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On September 8, 1909 the remote Romanian town of Botoani witnessed the birth
of a special child. His name was Max L. Blecher. Of Jewish origin, his family
belonged to the relatively affluent local bourgeoisie. His school years were spent
in the nearby city of Roman. Immediately afterwards, he took a huge geographical
leap to Paris with the intention of studying medicine. However, in 1928, shortly
after the arrival in France, Blechers existence took a dramatic turn as he was
diagnosed with tuberculosis spondylitis, also known as Potts disease or extrapulmonary tuberculosis. From this date on, one could say without exaggeration
that his existence resembled a prolonged Golgotha. He spent extended periods of
time at various sanatoria in Switzerland, France, and Romania. The grim reality
he encountered in these places constituted the main source of inspiration for his
prose. Because all treatments proved useless, in 1935 his family placed him in
a house at the outskirts of Roman, where he spent the rest of his life lying in
bed, completely immobilized. He took refuge in reading,2 correspondence, and
a few friendships cultivated with religious reverence.3 After almost ten years
of endless physical and psychological torments, endured, nonetheless, with a
saintly patience and discretion, he died on May 31, 1938. He was only 28. He left
behind three novelstwo of which were published before he died4a volume
This article has been made possible through a generous postdoctoral grant offered by the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, to which I extend my full
gratitude. I also wish to thank Karsten Sand Iversen for his critical and most helpful feedback.
1
Max Blecher, Vizuina luminat, in his ntmplri n irealitatea imediat. Inimi
cicatrizate. Vizuina luminat. Corp transparent. Coresponden, ed. by Constantin M. Popa
and Nicolae one, Craiova and Bucharest: Aius and Vinea 1999, p. 306.
2
Blechers intellectual interests ranged from the status of the chromosomes in biology
to art, poetry, twentieth century epistemology, and even the history of religions. See Blecher,
ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, pp. 36184.
3
Radu G. eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, Bucharest: Minerva 1996, p. 13.
4
Max Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, Bucharest: Vremea 1936 (French
translation: Aventures dans lirralit immediate, trans. by Marianne Sora, Paris: Denol
1972); Max Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, Bucharest: Editura librriei Universala Alcalay &
Co. 1937 (English translation: Scarred Hearts, trans. by Henry Howard, London: Old Street
Publishing 2008); and Max Blecher, Vizuina luminat, ed. by Saa Pan, Bucharest: Cartea
Leo Stan
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years later, the renowned philosopher and poet, Lucian Blaga, introduced Romanian
readers to Kierkegaards purportedly dualistic view of faith and reason, based on the
Danes peculiar employment of the Christian dogmas.19 Then in 1934, Mircea Eliade
published a tome with the evocative title, Oceanografie,20 whose Kierkegaardian
(explicit or implicit) undertones are not difficult to detect. Not to be ignored either
are Benjamin Fundoianus incidental remarks on Kierkegaard scattered throughout
the inter bellum Romanian press.21 Fundoianu (that is, Benjamin Fondane) published
his chief work, Conscience malheureuse, in which Kierkegaard occupies a relatively
central position, in 1936.22 It so happened that, thanks to Max Blecher, in the same
year a new line was added to the scanty bibliography of Kierkegaards entry onto
Romanian soil.
The title of Blechers article On Kierkegaards Concept of Repetition23 sounds
promising from one standpoint. It appeared in the newspaper Vremea on March
29, 1936. From the first lines we can safely infer that the text was sparked by the
allegedly most recent and most interesting24 French translation of Kierkegaards
Repetition. The term most recent should be taken cum grano salis because the
edition Blecher has in mind was originally published in 1933.25 In the preamble
we are offered two reasons for the deficient knowledge of Kierkegaard in the
Romanian literary milieu. First of all, opines Blecher, for the autochthonous public
the French publicationsthe channel par excellence for the discovery of any foreign
newcomerare difficult to procure. Second, while briefly delving into the quick
running waters of the philosophy of culture, Blecher conjectures that in Kierkegaard
the Romanian audience is confronted with an essentially different way of thinking,
Lucian Blaga, Eonul dogmatic, Gndirea. Literar, artistic, social, vol. 11, no. 2,
1931, pp. 708. See also Mdlina Diaconu, Kierkegaard-Rezeption in Rumnien, Revue
Roumaine de Philosophie, vol. 45, nos. 12, 2001, pp. 14964. Importantly enough, Diaconu
observes that the scholarly approach to Kierkegaards oeuvre was initiated by Nicolae Balc
who wrote the Kierkegaard chapter for Istoria filozofiei moderne, vols. 15, ed. by Mircea
Florian et al., Bucharest: Societatea Romn de Filosofie 193741, vol. 2 (De la Kant pn
la evoluionismul englez), pp. 53162; and by Grigore Popa, Existen i adevr la Sren
Kierkegaard, Sibiu: Tipografia Arhidiecezan 1940. Unfortunately, Blecher did not live long
enough to have consulted these exegetical works.
