ANIMALS & SEVERELY COGNITIVELY

IMPAIRED HUMAN BEINGS

Jeff McMahan
!
!

Bioethics

Jake Monaghan

University at Buffalo

Monday, October 29th, 2014

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRI

two problems of equality

one is fatal, the other is not

it has some counter-intuitive results, but all

correct theories will have this

the goal is to maintain the things we are most

confident about in a principled way
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PROBLEMS FOR TRI

the problem which McMahan thinks is fatal to

the TRI account leads him to offer a separate
account of the morality of killing persons

the TRI account remains plausible (and

McMahan thinks accurate) for the killing of nonpersons

RECAP

TRI says that the badness of death varies with

the strength of one's TRIs

so a comparable amount of goods lost in the

death of an animal, as in the death of a person,
makes the death less bad for the animal

this account fits nicely with our intuitions

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POTENTIAL PROBLEM

any psychological differences present between

animals and humans will also exist between
some humans and other humans
1. immature humans (fetuses & infants)
2. those with acquired cognitive disabilities
3. those with congenital cognitive disabilities
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TRIS & INFANTS

due to the cognitve structures of members of

groups 1-3, they have significantly weaker TRIs
than normally functioning humans do

the difference in the TRIs for infants and many

animals is not substantial

this has the potential to justify abortion

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TRIS & THE COGNITIVELY

DISABLED

members of groups 2 & 3, those with acquired

or congenital cognitive disabilities:

have weak TRIs

and also do not have the prospect of

significant future goods

TRIS & THE COGNITIVELY

DISABLED

So the TRI account does not recognize a

significant moral difference between the killing
of the severely retarded and most animals

this, however, is a problem for everyone, not

just the TRI proponent

e.g. we cannot make recourse to potential in

these cases like we can for infants
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THE OPTIONS

Anthropomorphism:

Consistent Elitism:

severely retarded human beings animals

Radical Egalitarianism:

severely retarded human beings animals

severely retarded human beings animals

Convergent Assimilation:

severely retarded human beings animals

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1. ANTHROPOMORPHISM

this preserves common sense, and seeks to

locate morally relevant features outside of
psychology and cognitive ability

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2. CONSISTENT ELITISM

this preserves intuitions about the moral status

of persons, and claims that it is permissible to
treat the severely retarded the way we currently
treat animals

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3. RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

this preserves intuitions about the moral status

of the severely retarded, and accords the same
moral status to animals

12

4. CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION

this claims that the moral status of the severely

retarded is roughly similar to that of animals,
but that the current opinion of their moral
status and the current treatment of both groups
is unjustified

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AGAINST CONSISTENT ELITISM

no significant difference between the moral

status of animals and the severely retarded

but refuses to abandon the current status and

treatment of animals

14


"Consistent Elitism, in short, regards
congenitally severely mentally impaired
human beings as morally comparable to
animals, accepting the radical implication
that it is permissible, other things being
equal, to treat these human beings in the
same ways in which we have hitherto found
it acceptable to treat animals with
comparable psychological capacities"
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AGAINST CONSISTENT ELITISM

of course, some of us have special relationships

to the severely retarded, so it might be
impermissible to e.g. experiment on them
(according to this view)

but this is not due to their intrinsic value, but

rather their instrumental value

this is so deeply repugnant that McMahan rejects

it without much argument
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AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

RE reverses the direction of assimilation (think

something like Francione's view)

"In short, animals with capacities equivalent to
those of severely mentally impaired human beings
must be our moral equals in those respects in
which the impaired human beings are our moral
equals."
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AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

the rights view "self destructs" at the lower end of the

scales of life

anencephalic infants have neither consciousness nor

the capacity for it

so the morally relevant features are not psychological

thus, since people think AIs have the right to life, we

must conclude that very low animals, and perhaps
plants, also have this right
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AGAINST RADICAL EGALITARIANISM

views about the morality of killing anencephalic

infants are changing; so we might not need to
think plants have right to life after all

but there is another problem:

on this view, we must regard the killing of

(barely) conscious humans as just as wrong as
the killing of persons; and thus the killing of e.g.
a fish as just as wrong as the killing of persons
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SIDE-NOTE ON ANIMAL RIGHTS

some rights theorists will stipulate a place on

the spectrum of consciousness at which a
creature has a right to life

this threshold will be low enough to grant most

mammals the right to life

these views are not, however, variants of

Radical Egalitarianism
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"For Radical Egalitarianism is distinguished by the fact that it preserves
traditional beliefs about the special sanctity of
the lives of even the most profoundly
psychologically impaired human beings. But
views that set a species-neutral threshold for
the possession of certain fundamental moral
rights or immunities require the abandonment
or revision of certain of these traditional
beliefs; for these views inevitably locate some
mentally impaired human beings below the
threshold"
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MEMBERSHIP IN THE HUMAN

