Get Homework/Assignment

Done

Homeworkping.com
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/

Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a

reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee whos having a
maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to
immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period.
Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods,
this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The
reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to
join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job
application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive
reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the
discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said
discrepancy and she was reminded about the companys policy of not
accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that
she wasnt aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadnt
deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained
unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed
from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances.
Issue:

Research Paper help

https://www.homeworkping.com/

Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/

click here for freelancing tutoring sites

PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
Facts:

Whether or not PT&T is liable against Graces illegal dismissal due

to certain company policy.
Ruling:
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Wheres a
company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs
afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the
fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is
that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of
the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Graces illegal dismissal
and the latter shall claim for damages.

Estrada vs. Escritor

A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote
to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a
man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who
stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and
challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the
proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor
move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the
conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for
disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code
against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias
learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow since 1998. She admitted that shes been living with
Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that
they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect
known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations)
jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the
approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
Ruling:
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it
does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of
evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show
that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General
utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct
circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in
cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these
distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right
to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil. 252
Facts:
Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,
defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established
their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one
month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject
the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and
provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating
her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal
domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given
by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of
the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate
maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and

Catalina is valid.

Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and
1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against
petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share
of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners
denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tagamakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an
accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio
and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid
even in the absence of marriage certificate.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In
this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private
respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or
destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three
children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until
1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents
herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez

185 SCRA 425
Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her
full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was
alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner
Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who
had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law
husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents
(Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to
bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases
contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of
pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being
preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of
Vitaliana Vargas.
Ruling:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article,
it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and

wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at
bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis--vis Vitaliana was
not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her
surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code

pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent
judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249
Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio
Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:

Wassmer vs. Velez

12 SCRA 648
Facts:

Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of

marriage.

Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiffappellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to
Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to
opposition of defendants mother and that he will be leaving. But on
September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be
returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear
nor was he heard from again.
Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the
defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to
pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955
defendant filed a petition for relief from orders, judgments and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Beatriz moved
to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.
Defendant wasnt able to appear but instead on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed
to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court
but this time defendants counsel informed the court that chances of
settling case amicably were nil.

Ruling:

Issue:

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Falsification of the monthly reports of cases

Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages

even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were
able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to

pay plaintiff damages.

Issue:

Ruling:

Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for

solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC.

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because

it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have
already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding
apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages.
The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to
pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual
damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the
defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will
come back and the wedding will push through.

Ruling:
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wifes presumptive
death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the
jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death;
(2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore
there is an irregularity.

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Facts:
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant
contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the
respondents residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and
that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

Araes vs. Judge Occiano

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the
marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias
death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized.
Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the
Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which
required the respondent to comment on the complaint.

Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the

ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner
and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the
need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due
to her own fault and negligence.
Issue:

of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was
not the proper forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage
contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said
marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City;
Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating
that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for
1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was
stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married
and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to
establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was
latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein
respondents.

Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage

without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Issue:

Ruling:

Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their

ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.

Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme
Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner.
Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate
court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the
truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The
best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to
produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded
the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this
being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless
pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best
evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as
evidence would make the marriage dubious.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo
and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died
intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and
administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein
petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving
heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro

G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court

Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castros parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castros parents. Thus, it was only in
March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple
decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four
(4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the
consent of Cardenas.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to
prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants,
the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due
search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no
marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.

Garcia vs. Recio

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In
1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided.
In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the
respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand,
respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993,
before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first
marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial
court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the
divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace
Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of
the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign
divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court.
Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on
evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree
was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because
he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to
marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage.
Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign
law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they
dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal

standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
Facts:
Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,
were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation
de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg
Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
on January 23, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987,
petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse
may prosper.
Ruling:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.

139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in
Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had
two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the
ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada
in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that
she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton
alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a
right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had
acknowledged that the couple had no community property.
Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court,
between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen.
Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United
States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of
the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained by the alien spouse.
Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies
for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible,
and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties.

Republic vs. Orbecido

472 SCRA 114
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married
with two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son
and 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid
divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted a
marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.
Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article
26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that
the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law,
they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or
Annulment instead.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling:
YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a
valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a
valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to
remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law,
(3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry.