20
Mircea Eliade, Oceanografie, Bucharest: Cultura Poporului 1934. For references to
Kierkegaard, see Mircea Eliade, Oceanografie, 2nd ed., Bucharest: Humanitas 2003, pp. 212;
pp. 1989; pp. 2001.
21
See Diaconu, Kierkegaard-Rezeption in Rumnien.
22
Benjamin Fondane, Conscience malheureuse, Paris: Denoel 1936. Fondane treats
Kierkegaard alongside Martin Heidegger, Lev Shestov, and Dostoevsky. A separate chapter
analyzes Kierkegaards category of the secret. However, it is highly improbable that Blecher
read Fondanes book before writing the material on Kierkegaard which I discuss below.
23
Max Blecher, Conceptul repetiiei la Kirkegaard [sic], Vremea, vol. 9, no. 431,
March 29, 1936. The article has been reprinted in Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat,
pp. 3768. Concerning page references I have followed this edition.
24
Blecher, Conceptul repetiiei la Kirkegaard [sic], p. 376.
25
Sren Kierkegaard, La Rptition. Essai dexprience psychologique par Constantin
Constantius, trans. by Paul-Henri Tisseau, Paris: Alcan 1933.
19
Leo Stan
fiction. Blecher calls this aspect the purely anecdotic side of the book,32 and
subsequently holds that in Repetition Kirkegaard [sic] recounts his first love, the
engagement to his inamorata, and the dreadful despair of being unable to marry
her.33 The far-reaching thesis seems to be that what was infinitely troubling and
painful in Kirkegaards [sic] life34 represents indubitable evidence that the nature
of thinking, in general, is pathos-filled.35 Of course, that Blecher completely ignores
the indispensible role of Constantin Constantius within the existential universe and
ideational dialectic of the book will significantly compromise his hermeneutic
enterprise.
Turning to the theoretical core of the article, Blecher starts from the premise that
Repetition carries within it the entire Kierkegaardian problematic36 and as such
represents a pertinent introduction to [Kierkegaards] oeuvre as a whole.37 On the
other side, Blechers discussion revolves around (1) the momentous significance
of negativity in Kierkegaards thought38 and (2) an inwardness-centered conception
of mysticism. Vis--vis the negative factor, Blecher observes that the essence of
Kierkegaards approach lies in the desire to repeat a past state of mind,39 and that,
at the same time, every effort to fulfill this desideratum is bound to fail. For instance,
when he painfully regains his freedom after having broken the engagement, the young
man/Kierkegaard believes that his reborn and exalted selfhood can be subjected
to a religious teleology. More exactly, the new identity seems encompassing and
passionate enough to pattern itself on the biblical example of Job. However, Blecher
insightfully realizes that within the confines of Repetition it is not clear whether
Kierkegaard did succeed in emulating Job.40 To Blecher what is nonetheless certain
is that, despite his ebullient claim to the contrary, Kirkegaard [sic] falls prey to the
same inner turmoil.41
32
Ibid., p. 376.
Ibid.
34
Ibid., p. 378.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid., p. 376.
37
Ibid.
38
For a full treatment of this issue, see Arne Grn, Subjektivitet og negativitet:
Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1997. See also Slavoj iek, The Parallax View,
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press 2006.
39
Blecher, Conceptul repetiiei la Kirkegaard [sic], p. 376.
