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The New Anthropology and Its Critics

Author(s): Edwin Ardener


Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 449-467
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2799031
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THE NEW ANTHROPOLOGY

AND ITS CRITICS*

EDWIN ARDENER

University
Oxford

Is therea 'new anthropology'?And if thereis, is it sufficiently


establishedor
recognisedthatit can be trulysaid to have critics,ratherthan perhapsmere
scepticaldetractors?
And how new is it? Let me say at once thatmy titleis intendedto conveythatsuchoriginalnoveltyas theremay have been about it is
largelyover.I do not wishto argueherewhetherit was bornin Paris,Oxfordor
Cambridgeor somewhereelse,tenyearsago, twentyyearsago, in thiscentury,
or
lastcentury;whilephilosophically
it is, of course,as old as thehills.I mean by
'new' thatsomething
hasalreadyhappenedto Britishsocialanthropology
(and to
international
anthropology
in relatedways)suchthatforpracticalpurposestextbooks whichlooked useful,no longerare; monographswhich used to appear
exhaustivenow seemselective;interpretations
whichonce looked fullof insight
now seem mechanicaland lifeless.It is also new enoughthatthesechangesare
understood
(or misunderstood)
by somein quitea different
light:thatmonographs
have givenway to lightweight
essays;whereonce was reason,unreasonreigns;
forverifiable
is substituted;
postulates
speculation
insteadof 'reality'we have the
cosmologicalorder.
Social anthropologists
do not muchlike ideologicallabels,but thatis not why
I do notwishto describethedivisionas between'functionalists'
and'structuralists'.
The old anthropology
butthenew anthrohasitsclaimto be called'functionalist',
pologyis notnecessarily
accurately
termed'structuralist'
unlessthattermis given
an evenwiderconnotation
thanithasalreadyacquired-indeedI shallbe suggesting
is subsumedby it. Furthermore,
sincethe idiosynthatthe old 'functionalism'
crasiesofindividuals
countforso muchin a smallsubjectlike ours,thesituation
has become confusedby various declarationsand rejectionsof theoretical
allegiance.
The confusionderivesfromthe extraordinary
rangeof positionsfromwhich
of thenewerpositionsfroman orthodox
debatebegins.Firstwe have criticism
ofviewamongthecore
Malinowskian
viewpoint.Thenthereis a setofdifferenlces
of 'new anthropologists'
themselves.
Thisturnsoftenon thenatureof 'structuralism', and on whethertheyare structuralist
or not. Then thereare certainuseful
a kindofoffshoot
of themain
debateson rationality,
and thelike,whichrepresent
of the
debates-or a fightin a ditchbetweenthelines.Then thereare criticisms
and others,and of British
structuralist
positionby Marxists,culturalmaterialists,
of thepurerLevi-Straussian
structuralism
by adherents
position.Thereareparallel
whereSturtevant
debateswithintheAmericanculturalanthropology,
(I964) has
of 'a new ethnography'(althoughthis
alreadyreferredto the establishment
is narrowerthantheone I havein mind).Somewherein themiddle
development
*The MalinowskiMemorialLecture,deliveredat the London School of Economics
197I.
and PoliticalScienceon 23 February,

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EDWIN

450

ARDENER

of it all comesa genuinesplit.It runslike a crackin an Arcticice-floeseparating


Some on one side leap
fromdepartment.
colleaguefromcolleague,department
back to the other.Not all thosewho led the debateend up on thesameside.
break(a coupure
as Althusser
(I969) would
Therehas occurredan epistemological
kind.So far,and in thatsense,thereare now a new
have put it) of an important
and an old anthropology.There is a position,acquaintedwith neighbouring
movements
as partof a changeof
whichseesthenew anthropological
disciplines,
mindin scienceitself
of theold.
The new is notthena merelyspeculative
and anomaloussubdivision
is totallyrestructured:
theold fieldand thenew
The fieldof socialanthropology
cannottherefore
be made
fieldformdifferent
conceptualspaces.A rapprochement
just by addingan extracourseoflectures.Nor does theanswerlie 'somewherein
withgreater:a courseinBoyle'sLaw
themiddle'.To compareourtrivialconcerns
cannotbe accommodatedto a syllabusin phlogistontheory.The restructured
results-itgenerates
them,plussomemore.
fielddoesnotabolishpreviousempirical
thetermscannotrepresent
to a newor'neo-anthropology',
a permanent
So ifIrefer
Theirtemporary
use drawsattention
situation.
onlyto thefactthatanthropology
has'rethought'itselfwillynilly,leavingthesubjectat leastas 'empirical'as it ever
friends
was, as well as muchharderto do well (a pointthatits more thoughtless
As a resultit isno longerpossibleto 'get
as well as itsdetractors
mightremember).
on withfieldwork',usingad hoc'concepts'in thesubsequentanalysis.
I canhardlydealwithall ofthisin an hour.Thislectureis in parta simplification
ofarguments
in a recentpublication
advancedand documented
and generalisation
forthemostimportantreferences.
(ArdenerI97ia; b),to whichthereaderisreferred
I shallpresentthe positionnow as some have asked,by avoidingany merely
I shall discussthreeinterand leavingout linguistics.
fashionableterminology,
contradiction
in
social anthropology;2) the
relatedthemes: i) the empirical
and syntagmatic
and 3) therelationconfusionbetweenparadigmatic
structures;
trendsto problemsin positivist
socialscience.
shipof theneo-anthropological
*

in thetheoryof Malinowskianfieldwork,
in
Therewas a centralcontradiction
so faras it was thoughtto be essentially
'observational'in nature.There was
offrequency
betweenl
statements
basedon observation,
alwaysa certainconfusion
before
and statements
about frequency.Thus,
measurement
statistical
became
commonin thesubject,Barnes(I949) drewourattention
to theobscureempirical
in anthropological
like 'divorceis freqtuent'
contentof statements
monographs.
of a certainnumberof actual
sort
of
of
'observations'
There was a
merging
of frequencyby supposedlywell-informed
subjects.
divorces,with assessments
it
as
a
It was combination,
were,of an unrandomsampleof marriageswithan
of
unrandomopinionpoll about the stateof marriage.Sociologisticcriticisms
on
taken
method
were
well
this
anthropological
point.
of thelaterstagesoffunctionalism
is notthatit failedto be an
But my criticism
but
it stubbornly
that
saw itselfas
accurateobservational,
probabilistic
science,
in
when
it
had
and
observational
its
failure
be so. The
to
empirical
anystrength
lay
soon
members
of
obvious.
Certain
the
Central
African/Manchester
symptoms
were
did set out to improvethe observational
methodsof
school of anthropologists

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THE

NEW

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND

ITS

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45I

fieldwork.Barnes,Mitchelland othersmade it possibleto applyadvancedstatisticalmethodswheretheyhad been previouslyregardedas impracticable.


The
resultwas unexpected:suchstudieswere not muchwelcomedeven by avowed
empiricists.
The more 'statistically
rigorous'seemedto mean,in some way, the
denythesoundnessofthisinstinct.
less'anthropological'.
We maynotnecessarily
Let us be clear,however,thattheworksof manyof thosewho chargethepostfunctionalist
tendencywithbeing'metaphysical'or 'speculative'failthemselves
criteriaof evidencewhich are known to the
to satisfyeven thoseelementary
Not forthemthelaboriousunpeelingoflayer
humblemarketer
of soap-powders.
ratherthe wide sweep of thebrushand the unrepupon layerof probabilities:
resentative
the unspecified
informant,
and the underemphasised
or unstatistic,
mentionedcolonialbackground.If 'empiricist'stonesare to be thrown,theold
functionalist
house,be it as imposingas theCrystalPalace,is madeofglassjust the
same.
Mostpost-waranthropologists
failedto come to gripswiththisproblemat the
heartof theirsubject-neithertruly'mentalist'nor 'behaviourist',neitherconto those
sistently
'idealist' nor 'materialist'.We should be grateful,therefore,
to drawattention
to thetopic,andrecognise
who madetheeffort
how surprisingly
hardit was to achievea hearingwithoutresortto a certainpolemictoneand even
to actsofsymbolicviolence,amongwhichthedetonationof Needham'splastique:
and sentiment
Structure
(I962) mustremainthe classicof our time.Let us recall
ofBopp andthoselinguists
thatSaussure'scriticism
who precededtheunrulyNeo'thisschool,whichhad
grammarians
was veryapplicableto thelaterfunctionalists:
the indisputablemeritof opening up a new and fertilefield . . . never set itselfto