Nial vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting
to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting
of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Ruling:

The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back

from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time
when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Manzano vs. Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,

had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the
respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
Ruling:

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply,

the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have
no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4.
The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for
at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent
Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249
Facts:
Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin,
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he
claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage
license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint

affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage
with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code is valid.
Ruling:
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months
and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and
wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in
their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when
he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their
marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an
instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already
only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the
marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate.

Facts:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On
his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot
four children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named
Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children,
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupos death he left certain properties with which he
acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his
death, descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on Lupos third
marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that
they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by
their common father. The petitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents,
children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial
court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully
married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their
said parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to equal
shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession
rights over the said estate.
Ruling:

Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for

partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his
father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig,
Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have
taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things

have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
Facts:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of
Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property
against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at
Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage
license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina
dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior
marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their
marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that
she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the
marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his
possession.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity
of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of
bigamy.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration
of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that
the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties.

Nial vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Same. Article 35
Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio.
Ruling:
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Republic vs. CA and Molina

February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo
Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The
RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which
was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not irreconcilable differences
personalities constitute psychological incapacity.

and

conflicting

Ruling:
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.

Leouel Santos vs. CA

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be
an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20,
1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latters parents. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julias parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
quarrel over a number of things like when and where the couple should
start living independently from Julias parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouels spending a few days with his own parents.
On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse
despite his husbands pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel
got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts
were of no avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.

Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of the FC.
Ruling:
The use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime
in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in
the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect
from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,
the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.

Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent
alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro
M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.
One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to

Choa vs. Choa

G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
Facts:
Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married
on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October
27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage
to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case

went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However,

petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioners
demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the
established quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case
to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial
of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense
must present evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners obligated to present her evidence
despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of
marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against
petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological
incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of
charges against him are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included
Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in
any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the
height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed
cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient
to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but
also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of
the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.

Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to

Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed
at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand,
they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner
was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that
respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point
of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence
and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
othershad been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage null and void.
Ruling:

Antonio vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not

adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the
trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies
and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner.

wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack
of merit.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of
having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his
mothers eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her
husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that
it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic
marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he
wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife
filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return
the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their
marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because
they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of
psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have
sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husbands
senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After
school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In
1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed
to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in
information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted,
but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty
to the charge.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
defense of good faith.
Ruling:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is

guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is

characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private
act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme
Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on
September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen
discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen
prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio
amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative.
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and
the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation
before final decree abated the action.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than
the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only
the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona.

Gandionco vs. Pearanda

G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987
Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco,
filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support
and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage
against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The
respondent Judge Pearanda ordered the payment of support pendente
lite.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be
suspended on the case of concubinage.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on
concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal
action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover
civil liability arising from the offense.
Civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related

to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of

in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.

of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely

filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations
of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been
condoned by the plaintiff-husband.
Ruling:
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by
the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him
and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband
and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for
legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes
within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Bugayong vs. Ginez

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After
marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter
left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila
would stay with Benjamins sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed
her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister
Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.
Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the
house of Leonilas godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and
stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On
the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information
he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which
Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried
to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF

Pacete vs. Cariaga

231 SCRA 321
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
(between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of
the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on
1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property

consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;

that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his
name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other
"dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and
that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion
in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on
the decree of legal separation.

Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support

against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now
petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and
praying for its dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which
both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the
lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positive
provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.
Issue:

Ruling:
Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can
put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less
than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention
not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the
parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in
order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would

bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed
father, an opportunity to be heard.
Ruling:
SC find no merit in petitioners submission that the questioned
decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and
clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised
attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless
behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization
of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then
exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to
collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking
the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

Macadangdang vs. CA
108 SCRA 314
Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that
due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth
to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.

Potenciano vs. CA
G.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001

Facts:
Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable
from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
However, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject,
Potenciano Ilusorio.
Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via
certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano
Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from
the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused
to see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling
giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family
Code to have custody of her husband in consortium.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to
live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69.
However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the
moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for
making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly
personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil. 252
Facts:
Same. Article 68
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband
outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. The law provides that
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home
at his option.
However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Article 68 emphasize
mutual love, respect and fidelity among husband and wife.