40
Repetition ends with the young mans outburst that he won himself back. The parallel
with Job, though explicitly endorsed by the young man, is rather artificial as long as the
transcendent is completely absent from his discourse, and as he lacks any sense of sinfulness.
That there may be a teleological suspension of the ethical, given the young mans deliberate
breaking of the engagement, is an untenable conjecture. Unlike Abraham, who willfully set
aside the ethical considerations (that is, his fatherly duties but never his love for Isaac) in order
to fulfill Gods commandment, the young man puts an end to the engagement due to an inner
impossibility to assume the marital role. It may be worth remembering that in the Postscript,
when he comments upon Repetition, Johannes Climacus never mentions the young mans
attempt to emulate Job, even if Climacus tackles the possible opposition between the ethical
and the religious. See SKS 7, 23845 / CUP1, 2628.
41
Blecher, Conceptul repetiiei la Kirkegaard [sic], p. 377.
33
Therefore, Blechers argument goes on, the difference between Kierkegaard and
the true mysticwho is particularized not necessarily by faith but by an incessant
inward examination42is negligible. Provided his pathos-laden search for a
solution,43 Kierkegaard must have placed himself between his real personhood and
his spiritual idealization in eternity.44 It is precisely on this existentialist ground that,
in Blechers view, Kierkegaard gives one the impression of a Hegelian in endless
becoming (formaie).45 Specifically, Kierkegaard rejects a third term not because
it was not logical, but because his inner uneasiness is too deep, too passionate to be
reducible to a merely objective perspective on the quandaries that torment him.46
Mysticism, holds Blecher, can be equated with an intense subjective quest
for meaningfulness and a continual dissection of ones inward commotions.
Consequently, (1) if mysticism hinges on an endless and ardent attempt to realize
repetition despite the impossibility of fulfilling it; (2) if Kierkegaard stressed the
permanence of the [inner] quest;47 and (3) if he remained within the parameters
of passion, at equal distance from the rational and the absurd,48 then, Blechers
reasoning goes, Kierkegaard can be considered a mystic. Even if Blecher does
acknowledge the significance of the eternal and its stakes for Kierkegaard, his slant
on the latters mysticism stresses the passionate introspection and inner antagonism
to such a degree that it almost borders on solipsism. It is for no other reason that
for Blecher, what particularizes Kirkegaards [sic] mysticism is precisely the
desire to free himself from any contingency (be it an inward one), to live his inner
conflict in its sheer purity, unbound by time, space, and feelings.49 The overall
thesis advocated here is that, since existential repetition50 constitutes an unattainable
ideal, the mystical (as different from religious) existencewhich Kierkegaards
personality peerlessly epitomizesis the only way out of repetitions impasse.
The odd aspect is, of course, the absence of any reference whatsoever to divine
transcendence. In Blechers article we look in vain for any mention of union with
God or suffering for the sake of Christ, to name only two exceptionally mystical
tropes. Moreover, as I hypothesized above, Kierkegaards substantial reflections on
the uniqueness of the Judeo-Christian religiosity and faith may have been within
Blechers reach. And yet, they are completely absent from his article. But once we
come to know more of Blechers personal and aesthetic Weltanschauung, the picture
42
Ibid.
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., p. 378.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid., p. 377.
50
By existential repetition I mean the possibility to fully relive a past experience.
The first example that comes to mind is, of course, Constantin Constantius who returns to
Berlin hoping to relive the same pleasures and enchantments from a previous trip. However,
the failure of this experiment makes him wonder whether repetition has a far more inward
connotation than he initially expected. And that is how he brings the young man into the
picture (together with his unseemly involvement in it).
43
10
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Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 66; pp. 6871; p. 74; Blecher, Vizuina
luminat, p. 275; pp. 299300; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, pp. 1779; Nicolae Manolescu,
Arca lui Noe, Bucharest: Gramar 1998, pp. 5667. Negoiescu, Engrame, p. 121.
52
We should not forget that in 1938, the year of Blechers death, Jean-Paul Sartre
published La Nause. Five years later Sartre sent to the printer his magnum opus, Ltre et
le nant (1943) which, in concert with Albert Camus Ltranger (1942) and Le Mythe de
Sisyphe (1942), arguably consecrates atheist existentialism as a self-standing literary genre
and philosophical current.