seek out the natureof its object of study'(I922: i6, my trans.).Of the Neoin
Pedersenwas able to affordtheluxuryof regretting,
grammarians
themselves,
of calmerdays,thattheyhad feltit necessary
theretrospect
to operatewithsuch
'clamourand strife'(I962: 292).
empiricism
had been
Let us suppose,forsake of argument,thatfunctionalist
consistently
aiming at the honourabletask of close and accurateobservation,
We can nowadaysappreciatethe many
throughcarefulstatistical
investigation.
fromclose
genuineobjectionsto anyattemptto apprehendthenatureofstructure
For example:havingchosensome elementary
miieasurement.
observational
probof themovementsovertimeof a groupof chairsand a
lem suchas thestructure
certaintable,we findthatthemicrometer
readingsat floorlevelturnup variations
A ratherbanal statement
which offerpuzzles of interpretation.
that 'this is a
but rendersthe microdiningroom' not only bringsorderinto the variations,
Such a statement
It is
measurements
has the statusof a programme.
superfluous.
sufficient
to accountfor the movementof individualchairs;it condensesthe
withinthe mostflexiblelinmits
essentialrelationships
of measurement.
Indeed,as
in thisseriespointedout(LeachI96I), no relationships
thefirst
lecturer
ofquantity
ofmicro-measurement
arenecessary.
In contrast,
therefinements
lead theobserver
to delicateprecautions
to accountforthe
belowthelevelofsignificant
phenomena,
of floor,slipperiness
unevenness
of linoleum,or
wobble of individualchair-legs,
in woodgrain,and so on. As if thosewere not problemsenough,the
variations
measureris alwaysat themercyof an arbitrary
changein theprogramme,'this
is a diningroom', whichmaybe modifiedwithouthisknowledge,in some such

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452

EDWIN

ARDENER

way as 'except on Thursdayfromseven untilelevenwhen it is a dance hall'.


Whereverhumanbeingsintervene
we arein thisscientifically
undignified
position.
In theworldofsocialformations
we do not,as itwere,evenknowwherethechairs
and tablesare. In refining
our statistical
surveysa pointcomes when we realise
of thecategories
this.We know thatthedefinition
thatwe useforourmeasuresis
thetrueproblem(ArdenerI962: 68-9).
of a preliminary
The interest
approachthroughthe analogyof theprogrammte
in thefieldofprediction
liesprecisely
and verifiability/falsifiability.
Thisis a great
irony,forthe onlykindof predictionwhichhas been acceptedas 'scientific'in
positivistsocial sciencehas been thestatistical
Yet the
statement
of probability.
'thisis a diningroom' whichis devoidofanymensurational
statement
component,
is quiteadequately'predictive'offuture
offurniture
movements
atfloorlevel.The
predictivities
are,however,of two different
kinds.Thus micro-measurement
may
X touchespointY on thefloor(wherethereis,say,a knotof
tellus thatifchair-leg
wood) itwillwitha quantifiable
probability
moveoffata certainanglefora certain
numberof millimetres,
accordingto itspreviousvelocity.Regularities
ofthissort
areremarkably
theprogramme
is predictive
specific.In contrast
ratherof kindsof
movement,includingsome kindsthathaven'thappenedyet,because(say) the
Queen has not yetdined,or thehaggishas not yetbeenpiped.We mightuse a
betterterminology,
andsaythattheprogramme
is totally'generative'
as to kindof
event,butit is notnecessarily
predictive
as to whentheeventswilloccur.Furthermore,theprogramme
itselfis finite:it maybe amendedor rejected.As a resultit
may never,even will never,generateall thekindsof eventsforwhichit is the
programme.
The image of theprogrammeis also useful,sincetheverytermembodiesthe
contradiction.
When a theoretician,
emiipiricist
offersa prosay a philosopher,
grammeitis essentially
uncalibrated
to events.Yet a computerprogramme
isjustthe
it
is
calibrated
to
events.
opposite, precisely
When thetermprogrammatic
is used of
someof thewritings
of Saussure,ofJ.R. Firth,of Hjelmslev,ofLevi-Strauss,
the
pejorative overtonessuggest: 'unverifiable','untested', 'unapplied'. When
is used of computeroutputany pejorativeimplicationwould be
programmed
as:
expressed 'strictly
derived'.A paralleldifference
predictable','mechanistically
in evaluationoccursin theusesof redundancy
in thedifferent
and
sensesofstylistics
communication
theory.In stylistics,
is superfluous
redundancy
and unmotivated,
an inelegancein theutterance.
leadingto an inefficiency,
In communication
theory
afterShannon(I948), redundancyis an essential,measurableelementin the
message,the eleganceof whichlies in its directrelationto the amountof noise
on thechannelwhichithasto overcome.The termsbeardifferent
values:theydo so
becausetheybelong to two different
systems.The computerprogrammeand
Shannonianredundancy
areprecise,becauseof theabstraction
fromnaturalevents
thattheyrepresent.
Yet whyshouldtheimprecise
literary
equivalents
be quiteso
unlikethem:notmerelydifferent
in degreebutin kind?
The programmesfor humaneventsare self-transforming.
They embodyinnumerablemeta-levels.
We mayvisualisea computerprogramme
fora calculation
in whichtherewas an instruction
to stop,rewriteall precedingx as y and thento
as ifall x hadbeeny fromthebeginning.
proceedwiththecalculation
Or we might
imaginea programme
foran outputof musicin whichan instruction
occurredto

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THE

NEW

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND

ITS

CRITICS

453

transpose
to anotherkey,or startat thetwentieth
bar of a new colmiposition.
Let
us go on to imaginethatthetapedoesnotclearlyshow us the code forthetranspositioninstruction,
and imaginefurther
thatthe transpositions
are many and
various,and thatwe do not even possessthattape: merelythe output.Are all
In thecaseofthemusicaloutputthe
thesestrings
offigures
partof one calculation?
questionofwhether
themusicwasall' thesame'wouldbe evenlessreal.In termsof
anyoneanalysis
theoutputwouldcontainapparently
unmotivated
redundancies,
the
programme
wouldnotbeproperly
calibrated
toanysingleconsistent
modelofevents.
stretches
Should all the systemsto whichthe different
of the outputreferbe
separately
stated?Or shouldsomebe regardedas falsestarts?
Shouldonlythefinal
stretch
of outputbe referred
to a specificsystem?
Do thetranspositions
themselves
expressa meta-system?
And so on. Shannonianinformation
theoryonce appearedto offera modelfora view of theoutputas essentially
probabilistic.
Given
enough'message',a copiousenoughoutput,thecode mightbe determined.
The
forEnglishdid actuallyderivefromwar-time
Shannoniantransition
probabilities
Jakobsonand Halle (I956), however,made an essential
distinction
code-breaking.
The cryptanalyst
lacksthecodebook.He is the
betweencryptanalysis
and decoding.
outsideobserver.The decoder(heremy possessorof the programme)does not
functionlike a cryptanalyst.
The code-bookas restoredor reconstructed
from
probabilistic
examination
of theoutputcan nevercontainrulesforkindsofchains
whichhave notyetbeen generated.
To see why, let us returnto our elementary
discussionof predictivity.
An
'this is a diningroom' can be
empiricist
mayplausiblyassertthatthestatement
It may be seenas summarising
looked at as probabilistic.
statements
probabilistic
aboutthenatureof theuse of diningrooms,fromwhichitspredictivity
derives:
a statistical
a 'folkstatistic'.
isin effect
as ifthestatement
Itis here,in my
assessment,
backedup by
view,thatthebasicchangein approachderivedfromLevi-Strauss,
becomesclear.Ifourobserverwereto deduce
thoughtin neighbouring
disciplines,
of a sufficiently
certainprobabilitiesfrom his measurements
large corpus of
he could,it is true,expressthemin a formulasuchas 'this
furniture
movements,
is now a termof artfortheseprobain whichthe statement
is a dining-room',
in theprogrammeof the
bilities.It bearsa 'familyresemblance'to thestatement
statement
is 'testable'in termsof how
and in additionthestatistical
informant,
thoseprobabilities
continueto be realised.Thereare,however,importaccurately
betweenthetwo statements.
antdifferences
'Theyderivefromthecriticalimportitself.The nativestatement,
as a programmefor
ance of themode of derivation
All the argumentsof
non-verbalevents,has not been apprehendedstatistically.
of languageapplywith equal
Chomsky(e.g. I969: 63) about the apprehension
oftheprogrammatic
ofsociety.The 'nativeactor'
structure
forceto theacquisition
withhighlyrestricted
hasbeenpresented
data,'a highlydegenerate
sample,in the
or incorrect'.Yet his 'comnsensethatmuchof it mustbe excludedas irrelevant
observer.
petence'willalwaysexceedthatoftheanthropological
Thus,ifwe 'test'
and it is 'wrong' statistically:
a programme
statement
thisis becauseit
statistically
We sometimesconfuseourselvesand our
statement.
is simplynot a probabilistic
becausein all societiestheprogrammeis subjectto a greateror lesser
informants,
in statistical
nowhereso oftenas in thepositidegreeto discussion
meta-language:
vistWest.