SPECIES

this section undermines the first option,

Anthropomorphism

such a view is speciesist (this term was coined by X and

popularized by Singer)

it is a disparaging term, intended to liken the view to

racism or sexism

at base, the claim is this: being a human does not, in and

of itself, give you a special moral status, just like being a
white person or a man gives you special moral status
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MY FAVORITE ARGUMENT
AGAINST SPECIESISM
1. Either speciesists will give criteria for humans
having superior moral status, or not
2. If they do, they abandon the position (because
not all humans will meet the criteria)
3. If the do not, then they are arguing in a circle
4. So either speciesists will abandon their position
or beg the question/argue in a circle
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MCMAHAN AGAINST SPECIESISM

the usual strategy is to find some intrinsic

property all humans have which animals lack

e.g. the soul

but this is a theological claim; or if understood

metaphysically, it is implausible

Even if it were true, it is not clear that this supports

our intuitions about the sanctity of human life
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"if the soul is immortal, killing an individual
with a soul does not terminate that individuals
existence. It merely causes that individual to
undergo an invol- untary transition from one
realm or mode of existence to another. If,
therefore, all human beings have immortal
souls while animals do not, it may actually be
worse to kill an animal than it is to kill a
human being, all things considered; for, given
this assumption, killing an animal deprives it
of any further good it might otherwise have,
while killing a human being does not."
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ANOTHER REASON FOR DOUBT

McMahan: we are not identical to our human

organisms; so we are not essentially members
of the human species

So why think that some property not directly

attributable to us is sufficient for high moral
status?

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THE SPECIES CONCEPT

a thorough discussion of this takes us into the realm of the

philosophy of biology, but briefly:

speciesism requires that species be categorized according to an

essence

but the essence cannot be phenotypic (since species can have

different morphologies and look very different)

and the essence cannot be genotypic, for we share many genese

with other species, and do not share genes with other humans

there is also the possibility of human-animal chimeras

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"Compare, for example, two possible chimeras. In one, more

than 99 percent of its genes are of human origin, though the
genes responsible for the growth and development of its
brain are from the original chimpanzee zygote. If species
membership is determined by the genome, this chimera is
presumably a human being, though its mental capacities are
those of a chimpanzee. In a second chimera, more than 99
percent of its genes are of chimpanzee origin, but the genes
responsible for the development of its brain have a human
source. This is presumably a chimpanzee with human
intelligence. If membership in the human species is sufficient
for a certain high moral status, the chimera with the
intelligence of a chimpanzee should have a moral status at
least equal to that of the one with human intelligence. This, I
believe, is implausible."
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ON THE INBREEDING VERSION OF

"SPECIES"
"In any case, if potential for interbreeding were
the criterion of species membership, that would
make it unlikely that membership in the human
species could by it- self be a morally significant
property. It seems ridiculous to suppose that an
anencephalic infant is sacred simply because it
is potentially capable of interbreeding with
people like you and me."
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THE SPECIES CONCEPT

McMahan belabors the point

An alternative way to argue is this:

species is a biological term, but biologists do

not agree on what constitutes a species

so the term cannot be used by moral

philosophers in the way speciesists need
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WHY THINK THE CATEGORY OF 'HUMAN'

IS DEVOID OF MORAL CONTENT?

Imagine that evolution turned out differently, and

other hominid species did not go extinct

If we lived in a world with H. Neanderthalensis

and H. Floresiensis, would they be as morally
insignificant as we take other non-human animals
to be?

this makes salient the way speciesism is similar to

sexism and racism
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FINNIS & SCANLON

moral worth is determined by what kind of thing we

are, and the normal characteristics of that kind

but again, if we are not essentially biological

organisms, this view is implausible

and again, the kind is not what is morally relevant, but

certain properties the kind typically has are;

so the properties are morally relevant, and not

species membership
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COMEMBERSHIP IN A SPECIES AS A
SPECIAL RELATION

we were previously concerned with intrinsic

differences

now, we'll consider extrinsic (relational)

differences

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SCANLON AGAIN

claims that we are specially related to severely

cognitively disabled humans,

all creatures to whom we are specially related

have high moral status

note: this is inconsistent with Scanlon's claim

considered in the prior section
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MORAL REASONS

intrinsic & extrinsic; or properties & relations

so if a being has an interest in living, that is a

property which gives it some sort of moral
status

if a being has a certain relation, it has some sort

of moral status
35


"One has more reason, or a stronger
reason, to save the child if one is related
to it in this important way than if one is
not specially related to it. In short,
special relations, such as the relation
between a parent and child, are an
independent and autonomous source of
moral reasons."
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NOZICK'S SUGGESTION

confined to intrinsic properties, there is no

moral difference between the severely retarded
and animals with similar cognitive faculties

the relational (extrinsic) properties yeild a

moral difference, however

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SPECIESISM & NATIONALISM

patriotism might make us feel good, but

it has significantly bad consequences (the

dehumanization & brutalization of foreigners)

speciesism is closely analogous

38

"first, ... there are no morally significant

intrinsic differences between certain
animals and severely retarded human
beings with comparable psychological
capacities, and second, that we would not
be justified in treating severely retarded
human beings the way we treat these
animals even if we were not specially
related to them."
39