53
See in this sense Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, pp. 1545. My position coincides with
that of Radu G. eposu, who unearths the biographical roots of Blechers literary activity. See
eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, pp. 21ff.
51
11
suffered a daily martyrdom,54 being tortured and humiliated by every inch of his
body55a reality that is impossible to disputethen the fact that his prose describes
only gravely ill people, whom he probably chanced upon in various sanatoria, cannot
be dismissed as marginal. In this regard, I would dare to say that the humanity that
literally crawls through Blechers pages is epitomized by the figure of the (hopeless)
patient. The wordsmith of ntmplri n irealitatea imediat (Events from the Close
Unreality), Inimi cicatrizate (literally, Scarred Hearts), and Vizuina luminat (The
Lighted Burrow, subtitled A Sanatorium Diary) portrays only negative heroes56
who resignedly live at the mercy of their sick bodies whims. Everyone in Blechers
fiction sees the world and themselves through the darkening lens of their diseased
condition and physical degradation. The novelistic triptych I alluded to earlier is
dominated by the imagery of a grotesque, tragic-comic humanity that is integrally
affected by the humiliations of a decaying corporeality and whose origin is anything
but divine. Many of Blechers characters suffer from terminal illnesses, while the
recovery period of others is long enough to result in unforgettable and ghastly
revelations.
Given the aims of this article, it is important to remember that there are, broadly
speaking, three ways in which Blechers personages wish to escape the inferno of
pain: a melancholy retreat into the oneiric and phantasmal dimension of interiority,57
the erotic escapades meant to compensate for physical invalidity, and the rapturous
immersion into the material and the abject. In what follows, after a short overview, I
project each of these against Kierkegaards discussion of the pathology of subjectivity.
Hereby I hope to open a few vistas that deserve a more extensive analysis.
To begin with, Blechers ailing protagonists have recurrent experiences of
estrangement from the outer world but also from themselves.58 Consequently,
some of them will seek liberation through evasive withdrawal into the depths of
imagination and dreams. Their self-absorbed involvement with the imaginary is so
profound, and their oscillation between daydreaming and facticity so vertiginous,
that reality and fantasy become impossible to discern.59 Thus one can speak of a
hallucinatory dimension of Blechers fiction. Oftentimes this oneiric universe is
imbued with a nightmarish aggressiveness, wherein one can guess the ghastly omen
of death or annihilation.60 However, the anti-traumatic descent into the abyss of inner
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 153.
Ibid.
56
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 160 (Scarred Hearts, p. 84).
57
Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 65; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 180;
eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 25; pp. 735.
58
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, pp. 1569; eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher,
pp. 53ff.
59
Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 64; p. 73; Blecher, Vizuina luminat,
p. 242; p. 260; p. 292; Manolescu, Arca lui Noe, p. 560; eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher,
p. 39; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 156; pp. 1635.
60
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 172; eposu, Blecher, Max p. 300; eposu,
Suferinele tnrului Blecher, pp. 7682. Balot observes that the spatiality encountered in
Blechers prose appears as a trap, a cavern, a burrow, while the objects that fill this space
are hostile towards the afflicted self. Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 44; p. 62;
54
55
12
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For a short time, eroticism in lieu of faith is taken as a possible suspension of bodily
wretchedness. Blechers fascination with carnal passion or even amoral sexuality is
very salient. Blechers patients feel that sexuality possesses the capacity to assuage
the brutal and continual assaults of pain. Their occasional carnal ecstasies are part
p. 88; p. 106; p. 107; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 158; pp. 16673; Manolescu, Arca lui
Noe, pp. 56970.
61
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 229 (Scarred Hearts, p. 226); eposu, Suferinele
tnrului Blecher, p. 61; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 176.
62
For example, Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 91; Blecher, Vizuina
luminat, p. 234. Aside from his intention to study medicine, Blecher manifested a genuine
and lasting interest in sciences.
63
SKS 11, 14653 / SUD, 307. SKS 11, 16475 / SUD, 4960.
