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Development,
Vol.
9,
No.
(July,
1963),
pp.
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RUTH LEEDS *
Reed College
Processes of exchange are governed by the moral norm of reciprocity
which specifies that a return must be given for benefits received. As Gouldner (1960) has pointed out, however, the norm of reciprocity is not completely ubiquitous for there are persons who are unable to reciprocate,
in particular, the very young, the very old and the very sick. At the most,
such persons are capable of acknowledging actions toward themselves
with appreciative gestures but are unable to initiate return favors. The fact
that such individuals do receive care and attention suggests that another
normative orientation is operative in lieu of the norm of reciprocity. This
orientation I shall call "the moral norm of giving." The present purpose is to
specify the norm of giving, to examine situations in which the norm of
giving is primarily operative, rather than the norm of reciprocity, and to
consider the manner in which the norm of giving complements the norm
of reciprocity, thereby contributing to accounts of stability and instability
within the social system.
T H E N O H M O F GIVING
2
The norm of giving implies that one should want to give, not because
of any anticipated returns but for its own value. This is emphasized, for
example, in the family when parents teach their child to share his toys
with others. Religious pronouncements remind us that it is more blessed
to give than to receive. The appeals of voluntary organizations emphasize
* Department of Sociology, Reed College, Portland, Oregon.
Revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, August, 1961. I am indebted to Hans L. Zetterberg for alerting me
to the topic and to Robert K. Merton for helpful suggestions. This paper was
written during the tenure of a fellowship (MPM-13, 085-C1) from the National
Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service.
2
Giving, and its complement, receiving, is a more complex action than the
following approach would lead one to think. Noblesse oblige which has more
relevance for times past than for times present is a form of giving that often
reaps its own reciprocity. Parsons' (1959) concept of double interchange between
system boundaries suggests that many actions which at first glance appear to be
unreciprocated are in fact reciprocated indirectly. For the present I have chosen
a relatively simple approach to the act of giving and therefore will disregard such
complexities.
1
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how one can help the less fortunate by giving. And the charters of these
voluntary organizations usually include a statement to the effect that one
should do "good deeds."
Enforcement of the norm of giving, realistically, cannot be routinized.
Giving, like charisma, changes its nature once it is circumscribed by the
formal rules and sanction procedures which accompany the rationalization
of action processes. If giving were routinized one might give to avoid negative sanctions or to receive rewards rather than for the sake of giving, in
which case one is no longer acting within the limits of the moral norm.
(This statement does not imply a priori a suspicion of the motives of those
who give within the framework of positive and negative sanctions.)
Whether or not the enforcement of the norm of giving is actually routinized
is an empirical problem. Certainly there are informal sanctions applied to
persons who are unwilling to give in "expected" situations. Rewards for
compliance with the norm have become routinized in some voluntary
organizations. Typically, they take the form of awards which symbolize
the services rendered by the awardees; the rewards do not necessarily
have any intrinsic material value. When a voluntary organization establishes an award it usually also introduces mechanisms which are intended
to prevent members from "working" for the award. Thus, criteria for
making the award remain vague so that one cannot predict precisely what
behavior will lead to recognition. Second, the recipient for the award is
usually elected by his peers or by a specially formed ad hoc committee
which comes into being shortly before the award is to be made. Such
methods of selection help preclude the possibility that an individual might
try to influence a judge in his own favor.
In short, according to its cultural definition the norm of giving is only
partially institutionalized (Parsons, 1951). Ideally, the person complies
with the norm of giving of his own volition. In the Parsonian tradition this
means that he has internalized the norm to the point where he has a needdisposition to give, and only in this sense is the norm of giving institutionalized in our society.3
Although the norm of giving is not explicitly codified on the level of
cultural values, I propose three criteria for judging whether or not an
actor has complied with it.
1. The person who engages in giving, treats it as an end in itself. He
anticipates no other satisfaction or gain than the pleasure of contributing
to the welfare of others.
