Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Consti II 4/14/15
TABLE OF CONTENTS
David v. Arroyo
Subsequent Punishment
People v. Perez
Libel
Policarpio v. Manila Times
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
8
9
Obscenity
Miller v. California
Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak
12
12
15
16
17
Soriano v. Laguardia
18
Freedom of Religion
Estrada v. Escritor
20
David v. Arroyo
Subject:
Moot and Academic, Locus Standi, Political Question(Calling-out Power),
Emergency Powers of the President, Facial Challenge (Overbreadth
Doctrine), Facial Challenge (Vagueness), Section 17, Article VII (Take Care
Power or Control Power of the President), Section 17, Article XII (Take Over
Power of the President), 'As Applied' Challenge,Acts of Terrorism, Right to
Peacably Assemble,
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 (PP 1017) 'declaring a state of national emergency'. On the same
day, the President also issued General Order No. 5 implementing PP 1017
and directing the AFP and PNP to take appropriate actions 'to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence'
Thereafter, during the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested
(without warrant) Randolf S. David, a UP professor and newspaper
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columnist, and Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
Also, in the early morning of February 25, 2006,operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP,on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila.
One week after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO No. 5, President Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.
Petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of and G.O. No. 5 and PP
1017.
The factual basis cited by the Arroyo camp for the executive issuances was
the alleged existence of plot attempts from the political opposition and NPA
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. The plot attempts were a clear
and present danger that justified the orders.
Held:
Moot and Academic
1.
2.
3.
Locus Standi
4.
In public suits, our courts adopt the 'direct injury' test which
states that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
'a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
5.
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failed to show direct injury,they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of 'transcendental importance.'
6.
7.
KMU's assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to
peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights
of their members. The courts took judicial notice of the announcement
by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
8.
10. As to how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of
power, the standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness. The test is
that 'judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not
that the President's decision is correct,' but that 'the President did not
act arbitrarily.'(citing Lansang v. Garcia)
11. To show arbitrariness, it must be shown that the President's decision
is totally bereft of factual basis'. If this is not proven, the Court cannot
thereafter undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings.' (citing IBP v Zamora)
12. Petitioners failed to show thatPresident Arroyo's exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, istotally bereft of factual basis.
The government presented reports of events leadingto the issuance PP
1017 (i.e. escape and threats of Magdalo group, defectionsin military,
etc.) which was not contradicted by petitioners. Hence, thePresident
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Facial Challenge (Overbreadth Doctrine)
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13. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases. PP 1017 is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence.
14. Claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only 'spoken words'
and 'overbreadth claims have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.'
Facial Challenge (Vagueness)
15. Related to the 'overbreadth' doctrine is the 'void for vagueness
doctrine' which holds that 'a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.' It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing 'on their faces'
statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth,it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it isvague in all its
possible applications.
Calling Out Power (First Provision of PP 1017)
16. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. Citing IBP v. Zamora, the Court ruled that the
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary ,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.'
17. Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo
found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office's vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
18. There is a distinction between the President's authority to declare a
'state of rebellion' and the authority to proclaim a ?state of national
emergency?. In declaring a state of national emergency, President
Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State's extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public interest.
19. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyo's calling-out power . As such, it cannot be used to
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justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be
done. specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants;
(b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial
Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
'Take Care' Power (Second Provision of PP 1017)
20. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution.
21. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate 'decrees.' Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Presidential Decrees
are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by then President Marcos in the exercise of
his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.
22. President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
respect to 'laws,' she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to
its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Take Over Power (Third Provision of PP 1017)
23. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President, during
a ?state of emergency?, authority to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, without authority or delegation from Congress.
24. A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to
declare 'a state of national emergency' and to exercise emergency
powers. While the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, the exercise of emergency powers , such as
the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress. The
President has no absolute authority to exercise allthe powers of the
State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency
powers act passed by Congress.
25. Congressmay grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
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certain conditions,thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
'As Applied' Challenge
26. Courts do not declare statutes invalid merely because they may
afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The
validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case.
'Acts of Terrorism'
27. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out
the 'necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.'
28. The Court declares that the 'acts of terrorism' portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional. Since there is no law defining 'acts of terrorism,' it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Consequently,there can be
indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises. These acts go far
beyond the calling-out power of the President. Yet these can be
effected in the name of G.O. No. 5 under the guise of suppressing acts
of terrorism.
Right to Peacably Assemble
29. David's warrantless arrest was unjustified. David, et al. were
arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As
can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition
and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought.
30. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that 'freedom of assembly is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.'
31. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and
rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power
to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and
hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present
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danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the
revocation of their permits.
People v. Perez
G.R. No. 21049 (1923)
FACTS:
On 1 April 1922, while in a public place, Isaac Perez and Fortunato Ladovice were
discussing the administration of Governor-General Wood. Perez shouted a number of
times: The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.
Consequently, Perez was charged of violation of article 256 of the Penal Code which
provides for the crime of contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority.
ISSUE:
Did Perez commit a crime? (Taking into consideration freedom of speech AND
sovereignty)
RULING:
No.
As to Freedom of Speech
In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705), the accused was
charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of the
United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and
though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial, the
appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.
As to Sovereignty
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with
having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by
unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was abrogated
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completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines,
and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of
article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the
information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of
the Penal Code nor of the libel Law.
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"punitive damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual
damages is neither found nor shown." An award of punitive damages -- as distinguished
from "general" damages, which are compensatory in nature -- apparently requires proof
of actual malice under Alabama law, and the judge charged that mere (gross) negligence
or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an
award of exemplary or punitive damages.