64
SKS 11, 147 / SUD, 31.
65
SKS 11, 1545 / SUD, 39; second and third emphases added.
13
of the larger telos to reactualize the primordial unity of being and to annihilate the
feeling of self-alienation.66 However, in the battle between thanatos and eros the
former is the sole possible victor. Since love is understood by Blecher exclusively
in physiological termsas if the soul were a mere chimerathe sickliness of
the body invades and defiles even the last sanctuary of relative purity, namely,
the human emotions and affection. Therefore, Blechers sufferers fall prey to an
overwhelmingly instinctual or sickly excessive sensuality.67 When not abandoning
themselves to an unbridled, Dionysian-like sexuality,68 they practice a hygienic
love without any trace of jouissance,69 or they enjoy perverse, heavily ritualistic
forms of sexuality.70 In the end, however, sex turns out to be every bit as impotent as
oneiric escapism. When the erotic ecstasy vanishes, the diseased are engulfed again
by the unfathomable blackness of existence, by melancholy, and forlornness.71
This disheartening landscape is not absolutely incommensurable with
Kierkegaards Christian spirituality and insistence on agape. To be sure, the issue
of sexuality most prominently arises in Kierkegaards mind in connection with the
dynamic between anxiety and the perpetuation of sin throughout human generations.
In Works of Love, when the limitations of erotic affection are explicitly taken up,
sexuality plays a marginal role. Kierkegaard is more interested in the selflessness
of agape as antithetical to the preferentiality of spontaneous love or friendship, to
the detriment and sometimes even exclusion of the sexual determinations of human
nature. In Kierkegaards philosophy, instinctual corporeality rarely comes to the
fore, and even then as indicative of the dangers it poses to salvation. On the other
side, as paradoxical as it sounds, Blecher could help us contemplate eroticism within
the horizon of fallenness, whose effects on erotic behavior have been insufficiently
addressed by Kierkegaard.
As to the third remedy practiced by Blechers unfortunate characters, we
should specify from the outset that it envisions the most elementary level of
existence. In Blechers relation to eroticism we already sensed a certain attraction
to a purely elemental physiology, to an organicity deprived of ineffability or any
spiritual connotations. Here matter and especially its decomposing constitution are
eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 68. On the loss of identity induced by
recurrent physiological crises, see Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 43; p. 44;
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 136 (Scarred Hearts, pp. 378).
67
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 161; p. 216 (Scarred Hearts, p. 86; p. 200); Blecher,
ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, pp. 501; Manolescu, Arca lui Noe, p. 564; and Blecher,
Vizuina luminat, p. 271; p. 306.
68
See, for instance, Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 60; p. 67; and Blecher,
Inimi cicatrizate, p. 216 (Scarred Hearts, p. 200). See also eposu, Suferinele tnrului
Blecher, p. 69.
69
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 126; see also ibid., p. 187 (Scarred Hearts, p. 16; p. 141).
70
Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, pp. 5661; Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate,
pp. 1889 (Scarred Hearts, pp. 1446); Blecher, Vizuina luminat, p. 287; and eposu,
Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 70.
71
Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 85; Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 164
(Scarred Hearts, p. 95).
66
14
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15
16
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Blecher is completely unaware of and unable to commune with the divine. As one
commentator put it, the human lot is, according to Blecher, a pointless struggle
in a carceral condition wherefrom there is no exit, except a few rare and transitory
moments of ecstasy when ones identity is suspended and allows one, as in a beautiful
dream, to take part in the infinite, profound, and essential existence of the Whole.85
I have claimed above that Kierkegaards category of despair represents a pertinent
tool in diagnosing the existential malady Blechers characters suffer from. In this
context, my thesis is reinforced by the presence of another symptom, namely, that
the individuals who people Blechers novels incessantly vacillate between organic
authenticity and mechanical objectification.86 As such, this vacillation gives birth
to a selfhood perceived as a burden, as something one has to free oneself from.
