Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115634
April 27, 2000
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT
and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners'
(a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well
as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated
April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin.2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and
twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at
P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose
Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two
hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegallysourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present
proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers
refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a
criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of
Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and
Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this
time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda.
The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was
again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and
Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray,
Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent
volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John
Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential
Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that
a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the
necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons
responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was
Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded
on it.9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner,
and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin
against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted
the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated
April 24, 1992. 10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the
trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary
Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO,
enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil
case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to
take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the
petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor
vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and
protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to
the direct order of the Supreme Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28,
1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
appropriate disposition. 13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It
ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted
by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate
court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest
products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and
unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter,
added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990,
is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in
the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code. . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without
the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties
imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest
products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority
to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These
products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima
facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found
by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones
charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the
commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is
pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections
78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject
of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:
. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous
plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of
the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid
seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the
simple devise of a writ of replevin. . . 21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. 22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. 23However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith
and without willfulness, malice or corruption. 24 In the present case, the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties
and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against
the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State's consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised
at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take
cognizance of the case and try it. 27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.1wphi1 Consequently, the
Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and
the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take
possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery
to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this
decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action,
against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised
Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree
"does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as
it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest
laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be
quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.[2]
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for
the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the
legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include
"lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of
the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy
circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have
it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted
that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.[3]
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, [4] guided by the principles that
penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not
artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two
terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec.
3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that
unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec.
68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by
the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to
forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought
and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised
by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other
grounds or issues.[5]
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing
out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and
Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist
of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to
facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was
issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February
Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy.
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
bearing
transport
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber,
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
the
product
were
not
equipped
with
certificates
of
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without
On June 10, 1992, the lower court [8] issued the herein questioned Order
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the
law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession,
without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest
In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court,
thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:
products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest
product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by
the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court
denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order
and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D.
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
forest products."
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by
Dictionary, lumberis defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for
the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and
possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent,
prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest
product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the
law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and
escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law
also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber
is wood. x x x.
seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is
country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of
produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting
Filipinos;
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its
and regulations;
discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical
difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised
legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is
patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x
x"
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would
certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow
the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an
opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is
broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber.
Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the
lower court said:
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse
of discretion.[13] Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings
are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[14] As this Court said:
"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot
be
allowed. The
administration
of
justice
would
not
survive
such
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
of a constitutional matter are present in a case, [25] this Court will not pass upon a
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action
constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be
of certiorari."[15]
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[16]
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of
deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this
problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing
this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of
rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused
discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed
against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper
that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the
procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea,
prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and
go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing
invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however,
has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's
assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been
prosecution
of
Criminal
Case
No.
9543.
This
Decision
is
immediately
SO ORDERED.
However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
DECISION
for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at
bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense
charged has prescribed,[23] this case may not be considered an exception to the
rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which
petitioner would have this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from
delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 68 [2] of the
Revised Forestry Code[3] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto
at
the
Valencia
Golden
Harvest
Corporation
Compound,
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber
was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation
one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the
company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large
stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company
had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by
R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The
DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L.
HUNDRED
EIGHTY
EIGHT
THOUSAND
THREE
Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more,
the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a
by E.O. 277.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994,
29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September
29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66
board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong,
[4]
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court
which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.
[5]
Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the
government. Spped jo
lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada
refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F &
G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as
October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with
of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber. [8]
[6]
feet of lumber
REASONABLE
DOUBT
THE
GUILT
OF
THE
ACCUSED-
PETITIONER PALLADA.
THE
PROPER
DOCUMENT
TO
JUSTIFY
PETITIONER'S
THAT
THE
PRESENCE
OF
ERASURES
IN
THE
Exh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of
lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation
issued by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Enterprises
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered
support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.[14]
merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was
made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess
timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who
criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other
possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are
hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be
issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required
for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. [15] As already noted, the
opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance
of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for
Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial
court:[16]
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of
flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the
Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher
describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . . Maniks
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420
pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents
describe the forest product[s] as lumber.
products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are
found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in
parenthesis.
addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public
Valencia
[20]
Golden
Harvest
Corporation
as
the
consignee.
Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that the same is
covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect
are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have
any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the
corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have
noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them
Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption
invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces,
regular and properly accomplished.[22]
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh.
"9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and
Exh. "[7-A]".[17]
Additionally,
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, 68, provides:
all
the
Auxiliary
Invoice
were
not
properly
ART.
person
guilty
of
theft
shall
be
of Not guilty to the charge in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro
Rojas of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a
police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern
Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality, they noticed a
Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of
Maasin. Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police
Station Commander Rojas maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase.[4]
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro,
Maasin, Southern Leyte, they ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to pull
over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions hurriedly
left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport of the
pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police
authorities that the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor
Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in
the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc.
(SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative.Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and
Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin,
Southern Leyte for further investigation.[5]
On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his
office at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber
that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte
from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found
that the cargo consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces
of Antipolo lumber of different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board
feet.[6]
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt [7] covering the fifty-one
(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo
truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo
truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian, Maasin,
Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the
CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8]
The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the
Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health
Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to
be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin,
Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by
law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando
dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela
Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer
in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the
plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in
Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed
Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that
a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees,
which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided
the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he
shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina
seedlings.[9]
On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire
for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his
mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after
Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the
said lumber.[10]
After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about
4:00 oclock in the afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen
instructed his cousin to personally supervise the hauling of the sawn lumber for
him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At around 7:00 oclock
in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were
confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]
Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station
Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for the sawn
lumber. After confirming ownership of the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas
that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor to cut Dita trees,
which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house and
that he had already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to
no avail. Rojas ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be
impounded at the municipal building of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of
Telen to produce the required permit from the DENR.[12]
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in
Maasin, Southern Leyte for investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces
of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO
Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn lumber on October 29,
1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer
for three (3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at
a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province.[13]
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local
cooperative engaged in buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on
October 29, 1993 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo,
accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu
cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from
Barangay San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily
acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber,
according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former
officemate at the provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides, the fee to
be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative.
[14]
At about 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu
cargo truck of SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte,
being escorted by a police patrol vehicle, heading towards the municipal town
proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned that the Isuzu truck
was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita
and Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to
the police authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport
coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the municipal building just the
same.[15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in
SLEFAICO, Inc.[16]
For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the
SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting abaca
fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for hire.[17]
While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on
October 29, 1993 in Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente Sabalo
approached him and offered to hire the services of the cargo truck. Genol
accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the accounting manager of SLEFAICO,
Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of
Sabalo to hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San
Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte, for a fee.[18]
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of
Alfonso Dator, proceeded to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers along the
way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in San Jose, Genol remained behind the
steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the actual nature of the
lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed
to Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before
the lumber could be unloaded at 8:00 oclock in the evening Genol was
approached by Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR
permit for the lumber.The pieces of lumber were confiscated by Rojas after Genol
failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office.[19]
Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this
case. He testified in substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor Telen,
to engage the services of a cargo truck to transport sawn pieces of lumber from
San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao, Maasin, Southern
Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the
Isuzu cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of
Alfonso Dator who readily acceded to the proposal for a fee of P500.00; [20] that he
saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel as the loading of the lumber was
going on in San Jose; and that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck were
confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show
to Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR
for the subject lumber.[21]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged and there being no modifying circumstances,
and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable, the
herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided
Barangay Soro-soro, appellant Telen failed to produce before the authorities the
required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to the said pieces of lumber.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of
assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations
constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products
Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall,
in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found.
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before
cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that written
permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the
Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in
renovating appellants house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements
thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that the appellant stands
charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a
special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the
prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is
whether or not the law has been violated. [23] The motive or intention underlying
the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of
the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal
permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin,
Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no
legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It
does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort
during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his
allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an
error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at
best, self-serving.[24]
The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of
DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990 [25] which prescribes rules on
valid basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for
purposes of computing the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant
considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary
to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Elizaga, [27] the accused-appellant therein was
convicted of the crimes of homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and its
contents that were taken by the accused-appellant from the victim was estimated
by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a conclusive or
definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its
contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More
pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, [28] this Court held that if there is no
available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution
failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accusedappellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the
value of P5.00.