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454

EDWIN

ARDENER

The elementary
exampleI have used so far,expressedthrougha verbalstatement,will not, however,take us safelyfar,withoutleadingus into purelylinLet us,therefore,
guisticside-issues.
quicklygo overthequestionof 'prescriptive'
fromthispointofview,foritreallyis important.
I do notneed
versus'preference'
to say to thisaudiencethatthesetechnicaltermsas appliedto marriagealliance
raisedcontroversy
(Needham I962). Whateverbe the rightsor wrongsof the
of distinction
applicationof thisdistinction
to specificmarriagesystems,
thekintd
cannotbe deniedanalyticalvalidity.It will emergemoreclearlyif we leave the
contentious
ethnography,
and takethecategory'marriageable
woman' inEnglish
society.The only dimensionI can thinkof along which the 'prescribed'/'preferred'distinction
clearlyemergesis thatof age, in thisway. The methodof
probabilistic
measurement
may well show us thatmostEnglishwomencontract
theirfirst
marriages
betweenages I8 and 28 withthepeaksomewherenearage 2I.
Native informants
like myselfmay also make statements
to the anthropologist
that the preferred
age of firstmarriagefor women also lies betweencertain
limits-possiblythesamelimits,or different
ones.
In mostfunctionalist
fieldworkthesetwo approachesare essentially
all thatis
necessary.
Thereis a 'real', lmleasured,
or notionally
measurable
situation,
and a set
of statements
aboutit by natives.The latterare 'normiis',
'values' or thelike.One
teststhesefortheirpredictivity
by theformer,theonlytrueobservational
yardstick.Manyofthecommentators
on Levi-Strauss
haveinterpreted
thesetwo kinds
of statements
as his 'statistical'and 'mechanical'models(Ardener
inaccurately
by theobserverwitha
I97ib: 233-5). Let us acceptthatthenativeis confronted
The observermay ask: 'What about theseotherwomen in unions
discrepancy.
whichtheycontracted
at theage of 40?', or thelike.The replymaybe, 'Oh yes,
thoseare stillmarriages'.In dealingthusempirically
with a preferred
criterion
of marriagethereis no conflictin modeof observationbetweennativeand observer.The observermightsaythat,in fact,mostoftheagesofwivesin marriages
contractedthisyearfelloutsidethoselimits.The nativemay reply,'Well that's
unusual',or 'What canyouexpectnowadays?';buthe willnotdenythattheseare
Thepreferred
marriages.
category(heredefinedby age) is likethat.Now, if,on the
theobserversays,'Why, you wereabsolutelyright,everywomanfirst
contrary,
marriedthisyeardid fallwithintheseage limits',it is easyto makethemistake,as
many have done, thatwe are in the presenceof a 'prescribed'
category:as if
a ioo percent.prediction
wereessentially
prescription
by a lay statistician.
The objectionsare:
i. Not all ioo per cent.predictions
thusin the case of the
are prescriptions:
is notreallymoreconvincing
preferred
age of marriagea ioo percent.realisation
thanan 8o percent.or a 5o percent.realisation,
sinceotheragesofmarriage
arenot
excluded.
2. In so faras prescriptions
incidentally
appearto claimto make ioo per cent.
or are castin sucha form,theirpredictivity
is not probabilistic:
predictions,
they
generatethenatureoftheevent.
Here liesthepoint.ConsiderourEnglishcriterion
again.You are still'testing'
thepreferred
age. You now ask: 'what of marriagesat age i5?'. The replythis
timeis thattherearenone.'What', you ask,'of thatyoungwoman whom I have
ascertained
to be iS andwho is married?'.The replyis this:'Eitheryou arewrong

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THE

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455

aboutherage andsheis married,


or youarerightaboutherage andsheis not
married'.
No amount
ofthesortofempirical
demonstration
thatworkedforthe
preferential
category
can now shakethenativestatement,
forthereis in facta
prescriptive
agecategory
ofmarriageable
women(allwomenofi6 yearsofageand
over)whichis different
inkindfromthepreferential
category
we havediscussed.
A prescription
thusdefines
thecategory
itself.
Now theonlylivelyattackon thissurely
self-evident
position
(cf MayburyLewisI965) hascomefromthecultural
materialist
MarvinHarris.
He remarks
in
ironical
disbelief:
Thereis nothingto be shockedaboutin theproposalthattheexistence
of theprescribed
systemdependsupon whetheror not an appropriate
'conceptual'distinction
is made by
the culturalcarriers
... Let it be recordedthenthatin thisfashion,the structuralists
climbup ropesand disappearoffthetopsof them(I969: 509-I0).

The ropetrickis an illusionall right-aglintin thebehaviourist


sunglasses.
Sincewe areeducated
in thepositivist
tradition-in
whichprescriptions
mustbe
re-encoded
inprobabilistic
terms-wehaveconfused
thewholematter
withnorms
andlawandethics.
Forthisreasoneventhepioneer
theorists
couldonlyapproach
thematter
through
theexisting
legalistic
term'prescribed'.
Innon-literate
societies
theterms
ofa prescription
needno adventitious
support.
Thesupposed
'empirical'
facts
arewhatisamended.
Thuswhile' prescribed'
numerical
minimum
ageisnot
a typical
feature
ofnon-literate
marriage,
insomesocieties
nomarriages
occurbefore
menarche.
Ifthereis evidence
thatthemenarche
hasnotoccurred,
themarriage
hasnotoccurred.
hasoccurred.
Ifthere
isevidence
ofa marriage,
thenthemenarche
Do notimagine
He will
thata skilled
couldconvince
themotherwise.
positivist
findtheterms
andmarriage
to meetanyobjection,
likethatvery
menarche
stretch
In comparielasticrubber-sheeting
to whichLeachoncedirected
ourattention.
of
is obviously
like'cross-cousin'
son,theprescriptiona genealogical
category
inany
child's
theethnographic
mechanics
ofa prescriptive
play.Whatever
category
in
anda
of
between
a prescribed
singlecase,thepossibility a differenceprinciple
debate.
seems
to
be
established
and
is
the
whole
preferred
category
clearly
worth
ofchoice-unless
Hobson'sisalso
Itdoesnotrelyonthatredherring:
theproblem
to
we owe entirely Needham(I962), sinceLeviincluded.This contribution
Strauss
denieshisownpartinit (I967).
nowsurprisingly
hadnosympathy
withHomansandSchneider
Harris,
indefatigable
critic,
(I955)
in
that
the
this.
He
sees
aswellas byimplication
forgetting
involved
clearly they,
do
not
to
wereonlyhalf-hearted
with.They
English
functionalists,
empiricistsstart
ofstatistics:
objectto theabsence
They are contentinsteadto grapplewiththe phantomsof idealizedrulesand idealized
Innocents
abroad!
fromwhichbeautifully
marriages,
logicalidealizedexchangecyclesresult.
ones.Theydo notrealize
to dealwithphantoms,
butnotwithelementary
Theyareprepared
who have
as distinct
fromtheeclecticAmericanamateurs
thatamongprofessional
idealists,
andbehaviourism
rubbedshoulders
withlogicalpositivism
too longto knowhow to really
in a hundredcasesis no betterthanthatwhichis
getofftheground,a rulewhichis manifest
manifestin one (I969: 505).

at floorlevel.
Beautifully
put,fromthepointof view of a micro-measurer
ofpresfeatures
ofthedebate.Thepeculiar
outcome
Harris
confuses
thegenuine
ofwhatI havecalledtheprogramme.
criptive
categories
areoftheveryessence

