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ALTRUISM AND THE N O R M OF GIVING


A u t h o r ( s ) : R u t h Leeds
Reviewed work(s):
S o u r c e : Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and
229-240
P u b l i s h e d b y : Wayne State University Press
S t a b l e URL: http://www.jstor.org/stabie/23082789

Development,

Vol.

9,

No.

(July,

1963),

pp.

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ALTRUISM A N D THE NORM OF GIVING

RUTH LEEDS *
Reed College
Processes of exchange are governed by the moral norm of reciprocity
which specifies that a return must be given for benefits received. As Gouldner (1960) has pointed out, however, the norm of reciprocity is not completely ubiquitous for there are persons who are unable to reciprocate,
in particular, the very young, the very old and the very sick. At the most,
such persons are capable of acknowledging actions toward themselves
with appreciative gestures but are unable to initiate return favors. The fact
that such individuals do receive care and attention suggests that another
normative orientation is operative in lieu of the norm of reciprocity. This
orientation I shall call "the moral norm of giving." The present purpose is to
specify the norm of giving, to examine situations in which the norm of
giving is primarily operative, rather than the norm of reciprocity, and to
consider the manner in which the norm of giving complements the norm
of reciprocity, thereby contributing to accounts of stability and instability
within the social system.
T H E N O H M O F GIVING
2

The norm of giving implies that one should want to give, not because
of any anticipated returns but for its own value. This is emphasized, for
example, in the family when parents teach their child to share his toys
with others. Religious pronouncements remind us that it is more blessed
to give than to receive. The appeals of voluntary organizations emphasize
* Department of Sociology, Reed College, Portland, Oregon.
Revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, August, 1961. I am indebted to Hans L. Zetterberg for alerting me
to the topic and to Robert K. Merton for helpful suggestions. This paper was
written during the tenure of a fellowship (MPM-13, 085-C1) from the National
Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service.
2
Giving, and its complement, receiving, is a more complex action than the
following approach would lead one to think. Noblesse oblige which has more
relevance for times past than for times present is a form of giving that often
reaps its own reciprocity. Parsons' (1959) concept of double interchange between
system boundaries suggests that many actions which at first glance appear to be
unreciprocated are in fact reciprocated indirectly. For the present I have chosen
a relatively simple approach to the act of giving and therefore will disregard such
complexities.
1

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how one can help the less fortunate by giving. And the charters of these
voluntary organizations usually include a statement to the effect that one
should do "good deeds."
Enforcement of the norm of giving, realistically, cannot be routinized.
Giving, like charisma, changes its nature once it is circumscribed by the
formal rules and sanction procedures which accompany the rationalization
of action processes. If giving were routinized one might give to avoid negative sanctions or to receive rewards rather than for the sake of giving, in
which case one is no longer acting within the limits of the moral norm.
(This statement does not imply a priori a suspicion of the motives of those
who give within the framework of positive and negative sanctions.)
Whether or not the enforcement of the norm of giving is actually routinized
is an empirical problem. Certainly there are informal sanctions applied to
persons who are unwilling to give in "expected" situations. Rewards for
compliance with the norm have become routinized in some voluntary
organizations. Typically, they take the form of awards which symbolize
the services rendered by the awardees; the rewards do not necessarily
have any intrinsic material value. When a voluntary organization establishes an award it usually also introduces mechanisms which are intended
to prevent members from "working" for the award. Thus, criteria for
making the award remain vague so that one cannot predict precisely what
behavior will lead to recognition. Second, the recipient for the award is
usually elected by his peers or by a specially formed ad hoc committee
which comes into being shortly before the award is to be made. Such
methods of selection help preclude the possibility that an individual might
try to influence a judge in his own favor.
In short, according to its cultural definition the norm of giving is only
partially institutionalized (Parsons, 1951). Ideally, the person complies
with the norm of giving of his own volition. In the Parsonian tradition this
means that he has internalized the norm to the point where he has a needdisposition to give, and only in this sense is the norm of giving institutionalized in our society.3
Although the norm of giving is not explicitly codified on the level of
cultural values, I propose three criteria for judging whether or not an
actor has complied with it.
1. The person who engages in giving, treats it as an end in itself. He
anticipates no other satisfaction or gain than the pleasure of contributing
to the welfare of others.
3
The norm of giving is not institutionalized, however, insofar as constraints
external to the individuali.e., sanctionsare absent. From the perspective of
cultural values the recalcitrant giver is an anomaly although from the perspective
of social action he might be in evidence. Muir and Weinstein (1962) report that
the hypothesis, "Social creditors are expected to avoid explicit demands for repayment from their debtors" was found to hold for both high and low SES groups.