In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita
and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore
not premium quality lumber. It may also be noted that the said pieces of lumber
were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land
owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the
renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been
convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving
violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as
amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest
of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the
minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code
which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the
appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods.[29] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, [30] the penalty to be imposed
on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
petitioner
SUPREME COURT
"Procedural
entered
into
Memorandum
of
Guidelines
in
the
of
Manila
Conduct
Agreement
Verification
(MOA)
of
containing
Private
Tree
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 161798
DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used
in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and
possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,
through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within
its concession and tree plantation area, violators who loaded the illegally cut trees
in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos, for transport out of
the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept
in PICOPs impounding area.
On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo, Uldarico
and MARILYN RANOSO-CODERA, and FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., for himself and
and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat, Jr., for himself and in
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso
pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds
government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares
of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its
officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, 1 February 16,
2001,2 and April 6, 2001,3 by virtue of which petitioner was designated a DENR
depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances
within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and
determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the
Memoranda.
On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision. With regard to private
respondents allegation that the aforesaid Memoranda were illegally issued, the
trial court disregarded the claim and sustained the validity of the Memoranda.
preliminary injunction.
normal and regular course of its duty to enforce forestry laws and procedures.
The RTC added that the application for the writ of preliminary injunction was the
On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was
wrong remedy to assail the legality of the Memoranda, such an action being
merely a collateral attack. Private respondents should instead have filed a petition
to declare the Memoranda null and void. However, the trial court granted private
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit on
October 17, 2001.8
checkpoint within PICOPs concession area. Private respondents also never denied
that PICOPs guards had been deputized as DENR officers to enforce the
Memoranda. Petitioner was therefore within its rights in exercising control over its
concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR depository.
On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction before the Court of
Petitioner also argues that the RTC intruded upon the primary jurisdiction of the
Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 23, 2003. 10 The
DENR when it took cognizance of private respondents complaint for damages and
appellate court held there was no grave abuse of discretion when the RTC issued
the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner had no right or interest to protect
Order (DAO) No. 97-3213 in asserting that it has the obligation to keep custody of
the apprehended forest products, tools and conveyances, the disposal of which
used only as a depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of
the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001. Neither did petitioner claim
ownership of the confiscated conveyances. While it claimed that some of the
confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner
admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be
The RTC also allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion in granting private
respondents prayer for issuance of injunction in violation of the doctrine of
of the vehicles and forest products since, being confiscated items, they will have to
should have awaited the results of the administrative procedure for summary
proceedings.
of DAO No. 97-32, instead of filing the complaint before the trial court. This would
have allegedly allowed the proper administrative officer to ascertain whether a
prima facie case lies against the offenders and whether the apprehended articles
should answer for the offense. By issuing the assailed writ of injunction, the trial
depository and the release of the conveyances and products to the government
court arrogated unto itself the power to rule on the rightful possession of the
agencies concerned has to be done but only in compliance with lawful court
subject conveyances.
orders.
Petitioner also contends that the injunctive writ was issued without due process
It should also be remembered that the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001,
of law since the transfer of custody of the forest products and conveyances was
Memorandum of January 21, 2002. As of the filing of the petition for review before
matter of the return of the seized conveyances was never ventilated during the
this Court on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any right, as a depository,
hearing and the issuance of the writ not sought for violates the rules of due
process.
All the foregoing considered, petitioners contention that the trial court violated
Petitioners arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied.
and the Office of the Government Prosecution was for the purpose of resolving the
SO ORDERED.
before the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. There were also
letters or notices to petitioner from officers of the CENRO and the Office of the
Government Prosecution requesting the release of some of the conveyances to
their owners.14 There is no reason for petitioner to refuse to hand over possession
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development
Corporation.
PULL-OUT
OF
LOGGING
MACHINERIES
AND
COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter
dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated
April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources
[MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of
TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October
12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
[hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other
forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum
order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the
contents of which were as follows:
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent
a
letter
addressed
reconsideration
of
to
the
then
President
Bureau's
Ferdinand
directive,
citing
Marcos
in
which
support
sought
thereof
its
contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no
operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on
this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of
the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire
on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR
through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986
denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a
contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and
that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among
ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis
was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all
logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva
the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the
availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also
removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now
issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was
lifted.
President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting
others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null
and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated September 15,
appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of
petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the
MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds
several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner.
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions
reasonable period.
and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the
same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is
whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion
Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition
No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87
and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in
1983 and 1984, respectively.