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The zone of enmpirical


observation(as normallymisunderstood)
containsthe
behaviourist's
statistical
pictureof thefacts.The middlezone of nativediscussion
aboutprobabilities
containsmuchof thefunctionalist's
materiallabelled'values',
'norms','preferences'
and thelike(to which'charter'beliefswereonce brutally
conjoined).Sincefolk-statements
of thistypecould be statistically
provedto be
predictivelyinefficient,
the anthropologist
has tended to miss or ignore the
categorieswhichare not so discussable-despite
the earlywarningfromEvansPritchard,
whose studyof Azande witchcraft
showed thatemnpirical
un(I937)
of theirthoughtsystem.It is surelythe
falsifiability
was thedefining
characteristic
ofthenewanthropology
contribution
to be moreconsciously
awareoftheprimacy
of theprogramme;to statethatin understanding
society,thenative'sas wellas
theobserver's
statements
areat themercyof theprogramme.
probabilistic
It is not its contribution
to deny that close measurement
and probabilistic
that are relevantto the programme,and
dialogue will uncoverregularities
as well
occasionally
some,usuallyecological,whicharecentralto theprogramme,
to theprogramme,
as lotsof ad hocregularities
whichareirrelevant
butwhichare
thesubjectmatterof otherfieldsof discourse.Let thisall continue,butevermore
skilfully.
We are in thepositionof one personwho imitatesanother.While personX
or patternedactivity,personY, the imitator(in comsome repetitive
performs
When X
putertermsa simulator)
acquiressome degreeof skill in predictivity.
Y flounders.
The predictivity
failsat theonly
changesto anothermode of activity
It seemsquitelikelythathumanbeingsin
momentat whichit is trulyimportant.
inertiaforvaryinglengths,along
societydo tendtowardsperiodsof repetitive
The patternof thesestretches
variousmeasurableparameters.
may thenbe reinfrastructure
coverableby observation.The biologicaland environmental
will
to thesein particular
is an honoursuchthata resoluteattention
imposeregularities
able study.Even withtheirhelp,however,themere'observer'of socialevents,
assistanceof some probabilistic
even with thefurther
dialoguewiththeparticipants,is truly(as Wiener(I948) says) in a positioncomparableto a Maxwell's
Demon, a being on the same scale as the moleculesin a thermalsystem.The
thathe cannotcommandtheinformation
to map
Demon's problemis,essentially,
thesystemof whichhe is a part.He is a goal-keeperin thefogtryingto intercept
footballs
kickedfromall directions.
*

in orderto holdthe
I haveproceededso farwiththenotionof theprogramme,
In orderto
ofthoseofyou who thoughtyou werededicatedempiricists.
attention
thinkmoreaboutit we shallhave to dropthemechanistic
analogy,but we have
not quite exhaustedit. Levi-Strauss's
myth-logicdoes resemblethatof a selfamendingprogrammesuch as I sketchedearlier.A piece of mythlooks like
unions
nonsense.A mythstatement
transforms,
inverts,
adds,subtracts,
performs
upon sets,all in a mishmashof operations,
imposedupon imagesof bitsof exorderof:
is of thenonsensical
perience.A mythstatement
apples+ pears= bananas

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Yet thiswould be a 'reasonable'outputof a programmewithtwo transpositions.


We could writeout an untransposed
programmelike this:
Programme:
i. Exemplify
thattheunionof two subsetsof a setis partof theset.
2. Let thesetbe apples.
Output: apples+ apples= apples
Imagine,however,thatcertainrewriteinstructions
intervene:
Output: apples+ [apples. . .]
Programme:
Rewriteapplesas pears
Olitput:
. . . + pears=[pears]
Programme:
Rewritepearsas bananas
Output: ... = bananas
In effectwe can 'restore' threelinear 'logical' statements
which the output
in different
exemplifies
phases.
i.

apples+ apples= apples

pears+ pears= pears


3. bananas+ bananas= bananas

2.

So threeexemplifications
ofa 'logical' definition
ofidentity
appearin theoutput
as an 'illogical'confusion
ofidentities.
The 'message'is,in theone case: 'theunion
oftwo subsetsofa setis partof theset'. In theother,it is: 'subsetsof different
sets
arenotpartofthesameset'. The humancapacityto 'receive'thenonsenseoutput
is striking.This is achievedthrougha 'symptomatic'reading,as Freud (and
Althusser)
wouldputit.The detailedwrite-out,
intothreelogicalstatements,
is the
equivalentof Levi-Strauss's
methodof analysisin Mythologiques,
althoughhe has
sethimself
an enormoustask.You arefree,ofcourse,to saythatthe'myth'ofthe
applesand pearssymbolises
a disquisition
formulaeare a
on identity.
Levi-Strauss's
kindof science-fiction,
perhaps-a set of possiblemethodswitha set of guessed
answers.They show us, however,thatrationality
can be restoredin partto the
'nonsensical'output,by a set of rewriteinstructions.
It is at thisveryabstruse
pointthathis thoughtintuitively
meetsChomsky's:it would be misleadingto
pursuetheirseparateonwardcourses.
The condensedstatements
of mythcan be in principleteasedout as totally
natureof
'rational',totally'logical', providedwe perceivetheself-transforming
theprogramme.
The 'rewrites'
thatarenecessary
to restore
aregenerated
rationality
withinthe programmeitselfNevertheless
in thatpart of the outputwhich is
in behaviourtheyare theprogrammatic
symbolised
homologuesof 'adaptations'
to theinfrastructure.
At thelevel of myth,however,theyare leastdirectlycalibratedto thenaturalorder,and thementalstructures
can be mostclearlyshown.
As Levi-Strauss
says(I970: io): 'when themindis leftto communewithitselfand
no longerhas to come to termswithobjects,it is in a sensereducedto imitating
itselfas object'.At thelevelof theadaptations,
kindbased
structures
of a different
on observation
maybe imposedor elicitedby theanalyst,
as we shallsee.Butwhat
is all thisaboutthe'restoration'of rationality?
of
Human 'rational'apperception
symbolicsystems
maywell be evolutionarily
olderand moredevelopedthanthe
abilityto unpackthemendlessly
intolinearlyexpressed
notations
(ArdenerI97ia:
xliii-xlvi).Let me remindyou of Ortegay Gasset's(I92I, mytrans.)description

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as 'an instrument
oftherichly
forthe
programmatic
powerofmetaphor
necessary
left... intheinsideofoneofhiscreatures,
actofcreation,
whichGodforgetfully
in thebellyof his
as an absent-minded
sewsup one ofhisinstruments
surgeon
patient'.
first.
ofpossible
involves
their
Theunpeeling
sequences
hypothesising
Hence,the
and thelike.
'structures':
thesuspicions
of arbitrariness
problemof validating
In comparison,
thoseannoying
cross-cousin
categories
begintolooklikebleeding
between
chunksof thenaturalorder.You will see thatmy initialdistinction
'output'and 'programme'
is, at thenextmeta-level,
exactlythesamekindof
ofa simultaneous
between
analytical
'linear'dissection
concept
as isthedistinction
the linearlogicalstatement
and the condensed,
transformationally
rewritten,
statement.
The programme
mythological
and the outputare simultaneously
present.
We mayargue,therefore,
are
thatthesamekindsofrewrite
arguments
inmplicit
intheoutput
ofsocialevents.
Thefinalrewrite
whenactionoccurs
willbe
intothesymbolism
ofbehaviour
itself.
Now thisis nothing
to do directly
with

correlations,
probabilities,
or polling,but I findno 'paralysisof reality'in it
(HarrisI969: 497).
In any case, certainprogrammatic
are 'calques' upon divisionsin
distinctions
the most behaviouristreality:sex differences,
bodily laterality,geographical
directions.
Nevertheless,
establishone level of categorisation
and humanbeings
builda metaphorical
levelupon it,thenupon thislevel,yetanother.The number
ofpossiblestructures
nestedone insidetheotheris thusbewilderingly
great.It is no
that
wonder
concentration
insteadupon theplaneor fieldof socialevents,as they
are generated,
was forlong so attractive.
Functionalists
have in factbeenusedto
orderingthisplane throughrudimentary
structures
of anothertype,call them
'syntagmatic'if you like,in oppositionto the 'paradigmatic'structures
of the
programme(see below, Appendix). Functionalists
did not always grasptheir
arbitrarynature,for syntagmaticstructuresfrequentlyapproximateto our
positivist
analoguesforrealityitself.The situational
logicofPopper,thefunctional
interrelationships
of Radcliffe-Brown:
they'feel' real.
It is notsurprising
thatthosewearingsyntagmatic
lensesdo notseeparadigmatic
structures.
Two casesfromEvans-Pritchard
will suffice.
As Douglas has pointed
out (197ob:xiv), Witchcrqft,
oraclesandmagicwas about knowing.The structures
were paradigmatic.Yet the contribution
as
was seen by most anthropologists
as about 'social control'and thelike. Again, The Nuerproposeda
syntagmatic:
modelof theoppositionof segments
in a systemof segments.
Thiswas a paradigmaticstatement:a trulySaussureanvision,but 'opposition'in a paradigmatic
statementwas apprehendedas 'conflict'in a syntagmatic
statement.Again:
'exchange' (Mauss): paradigmatic;'transaction'(Barth): syntagmatic.
So too:
'alliance': 'descent';'prescription':
'preference';andmy'programme':' output'.
The interlocking
planesof interpretation
show us something
of whatis meantby
the problemof calibrationof programmeto event.A humanbeing in society
experiencesan eventas an expressionof both modes.He and it are unitedin a

uniquevaleur
(Saussure
I922:

I53-4).