Altruism and the Norm of Giving

231

2. The person gives voluntarily. He is acting beyond the call of duty


and not fulfilling stipulated role obligations.4
3. On balance, the person "is doing good" as judged by the recipient
and spectators to the action.
An action that meets these three criteria will be called an "altruistic"
act. By specifying them, one avoids the twisted byways and blind alleys
of actions which are only superficially altruistic.
The first criterion eliminates consideration of the Machiavellian who
is caught in the midst of aiding others. This does not deny that a Machiavellian does in fact contribute to the welfare of others; this only affirms that
a Machiavellian bases his decision to aid others on what he can gain by so
doing, beyond simple satisfaction.
The second criterion permits deletion of acts which emerge from the
desire to fulfill one's role obligations. The social worker is not necessarily
more or less altruistic than the sociologist, and there is no need to eulogize
the roles of mothers and saints.
The third criterion spares the need for apologizing for the well-intended
failure, the person who places his finger in the dike which holds only a few
puddles from the last rain. It also saves apologies for those who do good
in one area and thereby reap harm in another. Spencer (1893), for example,
has no use for the person who goes to the slums, nurses the sick, unwittingly
becomes contaminated, and then exposes his family to the same malady by
returning home.
The last criterion presents some difficulties. One can argue that even
though the person in Spencer's example brings discomfort to his family as
a result of nursing the sick, his good work in the slums outweighs the
former. But such arguments are rarely fruitful. Hence, I shall make the
third criterion more explicit by rephrasing it to read: on balance, the person
"doing good" is not harming others or incurring costs out of proportion to
his act. 5
The three criteria for altruism lend themselves to a typology of givers.
The altruist emerges as the pure type who fulfills all three, thus complying
with the norm of giving. The well-intended failure, satisfies the first two
criteria, but receives a minus for the third. Another type of giver is one
who anticipates rewards for his actions, whose giving represents the fulfillment of role obligations, and who thereby receives minuses for the first
4
This criterion becomes problematic in the case of extremely diffuse role
relations J e.g., husband-wife) where one might be unable to distinguish what is
beyond "the call of duty" and what is not. However, insofar as even diffuse
relations tend to become routinized one could identify actions which transcend
role expectations. David H. French brought the problem of diffuseness to
my
attention.
5
Empirically, the third criterion might be the most difficult to assess, For
not all consequences of an act, both functional and dysfunctional, are always immediately apparent.

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two criteria. Examples are incumbents of service professions like doctors


and social workers. 6 Since my concern here is specifically with altruism,
I shall focus only on those acts which meet the three standards.
O P P O R T U N I T I E S FOR A L T R U I S M