Consequently, Blechers personages will do everything in their power to flee from
themselves. They are eager to become someone else and dread the impossibility of
annihilating their present ipseity.87 This is exactly what Kierkegaard meant by the
despair of not willing to be oneself or the despair in weakness.88 As if dissecting
Blechers bleak anthropology, Kierkegaard remarks that for someone fully given
to pure immediacy or immediacy containing a quantitative reflectionthere is no
infinite consciousness of the self.89 And he continues:
The man of immediacy is only physically qualified (insofar as there really can be
immediacy without any reflection at all); his self, he himself is an accompanying
something within the dimensions of temporality and secularity, in immediate connection
with the other, and has but an illusory appearance of having anything eternal in it.
The self is bound up in immediacy with the other in desiring, craving, enjoying, etc., yet
passively; in its craving, this self is a dative, like the me of a child. Its dialectic is: the
pleasant and the unpleasant; its concepts are: good luck, bad luck, fate.90
Astonishingly enough, Kierkegaard realizes that the person fully given to immediacy
understands everything in terms of fatality, and that whenever destiny deals her a
crushing blow, as when, for instance, she becomes physically ill, then unhappiness
sets in.91 Moreover, such an individual, states Kierkegaard, regards himself as dead,
as a shadow of himself.92 Indeed, due to the radical destruction of illness and pain,
Blechers characters lack concreteness; they are half-dead and incarnate a merely
generic selfhood without an unmistakable personal identity.93 Moreover, since in
Blechers thought the ever-shifting mask is much more valuable than real existence,
the ostentatious falsification of life appears heuristically adequate and aesthetically
advisable. Kierkegaard, too, realized that, while in despair, the first thing the self
85
17
longs for is a different identity.94 Because [immediacy] actually has no self,95 the
man of immediacy constantly aspires to exchange his actual selfhood for a new one
every time the outer reality seems unwelcoming. The difference here would be that
Kierkegaard does not insist as much as Blecher on the irrecoverable degradation of
physical suffering96 and especially, on the sufferers aspiration to the quietude of
indifference97 or a reification without remainder.98
The differences between our authors are, I hold, quintessential. Whereas Blecher
identifies human inwardness with the milieu of escapist phantasms or reduces it to
the entrails of the physical body,99 Kierkegaard relegates corporeality to immediacy,
and by qualifying the latter as deficient in reflection, he does not dwell too much on
its base despair. By contrast, in Blechers world, where God is dead, matter plays
the role of a pitiless destiny.100 The kind of introspection Blecher advocates does
not envision ones inner invisible emotions or reflexivity, but rather reveals a being
in flesh and bones, which is situated on this side of the skin in a purely physical
interiority.101 As contemplated by Blecher, human life is definable primarily by its
organic quantity and fleshiness, as a landscape shaped by veins, muscles, nerves and
a heart,102 wherein the soul and the spirit are utterly absent, almost inconceivable.103
Here we should never forget that, for Blecher, the bodily determination of existence
is, by virtue of its constitutive and mortal sickliness, a trap. This philosophical view
has a certain Gnostic or Neoplatonic flavor,104 but is not necessarily incommensurable
with the Christian understanding of corporeality.105
Finally, we arrived at what I consider the core point of contention. Even
if we could see Blechers world-view as an instance of human fallenness in the
Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 81; p. 92; p. 113; Balot, De la Ion la
Ioanide, p. 180. Blechers characters often display clear suicidal tendencies. See Blecher,
ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, p. 98 and Blecher, Vizuina luminat, pp. 3034.
95
SKS 11, 168 / SUD, 53.
96
Blecher, Inimi cicatrizate, p. 121; p. 134; p. 136; p. 139; p. 177; p. 225 (Scarred
Hearts, pp. 67; pp. 301; p. 37; p. 43; pp. 1212; pp. 21718).
97
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 159.
98
eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 41.
99
Blecher, Vizuina luminat, p. 233; pp. 2679; Manolescu, Arca lui Noe, p. 558.
100
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 175.
101
Manolescu, Arca lui Noe, p. 559.
102
Ibid., p. 559. See also Negoiescu, Engrame, p. 129.
103
However, we should keep in mind that, in addition to the paroxysmal proliferation of
corporeality, Blechers obsessions are equally directed towards the imaginary of subjectivity,
the phantasms of inwardness, the hallucinating unreality of psychical depths, the profundity
of the unconscious, and the terrifying spectacle of groundlessness. eposu, Suferinele
tnrului Blecher, pp. 223; see also ibid., pp. 367.