3
The norm of giving is not institutionalized, however, insofar as constraints
external to the individuali.e., sanctionsare absent. From the perspective of
cultural values the recalcitrant giver is an anomaly although from the perspective
of social action he might be in evidence. Muir and Weinstein (1962) report that
the hypothesis, "Social creditors are expected to avoid explicit demands for repayment from their debtors" was found to hold for both high and low SES groups.
231
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with psychiatric couch services, and the bartender who commiserates with
his customers.
The obverse is represented by those roles which are so tightly prescribed that the incumbents have no leeway for altruism even if they
are so inclined. A professional in a social work agency might be hampered
in this way. Nuns encounter disciplinary problems because of their devotion
to their work of caring for people at the expense of their religious obligations to ritual (Hulme, 1956). In such roles, where the opportunity for
altruism is present but one cannot legitimately seize it, one might anticipate
the emergence of the "Robin Hood" pattern. That is, the role incumbent
might violate rules in order to benefit others. When the incumbent is found
out and the piper must be paid, the well known dilemma arises: whether
or not to sanction a person who violated a rule for a "good" end, in this
case benefiting another. A similar dilemma arises vis-a-vis the well-intended
failure mentioned earlier. On the one hand, if he is given free rein, the
recipient of his minstrations is less well off than before. On the other
hand, if giving is valued, good intentions should not necessarily be discouraged by negative sanctions.
Social Vacuums
Social vacuums represent those situations in which the actions called
for have not been provided for through institutional means or cannot be
mobilized immediately. Automobile accidents are dramatic instances of
the vacuum in which means cannot be mobilized instantly, thus providing
the initial comers with an opportunity for altruism. A person who effectively
participates in whatever rescue work the situation requires is under no
obligation to do so. He could as easily go about his business for there is
no legal stipulation requiring him to give aid. Once he begins to give aid,
however, he is required by the law of most states to continue doing all he
can for the accident victim until other aid arrives. Given this legal obligation, in essence the altruistic decision to help an accident victim is tantamount to making a shortrun commitment. This is analogous to the longrun
commitment made by someone who decides primarily for altruistic reasons
to enter a service profession.
Disasters also provide opportunities for altruism but present a more
complex situation. Those who meet our criteria sometimes claim that they
were only fulfilling their duties which were redefined as a consequence
of the catastrophe. The heroes who arise during the first phase following
the disastrous event itself, in many instances only comply with their felt
role obligations (Killian, 1952). They do not define their acts of "heroism"
as being beyond the call of duty. In such instances, the true altruists might
be the ones who, under normal conditions, have few or no role obligations
to fulfill, and hence, cannot redefine their obligations to cope with the
disaster context. Drifters and strangers are, in a penultimate analysis,
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235
public. But many acts of altruism directed to the daily trivia must be
engaged in before the altruist will be recognized publicly (de Tocqueville,
1954).
Beyond the social vacuums, there are institutionalized channels for
which altruistic persons might volunteer their services. These would include
all philanthropic and charitable organizations to which one might contribute time or money. Also included would be voluntary organizations
whose aims are to further particular causes which are ultimately intended
to benefit others. An example of the latter would be the National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor or the League of Women Voters. To the
degree that voluntary service organizations require definite commitments
from their members to engage in action, to that degree the members incur
obligations which place them beyond the pale of the present discussion.
Again, however, the initial decision to assume such obligations could be
defined as an altruistic act, as is the case with those who stop to help
accident victims and those who choose to enter service professions primarily to help others. Those members of voluntary organizations, who for
all practical purposes have no longrun commitments and act, so to speak,
on a day-to-day basis, do fall, however, within the present framework.
For such members can, almost at will, take on or cast off their altruistic
roles which is tantamount to acting in a role vacuum.
In short, the norm of giving becomes manifest in those areas of the
human scene wherein other norms are vague or virtually nonexistent,
wherein specific role obligations have not emerged, wherein institutionalized
patterns for action cannot be mobilized with ease, and yet someone is in
need of help.