POSITIVE & NEGATIVE DUTIES

in inter-personal relations, special relationships serve

primarily to increase one's positive duties

(you owe more to your kids)

so if membership in the species is a special

relationship, it is unclear how it entails that we have
significantly less negative duties

consider: we still have the negative duty to not

harm children who are not our own
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ARE BIOLOGICAL RELATIONS

MORALLY SIGNIFICANT?

McMahan uses a thought experiment called "The

Sperm Donor" to conclude that, perhaps they are

I think McMahan is mistaken about this conclusion

Nonetheless, even if he is right about the sperm

donor case, speciesism is not vindicated

the relationship is no more morally significant

than one of race

PRAGMATIC REASON FOR SPECIAL

TREATMENT

it is unclear where to 'draw the line' of the moral community

we have a self-interested reason to draw it in such a way that

we're always within it

this is no help to the speciesist:

it concedes that there is no morally significant difference

between the severely retarded and many animals

but speciesism requires that there is a difference, not that

we have a reason to pretend there is one

CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION

recall the options:

1. maintain our commonsense view and current
treatment of animals (anthropocentrism)
2. treat animals the way we treat the severely retarded,
3. or treat the severely retarded the way we treat animals
4. or convergent assimilation

we've seen very good reason to deny 1-3

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"apart from possibly being permitted a
slight degree of partiality for the severely
retarded on the basis of their membership
in our species, we are required to accord
the same degree of concern and respect to
severely retarded human beings and
animals with comparable capacities. ... we
must revise our understanding of the moral
status of both animals and the severely
retarded."
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TYPES OF C.A.

s. r. humans

animals

s. r. humans

animals

the length of the arrow indicates the degree to

which we have to revise our beliefs about each
group

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CONVERGENT ASSIMILATION

To some degree, we must:

accept that the moral status of animals is

higher than we've thought to date

accept that the moral status of the severely

retarded is lower than we've thought to date

46


"It is more reasonable to expect that
we should instead alter some of our
views about animals quite radically,
alter others only a little, and retain yet
others unchanged."

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THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF

CAUSING PAIN

we typically think it is as morally objectionable to

cause pain in someone who is severely retarded
as it is in someone who is not

McMahan: there is no reason to substantially

modify this view

if we maintain this view, CA requires that we

substantially modify the traditional view about the
moral permissibility of causing pain to an animal
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SOME CAVEATS

pain has a higher 'opportunity cost' for persons

pain sometimes has long term ramifications (and these

are longer term in creatures with longer lives)

persons can suffer from the anticipation of pain

persons can suffer from anxiety about the cause of pain

but these are all reasons for thinking that the pain of
the severely retarded matter less
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THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO

PRESERVE LIVES

according to CA, if we maintain that it is just as

objectionable to kill an anencephalic infant as a
cognitively normal adult, we must think the same
about an animal without the capacity for
consciousness

but this can't be correct

so our typical beliefs about the sanctity of the

lives of anencephalic infants must be modified
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MODIFIED HOW MUCH?

This can be answered by considering how much it is

reasonable to modify our views about the morality of
killing animals

McMahan: our views about animals must be modified

far more drastically than our views about the severely
retarded

thus, it is morally permissible, if parents are willing, to

kill or let die an anencephalic infant for the purposes
of transplanting organs and saving others' lives
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PREFERRED VERSION OF CA

s. r. humans

animals

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A SHOCKING IMPLICATION? NO!

must we treat animals and the severely retarded equally?

no: there is no limit on supererogation ("going above

and beyond")

so there is no downward pressure on our treatment of

the severely retarded, although there is upward pressure
on our treatment of animals

the severely retarded are also specially related to family

members (parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, grandparents)
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ONE LIMIT ON SUPEREROGATORY

ACTS

"the bestowal of a benefit can be supererogatory
only if there are no moral demands that the
bestowal of the benefit would prevent one from
fulfilling. A person who, for example, leaves a
fortune in his will with the instruction that it be
devoted to the provision of luxuries for his pet cat is
arguably neglecting his duties. In a world in which
people are dying for want of basic necessities, it is
ob- scene to spend large sums of money on frivolous
indulgences for a pet, most of which the pet is
incapable of appreciating or benefiting from at all."
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICINE

it is morally permissible, with parental consent, to

kill or let die anencephalic or otherwise severely
congenitally retarded infants for the purposes of
saving the lives of others via organ donation

this view lays the groundwork for a defense of

abortion

it also justifies embryonic stem cell research

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