Given that altruistic acts are voluntary, 7 situations wherein there is an


opportunity for altruismoccasion to aid othersmust contain a certain
amount of leeway for non-prescribed actions. There are two sources of
such leeway: the role vacuum and the social vacuum.
A role vacuum exists when the norms accompanying a given role do
not cover the entire gamut of possible actions which, within normative
limits, are possible but not obligatory. A social vacuum represents an area
for action which is circumscribed, at most, by exceedingly general norms,
often represented by proverbs and cliches which speak of aid to fellow
men.
The two sources of leeway for altruism can be seen as complementing
each other. The social vacuum represents an interstice that "cries for
action" for which at least no immediate provision has been made. The
role vacuum permits the incumbent to act voluntarily as he sees fit. The
coincidence of the two, marks the structurally ideal context for altruism.
Some examples of social vacuums and role vacuums will be given but
each source of leeway will be discussed independently of the other.
Role Vacuums
There is leeway for altruism in a particular role when the gamut of
possible but not prescribed role actions include some which would benefit
others. For example, the school teacher usually is not required to take an
interest in his students beyond concern for their academic welfare, but
some do take an interest in the personal welfare of their students. Another
is the friend who is always ready to help regardless of circumstances.
The stranger's role, bereft of all ties, permits a person to come and go
freely and so allows for altruism (Simmel, 1950). Two examples from
popular culture are "the whore with a heart" who provides the client
6
Throughout the discussion, I maintain the distinction between institutional
and motivational levels of analysis. Insofar as members of service professions have
internalized specific norms of disinterestedness, and insofar as there are specific
sanctions which insure compliance with these norms within the occupational
community, doctors, social workers, etc., are not automatically altruistic anymore
than businessmen are automatically egoistic (Goode, 1957; Merton, 1957; Parsons, 1954).
7
One might challenge the notion that any act can be voluntary insofar as
action is controlled by mechanisms internal to the individual or external to him.
Without being haunted by the spectre of free will, altruistic acts are voluntary
insofar as they are not "expected." Furthermore, it will become apparent that
the belief that the altruist acts freely partially determines the response to his
action.

Altruism and the Norm of Giving

233

with psychiatric couch services, and the bartender who commiserates with
his customers.
The obverse is represented by those roles which are so tightly prescribed that the incumbents have no leeway for altruism even if they
are so inclined. A professional in a social work agency might be hampered
in this way. Nuns encounter disciplinary problems because of their devotion
to their work of caring for people at the expense of their religious obligations to ritual (Hulme, 1956). In such roles, where the opportunity for
altruism is present but one cannot legitimately seize it, one might anticipate
the emergence of the "Robin Hood" pattern. That is, the role incumbent
might violate rules in order to benefit others. When the incumbent is found
out and the piper must be paid, the well known dilemma arises: whether
or not to sanction a person who violated a rule for a "good" end, in this
case benefiting another. A similar dilemma arises vis-a-vis the well-intended
failure mentioned earlier. On the one hand, if he is given free rein, the
recipient of his minstrations is less well off than before. On the other
hand, if giving is valued, good intentions should not necessarily be discouraged by negative sanctions.
Social Vacuums
Social vacuums represent those situations in which the actions called
for have not been provided for through institutional means or cannot be
mobilized immediately. Automobile accidents are dramatic instances of
the vacuum in which means cannot be mobilized instantly, thus providing
the initial comers with an opportunity for altruism. A person who effectively
participates in whatever rescue work the situation requires is under no
obligation to do so. He could as easily go about his business for there is
no legal stipulation requiring him to give aid. Once he begins to give aid,
however, he is required by the law of most states to continue doing all he
can for the accident victim until other aid arrives. Given this legal obligation, in essence the altruistic decision to help an accident victim is tantamount to making a shortrun commitment. This is analogous to the longrun
commitment made by someone who decides primarily for altruistic reasons
to enter a service profession.
Disasters also provide opportunities for altruism but present a more
complex situation. Those who meet our criteria sometimes claim that they
were only fulfilling their duties which were redefined as a consequence
of the catastrophe. The heroes who arise during the first phase following
the disastrous event itself, in many instances only comply with their felt
role obligations (Killian, 1952). They do not define their acts of "heroism"
as being beyond the call of duty. In such instances, the true altruists might
be the ones who, under normal conditions, have few or no role obligations
to fulfill, and hence, cannot redefine their obligations to cope with the
disaster context. Drifters and strangers are, in a penultimate analysis,