Ty vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
Facts:
Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria
Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said
spouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of
Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore
two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be
declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time
they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is
untrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and private
respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed
their decision in favor of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply
with marital obligations of the respondent.
Ruling:
There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of
marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be
awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of
their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common
sense, militates against such incongruity.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and
lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the
spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and
in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda
in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that
their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the
latters health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition
for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the
latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a
condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting
Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus
to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband

to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ
of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
womans free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
denied.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony

with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage
different domiciles of origin. This difference could, for the sake of family
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300
Ayala Investments vs. CA
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

Facts:
Article 69; Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On
March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the
same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with
COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of
candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in
item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not
received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second
Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution
finding private respondents petition for disqualification meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos.
Ruling:
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law. The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automatically
loses her domicile of origin.

Facts:
Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching Exec. VP, executed security agreements and
making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness
to Ayala Investments.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a
writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo
caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of
sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction
against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon
application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said
properties at public auction.
Issue:

Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as

guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses.
Ruling:
The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or
profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult
each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to
get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered
to redound to the benefit of the family.
But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for
a third persons debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit
of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated
activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The
parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of
land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and then two
years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of
concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already
given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and
lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in
favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land
acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was
not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction
was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation.

Agapay vs. Palang

276 SCRA 341
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

Facts:
Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina
Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding,
he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang,
respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales
with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with
his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child.
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second
marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced
by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located
at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda
as the sole vendee.

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of
Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of
the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having
no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his
niece Leticia, the latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to
take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the

relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous
party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed
that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument
denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of
the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the
same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint
against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that
two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the
other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and
void.

of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his
properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas
real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian
to administer said properties.
Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the
declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole
powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell
the property. She alleged that her husbands medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece
of real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from
the court to sell said property.
RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced
that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties. However, Teodoro filed his
opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a
decision has already been rendered on the case. He also questioned the
propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to
pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization.
Issue:
Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property.
Ruling:
The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in
relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because he
was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due
to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.

Uy vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
Facts:
Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the
guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of
real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. The
petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity

De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz

130 Phil 324

Facts:
Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz,
defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven
parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay
Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures.
The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally
returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard
Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City.
Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the
defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began to
suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a
certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several
pieces of evidence on the defendants polo shirt and iron safe.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the
reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan,
Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife
temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The
defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and
family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give
them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to
draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their
children, two of whom were studying in Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to
comply with his obligations.
Ruling:
The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is
considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his
wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be
real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not
only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the
term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from
the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the
defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives
any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his
marital duties and rights.

Partosa-Jo vs. CA
216 SCRA 692
Facts:
Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered
fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be
his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for support was
granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property
was never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but
retain its affirmation on trial courts ruling. When their motions for
reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of
judicial separation of conjugal property.
The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that
the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties
mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage
although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.
Issue:
Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be
granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment.
Ruling:
SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had
already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial support
to the petitioner.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.

BA Finance Corporation vs. CA

161 SCRA 608
Facts:
Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BA
Finance Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in behalf
of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan, however,
Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and
demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the
basis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the
debt. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the
petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent
Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had
already abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of
the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory
note was executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the
special power of attorney procured by Augusto.
Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if
the attached properties were her exclusive property, the same can be
made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part
of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo.
Issue:
Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms
part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to
the obligation.

Johnson & Johnson Inc. vs. CA

262 SCRA 298
Facts:
Delilah Vinluan, defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises,
engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred an
obligation to the said company. She issued checks amounting to the
payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Johnson & Johnson,
petitioner, demands for the payment and even offered accommodations to
pay the obligation but failed. With these, respondent filed a complaint
against defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation
plus interest with damages. RTC granted the complaint and ordered
defendant to pay.
However, after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record
that there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendanthusband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife, they
held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said
obligation. Thus, they issued a writ of execution against the properties of
the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on execution covered also
the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership.
Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of
the levy on the conjugal properties. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion
to fix the value of the levied properties. Defendant-husband moved to
quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the
motion.