You will thinkthatthislectureis now retreating


intoan arcaneterminology.
Let me reassure
you. Whatevertermswe use,theymerelystatethatthestructures
of theso-called'structuralism'
arenot more'speculative'(whateverelsetheyare)

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thanthestructures
of theso-called'functionalism'.
Furthermore,
notall formulationsderivedby 'structuralists'
are paradigmatic,
althoughwhatappearsnovelis
theimmanentparadigmatic
awareness.Conversely,not all formulations
derived
by 'functionalists'
are syntagmatic,
but what appear old and familiarare the
syntagmatic
assumptions.
The methodofstructures
is indeedalreadybeingapplied,as yetin an earlyway,
to the syntagmatic
plane. I have alreadysuggested(I97Ia: lxxv) thatBarth's
transactions,
Barnes's,Bott's,Mitchell'snetworks,
andsuchdevelopments,
canthus
be designatedas stepstowardsthe higheststageof functionalism:
'That is: a
functionalism
becomeaware(oraboutto becomeaware)thatthefieldofbehaviour
or action,even when arbitrarily
isolatedfromthe ideologicalprogrammethat
determines
itsmeaning,mustitselfbe structured
by theobserverbeforeit can be
"observed"'. Syntagmatic
models 'work' untila paradigmaticchange occurs.
Theygenerateonlyeventsofthekindwhichhavealreadyhappened.Nevertheless,
a complementary
and fullyconscioussyntagmatic
structuralism
is much to be
in thismore
desired,and we mayhope fora functionalist
revivalor transmutation
rigorousform,as part of any trulynew anthropology.So far,however,the
'syntagmatists'
are wrestlingwith a hundredad hocterminologies,
due to their
inexperience
of thenatureof theparadigmatic
dimension.
Not theleastconfusing
is theirtendencyto label their'syntagms'withtheterm'paradigm'itself.
effect
The pathsto the elicitingof the rationality
have
of paradigmaticstructures
meanwhileled throughthepainstaking
ofall
examination
ofsymbolicexpressions
kinds:myth,ritual,folklore,legend,riddles,gestures,
jokes, lateralsymbolism,
totemicclassification,
and thelike.The Americananthropologists
ofthe'cognitive
structure'
school,despitea difference
ofemphasis,
mustbe regardedas partofthis.
Othershave examinedtheoral literature,
theproblemsof theonomasticprocess
has also been
and so on. The recentattentionto the philosophicalimnplications
valuable.The natureof the 'mentalistic'portionof societyis now moderately
well known,because of all thiswork. We are out of the range,however,of
probabilistic
testing.At different
stagesthemostbrilliant
Europeanexponentsof
thenew linesof approachhave,becauseof this,foundthemselves
faltering.
They
have all beenhighlysensitive
to thechargeof empiricalinadequacy.Levi-Strauss
and
thus recoiledfromthe implicationsof his own analysisof prescription,
Leachhas
resorted
to otherdenialsofhisown work,whichsometaketoo literally.
reaffirmed
hisfunctionalist
allegiance(how likethatGalileohe summonedforthin
Rethinking
anthropology!).
Douglas hasbeenaccusedby him(I97I) ofa retreatinto
Roman Catholicapologetics.Needhamhascome to despairof a futureforsocial
anthropology
exceptthroughdisintegration
or 'iridescent
metamorphosis'
(I970).
All assailLevi-Strauss.
in Sartre'shellthenew anthropologists
Like thecharacters
careabouteachother'sfaults.Nevertheless,
derive
thesehonourablecontradictions
fromthelocationof theircharacteristic
worksin thecoupure
itself,
epistemologique
althoughonlyLevi-Strauss
exemplifies
all phasesof it.
has conIt is no surprisethatin remoteuniversity
departments
anthropology
tinued,becauseof the absentconsensus,to be taughtmore or less unmodified
sinceI955 to new generations
ofstudents.
Or a coursein 'cognitiveanthropology'
or thelike is patchedon. The feelingsof some anthropologists
are echoedin the
jeer of Harrisabout 'Mysticism,cynicism,
and some may agree
and miniskirts',

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to view is theveritabledebauchery
of
withhimthat' . . . whatis mostdistressing
methodwhichhassucceededRadcliffe-Brown's
puritanical
reign.Thisweakening
of theempiricalfibres(can it be thesameinfluence
whichhas mliade
London the
exporterof all mannerof musicaland sartorialnovelty?)standsout in morbid
contrastto theutilisationof the linguisticmodel by Americanculturalanthropologistsin thestudyof emic categories'(HarrisI969: 544-5). (Ratherunfairon
Londonin thiscase!)
of presentation
Whateverdeficiencies
mayhave occurredin theheady'sixties,
we have alreadyseen thatthe apparentcollapseof methodwas a behaviourist
illusion.Isolatedand frequently
scornedalthoughtheyhavebeenin functionalist
forshowingus theway. It is true
circles,we mustthanktheneo-anthropologists
thatanthropologists
will need to be even morewidelyeducatedand even more
scholarly
thanat presentiftheyareto makethetransition
to thekindsof applicationsthatnow awaitus. Therewillbe no shortcuts.
*

We saw thatthe questionof the evaluationof the 'truth' of paradigmatic


is the hard one. There are threekinds of systemthat sciencein its
structures
censoriousadolescencereactedfirmlyagainst,or has come to distrustsince:
i)
Pre-positivistsystems-like religious cosmologies; 2) quasi-positivist
systems-likeMarxism or psychoanalysis;3) pseudo-positivist
systems-like
andso on. We now entera tangle:systems
ofallthese
Rosicrucianism,
flat-earthism,
is likethem.
typescan be thesubjectofstructural
analysis;yet'structuralism'
The scientific
positivistrestson experimental
verification,
or the Popperian
piecemealfalsification,
which is the same thing.The model physicaluniverse
of thelastfewgenerations,
andit
expressedin thisway was thegreatachievemnent
easilyrendersimplausibleboththepre-positivist
systemsand thepseudo-systems
wheretheybear on physicalphenomena.The quasi-positivist
systemsare not in
quitethesamecase. NeitherMarxismnor Freudianism,
althoughproductsof the
scientificrevolutionand empiricalin orientation,nowadays rest on a truly
positivist
basis.These systemsare like scythedchariotswhichsliceaway positivist
realityaroundthem.In principlethereis no way thattheycan putthemselves
into
a positionin whichtheycan be totallyfalsified
as systems.
Theiruse of positivist
language,and the commoncause thattheymade againsttheold religiousdogatfirst
matisms,
disguisedthefactthattheseweresystems
parallelto positivism,
not
aspectsof it. Pseudo-scientific
systemslike flat-earthism
are disreputable,
in contrast,becausetheycompetewithpositivism:theyattemptto builda non-positivist
superstructure
upon essentially
positivist
premisses.They assert,if you like, the
existenceof miraclesby resortto experiment.
This centuryis litteredwith the
corpsesof suchhybrids:theyrunfromspiritualism,
throughsacredmushrooms,
and beyond.
The quasi-positivist
systems
on theotherhanddo not,in theirmatureforms,
any
longerneed to competein thisway. Theyarealmostas well-protected
fromtotal
experimental
disproofas is thesystemof positivism
itself,buttheyarein no way
dependenton positivist
procedures.
Ifwe look now at Levi-Strauss's
structuralism,
ofall trendyaccretions,
stripped
we can seethatittrulyhasaffinities
withMarxism
as well as withvariousversionsofpsychoanalysis.
It is certainly
noteither,butit is