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those who can act completely voluntarily in a disaster situation. And in


some final analysis, they too might make claims of felt obligations to help
their fellow men.
From a psychological standpoint the redefinition of roles in instances
where the actor is presented with opportunity to act altruistically suggests
that some persons might experience guilt feelings if they do not rise to the
occasion. Granted that this might be the case, I prefer to classify particular psychological states which result from acts of giving, as the personal satisfaction permitted the altruist. Whether or not altruism "really"
exists is irrelevant here, for I am concerned with the social context in
which altruistic acts occur and not with the psychological reality of
altruism.
The redefinition of roles and the shift of felt obligations with regard
to disasters occur for the most part during the first phase following a
disaster. The phenomenon of role redefinition helps alleviate the immediate
distress engendered by the unwelcome event insofar as those persons
requiring immediate assistance need not depend on volunteers in the pure
sensei.e., persons who feel no obligation to help. The second and third
phases following a disaster, at which time assistance agencies have moved
into the initial vacuum, provide the altruist with additional opportunities.
It is unlikely that any agency is so well organized that it can take care of
all the problems which grow out of an emergency (Durkheim, 1958).
Thus, an interstice is created for the altruist to enter.
One need not go in search of accidents and disasters to find interstices.
("Interstice" refers to an area calling for action from some standpoint, for
which institutionalized provision has not emerged. The area is interstitial
as it represents a gap in institutional arrangements.) Within the realm of
everyday life there are opportunities to help others who do not receive
assistance or receive inadequate assistance through established channels.
Sorokin's (1950) sample of "good neighbors" are active in such vacuums,
visiting the shut-ins, giving shelter to those in need of it, etc. Persons
in want of psychological support as well as those who need more tangible
benefits, occupy the interstices of everyday life.
Another type of vacuum encompasses those actions which are fraught
with extreme danger for the actor. Certain acts of war as well as rescue
operations like those one encounters in mining accidents and on mountainsides are of this nature. Usually volunteers are recruited from established
groups to engage in the act in question. In this instance, the opportunity
for altruism emerges not because the situation is in a sense trivial, such
that it is overlooked by institutional arrangements, but because it is of
such a magnitude that it lies beyond the scope of institutional spheres
(Gouldner, 1954).
The reward structure for altruism emphasizes the last point. A single
act of altruism under dire circumstances is feted by the relevant group or

Altruism and the Norm of Giving

235

public. But many acts of altruism directed to the daily trivia must be
engaged in before the altruist will be recognized publicly (de Tocqueville,
1954).
Beyond the social vacuums, there are institutionalized channels for
which altruistic persons might volunteer their services. These would include
all philanthropic and charitable organizations to which one might contribute time or money. Also included would be voluntary organizations
whose aims are to further particular causes which are ultimately intended
to benefit others. An example of the latter would be the National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor or the League of Women Voters. To the
degree that voluntary service organizations require definite commitments
from their members to engage in action, to that degree the members incur
obligations which place them beyond the pale of the present discussion.
Again, however, the initial decision to assume such obligations could be
defined as an altruistic act, as is the case with those who stop to help
accident victims and those who choose to enter service professions primarily to help others. Those members of voluntary organizations, who for
all practical purposes have no longrun commitments and act, so to speak,
on a day-to-day basis, do fall, however, within the present framework.
For such members can, almost at will, take on or cast off their altruistic
roles which is tantamount to acting in a role vacuum.
In short, the norm of giving becomes manifest in those areas of the
human scene wherein other norms are vague or virtually nonexistent,
wherein specific role obligations have not emerged, wherein institutionalized
patterns for action cannot be mobilized with ease, and yet someone is in
need of help.
S O M E CONSEQUENCES O F T H E N O R M O F GIVING

