerview) this is not an unreasonableinterpretation.
Otto had realisedthat he had laid himselfopen to be interpretedin this
way he would have wishedto retreatto his narroweruse of "concept" and
"conceptualize.")
But we need not press Otto too far.It is enoughif we interprethim as
sayingonlythat the numinousexperienceis what cannotbe put intowords:
forthisis, in Otto's view,the distinctivethingin religion.We can findout
what morewe need to knowabout the fourthway fromothers.Let us try
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
to comparewith Otto's The Idea of theHoly the closing
It is interesting
pages of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Wittgenstein
speaks there of "the mystical" (das Mystische). For example, he says:
"The feelingof the worldas a limitedwholeis the mysticalfeeling."'0This
The interesting
thingin
withOtto's "creature-feeling.""1
has clearaffinities
this part of the Tractatus,forour purposes,is the view thereput forward
ofreligion("the mystical").The sortof questionsabout the worldthat can
be asked and answered,accordingto the Tractatus,are questionsabout
howtheworldis. (That is, roughly,questionsabout "how theworldworks.")
And these are questionsof natural science.But the sort of questionsthat
religiouspeopleask are questionsabout the factthat thereis a worldat all.
("Why is therea worldanyway?")
again, The Idea of theHoly, p. 205, on the Christianuse of "person."
9 In so faras the numinousexperienceis an emotionit is no different
fromother
emotionsin this.No emotioncan be definedin words,or even described-"directly"
described-in words.
10TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,
6.45.
11The Idea of theHoly,pp. 10, 52. It has even moreaffinities
withcurrentinterpretationsof the CosmologicalArgument;see, e.g., E. L. Mascall, Existenceand
Analogy.
8 See,

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POSITIVISM AND RELIGION

327

says: "Not howthe worldis, is the mystical,but thatit

As Wittgenstein
is.j512

But the troubleabout thissortof question,he holds,is that it cannotbe

answered.(At the least,we may say, ifit appearsto be answered,therewill
not be agreementthat any suggestedansweris the rightanswer.)Questions
about how the world works can be asked, and answered.But questions
they cannot be anabout why thereis a world at all are quite different:
swered;that is to say, theiranswercannotbe an answerin words.Because
theycannotbe answeredin wordsneithercan theybe askedin words."For
an answer which cannot be expressedthe question too cannot be exholds,that scepticismabout religious
pressed."113(It follows,Wittgenstein
mattersis senseless.The questionsand answersof religionare not capable
of being expressed,and it is absurd to have doubts about the answerto a
questionthat is not capable of beingexpressed."For doubt can onlyexist
wherethereis a question; a questiononly wherethereis an answer,and
this only wheresomethingcan be said."114)
Men cannothelp feelingthat even if all the "how" questionshad been
answeredthe "that" question would remain.The problemsof life ("the
riddle") menfeelare not touchedon in the answersto the "how" questions.
The way out of this, Wittgensteinsays, is foundwhen we see that our
feelingthat the problemsof lifehave not been touchedon comesfromthe
asked. If all "how"
desireto ask questionsthat cannnot be significantly
questionsare answeredthereare no otherquestionsleftthat can be annone that can properlybe asked).
swered(and therefore
It is at this point that Wittgensteinand Otto would part company.
Wittgensteingoes on to say that the "solution" of "the problemof life"
(the desireto ask "that" questions)comeswhenit is seen that such questionscannot(sensibly)be asked; the solutiontakes the formof a vanishing
of the sense that thereis a problemof life.Otto's directionfromthispoint
WhereWittgensteinends he begins.For Wittgenstein,
would be different.
perhaps,to see that in religionwe are asking questionsthat cannot be
answeredis, in a way, to see the pointlessnessof religion.For Otto, to see
that in religionwe are askingquestionsthat cannotbe answeredis to see
its point;we do not lose the sensethatthereis a problemoflife,or a "meaning" to life;but we perhapsrealizethat the question,"What is the meaning
12 Op.

cit., 6.44.

Cf. Otto, ReligiousEssays, pp. 90-91: "For the unspeakable is unspeakablybeatifying,it is fascinans.So richis its contentof blessednessthat all
othervalues are shed. But the natureofits contentcan onlybe felt,not expressed:
therefore'let himwho is wise attemptto add no word'." And Wittgenstein
again:
"There is indeedthe inexpressible.This showsitself;it is the mystical" (Tractatus,
6.522).
14 Ibid., 6.51.
13Ibid., 6.5.