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46I

butholmloioussort-nothomoousian
(ofthesamesubstance)
anentity
ofa similar
termsconveythe
Thesefourth
century
theological
ian (ofa similar
substance).
structuralism.
discussion
thathasgrownup aroundFrench
flavour
ofthcological
is 'like' Marxism
andpsychoanalysis,
itis certainly
notlike
Now ifstructuralism
nottherefore
morelike
dropthefearofthat.Areall three
flat-earthism.
We miiay
notorThe simpleansweris thatthelatter
dogmatic
systems?
thepre-positivist
They
itself
cansubject
tofalsification.
whichpositivism
iouslyinclude
propositions
It is, however,
werein facttheearlier(of coursetheoriginal)flat-earthisms.
witchcraft
typimodewhereby
instructive
to recallagaintheverysophisticated
No amountof positivist
the
measurement
wouldinvalidate
itself.
callyverifies
believeracceptsas giventhatdisasters
havea statistical
The witchcraft
system.
hasto explaintheindividual
of therate,and
incidence
He merely
probability.
that'20 peoplewilldieontheroadtoday'.He has
init.He accepts
sudden
changes
persons
die.
Everydayparticular
to explainthedeathonlyofparticular
persons.
is mapped,
carewithwhichtheincidence
themoregrist
Thegreater
thescientific
diedin a motoraccident.
In his
to hismill.So: Adelabu,a Nigerianpolitician,
enemies
milesaway,hispolitical
weremassacred
forwilling
home-town,
eighty
killedKennedy.
hisdeath.In sucha scheme
Johnson
truly
to explaintheincidence
inwitchcraft
liesin an attempt
beliefs
of
Thecausality
is Maxwell'sDemon,witha theory.
It is an essentially
Thebeliever
randomness.
thatprobabilistic
aresimply
notsecurely
itrecognises
'social'theory;
approaches
inthesyntagmatic
a modeofintervention
It hasa practice:
plane.The
predictive.
wellincludea specification
of'benefiting'
analysis
might
subordinate
syntagmatic
criteria
as of 'marginality'
or thelike.The number
of
individuals
by diagnostic
In itseconomic
thatthosewho
as we know,is enormous.
aspectitstates
variants,
events
shouldpaya socialtax(Ardener
systems
benefit
fromrandom
1970). Other
similar
thanwitchcraft.
topositivism
taskslessdestructively
They
attempt
parallel
structures.
fromthechainof eventsto unconscious
Theyare
all movecausality
ofMarxandFreudachieved
a
Thus,thesystems
' guesses'abouttheprogramme.
Itissignificant
topositions
topositivism.
that
return
supplementary
revolutionary
andhadto trimoffexcursions
intofields
flat-earthist
bothpassedthrough
phases,
ofMarr,andthebiotheories
hadmadeitsown: thelinguistic
whichpositivism
as weremanyofthemisapprehensions
werenotorious;
ofLysenko
logicalbeliefs
ofFreud.
methodforthe
Positivism
begins,then,to be clearlyvisibleas a powerful
a
in
on
a
of causality systems non-human
scale, calque,as it were,
examination
has
themetaphorisation
Yet
it
too
suffered
andthedice.
theearth,
uponthestars,
In
has
more
thesystem
andmorebeguntobe
ofallhumanstructures.thiscentury,
as
of genuine
scientific
is:
as a metaphysical
independent
one,that
apprehended
to
be
a
statistical
rate
now
comes
translated
of
Thusthehumanincidence
method.
'losers'or
notofwitches,
butofself.Peoplearestatistical
intotheresponsibility
and
more
from
More
that
flow
this.
all
with theimplications
they
'winners',
based on elaboratenon-measurements.
becomevictimsof socialengineering
is not
to humanaffairs,
as a newbeliefsystem
Butthislaypositivism,
pertaining
or
is
no
than
Marxism
method.
It
more
true
scientific
Freudianism;
validated
by
of thisghostimage
it is evenlesstrue.It shouldbe clearbynow thatrejection
or otherwise,
of rationality,
of'positivism'
shouldnotbe a rejection
positivist

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but a rejectionof theprivilegedstatusof metaphysical


positivism:whichis itself
immuneto testby experiment.
A 'positivistreligion',if not thatof Comte,has
certainly
won thecompulsorily
educatedmasses.
The emergenceof 'structuralism'
at thisperiodhas seriousimplications.
The
earliersystems
of Marx and Freudcouldbe seenin certaincarefully
obliquelights
as marginalto scientific
inquiry,and concernedwithpoliticsand mentalhealth.
The structuralist
approachencroaches
uponan established
mythology
aboutordered
thoughtitself,and echoesbiggerbattlesin the philosophyof science.For this
reason,thereis,I suggest,a life-or-death
noteaboutthevariousdebates.That the
smallsubjectof anthropology
shouldhave been called upon to house its most
powerfulstatement
in thehumanestudiesmaybe an accidentofacademichistory.
It is evidentthatwe are not merelyconcernedwithan internal'revolution',like
Malinowski'sdiscoveryof fieldwork,fromthe world-wideintellectual
interest
notonlyin structuralism
itself,
butin almostanywritingthatreflects
or resembles
it, evenin corruptand distorted
forms.The preparedness
of socialanthropology
derivedfrom the continentalschools of Durkheimand his followers,from
Saussureanand Prague linguistics,
fromEvans-Pritchard,
and his characteristic
pupils-includingtheOxfordtranslators
and developersof theideasof theFrench
school-even Dutch anthropology:
all weldedto materialcollectedin partsof the
globe veryoftenonly lightlytrodby the Malinowskians,
amongwhomLeach,
however,rectifiesthe balance in an importantmanner.Malinowskihimself,
in language,would surelyhave rejectedit all as some kindof
despitean interest
topsy-turvy
in the
Raddiffe-Brownianism?
We can see at once thattheconfusion
present
stateofanthropology
is ratherlikethatofa quietsuburbangardener
whose
pots have sproutedsome illegalbut valuableherb.A rag-tag-and-bobtail
thrust
his geraniumsaside,and offerenormoussumsfor the illicitweed. Shall he be
or rich?No wonderhe vacillates.
respectable
WhereI thinkthatLevi-Strauss's
is in advanceof somesupposed
structuralism
modernmasters,
is preciselyin his continualhold on a visionof empiricaldata,
eventhoughtheprecisedefinition
of ' empirical'is no longersimplein thepresent
age. Some of the occasionalexcessesderivefrommisinterpretation
of the new
freedoms.
Levi-Strauss's
systemcontainsat itsheartan outlineof modeswhereby
individuallyarbitrary
systemscan be matchedto each other.The data of a
structuralist
approachare in factall other
systems.
This is, afterall, onlya making
consciousof a kind of gamewe have alwaysplayed.We havevalidated,tested,
systems
against'reality9.
By thiswe havemeantour analoguesforreality.Logical
positivismand the scientific
methodrefinedtheseanalogues.We have matched
systemagainstsystem,in thefaiththatthepositivist
analogueshave a privileged
thelack of a privilegedset
position.In theworldof theunrecovered
programme,
of analoguesmustprovisionally
of a systemcan then
be assumed.The objectivity
The bringingof one systeminto
onlybe foundin its contrastto othersystems.
to anotherby transformational
linksis thenearestthingavailableto
relationship
When a systemis offered
whichis subsumedtotallyor in partby another,
testing.
falsification
of a kindhas occurred.In so faras thecore ofpositivist
analoguesfor
thanhumanlife,manyprovisionalanalyses
realityrestson morestablestructures
so we mustbe good at some hard
may be properlyrejectedas flat-earthism,
scientific
ideas. In zones where positivismcannotreach,the testingof system