Once someone has received aid he might seek to repay the altruist
for his kindness, particularly if the recipient is convinced that the giver's
action was completely disinterested. When helping others one frequently
encounters queries such as, "Why are you doing this for me?" or "What
do you hope to get out of it?" These indicate a degree of distrust on the
recipient's part. But once he accepts the fact that the giver is indeed
altruistic, that he is not being used for the peculiar ends of the giver, and
that the giver has acted freely, the recipient feels free to exercise gratitude
in his own way, to reciprocate as it pleases him, for no reciprocity is
anticipated. Direct reciprocity to the altruist might lead to an interchange
of giving in which case the norm of giving and the norm of reciprocity
overlap. Thus, the norm of giving might serve as a starting mechanism
for what becomes a stable relationship through adherence to the norm of
reciprocity.
Gouldner (1960) discusses how the norm of reciprocity serves as a
starting mechanism for social relations when it is internalized by both

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parties. The norm of reciprocity might be effective as a starting mechanism


in bargaining situations and other economic and political spheres. But it is
probably less effective than the norm of giving, in certain types of interpersonal relationships and certain types of role relations, for in these areas
utilitarianism tends to be seen with aversion in Western culture. In the
interpersonal case, the altruist would be offended by obvious repayment
and the recipient would rebel against the demand to repay. Moreover, the
giver, being the first to give, can never really be repaid for having taken
the initiative (Simmel, 1950). Within specific role relations, particularly
professional-client relations or super-subordinate relations, gestures which
smack of apple-polishing or bribery are frowned upon. For example, the
nurse resents the patient who is "overly nice" and the patient resists
"coaxing." The norm of giving then tends to ease the instrumental undertones of the norm of reciprocity; the interplay of the two norms facilitate
stable relations.
A second consequence of the norm of giving is that it creates a degree of stability in areas where expectations otherwise might be minimal
or nonexistent. One way this occurs is through the emergence of a chain
reaction process. The recipient of an altruistic act might in turn engage in
such acts toward others since he was helped in a time of need. This form
of repayment might lead to a network of altruistic acts which cut across the
regular lines of reciprocity. These acts tend to occur in the interstices
mentioned earlier and thereby contribute to a degree of stability. Second,
this degree of stability might be enhanced through observing altruistic
acts. 8 A witness to altruism might derive some sense of security from the
knowledge that in time of need he too might be helped by others. 9 The
emergence of such a general expectation which indicates a sense of trust
in others might tend to diminish the specific insecurity engendered by being
caught in an interstitial situation and the general insecurity wrought by
the Hobbcsian view of the human condition.
A third consequence of the norm of giving might be that it draws attention to the interstices which are in need of institutionalized patterns of
action in order to insure that aid will be available when required. The
effects of a spotlight on such areas opens a two-way street. On the one
hand, relevant observers might become cognizant of what remains to be
done in the area, thereby leading to the institutionalization of giving. On
the other hand, relevant observers might think that as long as altruists
are about, there is no need to have concern for those who are in want of
some sort. The latter response would tend to contribute to instability. For
altruism is voluntary, so one cannot always depend upon its regular occurrence.
8
Sills (1957) reports that prior experience with polio was a decisive factor
for joining the Polio Foundation for 18 per cent of 234 volunteers.
9
Leiba Brown suggested this point to me.