Ruling:
SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property.
Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the
marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of
the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to
enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent
was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family
and had left their conjugal home.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of
his wife which were incurred without his consent.
Ruling:
SC denied petition based on the respondent Courts original
findings which had already become final and indisputable. The defendanthusband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the
defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal
partnership, as well as the defendant-husband cannot be held liable. Only
the defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. The
conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot be
levied upon.

Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak

90 Phil 77
Facts:
The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M.
Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who acted as an agent in the sale on the
commission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total
sum P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved to
dismiss, on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed the motion
but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence this
appeal.
Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The first
transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not
signed by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any,
are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her",
and that both defendants refused to pay the notes.
Issue:
Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her
husband against the spouses Laperal.
Ruling:
The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. Ramon was not her
agent, and he did not contract for her. For the repayment of the sums
borrowed by him, Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own
private funds, and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. To reach
both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife
Evelina Katigbak. "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against
the wife, and she is not a necessary party defendant.
The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property
unless its administration has been transferred to him, which is not the
case. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts
incurred by the husband.

Villanueva vs. IAC

192 SCRA 21
Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of
land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and
Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of
extrajudicial partition.
Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz
Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had
no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate
children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus
Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property. In
the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo
Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land
at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, Consolacion
Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas
praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and
they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action
upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and
his wife Victoria. Victorias will stated that her interests, rights and
properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be
bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and
Teodoro in equal shares. Modestos will, on the other hand, bequeathed to
his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with
Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.

Issue:

principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary

upon the death of the person insured.

Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of

the spouses Modesto and Victoria.

Issue:

Ruling:
Even if it be assumed that the husbands acquisition by succession
of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would
nonetheless be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him
during the marriage by lucrative title.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from
his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law.

Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal

partnership.
Ruling:
SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to
the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the
husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the
proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in
part.
That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the
law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is
immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.

BPI vs. Posadas

56 Phil 215
Facts:
The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary
named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the insured
paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano.
The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was
appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary
estate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal,
Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila,
the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the
life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date
Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the
Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered
it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the
money to said widow. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental

Wong vs. IAC

200 SCRA 792
Facts:
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They
had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles
City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought
parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from
an officemate.
Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with
Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for
sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day
period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina
issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of

funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the
case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in
nature.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and
her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money.
After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wongs. A writ of
execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in
the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed
an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution,
levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not
given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as
Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing to
do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to
enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution
and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties.

Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband

alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
The respondent directly received the money or services to be used
in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within
the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan and services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial in the, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf
of the family business, the law presumes and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Issue:
Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive
properties of Romarico.
Ruling:
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists
in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with
money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.

Ayala Investments vs. CA

G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

Carlos vs. Abelardo

G.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002

Facts:
Same. Article 121-122
Issue:

Facts:
Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989,
respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him
and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the

purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct
their married life independently and on their own, petitioner issued a check
in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who
acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in full payment of the
property.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of
the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation
but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite
settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner.
Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages
against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. As they were
separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint,
respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from
petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a
staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.

Facts:

Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan obtained

by private respondent and his wife from petitioner.

Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition

and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their
respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman
of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer.
The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and
personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name.
Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but
respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely
in her name.
Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage
business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly
registered with the SEC. She denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married
to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all
real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and
registered solely in her name.

Ruling:

Issue:

Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts

contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that
the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and
lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus
benefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of
US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the
corporation and not as a loan. Defendant-husband does not appear to be a
stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos
Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to
participate in the income or profits thereof.

Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the

properties.

Issue:

Mallilin vs. Castillo

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

Ruling:
A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.

Valdez vs. RTC

260 SCRA 211

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.

G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005

Facts:
Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTCs judgment on liquidation
of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o
unions of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the
parties in the liquidation of their properties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property
regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be.
The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict
with Article 147 or 148.
The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and
shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership. However, the fruits of couples separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.

Facts:
Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G.
Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president
in a private corporation. The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo
Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house. The
Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles.
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. It
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.
Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of
Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from MIWCC
but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the
RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or the value
thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against
Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial
court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted an
indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property.
Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the
RTC of Paraaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she was
the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence,
the levy on execution of the property was null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of
Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.
Ruling:
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with
her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is
the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the Imus
Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner
and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee
after her marriage to Eduardo.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23.
At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase
the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim.
Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were provided
by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to
shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment
creditor.