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THTE NEW

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND

ITS

CRITICS

againstsystemis the only hope of advance.The maintenanceof a strategyof


provisionality
is essential,for only in thisway can the fatalobsessingeffectof
be finally
'unverifiable'
systems
loosened.'Let a hundredmodelsofformalsystems
practice,wherebya generacontend':thisis farsuperiorto thepresentintellectual
to
a
a
tionof scholarsis 'converted'to systemfor lifetime,
leavingtherethinking
'provisionality'
for
'relativism',
the next. Many people, one suspects,mistake
to
whereasit is clearlyquite the opposite.By denyingan absolutetruth-value
systemsof good fit,we become aware of what suchsystemsslice offwiththeir
shearsof relevance.As a resultnew kindsof 'universals'becomeaccessible.This
ofthefacilekind,butnot,I think,beyondthe
is to movewellbeyondstructuralism
contradictory
althoughitis.
programme
himself,
frequently
ofLe6vi-Strauss
It is interesting,
finallyto taketwo viewsinspiredby Marx. MarvinHarrisis a
il toto:'Every
ratherold-stylematerialist
who rejectstheDurkheimiantradition
and idealistic
imagesand
pore[hesays]ofDurkeim'stheoryisfilledwithmentalistic
formsDurkheimn
'returnsus to an
predilections'
(I969:
473). In the Elementary
aftertheworstof Hegel's "geists"' (HarrisI969: 478). As we
idealismpatterned
know,Marx said: 'For Hegel, theprocessof thought... is thedemiurgeof the
itsexternalphenomenon.For me, on thecontrary,
the
real,whichonlyrepresents
in man'shead' (Althusser
idealis nothingbutthematerial,
andtranslated
transposed
ofthiswhenhe says
I969: 89). Harrisis no doubttakinga commoninterpretation
thatLevi-Strauss'foundComte, Durkheimand Mauss standingon theirheads,
and hejoined them'(I964: 513).
The Marxistpositionis, however,no longeras simpleas that.Louis Althusser
of Marx can look dangerously
(I969), who is aware thathis modernrethinking
'idealist',is at som-epainsspecifically
to avoid thenotionthatMarx simplyturned
the crudeerrorsof Marxist
Hegel on his head. Furthermore,
underAlthussser
withpositivism.
materialism
are averted.His systemdoes not comllpete
Leninhimself
criticized
to
Engelsand Plekhanovforhavingappliedthedialecticexterlnally
application
of a conceptis neverequi'examples'fromthenaturalsciences.The externial
The applicationi
derived
valentto a theoretical
chaniges
nothingin the externally
practice.
ofthetruths
anyrealtranisformation
truthbutitsname,a re-baptism
incapableofproducing
thatreceiveit.The application
ofthelawsofthedialectic
to suchandsucha resultofphysics,
forexample,makesnotone iotaof differelnce
to thestructure
or development
of thetheoretical
ofphysics;worseitmayturnintoan ideologicalfetter
(Althusser
I969: I70).
practice

is applicabletoall developedideologicalsystems
Althusser's
parallel
terminology
in theirgeneration
from'flat-earthisms'
to andincluding
positivism.
Theyall differ
or a
of reality-transforming
practices.'So ideology',he says,'is notan aberration
lifeof
of history:it is a structure
essentialto thehistorical
excrescence
contingent
societies'(232). Again, 'It is profoundly
unconscious'(I969: 233). Again, 'Men
"live" theirideologiesas theCartesians"saw" ... themoon two hundredpaces
away . . .' (I969: 233). Again: he speaks of the 'overdeterminationof the real by

theimaginary
andtheimaginary
bythereal' (I969: 234). Finally'. . . themenwho
woulduseanideologypurelyas a meansofaction,as a tool,findthattheyhavebeen
caughtby it,implicatedby it,just whentheyare usingit and believethemselves
as
to be absolutemastersof it' (I969: 234). Harriswould thusgainlittlecomfort,
Marxistsnow disappearup ropesas well.
Althusser(I969: io6) moves the old Hegelian contradictions
into the same

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464

EDWIN

ARDENER

elaboratetransformations,
by the conceptof overdeteruniverseas Levi-Strauss's
(itselfborrowedfromthesystemof Freud):
miniation
is alwaysoverdetermined?
'What can thismeanbutthatthesimplecontradiction
The exceptionthusdiscoversin itselftherule,theruleof therule,and the"exof the new
simpleexamnples
ceptions" must be regardedas methodologically
rule'.
Douglas (I966) and Turner(i969)?
A strangebedfellowforour friends
but at presentthe
The new Marxismcan hardlyignorethenew anthropology,
scienceof 'socialformations'
can
onlychewat eachother.Althusser's
two systems
of a
as an overdetermination
theideologicalstatusof structuralism
demonstrate
thenew Marxismis
in thelate capitalist
period.For structuralism,
contradiction
itselfan advancedsystemof thetypeof itsown privilegedsubjectmatter.Harris,
thatthe new Marxismis
an old-liner,mightbe broughtin to warn,in effect,
phantomsand cannotcome offbest.I mustconfessto
meddlingwithelementary
withthe limitedends of the
brillianceis satisfied
some surprisethatAlthusser's
unlesshe is hopingslowlyto wean hisaudienceaway from
Marxistproblematic,
implicationsof the
its old mythology,towardsthe much more revolutionary
of metaphysical
(the'ghostimage') as a socialpractice.As
positivism
dethroning
he says: '. . . we know thata "pure" scienceonlyexistson conditionthatit
continually
freesitselffromthe ideologywhichoccupiesit, hauntsit or lies in
hasits
coreof structuralism
waitforit' (Althusser,
I969: 70). The anthropological
forthesupposedunreasonof
therationality
practice'generating
own 'theoretical
(Banaji1970) specifically
thepresentage. A Marxistcriticof Britishanthropology
exemptsLevi-Strauss'swork fromsimple criticismas an ideology. He overbutafterall
of modernBritishanthropologists,
delineates
someconfusions
sternly
byitsapparent
alwaysprogresses
MarxandEngelsthemselves
declaredthathistory
mistakes!
*

I do notfeel
In dirccting
anthropologists,
thislecturcmainlytowardspositivist
In thenew conceptualspace
to adoptthelabel 'structuralist'.
thenecdspecifically
and'functionalism'.
we haveonlydifferent
not 'structuralism'
kindsofstructures,
I have triedto makeclearthatan empiricalapproachand a procedurefortesting
herewithHarris)that,in
neednotbe of a positivist
(in agreement
type.I re-assert
anyway.
have only been pseudo-positivist
fact,Europeansocial anthropologists
lack of
despite
its
of
a
science
For thatreasontheyhave forso long had thegerm
proofs
whose
statistical
sociologists,
(dareI sayit?)with
statistical
proofs,in contrast
docucareful
have over the yearsalmostdestroyedtheirscience.Nevertheless,
proceed
should
in
our
armoury,
usingeverytechnique
mentaryor fieldresearch,
withgreaterconscientiousness,
not less. The returnof our subjectto fellowship
and
in thewiderintellectual
world,aftertheratherheartydominionover palmli
of metipinebequeathedto us by Malinowski,neednot blindus to thetradition
and to whichI am glad to pay
culousresearchwhichhisgreatpupilsestablished,
my tributein thisMemorialLecture.
I have spokenof the'new anthropology',
ratherthanof a 'new socialanthroFew
importance.
althoughnot of substantive
pology': thisI confessis deliberate,
fail nowadaysto wear a social aspect.The cultural
branchesof anthropology

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THE

NEW

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND

ITS

CRITICS

465

anthropology
oftheU.S. alsoprovidesparallelmodesof lookingat ourproblem:
thelinguists
and analysts
of categoriesof cognitionand thelike.The behaviourist
obsessioncharacteristic
of theAmericanschoolsitsill upon them,whilewe may
agreeforourpart,thattheBritishand Continental
schoolscan benefitfromsome
of theirmethods.But, in particular,
our old anthropological
linkswithstudents
of thebiologicaland environmental
infrastructure
beginto look veryimportant
again,sinceouranalysesstartwitheventsin theirzones.Furthermore,
to
thereturn
'anthropology'as a termmaywell symbolisetheend of thatperiodof one-sided
specialrelationship
withconventional
socialsciencewhichhas obscuredthe true
developmentof our subject.From conversation
with many scholarsin neighbouringfieldsitseemsthattheymaywellbe movingin similardirections.
Anthropologywillthen,we maythink,surviveintothenextgeneration,
bothempirically
and analytically,
and somebrightstudents,
witha littlehelp fromitsfriends
providedthatwe recognisethatthelongyearsofsinmply
patchingup theold consensus
arehappilyover.
APPENDIX