(a) Application by state courts of a rule of law, whether statutory or not, to award a
judgment in a civil action, is "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
(b) Expression does not lose constitutional protection to which it would otherwise
be entitled because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement.
(c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient
to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is
alleged and proved.
(d) State court judgment entered upon a general verdict which does not
differentiate between punitive damages, as to which, under state law, actual malice
must be proved, and general damages, as to which it is "presumed," precludes any
determination as to the basis of the verdict, and requires reversal, where
presumption of malice is inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements.
(e) The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for
respondent, since it failed to support a finding that the statements were made with
actual malice or that they related to respondent.
* Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, ommission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
discredit, dishonor, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is already dead.
* Test of defamatory character of the words used.
The words must be construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless
understood in another sense.
* Malice-in-Fact-- May be shown by proof of ill-will, hatred or purpose to injure.
* Malice-in-law-- is presumed from a defamatory imputation. In other words, there is a
presumption of malice when defamatory imputations are made.
* When is this presumption of malice rebuttable?
There is no presumption of malice when:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
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Conclusion:
Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1461
The Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect
every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without
redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court
held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the
demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v.
California (1973).
Memoirs v. Massachusetts
383 US 413 (1966)
Facts of the Case
A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal
proceedings against an "obscene" book, 'Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.' The book,
also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750.
Memoirs is nothing more than a series of minutely and vividly described sexual episodes.
The book starts with Fanny Hill, a young 15-year-old girl, arriving in London to seek
household work. She goes to an employment office where, through happenstance, she
meets the mistress of a bawdy house. This takes 10 pages. The remaining 200 pages of
the book detail her initiation into various sexual experiences, from a lesbian encounter
with a sister prostitute to all sorts and types of sexual debauchery in bawdy houses and as
the mistress of a variety of men. This is presented to the reader through an uninterrupted
succession of descriptions by Fanny, either as an observer or participant. of sexual
adventures so vile that one of the male expert witnesses in the case was hesitant to repeat
any one of them in the courtroom.
Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and
copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene.
Question
Is the material obscene?
Conclusion
Decision: 6 votes for Memoirs, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly
No. The Court held that the Massachusetts courts erred in finding Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure to be obscene. The Court, applying the test for obscenity established in Roth
v. United States, held that the book was not "utterly without redeeming social value." The
Court reaffirmed that books could not be deemed obscene unless they were unqualifiedly
worthless, even if the books possessed prurient appeal and were "patently offensive."
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, elaborating Roth case:
Three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
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description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.
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The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
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No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as
petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his
right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media),
a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language.
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, rests on the
theory that it is the courts function in a case before it when it finds public interests
served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on
the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater
weight shall be placed.
In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of
speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect and promote the
development and welfare of the youth.
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Estrada v. Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-16514 (2003)
Subject:
Freedom of Religion (Free Exercise Clause. Non-Establishment Clause), Strict
Neutrality vs. Benevolent Neutrality
Facts:
Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter to the judge of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas
City, complaining of immoral acts committed by Soledad Escritor, a court
interpreter in said court, who is allegedly living with a man not her husband.
During the investigation, Escritor admitted that she has been living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and
that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." Quilapio executed a similar pledge. At
the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living
with another woman. Insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and
Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Moreover, at the time Escritor joined the judiciary, her husband has already
died and there was no longer any legal impediment to marry on her part,
although Quilapio was still married to another but separated.
Escritor, who is charged with committing "gross and immoral conduct" under
the Revised Administrative Code, invokes the moral standards of her
religion, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement with a man not her legal husband does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable.
Held:
Free exercise clause
1. The Free Exercise Clause embraces two concepts - freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection
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of society.
Evolution of Different Tests employed by the courts
under the Free Exercise Clause
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(iii) the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion.'
Strict Neutrality vs. Benevolent Neutrality
4. The two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion clause
cases: separation (strict neutrality) and accommodation (benevolent
neutrality).
(a) Under the strict neutrality approach, the government
should base public policy solely on secular considerations,
without regard to the religious consequences of its actions. It
adopts a policy of religious blindness. This approach has been
used in education cases where the court refused to allow any
form of prayer, spoken or silent, in public schools. However,
this separationist approach has become problematic in
contemporary times when both the government and religion
are growing and expanding their spheres of involvement and
activity, resulting in the intersection of government and
religion at many points.
(b) The benevolent neutrality approach allows for interaction
between the church and state as called for by necessity or
practicality. Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote
the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice
Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into
account . . .to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish."
Accommodation theory
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created a burden on the free exercise of
religion? The courts often look into the sincerity
of the religious belief, but without inquiring into
the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth. The
sincerity of the claimant's belief is ascertained
to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to
escape a mandatory regulation.
(b)
Is there a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty? In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
state and that they are compelling.
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10. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
Religious clauses and Morality
11. The morality referred to in the law is public and secular morality, not
religious morality. The distinction is important because the jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement
the Court makes in the case at bar should be understood only in this realm.
Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the Compelling State
Interest Test
12. In ruling on Escritors claim of religious freedom, the court applied the
compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. the
claim of religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the
Civil Service Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
13. Applying the balancing process earlier discussed, the court found that
Escritor's right to religious freedom has been burdened as she is made to
choose between keeping her employment and following her religious
precept. She appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is
not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality.
14. However, the case must be remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator to properly settle the issue of the existence of a compelling
state interest. The government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold which can
override respondent's religious belief and practice. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.