Agapay vs. Palang

276 SCRA 341
Facts:

Juaniza vs. Jose

89 SCRA 306
Facts:

Same. Article 148.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by
cohabitation between her and Miguel.
Ruling:
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was
patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in
the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade
the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Since
petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
over the same.

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the

passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of
the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969
which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of
its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to
that of husband and wife.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that
the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages
jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC)
is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law
relationship is incapacitated to marry.
Ruling:
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership
contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is
an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the
aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the
jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers
of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that
the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents.

Tumlos vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
Facts:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner
Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without
the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months,
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several
times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building.
Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the
complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause
of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She
then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants
alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an
amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as
their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in
litis.
Ruling:
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an
actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors
her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent
Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not

Docena vs. Lapesura

G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001
Facts:
Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of
land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena.
The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since
time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The
trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The
CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to
vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners
with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the
Writ of Demolition.
Issue:
Whether or not joint management or administration does require
that the husband and the wife always act together.
Ruling:
Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone,
subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that
even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of
demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals
without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of
non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and
that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or
claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices
and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.

The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission,

it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family
Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such
complaint premature.

Martinez vs. Martinez

G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005
Hontiveros vs. RTC
G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts:
The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well
as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and
Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then
bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and
Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate.
Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father,
where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila.
Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of
TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no
allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had
been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.
In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote
Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter
and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged
that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in
their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been
made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No
amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the
preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.

Facts:
The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at
Jamindan, Capiz.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that private respondents answer did not tender an issue or that it
otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private
respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners
claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be
resolved after trial.
The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an assessment of
the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is
inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer
specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because
the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof,
however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the
amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The court
dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in

the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient
compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.

Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege
under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to
filing thereof.

Ruling:

Ruling:

Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as

defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of
the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
"members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may not
validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of
the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough.
This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

Manalo vs. CA
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
Albano vs. Gapusan
A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976

Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of
legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a
petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this
order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who
were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the
petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners,
through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition
for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made.
Ruling:

Facts:
Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge
Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the
law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile
personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of
their conjugal partnership.
In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench,
respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of
the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar, Ilocos Norte
and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It was
stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or
concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing
an action against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He
explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they
signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children
with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement
that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief
was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent
incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in

effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge
Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.

the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of

defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a
notary.

Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the
Family Code.

Ruling:
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law
considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband
and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership".
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically
dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by
this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is
no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in
the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore,
a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was
not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code.

Modequillo vs. Breva

185 SCRA 766
Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment
on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel
of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed
by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969
prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that

Manacop vs. CA
277 SCRA 941
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased
residential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc.
filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of
filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise
agreement with private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned
compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the
agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for execution
which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was

delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other

personal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auction
for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs
of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the
ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondent
opposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ
of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by
petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had
not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables, the
lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled
that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not
duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory
judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a
house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family
Code.

land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by

virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the
former.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a)
declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such
entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner
of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of
law are involved.
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter,
his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to
help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueas, his wife,
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix
and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and
wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal.
Issue:

Ruling:
The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean that
Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the FC.

Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of

Emiliano.
Ruling:
Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that
Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to
the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no
other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse.
And here there is no such proof.

Andal vs. Macaraig

89 Phil 165
Facts:
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian
ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano
Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
Facts:

Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties,

upon their death the fight for administration of Vicentes estate ensued.
Vicentes sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate. On the other hand, Marisa BenitezBadua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate.
In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence. Petitioner
Marissa, prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by
submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously
treated her as legitimate child. On the other hand, respondents proved by
testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetriciangynecologist which prevented her to give birth. The older sister of Vicente
also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses,
who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouses
were having this problem.

G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Facts:
Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which they
begot a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his
wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment on the
ground of bigamy. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only
a sham and she never lived with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresas
marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage
with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate.
Custody was then given to Theresa.
Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marriage annulled. She argued that a putative father cannot have
visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the childs surname be
changed to the mothers maiden name. Gerardo opposed the motion and
insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the fathers surname to the
child.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the
spouses and has the right to be the sole heir.

Issue:
Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is
considered legitimate.

Ruling:
Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Live of Birth
Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate.
The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or
adopted child of deceased was denied, on the ground that Articles 164,
166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where
a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husband
or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife.