104
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 168; Manolescu, Arca lui Noe, p. 559; p. 571; eposu,
Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 75; p. 83.
105
Here we should remember that by taking on a human body, Christ restored the sanctity
of corporeality. At the same time, physical pain, illness, and ultimately death are conceived
by the Christian doctrine as a direct consequence of the Fall. It may be useful to realize that
neither Kierkegaard, nor Blecher, pay any attention to the transfiguration of the body via
Gods embodiment in Christ.
94
18
Leo Stan
19
seen as a sign of their sickness unto death. From a different perspective, Blecher
abundantly buttresses Kierkegaards view of despair as unawarenessand therefore
implicit rejectionof the eternal. He does so through an exclusive emphasis on the
devouring temporality. As already mentioned, Blecher is completely uninterested
in attaching any expiatory sense to human tribulations, physical or otherwise, in
stark contrast to Kierkegaard, for whom suffering is a source of joy because it is
a constitutive part of a soteriological scenario. In sum, granted the impossibility
of religious rebirth, Blecher emerges from his life and oeuvre as an Ecclesiastes
without God, absorbed only by his fetid sores and inconsolable grief; an Ecclesiastes
for whom even the eternally meaningless ordeal of Sisyphus remains a bliss.114
And yet, irrespective of their significant divergence, the careful reader cannot
help noticing a few salient similarities, this time from a biographical viewpoint.
Both Kierkegaard and Max Blecher have learned the harsh lesson of suffering,
whether physical (Blecher) or psycho-spiritual (Kierkegaard). Neither of them
has been spared the torments of eros. It appears that Blecher secretly fell in love
with a married woman,115 although his affection never crossed the limits of a book
dedication.Kierkegaards marital-erotic fiasco, the most debated episode of his
biography, need hardly be mentioned. Next, we should not ignore that both authors
have benefitted from the generosity and wealth of their fathers, although Blecher
was never physically fit for the aesthetic extravagances of the young Kierkegaard.
Their vital dependence on writing116 and their fondness for pseudonymity117 brings
further support to the tenet that these great sufferers found a comparable means to
sublimate their earthly purgatory. Last but not least, Blecher and Kierkegaard might
have been kindred in death. Noteworthy in this sense is that after his fatal collapse
in the street, Kierkegaard was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the spine marrow.118
Thus, for a few weeks he may have experienced, to be sure, on a different scale, what
Max Blecher endured during the last ten years of his sorrowful passage through life.
See Blecher, ntmplri n irealitatea imediat, pp. 934; Blecher, Vizuina luminat,
p. 303; Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 176; p. 178.
115
See Bicu, Max Blecher, pp. 16973.
116
Balot, De la Ion la Ioanide, p. 171.
117
eposu, Suferinele tnrului Blecher, p. 18.
118
See Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life Seen by His Contemporaries, ed. by Bruce
H. Kirmmse, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 118; p. 119.
114
Bibliography
I. References to or Uses of Kierkegaard in Blechers Corpus
Conceptul repetiiei la Kirkegaard [sic], Vremea, vol. 9, no. 431, March 29, 1936.
Exegeza ctorva teme comune, Azi, vol. 5, no. 23, MayJune, 1936.
II. Sources of Blechers Knowledge of Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard, Sren, La Rptition. Essai dexprience psychologique par Constantin
Constantius, trans. by Paul-Henri Tisseau, Paris: Alcan 1933.
La puret du coeur, trans. by Paul-Henry Tisseau, Bazoges-en-Pareds: privately
published 1936.
III. Secondary Literature on Blechers Relation to Kierkegaard
Bicu, Iulian, Max BlecherUn arlechin pe marginea neantului, Bucharest:
Editura Universitii Bucureti 2004, pp. 323; pp. 389; p. 79; pp. 812; p. 112;
pp. 197204.
Iversen, Karsten Sand, Kdets fortvivlelse, in Max Blecher, Hndelser fra den
umiddelbare uvirkelighed, trans. by Erling Schller, Copenhagen: Basilisk 2010,
pp. 14255.