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PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

of life?"is not one that can be clearlyansweredin words,and so not one

that can be properlyasked.
III
Now positivisticphilosophyis commonlyheldto be an enemyof religion.
But a brandingof religiousassertionsas "nonsense" need not be anti-religious. It can be interpretedas an attack on those who in the name of
religionare pervertingreligion.It can be interpretedas a returnto the
truthabout religion.Otto conceivedhimselfin The Idea of theHoly to be
recoveringthe essentialelementin religion-whichhad been in danger of
being lost under a cloud of rationalizing.What is essentialabout religion
side, the part that cannot be "conceptualized"-that is,
is its non-rational
the part that cannot be put into words. Otto travels the same road as
Wittgenstein.Are we to call Otto an enemy of religion?Why not call
Wittgensteinits friend?
Modernpositivisticphilosophyhas been developedby men of a scientific
and not a religiousturnof mind. (Perhaps thisis not true of Wittgenstein
himself.)The interestof the membersof the Vienna Circlewas mainlyin
was as thehelpersofscientists.
science,and forthemtheuse ofphilosophers
The observationstatementsof science were theirmodel for sense,'6and
because scientists'observationstatementsare empiricallyverifiablethe
test forsense becomes "amenabilityto verificationby sense experience,"
and whateveris not so verifiableaccordinglyis "non-sense."(An exception
is made of "analytic" propositions,whichare also foundin sciencein the
propositionthat
formofmathematicalpropositions;but the onlytheological
has any obvious claim to be regardedas analyticis "God exists,"and the
that arise if one does regardthis as analytic have been
grave difficulties
pointedout by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant.) Theologicalpropositions are not (most of them, anyway) verifiableby sense experience,so
theyare nonsense."Nonsense" is a pejorativeword,and people do not like
being told that theyare talkingnonsense.'6Theologianslike it as littleas
anyoneelse. People who insultone are one's enemies.So the positivistsare
enemies of religion.
I want to say that this opinion may be a mistakenone. Positivistic
philosophershave certainlynot thoughtof themselvesas supportersof
religion.But that could be because theyhave mistakenwhat is important
statelaws shouldbe heldto be "nonsense"as muchas theological
Scientific
ments,fortheyare not verifiableby sense experience.
15

16 Nor do theylikebeingtoldthatwhattheyare sayingis "non-significant,"

But "non-significant,"
i.e. unimportant.
whichsuggeststhat it is insignificant,

and "nonsensical,"mean forthe positivistonly "not amenableto verificationby

sense experience."

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POSITIVISM

AND RELIGION

329

about religion.Theologianshave thoughtofpositivisticphilosophersas the

enemiesof religion.But that could be because theologianshave mistakenly
thoughtthat what the positivistsveryproperlypointedout strikesat what
is most importantin religion,whereaswhat it strikesat is what is least
on whichhas led to a mistakenemimportant-somethingconcentration
phasis in accountsof what religionis. Perhaps positivisticphilosophyhas
done a serviceto religion.By showing,in theirown way, the absurdityof
what theologianstryto utter,positivistshave helpedto showthat religion
belongsto the sphereof the unutterable.And this may be true. And it is
what Otto, too, in his way, wanted to point out.'7Positivistsmay be the
enemiesof theology,but the friendsof religion.
I have in the precedingparagraphbeen tryingto make a pointin a very
generalway. But it will be obvious that thereis an ambiguityin what I
have been saying.There is, as I pointedout earlier,morethan one kind of
nonsense. I have myselfbeen using "nonsense" in two ways. There is
nonsensein theusual sensein whichthe theologicalpropositionsI began by
listinghave been heldto be nonsense-i.e., perhaps,"literally"absurd.And
thereis nonsensein the positivists'sense-i.e. where"nonsensical"means
senses
"not verifiableby sense experience."And surelythese are different
sensesof "nonsense"thento praise
of "nonsense."And iftheyare different
the positivistsforpointingout that theologicalpropositionsare "nonsensical" (in theirsense) is notto have said anythingthat bears on the opening
part of this article;forthereit was pointedout that people may have a
certainworrybecause they feel some theologicalpropositionsto be nonsense of "nonsensical."
sensical-but "nonsensical"in a different
But thereis an importantconnection.That theologicalpropositionsare
nonsensein one sense of "nonsense"gives rise to a worry.One way out of
the worry(thefourthway mentionedabove, or the positivisticway) can be
foundwhenit is seen that theologicalpropositionsare nonsensein another
and the Vienna Circletogether,and
sense of "nonsense".Put Wittgenstein
join both withOtto, and we have the fourthway out of the worry:a way
that is not a turningof one's back on the worry,not a "resolving"of it (in
the sense of overcominga neuroticfeeling,though Wittgensteintaken
alone mightto some suggestsomethingof this sort), not an anti-religious
reaction(forwe have Otto to give it religiousrespectability).
Religionbelongsto the sphereof the unsayable,so it is not to be wondered at that in theologythereis much nonsense(i.e., many absurdities);
17 In M. Buber's I and Thouthereis a similarview. Buber wantsto say that the
distinctivethingin religionis the "I-Thou relation."But if you tryto analyze this
relation,or to talk about it, it will vanish,and you will findyourselftalkingabout
I and It. It followsthat theologiansare boundto fail shouldtheyseek to say what
religionis.