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR
[now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to
have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition
for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is
its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356
fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable
time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the
law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of
these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter
[Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And
dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting
failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders
reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters
the
as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106
Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6
petitioner
susceptible
to
the
adverse
legal
consequences
of
laches
SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA
374].
19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex
presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to
"6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order
assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29;
issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the
Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The
averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public
alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right
itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their
in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have
been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau
actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of
its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts
which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
case at bar,
Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago,
108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated
L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-
21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218,
and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646,
January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No.
presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization
L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case,
of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at
large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than
suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber
licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the
adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged
irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging
concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done
in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and
undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of
forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court
will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of
conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part
of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation
of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority,
when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1,
Article VIII].
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to
issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is
admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was
in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence
necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision2 and the February 15, 2002 Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is herebyAFFIRMED with modification on the
penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is
hereby ACQUITTED."4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for
violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon
under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at
Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture
into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one
(1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and
valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without
having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary
permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the
aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
Contrary to law.
"Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro
Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution
presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita DangalanMendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and]
Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [DangalanMendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the
land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who
ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez.
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the
cutting of trees, ignored his complaint.
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that
he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez
[indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge
against him. In a drinking spree, he happened to box Oscar
Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with]
revenge.
"On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged.
Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision,
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal
[to the CA]."5
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution
witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Prosecution
Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner
had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita DangalanMendozas land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence
in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It
ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under
Section 4 of Rule 1336 of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following
established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi,
petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February
12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she
pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her
to forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the
conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre
hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show
the latters participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court
held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 1307 of the Rules of
Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioners admission, which did
not constitute any of the exceptions8 to this provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules."
Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on
that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. 13 Hence, information
that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered
hearsay.14
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990,
they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their
testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons.First, they were
indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the
admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from
their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the
utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated
therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on
the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. 15 Gotesco
Investment Corporation v. Chatto16 ruled that evidence regarding the making of
such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that
fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from
questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because he failed to object to
it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to
hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it
may be admitted.17 The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript
of the stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?
A We were not able to see.
Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long
time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that
he took the liberty of cutting those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused
mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees.
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.
Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you
at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi."18
Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies
of the persons who heard it19 fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. According to this provision, "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon
the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is
true.20 The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against
him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not
given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities.
Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. 21 We have ruled previously
that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but is given in an ordinary manner.22
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which -- with the assistance of
the barangay tanods23 -- was conducted by the owners brother, Manuel Dangalan
cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of
Section 12 (1) of Article III 24 of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda
rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner.25
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation
are relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession is the basis of conviction.26 In the present case, the conviction of
petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of
circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique
advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. 27Equally
established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the
trial court,28 as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs findings,
if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned
from them.29 We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the
lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other
forest products without the legal documents.31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. 32 It was thus necessary for the
prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of
lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence,
however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its
conclusions and findings of guilt. 33 Conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the
following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the
affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC)
considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
"x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and
control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better
chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay
[t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he
ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-inlaw, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by
Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the
lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him
as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation."36
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances
sufficiently proved petitioners culpability:
"x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel
Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the
cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner]
of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days ofprision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and
grave abuse of discretion filed by Alfredo Y. Chu (complainant) against Judge
Camilo E. Tamin (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 23).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IX, applied for a
search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that
complainant was in possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 [1] (PD 705), as amended. On the same
day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of
several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainants fishpond in Bulawan,
Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz,
from Branch 23 whether respondent judge examined any witness before issuing
Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court Lumapas her
explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of
Search Warrant No. 364, as forwarded by respondent judge to the OCA and as
obtained by complainant.
In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge
Franklyn A. Villegas (Executive Judge Villegas) stated that he verified the records
Lumapas. These certified copies did not contain any transcript of respondent
of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He found on page 5 of the records a
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge
issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation
certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He explained
issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284),
that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the
authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more
examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal
than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did
researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on
Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the
however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such
pages of the records were not yet physically paged. He claimed that the pages were
examination but the record of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder
numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the
through inadvertence.
following week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was
[2]
numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to accept the referral of the
In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of
case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for
their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent
In the Resolution of 10 September 2001, the Court referred this case to the
OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
Branch 24, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 24). In lieu of the original copy,
respondent judge attached to his Indorsement an alleged computer printout of the
transcript, claiming that the time and date of its encoding was verifiable in the
computer files in his office.
Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify
Respondent
judge
stands
firm
on
his
claim
that
he
conducted
writing. Thus, respondent judge erred because Section 5, Rule 126, [of the ] Rules
of Court specifically [requires such] x x x.
suspect. First, the respondent judge [initially] failed to produce a copy of the
transcript of the searching questions allegedly made on September 9, 1999 and
This is a basic legal precept which all judges are expected to be conversant
append the same to the record of the case. x x x x The transcript of the searching
with. Th[e] Court has often impressed upon judges that as mandated by the Code
questions was, in fact, produced [only] after the filing of the instant
of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and legal profession to know the
complaint. Further, it was noted that during the hearing of [complainants motion
very law they are supposed to apply to a given case. In this case, respondent
to quash Search Warrant] Nos. 281, 282, 283 and 28[4] taken on 21 January
questions need not be in writing. This is borne by the following exchange during
the said hearing:
In other words Your Honor, they would not admit that the
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
Court:
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. R. Rambuyong:
This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and
From the Case of HATA versus BAYONA, Your Honor, the
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
with.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that respondent judge either did not
conduct the required searching questions, or if he did, he did not put it in
Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe,
[8]
as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon
a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of probable cause,
it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses
personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
We uphold the OCAs findings that respondent judge, who had earlier
professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to examine any witness
(Emphasis supplied)[9]
before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing.
His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so
elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on
complied with the rule that he must personally examine in the form of searching
search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it,
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [11] Specifically, respondent judge failed to
witnesses. Respondent judge stated, however, that the certified copies of the
conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code
records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination
because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies
inadvertently failed to do so. This explanation fails to persuade us.
obtained by complainant constitutes the entire record of the matter. [10] This
renders improbable respondent judges claim that the transcript already formed
part of the records but the legal researcher in his office inadvertently missed it in
What was said in a case,[12] similarly involving gross ignorance of basic rules,
bears repeating here:
[A judge] is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and
conversant with basic legal principles. He owes [it] to the dignity of the court he
sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who depends on him,
to know the law which he is called upon to x x x apply. Not only that, there would
be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration
of justice if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp [of] legal principles.
On the Penalty to be Imposed
As recommended by the OCA, respondent judge should be fined P5,000. On
26 June 2003, in Gregorio Limpot Lumapas v. Judge Camilo Tamin,[13] this
Court dismissed respondent judge from the service for disobedience to an order
issued by a superior court, as well as for gross ignorance of the law x x x with
forfeiture of all benefits due him except for accrued leave credits. Thus, the fine
of P5,000 should be deducted from respondent judges accrued leave benefits.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine of P5,000 to be deducted from his
accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
vs.
amount.
Contrary to Law.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now
form.
Regional Trial Court) of Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares and twenty other John Does,"
dismissing the information filed therein.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds
invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo), The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9,
1977 (p.42, Rollo).
following questions of law: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense;
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
and (2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private
respondents and the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially
That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at
alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in
Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not
precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of
the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused
Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John
"illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of
said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease,
accused
Logging
license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can
grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the
asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement,
being
the
administrator
of
the
Infanta
lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the
state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were
taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name
of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state
can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner
of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those
produced in private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R.
No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of
timber in private lands. This Court held therein:
theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency
of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the
law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30,
1988, 165 SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
timber,
firewood
and
other
minor
forest
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective
because:
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the
. . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting,
gathering and carrying away of the logs were done without the
the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the
(Art. 429, New Civil Code) the very rights violated by the
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather,
collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong
to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in
private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the
forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was
Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:
Forestry
Law;
from
as
the
required
Director
by
Forest
Law
and
gathering
and
forest
thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and
and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the
Regulations.
removing
The
of
the
Forestry
cutting,
of timber
and
the
other
If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the
authorities
designated
by
law
to
conduct
preliminary
The
seized
products,
immediately
disposed
among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof
materials
of
in
and
equipment
accordance
with
shall
be
forestry
or complaint.
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not
repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to
conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the
information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer
may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the
committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The
him. . . .
committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is
brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the
forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with
the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
and file the necessary informations in court.