S O M E CONSEQUENCES O F T H E N O R M O F GIVING
Once someone has received aid he might seek to repay the altruist
for his kindness, particularly if the recipient is convinced that the giver's
action was completely disinterested. When helping others one frequently
encounters queries such as, "Why are you doing this for me?" or "What
do you hope to get out of it?" These indicate a degree of distrust on the
recipient's part. But once he accepts the fact that the giver is indeed
altruistic, that he is not being used for the peculiar ends of the giver, and
that the giver has acted freely, the recipient feels free to exercise gratitude
in his own way, to reciprocate as it pleases him, for no reciprocity is
anticipated. Direct reciprocity to the altruist might lead to an interchange
of giving in which case the norm of giving and the norm of reciprocity
overlap. Thus, the norm of giving might serve as a starting mechanism
for what becomes a stable relationship through adherence to the norm of
reciprocity.
Gouldner (1960) discusses how the norm of reciprocity serves as a
starting mechanism for social relations when it is internalized by both
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Although altruism might lend some stability and security to the interstices of action, it does not lead to complete stability. Even if one can
depend upon its regular occurrence, altruism might in the long run provide an inappropriate solution for those dependent on it. For example,
the giving of food and clothing to the unemployed is in the concrete instance beneficial. Or listening to a person's troubles might provide temporary
solace. But giving does not lead to a direct solution of such problems.
Mills' (1959) distinction between the "personal troubles of the milieu"
and the "public issues of the social structure" clarifies the foregoing. Altruism may ease the particular problems of a particular individual, but
unless it is channeled and routinizedits nature changed so that it can
operate on a large scaleit cannot ease the personal troubles that have
multiplied into public issues. Insofar as voluntary service organizations try
to bridge this gap, their altruism contributes to stability of the social order
on a more macroscopic scale than does individual altruism. Volunteers
to these organizations represent an intermediate type, between the altruist who acts freely and the person who has made a professional commitment to serve. Hence, the volunteer who joins a service organization in the
hope of realizing other ends besides those of benefit to others need not be
eschewed; he commits himself to a course of action which the altruist does
not do.
Once individual acts of altruism become routinized, the focus shifts
from the altruistic individual to the altruistic organizationfrom the norm
of giving as it operates on the individual level to the norm of giving as it
operates on the institutional level. This is not the place to discuss altruistic
organizations. Suffice to say that only recently have the dynamics of voluntary groups, some of which would certainly qualify as altruistic organizations,
received systematic attention. 10
One approach to a study of the dynamics of voluntary organizations
would be to consider variables which constitute altruism on the organizational level and examine how they vary from one organization to another.
Voluntary associations can be differentiated, for example: by the degree to
which they initiate additional beneficial activities or only maintain already
existing ones; by the degree to which they engage in actions that require
the overcoming of major obstacles or engage in those which can be accomplished with relative ease; and by the degree to which they seek out
virgin areas (e.g., the construction of a hospital which can adequately
serve an expanding population) or engage in standard activities (e.g., reading to patients in hospitals) (Merton, 1961). Furthermore, service groups
might change through time with regard to these variables. For example,
obstacles are surmounted or eliminated, time and energy might allow only
10
As an outgrowth of Sills' (1957) study of the Polio Foundation, the
Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University has undertaken
several other projects in the area of voluntary organizations.
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PRAY, K . L. M .
Charity. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1 9 3 3 , 2 , 3 4 0 - 3 4 5 .
Q U E E N , S . A.
The background of social work. In E. Faris, et al. (Eds.), Intelligent Philanthropy Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930, 258.
SILLS, DAVID.
The volunteers. Glencoe: Free Press, 1 9 5 7 .
S I M M E L , GEORG.
The sociology of Georg Simmel. Glencoe: Free Press, 1 9 5 0 .
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