The distinctionl
between 'paradigmatic' and 'syntagmatic',I take ultimatelyfromSaussure
and his school, and Jakobson,althoughI realisethatthereare alreadyrathermany uses of these
terms,some over-elaborate.'Paradigm' is also a term(derivingfroma more traditionalusage)
whiclhis importantin themoderndiscussionsofthehistoryof science.I do not necessarilysee my
uses as inconsistentwith these,but the distinctionI am makinglies both in the oppositionwith
'syntagm', and in expression of this opposition at a particularmeta-level. The essential
linguisticdistinctionis succinctlypresentedby Milner (I97I: 254-5), where he shows the two
axes lying at right-angles(and definlingthe 'paragrammaticspace'). The acoustic chain of
Saussure is generatedlinearlyalonlgthe syntagmaticaxis. The paradigmaticaxis definesthe
chain.I Again: Levi-Straussrearrangeshis
classesof grammaticalrelationlship
in the synltagmnatic
mythsby imposinga paradigmaticaxis vertically,in oppositionto the 'linear' generationof the
which is thus 'syntagmatic'.Finally,my own usage moves a step furtherfrom
mythcontenlt,
the notionlof linear generation.Socially apprehendedevenltsare generatedin a multi-dimensional space. If we sce them as merelygeneratedin ordinaryspace, thisconceptual fieldI call
the 'syntagmaticplane'. Events in thisplane can be apprehendedby an observerthroughthe
elicitingof syntagmaticstructureseitherin space or over time, or both. The same eventsare,
structureis also an evenlt
however, generatedparadigmatically.Every evelntin a synltagmatic
in a paradigmaticstructure.The formeris a structurein the ' output'; thelatteris a structurein
the 'programme': termswhich are too mechanisticformore than analogical use.
To recapitulatebrieflythe calibrationof the two planes.In a specificsociety,theparadigmatic
'witch' is generatedas an apperception(say) of random incidence of disaster.The link to the
syntagmatic
planeisprovidedby a 'theoreticalpractice'whichspecifiesthe'witch'. The commion
featuresof such specifications
in a given societyare syntagmaticstructures.
Again: paradigmatic
'oppositions' among the Nuer, specify,througha theoreticalpractice,events which, in the
syntagmaticplane, may be labelled 'conflicts'.The pairs of termsI quote here and in the text
above are certainlly
universalanalyticaloppositiolns.They are meanit
not intenldedto represenit
to inidicatethatanthropologicalconceptshave tendedto be separatelylabelled accordingto the
in the thoughtof the analyst.
primacyof the syntagmaticor paradigmaticstructures
As I have already indicated,theregularitiesof syntagmaticstructures
are usuallyconfusinigly
As I see it, the Manchesterworkers,
called 'paradigms' insteadof 'syntagms' by functionalists.
for example, are constantlyanalysingsyntagms,without understandingthat the specification
of their'networks', 'ethnicities',and the like, lies in paradigmaticstructures(in the precise
sense)which are inaccessibleto theirmode of analysis.It will be necessaryto presenta detailed
example fromactualfieldworkin orderto take thematterfurther;thismustawait a subsequent
paper. Meanwhile,it may be noted thatthetermsused by Needham (I963: xlii-xliii),to express

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ARDENER

EDWIN

466

in
the'theoretical
capital'of socialanthropology
fromtheFrenchschool,areall paradigmiiatic
nature,
whichaccountsfortheirintuitive
richness.
The multiplicity
of ad hoctermsin functionalist
socialscience,all ultimately
unsatisfactory,
andmostlyoutmodedas soonas invented,
shortrepetitive
lifeofso
derivesfromtherelatively
manyobservedpatterns
ofevents.The reasonwhyI haveaccordedtheterm'transaction'
the
statusof a syntagmatic
concept,is notbecauseof itsparticularly
greatpower,butbecauseit
neara minimalpattern
in thatplane.Nevertheless,
labelssomething
theprimacyof theparaof meaningor 'value' to suchtransdigmaticstructures
providesthesourceofanyascription
actions.
Theprimacyoftheparadigmatic
structures
is stillmaintained
whenan unprogrammed
event
intrudes
fromaninfrastructural
source-sayaneventinthenatural
order,likeanunprecedented
Thesyntagms
shattered
insucha case.No predictivity
earthquake.
maybe totally
fromprevious
syntagmatic
patterns
maysurviveduringthedisastrous
circumstances.
Yet it is evidentthatin
thecrisisitself'when theskiesrainblood', certainparadigmatic
stillgeneratethe
structures
humanapperceptions
oftheevents.Eventually
newsyntagms.
Thusany
itis theythatgenerate
inhistory
liesintheparadigmatic
continuity
ofsocieties
acrosscrises
structures
rather
thaninthe
syntagms.
Theyare thusequivalentto whatin an earlierpaperI havecalled(at thelevelof
andparadigmatic
belief)the'templates'(I970: i55, i59). Sincebothsyntagmatic
structures
are
the'paradigmatic
simultaneously
delineated
through
events,
primacy'probablyderivesfroma
in thementalistic
basicandsystematic,
structure
of human
'event-oriented',
adaptivecapacity
as wellas primary.
society.It wouldthusbe bothtrulyprimitive
I do notliketoleavethematter
therewithout
aboutthe'location'
takingup certain
questions
ofstructures:
i. The relationship
paradigmatic:
syntagmatic
is an expressionof relationship
between
dimensions.
in two dimensions
are paradigmatic
in one dimension;
Structures
to structures
in threedimensions
in two dimensions;
structures
structures
areparadigmatic
to structures
in
infivedimensions
areparadigmatic
structures
fourdimensions
tostructures
inthreedimensions;
in fourdimensions:
are paradigmatic
to structures
and so on. In normallinguistic
usagethe
chainisseenaslinear(inonedimension)
hastobe represented
andtheparadigmatic
syntagmatic
a modelin twodimensions.
Yet anyreality
to whichitcorresponds
mustbe conceived
through
in fourdimensional
theone dimensional
ofas operating
linear-chain
space-time:
representing
in threespacedimensions
an outputgenerated
overone dimension
oftime.Ifthissyntagmatic
thentheparadigmatic
continuum
is fourdimensional,
dimension
is a fifth
dimension.
There
is
2.
nothingwrongwithfivedimensions;
The time(t) ofa givendimension
in a space(s)
(d) mustbe expressed
through
co-ordinatcs
of a dimnension
one higher.So:
In d1,t1is expressed
in S2
coordinates
through
29 d2, t2 ,,
29 d3, t3 ,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

,, S4

d4, t4 ,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

,,

S3
s5

The relationship
t betweenspacesofsucceeding
is thusofthesamelogicalorderas
dimensions
thatbetweensyntagmatic
andparadigmatic.
While I am concernedherewithlogicaldimensions,
we can hardlyignorethefactthat
Einsteinhasalreadymappedthemon to thenaturalorder.Thust3 is ournaiveexperience
of
'Time three'thenis 'syntagmatic
Einstein's
four-dimensional
continuum.
time',thetimeof
humanhistoriography,
andrelative
whosevulnerable
natureI haveshown(I97ib) intheterms
The natureof 'Time four' is apprehended
of structure.
by us throughits contradictions:
inEinstein's
rendered
theconceptofthespeedoflight,through
whichinterthought
through
valsin spaceas wellas timein S4 areshrunken
The natureoffourdimensional
to simultaneity.
a meta-level
concouldonlybe expressed
one higher:a fifth
space-time
byEinsteinthrough
ceptualdimension.
Thereis nothinig
thenabout any of this.'Paradigmatic
structures'
are conmysterious
The relationship
forournarrowpurposesas
ceptually
t4maythenbe expressed
s5 structures.
will lie in S5. The 'predictivity'
of thepro'paradigmatic
time',forwhichtheco-ordinates
inthenarrowsenseis a
notint3(syntagmatic
grammeisint4therefore,
time),but'predictivity'

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THE

NEW

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND

ITS

CRITICS

467

worldas thatin
We mustpresumethatsocialeventsoccurin thesameconceptual
t3 concept.
models
whichthephysicist
lives,butone wouldneverbelievethisfromthelow-dimensional
let
socialscience-asifsocialsciencerealityweretrulypre-Newtonian,
usedby conventional

alone pre-Einsteinian.

with
areoutlinedherein orderto expressmykeendissatisfaction
Thesefurther
refinemenlts
syntagmatic:
paradigmatic
dimension
to theopposition
Lefebvre's
additionof a 'third'symbolic
of 'dimension'as well as thoseof the
theformalproperties
(I966: 227, 247), thusobscuring
opposition.
syntagmatic:
paradigmatic
NOTE
I

actuallyusedtheterm'serieassociative'fortheparadigmatic
relations
Saussurehimself

(1922:

170-84).
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