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US v Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved
Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor
General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed
the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on
the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said
EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged
of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order

issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as
a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
Mabanag v Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could
have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending
the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the
case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or
not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from
each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal
of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be
proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the
law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if
one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two,
the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say
or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.
2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies
or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the
case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there
is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.
CASCO v GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to
RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance,
Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that
urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers
for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused
to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of
Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary
Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxxxxxxxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains
that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed
as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and,
formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea
and formaldehyde.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed
as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde
under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of
Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in
the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the
enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
Bengzon v senate blue ribbon committee
203 SCRA 767
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the
Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that
Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations
and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and
Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of
their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and
injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
Garcia V Mata
G.R. No. L-33713
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive
status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate
him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which
prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has
no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item
therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).
Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600
fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an
appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of
inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION
MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the
general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision
attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must
be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are
clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
Demetria v Alba
148 scra 208
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the BatasanPambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.

Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD.

This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
Endencia v. David
G.R. No. L-6355-56
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of
RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the
Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the
pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress
says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation.
This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the
phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in

section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to
give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used
in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the
Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the
judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing
their salaries.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and
so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
64 Phil 201
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic
Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of
Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which
would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border
design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act
No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the
production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said
stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13,
Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of
public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of
Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not
appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the
sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being used
for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.
On religious freedom

The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is
recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored
the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be
further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition
of profound reverence to religion.
Estrada v. Desierto
353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President
Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he
was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp
descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of
Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap
informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20
turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her
oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After
his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set
in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if
he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
Soliven v Makasiar
167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit
Must Be Invoked by the President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a

complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded
his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the
courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in
court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other
than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in
which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Gloria v CA
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. BienvenidoIcasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos right to security of
tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same
attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of
tenure.

Held:
1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is
directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are
those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions
may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or
that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that
the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be
inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to
the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications
and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus
be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the
field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a
permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with
no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in
Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our
civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed
without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to
illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals,
183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without
the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary
step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA
651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of
his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be
countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15,
2000)
Forbes v Tiaco
Forbes vs. ChuocoTiaco (16 Phil 534)
Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law
0
1
The three plaintiffs in error severally sued the defendants in error, alleging that Mr.
Forbes was the governor general of the Philippines, Trowbridge chief of the Secret

Service of Manila, and Harding chief of police of the same; that the plaintiff was a
Chinese person, lawfully resident in the Philippines, and that the defendants forcibly
deported the plaintiff to China, and forcibly prevented his return for some months;
that the plaintiff returned on March 29, 1910, and that the defendants threatened
and were trying to expel the plaintiff again,Trowbridge and Harding acting
throughout under the order of the defendant Forbes. There was a prayer for an
injunction and damages. The defendants demurred, but the demurrer was overruled
and a temporary injunction granted. Thereupon Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge
sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging
that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the
proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was
immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to,
but the supreme court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and
ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications
for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground
that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 5, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692.
2
The purpose of the first suits, of course, was to make the governor general
personally answerable in damages for acts done by him by color of his office and in
pursuance of what he deemed to be his duty, as well as to prevent his exercising
similar power in the future. This sufficiently appears by the declarations, which
suggest and do not exclude official action, and is alleged in the complaints for
prohibition. On April 19, 1910, in less than three weeks after the original suits were
brought, the Philippine legislature passed an act which, reciting that the governor
general had authorized the deportation in the exercise of authority vested in him
by law, enacted that his action was approved and ratified and confirmed, and in all
respects declared legal, and not subject to question or review. So that, if ratification
by that body can dispose of the matter, no court has authority to entertain the suits.
3
The first doubt that naturally would occur is whether, if a right of action had vested
previously, it could be taken away by such a statute. But it generally is recognized
that in cases like the present, where the act originally purports to be done in the
name and by the authority of the state, a defect in that authority may be cured by
the subsequent adoption of the act. The person who has assumed to represent the
will and person of the superior power is given the benefit of the representation if it
turns out that his assumption was correct. OReilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U. S.
45, 52, 52 L. ed. 676, 678, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S.
370, 382, 51 L. ed. 1098, 1102, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742, 11 Ann. Cas. 688; ThePaquete
Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 465, 47 L. ed. 901, 903, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Phillips v.
Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 23, 10 Best & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 28, 22 L. T. N. S. 869;
Secretary of State v. KamacheeBoyeSahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. C. 22, 86, 7 Moore, Ind.
App. 476. Compare West Side Belt R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. 219 U. S. 92, 55 L.
ed. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; Dunbar v. Boston & P. R. Corp. 181 Mass. 383, 385,
386, 63 N. E. 916.
4