Concepcion vs. CA

Ruling:
Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the
spouses had lived together.
The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children, for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not
what a parent says it is.

Liyao vs. Liyao

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
Eceta vs. Eceta
G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from
Ramon M. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of the
said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up
to the time of Williams untimely demise. They lived together in the
company of Corazons two children from her subsisting marriage.
Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. During her three day stay at
the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even
asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate.
He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be
deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce
him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta
sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a
son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the
disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente
as his compulsory heirs.
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria
Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his
compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria
Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City
for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that
by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and coowner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is
paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be
able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao.
Ruling:
SC denied the petition. A child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of
children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with
the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.

Issue:
Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the
certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation
of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father
Vicente Eceta.
Ruling:
Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the
Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only.
The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa,
was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and
admitted, as duly noted in the trial courts pre-trial order, that Maria
Theresa is Rosalinas granddaughter.
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her
filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate.
Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is
deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18
Bernabe vs. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Amelita Constantino, petitioner and waitress at Tonys Restaurant,
met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita
to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. While dining, Ivan
professed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they
have had a sexual intercourse. But after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed
that he is a married man. However, they repeated their sexual contact in
the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila,
which resulted to Amelitas pregnancy.
Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. She then filed
for the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages.
However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita, respondent petition
the complaint CA that RTC erred in its ruling. CA favored the respondent
and dismissed the complaint of petitioner.

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary,
Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole
surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the
share of Bernabes estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death
of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
Petitioner Ernestina averred CAs ruling to be of error due to RTCs ruling
based on Article 175.
Issue:

Issue:
Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan to
her son Michael to warrant support.
Ruling:
SC dismissed the petition. She was inconsistent in her response
whether they did or didnt have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd week
of November. At first, she said she remembered during cross-examination.
Later in her response, she said she doesnt remember.
This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. He
was conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. She
wrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was four
months pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on
October. She wrote to Ivans wife where she revealed her attachment to
Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend.
Moreover, she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resulting
to her leaving work.

Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case

against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of
paternity by the latter.
Ruling:
SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when
the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given
the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead.

and special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than
mere preponderance of evidence.

Jison vs. CA
G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998
Facts:
Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia
Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Franciscos
daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that
Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she
obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank
examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina
prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
Francisco support and treat her as such.
Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had
ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses,
Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against
him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription.
He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages
due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

Conde vs. Abaya

13 Phil 249
Facts:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina
Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural
children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano
Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession.
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However,
Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the
deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of
said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she
considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the
matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the
property left by Casiano Abaya.

Issue:

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action
acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.

Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter

of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family.

Ruling:

Ruling:
SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate
daughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high
standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and
continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court

in

the

The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a

personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child
may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three
cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or
she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had
already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the
child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he

or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her
heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

Ruling:
The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not
during the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents.
In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child.
She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio
Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued for compulsory
recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she could
present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its
personal nature and intransmissibility.

Marquino vs. IAC

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran
249 SCRA 447

Facts:
Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial
Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages
against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. Also
impleaded as defendants, were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their
legitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino.
The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and
allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single.
Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was
hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. She always
received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she
enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural
child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The
Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.
During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana
could finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered
substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to
the heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case.
Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Eutiquio Marquino died while
the case was pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is
intransmissible in character.

Facts:
Complainant Abadilla, contends that respondent had scandalously
and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondent
allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla
Baybayan. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of
the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita
Banzuela.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims
that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three
illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate
affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent
knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of
the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a
dispenser of justice. Respondent, in his comment, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor
immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his
first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and, since then,
and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has
had no news of her being alive.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in

legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous
relationship.

the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's

heirs by way of intestate succession.
Issue:

Ruling:
SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders
his dismissal from the service. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought
to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three
children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate
since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife. Legitimation is limited to natural
children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to
intervene in this proceeding.
Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any
portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion
of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is
an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of
the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter
but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Teotico vs. Del Val

13 SCRA 406
Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina
Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of
Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service
to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix,
filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed
the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground
that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court
rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that

Republic vs. CA and Bobiles

205 SCRA 356
Facts:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition
of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner
seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat,
then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was
four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The
order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of
said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other
places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
petition.
The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child,
Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and

purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which
granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.
Ruling:
The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption
will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of
his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in
granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the
same. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the
light of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issued
by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of
the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life.

Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing

petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition
for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant petition.
Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.
Ruling:
SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given
to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Tamargo vs. CA
209 SCRA 518
Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of
10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings
before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses

Javier vs. Lucero

94 Phil 634
Facts:
Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant had their
marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At the time of their marriage,
they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr.
Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for he was an
enlisted man in the US Navy. Because of defendants departure,
respondent chose to live with defendants parents but left due to frictions
having occurred between them. She then stayed to her native place in
Tanza, Cavite.

With the events transpired, the relationship of the spouses become

strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against
Salud Arca at Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint, respondent
averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of
Naic, Cavite. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not
of desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that since his departure
to US Navy, he had always supported his spouse and his son through
allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Through these she
prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

Ruling:
It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal
abode by her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an action
against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other
remedy, notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who is
obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed
pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the
right to the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his son
even if he reaches the age of majority.
Ruling:
Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo
Javier, and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination
of the appeal his education, or the completion thereof, would be unduly
delayed. That is good reason for immediate execution.
Support also includes the education of the person to be supported
"until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or
vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article
support was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252, 262
Facts:
Same. Article 204. Emphasis on the options of support.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of the
conjugal domicile.

De Asis vs. De Asis

303 SCRA 176

Facts:
Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that
petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated
demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and
that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mothers child
sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioners judicial
declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from
him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject
to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By
virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for
the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court,
which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was
brought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in
an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari. CA dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion
after the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged.
Ruling:
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor
transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondent
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject
minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and
private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature
of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

Espiritu vs. CA
242 SCRA 362
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding
first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return
to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the
name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines,
but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was
sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with
his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to
gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now
reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be
approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain
custody over the children be granted.
Ruling:
SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and
retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.

discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules

and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the
fact that he wasnt present cant be considered against him because he
wasnt required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

Amadora vs. CA
160 SCRA 274
Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage
and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved.
Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic.

Ylarde vs. Aquino

163 SCRA 697
Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Pangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. As
part of work education, private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to
help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of
World War II.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete
block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole.
Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving,
private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the
stone."
After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde,
playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but
unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to the
wall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, he
died. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages
against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano.
Issue:

Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school

is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason:
Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the
ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old
schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school
personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not
also liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing

Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the
death of Ylarde.
Ruling:
SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious
person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent
Aquino did. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
company. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident
would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive
today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary
precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all
these years.

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted
an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan
City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos
died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents
of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any
liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have
causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner
and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school,
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Tamargo vs. CA
209 SCRA 518
Facts:
Same.
Articles
220-233.
Emphasis
suspension/termination of parental authority.

on

effects

and

Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against
their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody
was yet lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling:
GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable
for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED
NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care
and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a consequence
of PARENTAL AUTHORITY.
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS:
Art. 2176: Quasi-delict Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons
for
whom
one
is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are

responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.

Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to
know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent
involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The
damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesnt
apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already.

Libi vs. IAC

214 SCRA 16
Facts:
Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased Wendell
Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to
the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy
sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that
they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girl
hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with
her best friend. On the day of the incident, the two were found shot dead
with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl instituted this
case against the parents of the guy for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the
death of Julie Ann Gotiong.
Ruling:
DENIED. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising
due diligence, diligentissimi patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the
guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father and the
mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been
negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of
his mother. The said gun was missing. The parents were also unable to
explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. The said photograph
was dedicated to the girl.

Laperal vs. Republic

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
Facts:
Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City
of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of
this petition;
2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision
entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria
vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a
decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is
now final;
3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she
naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.
Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years
now;
4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally
separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased
to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed

to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her

maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden

On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta,

instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason,
would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court
for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.

name.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden
name of Elisea Laperal.

Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based

on her alleged facts.
Ruling:

Ruling:
The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the
petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change
of the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the second decision which
reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive
business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place,
these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.

Llaneta vs. Agrava

G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974
Facts:
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to
Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In
1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations
with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's
birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived
with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in
the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her
dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years
old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where she
was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a
scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she
discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is
the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.

The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita

Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that she
has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A
sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in
order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in
confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail
endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new
surname.