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330

PHILOSOPHY

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

this is the natural result of tryingto put into words-and to discussvarious kinds of inexpressible"experiences,"and of tryingto say things
about God.Also, theologicalpropositionsare held to be non-sense(i.e., not
by senseexperience)by the Vienna Circle;and the
amenableto verification
reasonwhytheyare non-senseis that theyare attemptsto say the unsayable. It is not to be expectedthat the resultof attemptsto say the unsayable should be propositionsthat are amenable to verificationby sense
experience.(Notice that thisis the reasonwhyand not just anotherway of
saying the same thing.)
I have discussedthe positivisticway out of the worryas a seriouscontributionto philosophyof religionbecause that is what I thinkit is. To
is wrong;to thinkof it as by-passingthe worry
regardit as anti-religious
is wrong;notto take theworryitselfseriouslyis wrong.The positivisticway
is importantboth because it helps to pinpointthe worryand because it
shows a way out of it.
Is it the rightway? There is no answerto this question,forthereis no
one rightway out ofthe worry.Worriesare not likethat. But the positivistic way is an answer;and an answerthat is so oftennot seen,or rathernot
seen forwhatit is, thatit deservesto be lookedat. There certainlyseemsto
be this wrongwithit, that it may excludetoo much: in throwingout the
wateroftheologywe may be also throwingout the baby of "direct,""firstorder"religiousassertions;and thiswe may well not want to do.
Perhaps somethingshould be said about the relationof the positivistic
but I have no qualificationsto say anythingabout this,
way to mysticism,
and shall not try.Also, but this is too long a storyto attempthere,somethingneeds to be said about the relationbetweenreligionand theology.
One point to end. If it is foolishfortheologiansto refuseto learn from
positivisticphilosophyit is disastrousforthemto mistakethe lesson. Another,and a preposterous,kind of linkingof positivismand theologyis
possible,and has even been tried."8This linkingtakes the formof an acprincipleof the Vienna Circle-that a proposiceptanceof the verification
tion (unless it is analytic) "has sense," "is significant,""is meaningful,"
by sense experience-and issues in an
onlyif it is amenableto verification
to
bludgeon theologicalpropositionsto make them meet this
attempt
This is a forlornhope, and it is a dangerousthingto do. The
prescription.
properlinkageconsistsin an accommodationof positivismto theology,not
of theologyto positivism.Theologydoes not gain by beingreducedto the
termsof any school of philosophy.
THOMAS McPHERSON.
UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE

OF NORTH WALES,

BANGOR, WALES.
18

See on this my "The Existenceof God" (Mind,October,1950).

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POSITIVISM

AND RELIGION

331

EXTRACTO
moderno,el cual sostieneque toda afirmaci6n
El positivismofilos6fico
religiouso teol6gica carece de sentido,es consideradopor los positivistas
mismos,y aun por otros, como anti-religioso.Sin embargo,puede mostrarse que no lo es necesariamente,por cuanto esta filosoffapositivista
concuerdacon una tendenciamuy acusada en filosofiade la religion.Su
pero su efectoes el mismo.Esto se pone
terminologiapuede ser diferente,
de manifestoal comparardetalladamentelas ultimaspaginas del Tractatus
de Wittgensteincon La Idea de lo Sagrado de Rudolf
Logico-Philosophicus
Otto. Al sostenerque toda afirmacionreligiouso teologicacarece de sentido, porque los terminosque la constituyenno han recibidoningunasignificacion,los positivistasdicen con otras palabras lo mismo que esos filosofosde la religionque sostienenque las cosas esencialesde la religionson
"inexpresables","irracionales","imposiblesde conceptuar". Si las cosas
esencialesde la religionno pueden expresarse,entoncescualquierintento
de expresarlasdara lugar a expresionessin sentido,o sea lo mismo que
los positivistasentiendent6cnicamentepor "sin sentido", a saber: algo
que no es reductiblea comprobacionpor la experienciasensible.

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