Therefore the deportation is to be considered as having been ordered by the

governor general in pursuance of a statute of the Philippine legislature directing it,
under their combined powers, and it is unnecessary to consider whether he had
authority, by virtue of his office alone, as declared by the statute, or whether, if he
had not, he had immunity from suit for such an official act done in good faith. The
former matter now is regulated by a later statute providing for a hearing, etc. No.
2113. February 1, 1912. On the question thus narrowed the preliminaries are plain.
It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and
seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the
United States. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 707, 728, 37 L. ed.
905, 911, 918, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228,
231, 41 L. ed. 140, 141, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S.
296, 302, 46 L. ed. 917, 920, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686; United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 289, 290, 48 L. ed. 979, 983, 984, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719.
Furthermore, the very ground of the power in the necessities of public welfare
shows that it may have to be exercised in a summary way through executive
officers. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253,
263, 49 L. ed. 1040, 1044, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84,
85, 53 L. ed. 410, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235. So that the question is narrowed further to
the inquiry whether the Philippine government cannot do what unquestionably
Congress might.
5
As Congress is not prevented by the Constitution, the Philippine government cannot
be prevented by the Philippine Bill of Rights alone. Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369,
5, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692. Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty
without due process of law, unless on other grounds the local government was
acting beyond its powers. But the local government has all civil and judicial power
necessary to govern the Islands. Act of March 2, 1901, chap. 803, 31 Stat. at L. 895,
910, act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 1, 32 Stat. at L. 691. The forms are different,
but as in Hawaii, the proximate source of private rights is local, whether they spring
by inheritance from Spain or are created by Philippine legislation. See Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 354, 51 L. ed. 834, 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Perez v.
Fernandez, 202 U. S. 80, 91, 92, 50 L. ed. 942, 945, 946, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. It
would be strange if a government so remote should be held bound to wait for the
action of Congress in a matter that might touch its life unless dealt with at once and
on the spot. On the contrary, we are of opinion that it had the power as an incident
of the self-determination, however limited, given to it by the United States.
6
By 86 of the act of July 1, 1902, all laws passed by the Philippine government are
to be reported to Congress, which reserves power to annul them. It is worthy of
mention that the law under consideration was reported to Congress and has not
been annulled. The extension of the Chinese exclusion and immigration laws to the
Philippine Islands has no bearing on the matter. The right to remain, for instance,
under the act of April 29, 1902, chap. 641, 4, 32 Stat. at L. 176, U. S. Comp. Stat.
Supp. 1911, p. 524, does not prevail over a removal as an act of state.
7

It is held in England that an act of state is a matter not cognizable in any municipal
court. Musgrave v. Pulido, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 103, 108, 49 L. J. P. C. N. S. 20, 41 L. T. N.
S. 629, 28 Week. Rep. 373. And that was the purport of the Philippine act declaring
the deportation not subject to question or review. As the Bill of Rights did not stand
in the way, and the implied powers of the government sanctioned by Congress
permitted it, there is no reason why the statute should not have full effect. It
protected the subordinates as well as the governor general, and took jurisdiction
from the court that attempted to try the case.
8
Whether prohibition is technically the proper remedy, historically speaking, we need
not inquire. On such a matter we should not interfere with local practice except for
good cause shown. In substance the decision of the Supreme Court was right.
9
Judgment affirmed.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability
549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department
Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings
and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between
GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita
be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other

countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
Facts of the case:
During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency.
The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition
have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military
adventurists, which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims
to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear and present
danger.
On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017.
Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the AFP.
However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group
indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to
show disgust.
At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of
bombings and attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event
where the President was invited. The next morning after the alumni homecoming
celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.
PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are
planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman
PepingCojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration.
Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed
component to Anti- Arroyo protests.
Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan
was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5.
Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical
situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I.

Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and
takeover of facilities can be implemented.
Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist
and UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street
rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took
place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down
the government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then
represented the Anakpawis Party.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is
unconstitutional? Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily
Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional?
Ruling of the court:
Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance
of PP 1017, but the Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one
that ceases to present a justiciable controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which calls for military aid.
Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the
basis then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the
President may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence.
The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
conduction of a public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is
the prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers such as the
taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which
is entirely different from the martial law.
As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court
considers those actions unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional
mandate of freedom of expression.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry;
Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment

from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command.
Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of
the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may
be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The
impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize
the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to

testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of
the courts.
In the Matter of The Petition for Habeas Corpus of TeodioLansang v. Garcia
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing
the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of
Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by
Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of
the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the
constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently
abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into
the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including
two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by
the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners.
In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed
by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a
house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the
house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of
Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather
it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o
just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to
a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed
and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated.
The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was
once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the
suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the
president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered
effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field
thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Aquino v. Enrile
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued
and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even
without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas
corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special
affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial
Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration
of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President
may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing
the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
Presidents order.
Olaguer v Military Commission
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp BagongDiwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They
were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5)
arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the
petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by
the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already
released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose
behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition
for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the
herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention
centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be
dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to
try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the
jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military
courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian
defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction,
even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that
any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the
President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they
assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the
COA.
Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is
invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be
classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this
case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the
Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).