Altruism and the Norm of Giving

237

Although altruism might lend some stability and security to the interstices of action, it does not lead to complete stability. Even if one can
depend upon its regular occurrence, altruism might in the long run provide an inappropriate solution for those dependent on it. For example,
the giving of food and clothing to the unemployed is in the concrete instance beneficial. Or listening to a person's troubles might provide temporary
solace. But giving does not lead to a direct solution of such problems.
Mills' (1959) distinction between the "personal troubles of the milieu"
and the "public issues of the social structure" clarifies the foregoing. Altruism may ease the particular problems of a particular individual, but
unless it is channeled and routinizedits nature changed so that it can
operate on a large scaleit cannot ease the personal troubles that have
multiplied into public issues. Insofar as voluntary service organizations try
to bridge this gap, their altruism contributes to stability of the social order
on a more macroscopic scale than does individual altruism. Volunteers
to these organizations represent an intermediate type, between the altruist who acts freely and the person who has made a professional commitment to serve. Hence, the volunteer who joins a service organization in the
hope of realizing other ends besides those of benefit to others need not be
eschewed; he commits himself to a course of action which the altruist does
not do.
Once individual acts of altruism become routinized, the focus shifts
from the altruistic individual to the altruistic organizationfrom the norm
of giving as it operates on the individual level to the norm of giving as it
operates on the institutional level. This is not the place to discuss altruistic
organizations. Suffice to say that only recently have the dynamics of voluntary groups, some of which would certainly qualify as altruistic organizations,
received systematic attention. 10
One approach to a study of the dynamics of voluntary organizations
would be to consider variables which constitute altruism on the organizational level and examine how they vary from one organization to another.
Voluntary associations can be differentiated, for example: by the degree to
which they initiate additional beneficial activities or only maintain already
existing ones; by the degree to which they engage in actions that require
the overcoming of major obstacles or engage in those which can be accomplished with relative ease; and by the degree to which they seek out
virgin areas (e.g., the construction of a hospital which can adequately
serve an expanding population) or engage in standard activities (e.g., reading to patients in hospitals) (Merton, 1961). Furthermore, service groups
might change through time with regard to these variables. For example,
obstacles are surmounted or eliminated, time and energy might allow only
10
As an outgrowth of Sills' (1957) study of the Polio Foundation, the
Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University has undertaken
several other projects in the area of voluntary organizations.

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for maintenance of ongoing activities so that new ones no longer can be


initiated, and activities which at one time represented innovations might
become standardized and taken for granted. These variables have been
presented here only to suggest one possible avenue of approach to a study
of altruistic organizations.
Reviewing the consequences of the norm of giving, in general, it could
complement the norm of reciprocity in the development of social relations,
thus having a structural effect. Second, adherence to the norm could yield
social-psychological effects by lending an aura of predictability and security to interstitial areas. Third, enactment of the norm of giving could
spotlight problem areas which might lead to change.
A N HISTORICAL E P I L O G U E

Most persons with sociological insight who have considered altruism


in the past, have viewed it either as a panacea or as a cloak-masking evil.11
The former treated altruism as a faith which offers salvation. Couched in
many forms, but in essence always the same, the argument was put forth
that if society is to survive, and survive effectively, more altruistic actions
would have to occur than heretofore. Kropotkin (1955), Ashley Montagu
(1955), Sorokin (1948) and the nineteenth century American sociologists
of Applied Christianity exemplify this approach.
Those who considered altruism as a cloak-masking evil had a "realistic"
if not cynical view of human nature. They unmasked altruism by revealing
the Machiavellian motives underlying altruistic acts. Their cost accounting
demonstrated that in the end the giver benefited at the expense of the
recipient. The recipient would learn to depend on charity or would not
correct his pernicious ways as a result of receiving charity (Brinton, 1933;
Pray, 1933; Stuart, 1933). Or the donor would suffer because the recipient
took advantage of his generosity. Mandeville (1924), a contemporary of
Swift, presented such arguments to the public; he concluded that legislative measures should replace private charitable efforts. Pareto (1935) wrote
of women who neglected their housework for charities. Stuart Queen
(1930) revealed how altruism served as a bootstrap for the nouveau riche
who wanted to make their status and power commensurate with their
wealth.
A potpourri of ethical biases inheres in the U t o p i a n approach to altruism. And a bias in the direction of dysfunctions permeates the writings
of the unmaskers of altruism. The present approach to the concept is intended to avoid a bias in either direction, in an effort not only to make an
objective analysis of the act but also to cast some light on non-reciprocated
actions and perspective on reciprocated ones.
11
For a resume of those who treated altruism as a panacea, see Budd
(1956).

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