With
the
offenses,
exception
of
the
so-called
"private
crimes"
and
in
election
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations
both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest
covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the
presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to
any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint
his presence) he is still required to file the proper complaint with the
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the
authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-
appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accusedappellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court
dismissing the information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated.
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When
interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber
SO ORDERED.
(3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the
forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to
7
from the
vs.
Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued
to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
PUNO, J.:p
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force
Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force,
together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information
that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of
the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of
General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they
posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street.
Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548
pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.
confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber.
The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile
lumber.
10
When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest
products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber
with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed
value of P93,232.50.
11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an
I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
SO ORDERED. 17
Appellant
errors:
12
14
us
with
the
following
assignment
and Elpidio
since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from
the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came
from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were
given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.
of
presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department
Sabal.
before
the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he
13
comes
now
18
15
evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and
and seizures.
the
constitutional
perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-
investigation.
rights
of
accused
under
custodial
16
states:
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the
possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the
time of its enactment.
CANCELLED.
provides:
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
at
Nagrangtayan,
Sanchez
Mira,
Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
comes first.
original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he
has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his
548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with
seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle
and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on
said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the
possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one
xxx xxx xxx
was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit
the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from
CENRO on March 4, 1994, the Court has doubts that this was
a polluted source.
19
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of
The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the
illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves
that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D.
705, to wit:
searches
and
seizures
of
authority; and
regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a
legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum
prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized
lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree".
Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to
counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized
by this court in People vs.Bagista,
20
thus:
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search
appellant's truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging
received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks
later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General
Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant.
When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of
the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the
coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting
documents,
accused-appellant
could
not
present
any.
The
foregoing
considering that the same were not transported out and merely used for his own
agricultural purposes.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that he should not be held liable
under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended since the timber that was cut and
gathered came from his titled property.
He further asserts that the part of Section 68, PD 705 incorporating the
provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code regarding qualified
theft should not be made to apply to his case since the aforestated articles of the
penal code apply only to those who commit theft, which under the law is a crime
committed when there is unlawful taking of a property belonging to another. He
insists that both penal provisions should not be made to apply since he is the
owner of the property and as owner he cannot be accused of stealing his own
property. Petitioner concludes that Article 309 therefore applies only to other
persons or strangers gathering timber from the titled property of another while
Article 310 is inapplicable in his case since such pertains to theft of coconuts in a
plantation.
At the outset, the Court notes that while petitioner continues to harp on
the alleged questions of law present in this case, the petition at bar was filed via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Nothing is more settled than the rule that a
writ of certiorari lies only where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court believes that none of the
aforementioned circumstances is present in this case.
Be that as it may, although this Court at the outset had pointed out that
herein petitioner adopted the wrong remedy and committed certain technical
violations of the Rules on Civil Procedure which necessitate its outright dismissal,
nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice and in view of the novelty of the
question of law involved, the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion shall
treat this petition as having been filed under Rule 45.
The fundamental question of law we seek to resolve in this case is: may a
person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the necessary
permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said property,
be criminally charged for violating PD 705?
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of
the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
[15]
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to
their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in
the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled
in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.
[18]
The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. [19] The trial court cited Sections
87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of
lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part
of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic
then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. [25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,
and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. [30] They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. [31]
[28]
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and
grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government
great leeway for classification. [42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. [43] Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006,Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any
of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted
under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. [47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain
will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced
in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the
method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which
were set forth in said decree. [54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property,
is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, [56] from the date of its
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to
the State.[58]
public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. [61] The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public
lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x
x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system
and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.
[67]
Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law
limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which now provides
for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal
grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment
title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.[59]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter,
the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
under
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and
mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is
safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is
not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral
today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for
one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact
that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry
or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is
a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance
belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in
the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public
domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands
from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts
no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their
title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration
court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the
courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application
for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-ininterest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on
the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions ofBoracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years
under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they
may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was
passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in
theIslands. It also provided for the issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the
governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term
public land referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has
not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private
lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its
powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified
the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind
the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure
the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but
sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and
Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands
in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin
Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide
open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of
the proclamation.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not
bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the
law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. [130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot.They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do
not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the
law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism
industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called
the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are
bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss
of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to
acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill [133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to
decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary
to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease
some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as
absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision
to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in
adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of
the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse
or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents.
The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human
lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.